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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

In case No. 01--CF--3161, defendant, Octaviano Marungo, was indicted for two counts ofunlawful use of a weapon within 1,000 feet of a school or park (720 ILCS 5/24--1(c)(1.5) (West2000)), and three counts of unlawful use of a weapon (720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(4) (West 2000)). In caseNo. 01--CF--3614, defendant was indicted for the offenses of unlawful possession of a controlledsubstance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 2000)) and unlawful possession ofa controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2000)). Defendant filed a motion to quash arrestand suppress evidence in each case. The trial court denied each motion on May 29, 2002, followingan evidentiary hearing. Defendant moved for reconsideration in light of this court's recent decisionof People v. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d 22 (2002), which was filed on May 24, 2002. The trial courtreversed each order and granted defendant's motions. The State appeals in both cases, contendingthat the trial court erred in applying White and granting defendant's motions to quash arrest andsuppress evidence. We consolidated the appeals, and for the following reasons, now affirm.

The salient facts of both cases are not in dispute and we will briefly set them forth here. Incase No. 01--CF--3161, Officer Steven Stemmet of the Aurora police department testified at theevidentiary hearing that around 3:22 p.m. on November 11, 2001, he saw defendant's car fail to cometo a complete stop at a stop sign. He also observed that defendant's car had a license plate placed onthe dashboard. Stemmet effected a traffic stop, approached the car, which was driven by defendant,and asked for defendant's driver's license and proof of insurance. Stemmet returned to his squad carand ran a computer check on defendant. He found that there were no outstanding warrants, returnedto defendant's car, and informed defendant that he was going to write him two citations. Stemmettestified that he did not see any criminal activity at that time. Stemmet asked defendant what hewanted to post as bond, but defendant never answered because Stemmet also asked defendant if hehad anything illegal in the car. Defendant responded no, and Stemmet then asked for consent tosearch his car. After receiving consent, Stemmet searched the car and found a loaded Smith andWesson .40-caliber handgun under the driver's seat.

Upon reconsideration, the trial court noted that White held that, while a police officer makinga lawful stop of a motorist is not precluded from making reasonable inquiries concerning the purposeof the stop, the scope of the activities and questioning by the police during an investigatory detentionmust be reasonably related to the circumstances that initially justified the stop. The court furthernoted that White held that questioning wholly unrelated to the purposes of the stop that is reasonablycalculated to elicit incriminating responses is impermissible unless supported by independent,reasonable, and articulable suspicion. In applying these principles to the facts, the trial court foundthat the request for consent to search was totally unrelated to the traffic offense, which was the basisfor the stop, and that the request was calculated to elicit an incriminating response. The court alsofound that there was no independent, reasonable, and articulable suspicion to form the basis for therequest to search. Accordingly, the trial court concluded that defendant's fourth amendment rightswere violated and the court granted defendant's motion to suppress.

In case No. 01--CF--3614, defendant first testified at the evidentiary hearing that atapproximately 7:15 p.m. on December 15, 2001, he was driving in Aurora and was pulled over byan unmarked Aurora police car and subsequently placed under arrest. Defendant stated that he turnedhis turn signal on approximately 1,000 feet prior to making the turn. Officer Jeff Wiencek nexttestified that he observed defendant's car make a turn without activating its turn signal within 100 feetprior to turning. While Wiencek and his assistant, Officer Knepp, ran a license plate check,defendant, the driver of the car, walked to a unit four houses away and returned to the car. By thatpoint, the license plate information returned and Wiencek went over to the car to speak withdefendant. The car had stopped in the driveway before the officers had an opportunity to activatetheir lights and pull the car over. Other than the traffic violation, Wiencek had not seen defendantcommit any other crimes. Wiencek and Knepp also wanted to speak with defendant because theyconsidered defendant's actions to be suspicious. Wiencek testified that defendant had parked hisvehicle at a house in an area where there were gang problems. Further, defendant also actedsuspiciously when he walked four houses away from where he parked, looked at the officers as hewalked away, and stood by the door of a residence for a moment before he walked back to his car. Because he felt this behavior was suspicious, Wiencek wanted to see whether there was any ongoingcriminal activity other than the failure to properly signal a turn within 100 feet of an intersection. Asdefendant returned to the car, Wiencek approached him and asked what he was doing. Defendantreplied that he was looking for somebody, but would not give the person's name or address. Wiencekasked defendant for identification and defendant gave him an identification card. Also, during theconversation, the officers asked defendant if they could look in his car. Wiencek stated that the gangactivity in that area was one reason why he wanted to investigate defendant. Wiencek admitted thathe had not seen anything that made him think that defendant had a gun. During his search, Knepplocated two bags of cocaine. The traffic citation was not written until defendant was placed incustody and had been transported to the police station.

Upon reconsideration, based on White, the trial court found that the request to search wastotally unrelated to the traffic offense, which was the basis for the stop, and that the request wascalculated to elicit an incriminating response. The court further found that no evidence was presentedto determine the nature of any gang-related problems and that it was not uncommon for people tolook at the police to see what they were doing. As such, the court concluded that no independent,reasonable suspicion had been articulated that could form the basis for requesting permission tosearch the car. Accordingly, the court concluded that defendant's fourth amendment rights wereviolated, and it reversed its previous order and granted defendant's motion to suppress.

The State contends on appeal that the trial court erred in applying White and grantingdefendant's motions to quash arrest and suppress evidence. Essentially, the State argues that Whiteholds that an officer cannot properly ask the defendant for permission to search his car, unless thatrequest is based on something related to the initial traffic stop or, alternatively, is based on some othercriminal activity observed by the officer. The State points out that in certain cases an officer may askfor permission to search a vehicle, even though such a request is unsupported by probable cause. See,e.g., United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002). The State fears that White willbe increasingly expanded by the trial courts, as the trial court did in this appeal, in an almost"talismanic manner" to create a per se rule. The State argues that such an analysis carries Whitebeyond the parameters of the problem that arose in that particular case and creates a whollyunrealistic situation for police officers in traffic stop cases. The State asserts that White should belimited to its facts in order to strike a better balance between protecting citizens from unwarrantedinterference with their privacy and serving their interests in the efficient and effective prevention anddetection of crime. The State asks us to reexamine our decision in White in light of its argument. Finally, the State requests that we reexamine White in light of the recent Illinois Supreme Courtopinion of People v. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220 (2003), and "make whatever adjustments andmodifications that are necessary." Accordingly, a brief overview of White and Gonzalez is necessaryfor the disposition of this appeal.

In White, an officer pulled the defendant over for failing to signal a lane change and the officerobserved a lawn mower and weed whacker in the back of the defendant's station wagon. The officerasked to see the defendant's driver's license and proof of insurance and informed him of the reasonfor the stop. The officer then asked the defendant if he had any receipts for the items. The defendantgave him the receipts, and the officer observed that the name on the receipts was different from thatof the defendant. The officer inquired about the name on the receipts and asked the defendant wherethe items came from. Additional statements made by the defendant regarding the ownership andpossession of the items, and a further check of the car during the computer check, subsequentlyrevealed that the defendant had forged a check in order to obtain the lawn mower and weed whacker. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 25-26.

Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), a dual analysisis applied in determining whether a traffic stop implicates the fourth amendment. The first prongconcerns whether the officer's action in stopping the vehicle was justified at its inception. The secondprong considers whether the officer's conduct following the stop was reasonably related in scope tothe circumstances that justified the interference in the first place. In White, we were concerned withthe scope of the detention and whether the questioning about the items in the back of the stationwagon was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in the firstplace, absent reasonable suspicion to conduct this type of questioning. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 28. Based on our review of the relevant case law, we held:

"While a police officer making a lawful stop of a motorist is not precluded from makingreasonable inquiries concerning the purpose of the stop, the scope of the activities andquestioning by the police during an investigatory detention must be reasonably related to thecircumstances that initially justified the stop. [Citation.] An officer may expand the scopeof his detention beyond that which is reasonably related to the circumstances only when theofficer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that other criminal activity may be afoot orwhere matters that arise during the course of the stop cause the officer reasonable suspicion. [Citation.] Questioning wholly unrelated to the purposes of the stop, which is reasonablycalculated to elicit incriminating responses, is impermissible unless supported by independent,reasonable, and articulable suspicion." White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at 34.

In applying the law to the facts, we found that the officer's questions regarding the ownershipof the items in the car were intrusive, calculated to elicit possibly incriminating responses, whollyunrelated to the purpose of the traffic stop, and unsupported by independent, reasonable suspicion. We further found that the defendant was doing nothing unusual to indicate that other criminal activitywas afoot. Accordingly, we affirmed the trial court's suppression order. White, 331 Ill. App. 3d at35.

In April 2003, one year after White was decided, the supreme court in Gonzalez conducteda thorough analysis to determine when and to what extent a police officer's conduct following a trafficstop satisfies the second prong of the Terry test. In Gonzalez, the officer stopped a car, in which thedefendant was the passenger, for not having a front license plate. The officer approached the car onthe passenger's side. He observed no criminal conduct by the defendant either before or immediatelyafter the stop, and asked him for identification. The defendant complied. Thereafter, the officer rana criminal history check of the defendant. The ensuing encounter between the officer and thedefendant resulted in a search of the defendant's person, revealing a packet of cocaine. The defendantfiled a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The trial court concluded that, absent anysuspicion of criminal conduct by the defendant, the officer's request for identification wasunreasonable. On appeal to the supreme court, the defendant's sole contention was that the officerhad no lawful basis to ask him for identification.

The supreme court first discussed at length the divergence of opinion among the federal andstate courts regarding the parameters of the Terry "scope" requirement when determining thepropriety of police questioning during a traffic stop. See Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 229-32. Thesupreme court noted that our appellate court also has not been uniform in its approach whendetermining the permissible scope of police questioning during a traffic stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2dat 232. In particular, the supreme court cited White and noted the fact that we applied the Terryframework in a manner similar to the approach adopted by one of the divergent federal courts withwhich Gonzalez disagreed. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 232; see United States v. Holt, 229 F.3d 931(10th Cir. 2000), rev'd upon rehearing en banc, 264 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 2001).

The supreme court concluded that the divergent approaches taken by various districts of theappellate court do not strike "the proper balance between the government's interest in effective lawenforcement and the individual's interest in being free from arbitrary governmental intrusions, whichlies at the core of the concept of 'reasonableness.' " Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 233. Accordingly, indetermining whether police questioning during the course of a traffic stop satisfies the second prongof the Terry analysis, the court formulated the following framework:

"[W]e must consider, as an initial matter, whether the question is related to the initialjustification for the stop. If the question is reasonably related to the purpose of the stop, nofourth amendment violation occurs. If the question is not reasonably related to the purposeof the stop, we must consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable,articulable suspicion that would justify the question. If the question is so justified, no fourthamendment violation occurs. In the absence of a reasonable connection to the purpose of thestop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion, we must consider whether, in light of all thecircumstances and common sense, the question impermissibly prolonged the detention orchanged the fundamental nature of the stop." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235.

In applying the Gonzalez framework, the court held that the officer's request for identificationfrom the defendant did not render the defendant's otherwise lawful detention unreasonable. The stopof the vehicle was based on the officer's observation that the front license plate was missing, whichwas a violation of our vehicle code. The defendant, who was not implicated in the code violation andwho was not suspected of any other wrongdoing was a passive occupant and therefore, the requestfor identification was not directly related to the initial justification for the stop and was not otherwisesupported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235-36. The officer's question, however, "did not run afoul of the fourth amendment." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2dat 236. The request for identification was made during the course of the stop while the driver wasbeing questioned by another officer and did not impermissibly prolong the defendant's detention, nordid the question change the fundamental nature of the stop. The court concluded that the questionwas a simple request for identification that was "facially innocuous" and did not suggest "officialinterrogation" nor was it the "type of question or request that would increase the confrontationalnature of the encounter." Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 236.

Although Gonzalez did not expressly overrule White, it is clear that Gonzalez has explicitlyformulated the framework to be employed by our courts in determining whether police questioningduring the course of a traffic stop implicates the fourth amendment. At the time of the trial court'sdecision in the present case, Gonzalez had not yet been filed, and ordinarily, we would reverse andremand to the trial court for consideration in light of Gonzalez's recent pronouncement. However,because the parties do not dispute the facts and the ultimate question posed by the legal challenge tothe trial court's rulings is reviewed de novo, we can decide the matter in this court. See Gonzalez,204 Ill. 2d at 223 .

We note that, while the State argues that we should reexamine White in light of Gonzalez andasserts that the facts in the present cases are different from those in White, the State fails to argue how the facts here satisfy the Terry scope requirements set forth in Gonzalez, such that theinterrogations in each case did not run afoul of defendant's fourth amendment rights. The Statetherefore has waived the right to challenge the trial court's holding that the officers' interrogationsviolated defendant 's fourth amendment rights.

Even without waiver, however, the application of the principles espoused in Gonzalez to thepresent cases would lead us to conclude that the trial court's ruling were correct. In case No. 01--CF--3161, the initial justification for the stop was the failure to stop at a stop sign and improper displayof a license plate, violations of our vehicle code. Stemmet did not observe any criminal activity butasked defendant if there was anything illegal in his car. Thus, the question posed to defendant wasnot directly related to the initial justification for the stop and was not otherwise supported by areasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Unlike Gonzalez, where the officer made asimple request for identification, which the court termed "facially innocuous," here, the officer askeddefendant if there was anything illegal in his car. This question had no reasonable connection to thepurpose of the stop and served only to prolong the detention of the vehicle and to change thefundamental nature of the stop into one that would increase the confrontational nature of theencounter.

An even stronger argument could be made in case No. 01--CF--3614. The initial justificationfor the traffic stop was the failure to signal within 100 feet of a turn. The officer here did nothingexpected of an officer during the normal course of a traffic stop. Wiencek approached defendant andasked for identification, which defendant provided, but did not check on defendant's status. Instead,Wiencek treated the encounter as a criminal investigation simply because defendant was in an areaknown to have gangs and because defendant parked in a driveway four doors away from anotherresidence and watched the police as he returned to his car. The trial court did not find this behaviorsuspicious and found that no independent, reasonable suspicion had been articulated that could formthe basis for requesting permission to search the car, and the State does not refute this finding. It isclear that Wiencek was not interested in treating the encounter as a traffic stop. Although the initialstop was justified as a violation of our vehicle code, the request to search the car violated defendant'sfourth amendment rights. The question to search not only prolonged any legitimate detention of thecar to investigate a traffic violation, but also changed the fundamental nature of the stop to a searchfor a violation of our criminal code. Wiencek's interest in searching the car, and his conversation withdefendant about being in a gang-related neighborhood, showed that his intent was to conduct acriminal investigation. In addition, the fact that Wiencek waited until he arrived at the police stationto write the traffic citation suggests that the initial justification for the stop was mere pretense.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and GILLERAN JOHNSON, J., concur.