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October 31, 2001

PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Milos Mandic, was foundguilty of violation of an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/12--30(West 2000)) and sentenced to 12 months' supervision. Defendanttimely appeals, contending the State failed to prove him guiltybeyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant argues that (1) the Statefailed to prove that he did not have a right to be present at thechurch where he allegedly violated the stay-away provision of theorder by contacting his children, and (2) the State failed to provehe acted intentionally because the trial court improperly appliedan unstated mandatory presumption that any contact with a protectedperson constituted a criminal violation. We affirm.

When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,the same standard of review applies to both jury trials and benchtrials. People v. Patterson, 314 Ill. App. 3d 962, 969 (2000). The applicable standard is whether, after viewing the evidence inthe light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier offact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond areasonable doubt. Patterson, 314 Ill. App. 3d at 968-69, citingPeople v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985). In a bench trial,the court is presumed to know the law, and this presumption mayonly be rebutted when the record affirmatively shows otherwise. People v. Kelley, 304 Ill. App. 3d 628, 639 (1999). "The trier offact in a bench trial is not required to mention everything--or,for that matter, anything--that contributed to its verdict." People v. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d 991, 1000 (1998). If the recordcontains facts that support the trial court's finding, thereviewing court may consider those facts to affirm the finding,even if the trial court did not state specifically that it reliedon them. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1000.

The common law recognized that a crime required both actusreus, a guilty act, and mens rea, a guilty mind, and, with theexception of certain absolute liability offenses, the Criminal Codeof 1961 (the Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/1--1 et seq. (West 2000))retains this distinction. Compare 720 ILCS 5/4--1 (West 2000)("Voluntary Act") with 720 ILCS 5/4--3 (West 2000) ("MentalState"). In this case the State was required to prove thatdefendant (1) committed an act prohibited by an order ofprotection, or failed to commit an act ordered by an order ofprotection, and (2) he had been served notice of or otherwiseacquired actual knowledge of the contents of the order. (720 ILCS5/12--30(a) (West 2000).

At trial defendant stipulated that at the time of the allegedviolation a valid order of protection was in effect that requiredhim to stay away from his ex-wife and their children. On appealdefendant concedes the validity of the order.

Initially we wish to clarify that, although defendant raisesthe issue obliquely in his brief, freedom of religion (see U.S.Const., amend I; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,