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The State appeals from an order of the circuit court of DuPage County dismissing the indictment filed in this cause. For thereasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

On July 13, 1996, defendant, Donald R. Mann, was charged withvarious traffic offenses by the issuance of four Illinois citationand complaint forms. One of those complaints alleged that on thatsame date he committed the Class A misdemeanor offense of drivingwhile license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6--303(a) (West 1996)). Defendant signed an individual bond and was required to appear incourt on August 20, 1996.

After defendant failed to appear in court on several dates andwas arrested several times on bench warrants, the trial court, onMay 22, 2001, granted the State's motion to nol-pros the Illinoiscitation and complaints, allowing the State to enhance the driving-while-license-revoked charge to a felony.

On August 9, 2001, the grand jury returned an indictmentcharging defendant with the felony offense of aggravated drivingwhile license revoked (625 ILCS 5/6--303(d) (West 1996)) alleging:

"[O]n or about the 13th day of July 1996 at and within Du PageCounty, Illinois, Donald R. Mann committed the offense ofAggravated Driving While License Revoked in that saiddefendant drove or was in actual physical control of a motorvehicle on a highway in Illinois, at a time when his driver'slicense, permit, or privilege to operate a motor vehicle wasrevoked pursuant to a violation of 625 ILCS 5/11--501, thedefendant having been previously convicted of Driving WhileLicense Revoked in violation of 625 ILCS 5/6--303, theoriginal revocation being based upon the defendant'sconviction for a violation of 625 ILCS 5/11--501, and aprosecution was pending against this defendant for the sameconduct from July 13, 1996[,] to May 22, 2001[,] which periodis excluded from the applicable limitation under 720 ILCS5/3--7(c)***."

Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictment on theground that the State failed to file the indictment within threeyears of the date of the offense, thereby barring the prosecutionunder the applicable limitations period (720 ILCS 5/3--5(b) (West1996)). At the hearing on defendant's motion, the assistantState's Attorney argued that the misdemeanor driving-while-license-revoked charge was a prosecution "pending against defendant for thesame conduct" as was alleged in the indictment and, therefore, theperiod of time from July 13, 1996, until May 22, 2001, was excludedfrom the three-year statute of limitations pursuant to section3--7(c) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS5/3--7(c) (West 1996)). In response, defense counsel took theposition that the criminal proceeding on a misdemeanor chargepursuant to the filing of an Illinois citation and complaint didnot constitute "a prosecution" as that term is used in section 3--7(c).

In ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, thetrial court stated:

"It really comes down to a situation where there was amisdemeanor traffic charge pending by way of complaint whichis certainly sufficient for a misdemeanor. But the issue iswhether or not that is a prosecution pending since thedefendant is now charged with a felony offense.

I find that it is not the same offense. There areadditional elements required for purposes of the felony. Although that's presented at sentencing, it's not the sameoffense for purposes of the prosecution pending.

So for that reason, I find that the prosecution was notcommenced within the applicable statute of limitations periodand the motion to dismiss will be granted."

The State timely appeals from that order pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 604(a)(1). 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).

As a preliminary matter, we take up the State's motion tosupplement the record on appeal with the common law record in themisdemeanor proceeding and with the affidavit of the assistantState's Attorney who handled this cause in the trial court. Defendant filed an objection to the State's motion, contending thatthe common law record in the misdemeanor proceeding and theprosecutor's affidavit are not part of the record in this cause. We ordered that the motion be taken with the case and now grant theState's motion to supplement the record with the common law recordin the misdemeanor proceeding, and deny the motion to supplementthe record with the prosecutor's affidavit.

The State's motion regarding the common law record in themisdemeanor proceeding is granted as to the pertinent factscontained therein because it is proper for this court to judiciallynotice that court file even though the trial court did not formallydo so. A reviewing court may judicially notice factual evidencewhere the facts are capable of immediate and accurate demonstrationby resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable accuracy. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction, 96 Ill. 2d 159, 166(1983); People v. Davis, 65 Ill. 2d 157, 161-65 (1976). When andhow defendant was charged, his failure to appear in court, hisarrests on bench warrants, and when the State's motion to nol-proswas granted are pertinent matters contained in the common lawrecord of the underlying misdemeanor proceeding. These matters arecapable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to aneasily accessible source of indisputable accuracy. Our judicialnotice of these pertinent facts from the common law record in themisdemeanor proceeding is also appropriate because the State, thetrial court, and defendant all assumed them to be true at thehearing on defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, anddefendant has not denied that these facts are true in this court. See Midway Tobacco Co. v. Mahin, 42 Ill. App. 3d 797, 811 (1976). The State's motion to supplement the record on appeal with theprosecutor's affidavit is denied because, ordinarily, an attorney'saffidavit cannot be used to supplement the record on appeal. Silnyv. Lorens, 73 Ill. App. 3d 638, 642-43 (1979).

Because the trial court's dismissal of the indictment onstatute of limitations grounds in this case raises a purely legalissue, we review de novo the trial court's rulings. People v.Blankschein, 337 Ill. App. 3d 526, 529 (2003). Generally, aprosecution for a felony must be commenced within three years afterthe commission of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/3--5(b) (West 1996). Where an indictment facially shows that an offense was notcommitted within the applicable statute of limitations, it becomesan element of the State's case to allege and prove the existence offacts that invoke an exception to the limitations period. Peoplev. Morris, 135 Ill. 2d 540, 546 (1990). Section 3--7 excludescertain periods of time from the applicable statute of limitationsand provides in pertinent part:

"The period within which a prosecution must be commenceddoes not include any period in which:

* * *

(c) A prosecution is pending against the defendant forthe same conduct, even if the indictment or information whichcommences the prosecution is quashed or the proceedingsthereon set aside, or are reversed on appeal." 720 ILCS5/3--7 (West 1996).

On appeal the State contends that the trial court erred indismissing the indictment, arguing that the conduct alleged in themisdemeanor complaint is the same conduct alleged in the felonyindictment and, therefore, for purposes of section 3--7(c), aprosecution was pending against defendant from July 13, 1996, untilMay 22, 2001. Accordingly, the State concludes that this period oftime is properly excluded from the three-year limitations periodpursuant to section 3--7(c).

Defendant does not contend that the State failed tospecifically allege in the indictment the existence of facts thatinvoke the section 3--7(c) exclusion, but responds with threearguments in support of affirming the trial court's order: (1) thatthe State failed to comply with the compulsory joinder provision ofsection 3--3(b) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/3--3(b) (West1996)); (2) that in order to exclude time from the applicablelimitations period pursuant to section 3--7(c), the prior criminalproceeding cannot be initiated by a complaint; and (3) that section3--7(c) was not applicable in this case because the indictmentadded elements to the misdemeanor charge and, therefore, themisdemeanor proceeding did not involve the "same conduct" as wasalleged in the indictment.

Defendant's first argument questions the State's failure in1996 to join the misdemeanor and the felony driving-while-license-revoked charges pursuant to the compulsory joinder requirements ofsection 3--3(b). Defendant contends that section 3--3(b) bars theState from pursuing the felony charge because it was not joinedwith the misdemeanor proceedings.

Section 3--3 provides in pertinent part:

"