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PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Marcella R. Miles, was convicted of the offense ofpossession of a counterfeit credit card (720 ILCS 250/16 (West 2002)) and sentenced to five years'imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends that (1) her due process rights were violated becausethe statute under which she was convicted contains an unconstitutional mandatory presumption ofintent, and (2) the statutory penalty under which she was sentenced is impermissibly disproportionateto the seriousness of the offense. We reverse and remand.

At trial the State presented evidence establishing that on March 29, 2002, Naperville policeofficer Brian Cunningham was contacted by Detective John McAnally regarding a credit card fraudinvestigation at a retail establishment near Route 59 in Naperville. McAnally asked Cunningham tomaintain surveillance of a Dodge Ram van and its occupants, one of whom was defendant. Duringhis surveillance, Cunningham observed one of the other occupants, the driver, get out of the van andwalk to the edge of a parking lot. The driver went to a landscaped area, moved a rock and somemulch, and retrieved a white item.

Another officer effectuated a traffic stop of the van. As Cunningham approached the van, heobserved defendant move toward the rear of the vehicle and observed her "stuff" a white plastic bagwith blue lettering into a hole in the door panel. Cunningham ordered the occupants out of thevehicle and retrieved the bag that he had observed defendant put in the door panel. Inside the bag,Cunningham found six credit cards. The parties stipulated that the six credit cards retrieved from thebag in the door panel were counterfeit.

Following arguments of the parties, the trial court found defendant guilty. With respect todefendant's intent to defraud, the trial court stated:

"Why does a person have counterfeit credit cards? And that's why the statuteprovides it is prima facie evidence that the person intended to defraud if they possessed twoor more cards which have been counterfeited. And the Defendant possessed six credit cardswhich were clearly counterfeited. She knowingly possessed those cards ***."

After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to five years' imprisonment. Defendanttimely appeals.

Defendant first contends that her conviction must be reversed because the statute under whichshe was convicted contains an unconstitutional mandatory presumption. Section 16 of the IllinoisCredit Card and Debit Card Act (the Act) (720 ILCS 250/16 (West 2002)) provides:

"A person who, with intent to defraud either a purported issuer, or a person providingmoney, goods, property, services or anything else of value, or any other person, counterfeitsa purported credit card or debit card or possesses a purported credit card or debit card withknowledge that the card has been counterfeited, is guilty of a Class 3 felony. The possessionby a person other than the purported issuer of 2 or more credit cards or debit cards whichhave been counterfeited is prima facie evidence that the person intended to defraud or thathe knew the credit cards or debit cards to have been so counterfeited." 720 ILCS 250/16(West 2002).

The constitutionality of a statute is subject to de novo review (People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413, 418 (2000)) and may be raised for the first time on appeal (People v. Wooters, 188 Ill. 2d500, 510 (1999)). Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the challenging partybears the burden of rebutting that presumption. People v. Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000). Thiscourt has a duty to interpret a statute in a manner that upholds its validity and constitutionality if itcan be reasonably done. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d 441, 448 (1998).

A presumption is a legal device that either permits or requires the fact finder to assume theexistence of an ultimate fact, after certain predicate or basic facts have been established. People v.Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d 198, 203 (2003), citing People v. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d 133, 141 (1998). Althoughdue process requires that the State prove a criminal defendant guilty of every element of an offensebeyond a reasonable doubt (In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90 S. Ct. 1068,1073 (1970)), the State may, in some instances, rely upon presumptions and inferences (Pomykala,203 Ill. 2d at 203). However, these presumptions cannot relieve the State of its burden to prove eachelement of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L. Ed.2d 39, 99 S. Ct. 2450 (1979).

Presumptions are classified as either permissive or mandatory. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203. A permissive presumption allows, but does not require, the fact finder to infer the existence of anultimate or presumed fact upon proof of the predicate fact, without placing any burden on thedefendant. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 142, citing County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, 60 L. Ed. 2d777, 792, 99 S. Ct. 2213, 2224 (1979). A mandatory presumption, on the other hand, requires thefact finder to accept the proffered presumption. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203. A mandatorypresumption may be conclusive, i.e., irrebuttable, or it may be rebuttable. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at203. Both types, however, are per se unconstitutional. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 203-04.

In the present case, defendant argues that the second sentence of section 16 creates amandatory presumption of intent to defraud based solely on the possession of two or more counterfeitcredit cards. The State counters that the second sentence is a permissive presumption because thereis no restraint on the fact finder's ability to accept or reject the presumption and because the factsgiving rise to the presumption are only evidence of the intent to defraud to be considered with theother evidence presented on the issue of intent. The Pomykala court rejected this type of argument,and we shall also. See Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 207-08.

In Pomykala, the defendant was convicted of reckless homicide after his car hit an oncomingvehicle while he was under the influence of alcohol. The trial court gave a nonpattern instruction tothe jury based on section 9--3(b) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9--3(b) (West 2000))indicating that, if it found that the defendant was under the influence of alcohol at the time of theincident, this created a presumption of recklessness unless disproved by contrary evidence. Thestatute provided:

"In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or anyother drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be presumed to be evidence ofa reckless act unless disproved by evidence to the contrary." 720 ILCS 5/9--3(b) (West2000).

Our supreme court also recognized the prior version of the statute:

"In cases involving reckless homicide, being under the influence of alcohol or anyother drug or drugs at the time of the alleged violation shall be prima facie evidence of areckless act." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 38, par. 9--3(b).

It noted that, in amending the statute, the legislature excised "prima facie" from the prior version ofthe statute and incorporated the definition of "prima facie" in its stead. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 204. The Pomykala court found a prohibited mandatory presumption because the language, that is, thedefinition of "prima facie," compelled "a finding of recklessness without any factual connectionbetween the intoxication and the reckless act, unless this presumed connection is disproved." Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 208.

In light of this authority, we turn to the statute at issue in this case. The primary rule ofstatutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 207,citing People v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). In doing so, we look to the language used in thestatute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 207. Onour review of the statutory language at issue here, and in considering our supreme court precedent,we believe the second sentence of section 16 of the Act contains language of a mandatory rebuttablepresumption. The phrase "prima facie" is defined as "a fact presumed to be true unless disproved bysome evidence to the contrary." Black's Law Dictionary 1189 (6th ed. 1990). Pursuant to Pomykala,the statute must be read from the perspective of a reasonable juror and not with the legal expertiseof judges and lawyers. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 208. We note that the language from the definitionof "prima facie," "unless disproved by some evidence to the contrary," was interpreted by thePomykala court as requiring the defendant to rebut the presumption. See Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at208. Consistent with the Pomykala analysis, if a statute incorporating the definition of "prima facie"to establish an element of a criminal offense creates a prohibited mandatory presumption, then astatute that uses the object of the definition, that is, "prima facie," to establish an element is similarlyprohibitive. See Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 204-09.

In the present case, the State was required to prove that defendant, with the intent to defraud,counterfeited a purported credit card or possessed a purported credit card knowing that the card hadbeen counterfeited. Section 2.07 of the Act provides that "intent to defraud" means "an intention towrongfully cause another to assume, create, transfer, alter or terminate any right, obligation or powerwith reference to any person or property." 720 ILCS 250/2.07 (West 2002). Our review of therecord, including the State's closing argument and the trial court's remarks, reveals that defendant'sintent to defraud was established only by the State's evidence showing that defendant possessed sixcounterfeit credit cards. As a result, the State was effectively relieved of its burden of provingdefendant's intent to defraud beyond a reasonable doubt. When the State rested, therefore, theburden clearly shifted to defendant to prove, for example, that she was merely holding the bag andhad no knowledge of its contents or intent to defraud any person or credit card issuer. See Pomykala,203 Ill. 2d at 208. The placement of such an evidentiary burden on a defendant is alwaysunconstitutional. Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 147. Accordingly, we hold that the second sentence of section16 of the Act creates an unconstitutional mandatory presumption of intent to defraud.

We must next consider whether the second sentence of section 16 of the Act may be severedfrom the remainder of the statute. Section 16 does not contain a specific severability provision. However, under the general severability statute (see 5 ILCS 70/1.31 (West 2002)), severability maybe appropriate if the remainder of the statute is complete in itself and is capable of being executedwholly independently of the severed portion. Pomykala, 203 Ill. 2d at 209. The first sentence ofsection 16 of the Act sets out all of the elements of the offense of possession of a counterfeit creditcard and its penalty. The excision of the second sentence does not impair the meaning or operationof the remainder of the statute, because the second sentence operates only to ease the State's burdenof proof. See Watts, 181 Ill. 2d at 150-51. We therefore conclude that the second sentence ofsection 16 of the Act may be severed from the remainder of the statute.

Although our disposition of this issue makes it unnecessary for us to consider defendant'sother contention regarding the proportionality of her sentence, we do briefly assess whether, afterreviewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to provedefendant guilty of the offense of possession of a counterfeit credit card. See People v. Taylor, 76Ill. 2d 289, 309 (1979) (holding that the double jeopardy clause precludes a second trial giving theState another opportunity to offer evidence not presented in the first trial). Having reviewed therecord here in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact couldhave found the essential elements of the offense of possession of a counterfeit credit card beyond areasonable doubt. This conclusion does not imply that we have made a finding as to defendant's guiltthat would be binding on the court on retrial. See Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 310.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is reversedand the cause is remanded to the circuit court for a new trial.

Reversed and remanded.

BYRNE and GILLERAN JOHNSON, JJ., concur.