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JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Pursuant to a partially negotiated guilty plea, defendant,Milton Muntaner, was convicted of murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch.38, par. 9--1(a)(1)) and attempted murder (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985,ch. 38, pars. 8--4(a), 9--1(a)(1)) and sentenced to concurrentextended terms of 50 years' imprisonment. He appealed, arguingthat (1) the trial court misconstrued his postsentencing motion,(2) the trial court violated his constitutional rights when itdenied him a hearing on the motion, and (3) his sentences wereexcessive. This court affirmed defendant's convictions andsentences. People v. Muntaner, No. 2--86--1006 (1987) (unpublishedorder under Supreme Court Rule 23). Almost 13 years later,defendant petitioned the trial court for postconviction relief,arguing that his extended-term sentences violated Apprendi v. NewJersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The trial court dismissed the petition, finding that Apprendi couldnot be applied retroactively on collateral review. In reachingthis conclusion, the trial court mentioned that defendant'spetition was not filed timely. Defendant now appeals the dismissalof his petition, arguing that his extended-term sentences violatedApprendi. Defendant also argues for the first time on appeal thathis extended-term sentence for attempted murder cannot standbecause an extended-term sentence may be imposed only for his mostserious offense, which is murder. For the reasons that follow, weaffirm as modified.

The first issue defendant raises on appeal is whether his 50-year extended-term sentences must be vacated because they violatedApprendi. The State argues that this court is precluded fromaddressing this issue because it was raised in an untimely petitionand because it is waived.

Our supreme court has held that Apprendi does not applyretroactively to cases on collateral review. People v. De La Paz,No. 93208, slip op. at 14 (May 8, 2003). We are bound by thisdecision. Consequently, a determination of whether defendant'spetition was untimely or whether this issue is waived is moot. SeePeople v. McGee, 328 Ill. App. 3d 930, 936 (2002) (timeliness ofpetition was moot because Apprendi did not apply retroactively tocase on collateral review).

The second issue defendant raises on appeal is whether hissentence for attempted murder must be reduced because an extended-term sentence may be imposed only for his most serious offense,which is murder. The State argues that this issue is waivedbecause defendant never raised it in a postsentencing motion, ondirect appeal, or in his postconviction petition.

In resolving this issue, we find People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d107 (1995), instructive. In Arna, the defendant was sentenced toconcurrent terms of 30 and 45 years' imprisonment. Arna, 168 Ill.2d at 111. On appeal to the appellate court, the court sua spontedetermined that the trial court erred when it imposed concurrentsentences because consecutive sentences were mandatory undersection 5--8--4(a) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS5/5--8--4(a) (West 1992)). Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 111. Our supremecourt agreed, noting that the concurrent sentences were void and,thus, the appellate court could correct the sentences at any time. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 112-13.

An extended-term sentence may be imposed only for the mostserious offense of which the defendant is convicted. 730 ILCS 5/5--8--2(a) (West 2000); People v. Pittman, 316 Ill. App. 3d 245, 253(2000). When a sentence greater than that authorized by statute isimposed, the excess portion of that sentence is void and may beattacked at any time. People v. Linwood, 243 Ill. App. 3d 744, 745(1993). Thus, in contrast to the State's position, the issue isnot waived.

At the relevant time, murder, a separate class of felony,carried an extended-term sentence between 40 and 80 years, andattempted murder, a Class X felony, carried an extended-termsentence between 30 to 60 years. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38,pars. 8--4(c)(1), 1005--5--1(b)(1), 1005--8--2(a)(1), (a)(2). Thenonextended term for attempted murder was between 6 and 30 years. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 1005--8--1(a)(3).

Here, defendant's extended-term sentence for attempted murderwas improper because it was not the most serious offense of whichhe was convicted. Thus, consistent with Pittman and Linwood, wemust reduce the excess portion of defendant's extended-termsentence for attempted murder to the maximum allowable term of 30years' imprisonment, which is to run concurrently with defendant'sextended term of 50 years' imprisonment for murder. Pittman, 316Ill. App. 3d at 253; Linwood, 243 Ill. App. 3d at 745.

In reaching our conclusion that defendant's sentence forattempted murder must be reduced, we note that the Fourth Districthas addressed this issue in a case that is factually similar. SeePeople v. Thompson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1027 (2003). In Thompson, thedefendant was convicted of aggravated battery and violating anorder of protection, and he was sentenced to concurrent extendedterms of nine and six years' imprisonment. Thompson, 335 Ill. App.3d at 1028. The defendant argued that his six-year extended-termsentence for violation of an order of protection was improper andvoid because, when multiple sentences are imposed, the trial courtmay impose an extended-term sentence only for the most seriousoffense. The appellate court denied this claim on three bases.

First, the court noted that a reduction for the less seriousoffense, i.e., violation of the order of protection, would notaffect defendant's ultimate punishment because the sentence foraggravated battery was proper. Thompson, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 1029. Thus, because the two sentences were to run concurrently, defendantwould still be incarcerated for potentially nine years regardlessof whether the court reduced his six-year sentence. Second, theappellate court determined that extended-term sentences werestatutorily created. Thompson, 335 Ill. App. 3d at 1029. TheFourth District consistently has held that statutorily createdmatters are not of constitutional magnitude, and, therefore, theyare not subject to scrutiny under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act(Act) (725 ILCS 5/122--1 et seq. (West 2000)). Thompson, 335 Ill.App. 3d at 1029. Third, the appellate court concluded that theissue was waived because it was not raised in a postsentencingmotion, the direct appeal, or a postconviction petition. Thompson,335 Ill. App. 3d at 1030.

We disagree with the Fourth District. The statutespecifically provides, without limitation, that an extended-termsentence may be imposed only for the most serious offense of whichthe defendant is convicted. See 730 ILCS 5/5--8--2(a) (West 2000). Also, although imposition of an improper extended-term sentence maynot be recognizable under the Act, that does not mean that thiscourt may not review such a sentence. As noted previously, theexcess portion of defendant's sentence is void and may be attackedat any time. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d at 112-13; Linwood, 243 Ill. App.3d at 745. The Fourth District never mentioned Arna in itsanalysis. Lastly, we conclude that waiver does not apply herebecause a void order is not subject to waiver. Linwood, 243 Ill.App. 3d at 745.

For these reasons, we affirm as modified the judgment of thecircuit court of Lake County.

Affirmed as modified.

McLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.