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Modified Upon Denial of Rehearing

JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Domingo Mendoza, entered a blind guilty plea toburglary (720 ILCS 5/19--1(a) (West 1998)), and the trial courtsentenced him to three years' probation with the condition that hecomply with the Treatment Alternatives for Safe Communities (TASC)program (see 20 ILCS 301/40--5 et seq. (West 1998)). The Statepetitioned to revoke defendant's probation, and defendant admittedthe allegations of the petition. The trial court sentenceddefendant to 10 years' imprisonment after finding he was subject toa mandatory Class X sentence under section 5--5--3(c)(8) of theUnified Code of Corrections (Code) (730 ILCS 5/5--5--3(c)(8) (West1998)). On appeal, defendant argues that (1) because he was not"over the age of 21 years" when he was convicted, the trial courtimproperly enhanced his sentence under section 5--5--3(c)(8) of theCode and (2) even if section 5--5--3(c)(8) applies here, whendefendant pleaded guilty, the trial court failed to admonish himthat he could be sentenced as a Class X offender. We affirm.

Defendant was born on February 10, 1978. The State chargeddefendant with burglary and theft (720 ILCS 5/16--1(a)(1)(A) (West1998)). The indictment alleged that the offenses occurred on March24, 1999. On July 23, 1999, the parties presented a plea agreementto the trial court. Defendant would plead guilty to burglary, andthe State would nol-pros the theft charge. While admonishingdefendant, Judge Burke advised him that burglary was a Class 2felony punishable by 3 to 7 years' imprisonment or, if defendantwas eligible for an extended term, 7 to 14 years' imprisonment. While arguing the aggravating sentencing factors, the assistantState's Attorney stated, "[t]he only reason he's not Class Xeligible, Judge, is the fact that he is 21. I believe the statuterequires an individual to be over the age of 21." The State askedthe court to impose an extended term of eight years' imprisonmentbased on defendant's criminal history. See 730 ILCS 5/5--5--3.2(b)(1) (West 1998). The trial court sentenced defendant to 3years' TASC probation and 364 days of periodic imprisonment withcredit for 122 days served.

On February 2, 2000, the State petitioned to revokedefendant's probation on the ground that TASC terminated him fromits treatment program. The hearing on the petition commenced onApril 6, 2000. The trial court heard testimony from one witnessand continued the hearing. On April 13, 2000, pursuant to theparties' agreement, the trial court continued the cause until June15, 2000, "for status on TASC compliance." The court ordereddefendant to comply with all of the conditions of the TASC program. During the June 15 hearing, a TASC representative reported thatdefendant was complying with the treatment program and was "doingextremely well."

On November 15, 2000, the State filed a second petition torevoke, again on the ground that TASC terminated defendant from itsprogram. The State alleged additionally that, on August 10, 2000,he tested positive for drugs and missed several treatmentappointments in July and August 2000.

Defendant admitted the allegations of the petition. Duringthe hearing, the State informed Judge Creswell that defendant waseligible to be sentenced as a Class X offender, and Judge Creswelladmonished defendant accordingly.

The trial court continued the cause for sentencing. Defendantagain petitioned for TASC treatment, and TASC accepted him. At theconclusion of the sentencing hearing, the trial court found that itwas unlikely that defendant would comply with a treatment programand that TASC probation would deprecate the seriousness ofdefendant's conduct. Accordingly, the court sentenced defendant to10 years' imprisonment.

Defendant timely moved to reconsider the sentence. The motionargued that a sentence of six years' imprisonment would betterrecognize the gains defendant made while undergoing treatment andhelp him to progress by continuing treatment. Defendant filed asecond motion arguing that section 5--5--3(c)(8) of the Codeviolates the proportionate penalties clause of the IllinoisConstitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,