People v. Mancilla

Case Date: 06/11/2002
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-01-0067 Rel

No. 2--01--0067


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT


 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Ogle County.
)
         Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 98--CF--40
)
JOE L. MANCILLA, ) Honorable
) Stephen C. Pemberton,
        Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
 

 


JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Joe L. Mancilla, entered a blind guilty plea to theunlawful possession, with the intent to deliver, of more than 1 butless than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine (720 ILCS570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)). The trial court sentenced defendant tofive years' imprisonment and imposed, among other things, a $1,450fine and a $7,000 street-value fine. To facilitate the payment ofthe fines, the court ordered the Department of Corrections (DOC) towithhold 25% of defendant's monthly corrections income and remitthat amount to the circuit court clerk. On appeal, defendantargues that (1) the withholding order is void because no statuteallows it and (2) he is entitled to a $15 credit against his finesfor the three days he spent in jail before sentencing. We vacatethe withholding order and modify the judgment to reflect a $15credit against the fines.

The State argues that defendant has waived his challenge tothe withholding order because he did not raise it in the trialcourt. Ordinarily, a sentencing issue not raised during thesentencing hearing or in a postsentencing motion is waived. Peoplev. Watkins, 325 Ill. App. 3d 13, 17 (2001). Here, however,defendant challenges the trial court's statutory authority to enterthe withholding order. A sentencing order that does not conform tostatutory requirements is void and may be attacked at any time. People v. Arna, 168 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995); People v. Davis, 319Ill. App. 3d 572, 578 (2001). Therefore, we will addressdefendant's contention.

Defendant claims that there is no statute that authorizes awithholding order directed against DOC wages. Although we agree that the withholding order must be vacated, we do so for adifferent reason.

Section 5--9--4 of the Unified Code of Corrections(Corrections Code) provides that "[t]he court may enter an order ofwithholding to collect the amount of a fine imposed on an offenderin accordance with Part 8 of Article XII of the Code of CivilProcedure [735 ILCS 5/12--801 et seq. (West 2000)]." 730 ILCS 5/5--9--4 (West 2000). Defendant relies on the Fourth District'sdecision in People v. Watson, 318 Ill. App. 3d 140 (2000). There,the court held that "[t]he relevant sections of the Code of CivilProcedure do not authorize the withholding of DOC wages." Watson,318 Ill. App. 3d at 143. The Fourth District followed Watson inPeople v. Calvert, 326 Ill. App. 3d 414, 426 (2001), People v.Scott, 324 Ill. App. 3d 641, 641-42 (2001), and People v.Williamson, 319 Ill. App. 3d 891, 900 (2001). The Fifth Districthas followed Watson. People v. Torres, 327 Ill. App. 3d 1106, 1115(2002).

We disagree with Watson and the decisions following it. Areview of the Code of Civil Procedure and the Corrections Codeleads us to conclude that the legislature did not intend to excludeDOC wages from withholding orders. When construing a statute, acourt's primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to thelegislature's intent. People v. O'Brien, 197 Ill. 2d 88, 90(2001). Our inquiry always must begin with the language of thestatute, which is the most reliable indicator of legislativeintent. People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36, 42 (2000). Where astatute is unambiguous, a court must give it effect as writtenwithout reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions thatthe legislature did not express. People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d364, 371 (2001).

Article XII, Part 8, of the Code of Civil Procedure governsthe procedure by which a judgment creditor may obtain a wagededuction order against a judgment debtor's employer. Section 12--801 defines "wages" as "any hourly pay, salaries, commissions,bonuses, or other compensation owed by an employer to a judgmentdebtor." 735 ILCS 5/12--801 (West 2000). Although the relevantCode of Civil Procedure provisions do not mention DOC wages, the Corrections Code contemplates an employment situation, and the DOCwages are compensation for work performed.

Chapter III, Article 12, of the Corrections Code governscorrectional employment programs. Section 3--12--1 provides thatthe DOC "shall, in so far as possible, employ at useful workcommitted persons confined in institutions and facilities of the[DOC], who are over the age of compulsory school attendance,physically capable of such employment, and not otherwise occupiedin programs of the Department." 730 ILCS 5/3--12--1 (West 2000). Section 3--12--2(a) prescribes the types of employment the DOC mayestablish. 730 ILCS 5/3--12--2(a) (West 2000).

Section 3--12--5 establishes the compensation for such work:

"Persons performing a work assignment undersubsection (a) of Section 3--12--2 may receive wagesunder rules and regulations of the [DOC]. *** Of thecompensation earned pursuant to this Section, a portion,as determined by the [DOC], shall be used to offset thecost of the committed person's incarceration. *** Allother wages shall be deposited in the individual'saccount under rules and regulations of the [DOC]." 730ILCS 5/3--12--5 (West 2000).

We see nothing in the relevant statutory schemes indicatingthat the legislature intended to exclude DOC wages from the scopeof section 5--9--4 of the Corrections Code. The legislature hasestablished the types of income exempt from deduction orders, andDOC wages are not included. See 735 ILCS 5/12--804 (West 2000). The Corrections Code contemplates an employment situation and thepayment of wages as defined in section 12--801 of the Code of CivilProcedure. We note that the author of Williamson has reconsideredher position and now believes that DOC wages fall within section12--801's definition of "wages." Scott, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 642-43(Myerscough, J., specially concurring in part and dissenting inpart). For these reasons, we reject defendant's argument.

Although we have concluded that section 5--9--4 applies to DOCwages, we nevertheless must vacate the withholding order herebecause the statutory procedure for obtaining such an order was notfollowed. The Code of Civil Procedure provides for the issuance ofa summons against the employer (735 ILCS 5/12--805 (West 2000)),the consideration of offsetting and adverse claims (735 ILCS 5/12--809, 810 (West 2000)), and a trial conducted as in other civilcases (735 ILCS 5/12--811(c) (West 2000)). Here, there was noprocedure that resulted in the withholding order. The issue wasnot even discussed during the sentencing hearing, and it appearsthat the withholding order merely was a part of a standardsentencing form.

We acknowledge that DOC wages present a unique situation. Forexample, the judgment creditor and the employer are the sameentity. Nevertheless, absent the parties' agreement on the issue,compliance with the statutory procedure is required to ensure thatall claims against a defendant's wages receive due consideration. Because no wage deduction proceeding under the Code of CivilProcedure was conducted here, the withholding order was void. Davis, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 578-79.

An additional problem here is that the amount of thewithholding, 25% of defendant's DOC wages, appears to exceed theamount authorized under section 12--803 of the Code of CivilProcedure. That provision states that the maximum wages subject tocollection are the lesser of (1) 15% of the debtor's gross weeklywages or (2) the amount by which the disposable earnings for a weekexceed 45 times the federal minimum hourly wage. 735 ILCS 5/12--803 (West 2000). Thus, it appears that the 25% withholding orderexceeds the permitted amount. See Davis, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 578(50% withholding order); People v. Despenza, 318 Ill. App. 3d 1155,1157 (2001) (same).

Defendant's second contention on appeal is that he is entitledto a $15 credit against his fines because he spent three days injail before sentencing. The State agrees. The record reveals thatdefendant was arrested on March 12, 1998, and posted bond on March14. Defendant is entitled to a $5 credit against his fines foreach day he was incarcerated before sentencing. 725 ILCS 5/110--14(West 2000); People v. Gonzalez, 316 Ill. App. 3d 354, 366 (2000).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's convictionand prison sentence but vacate the withholding order and modify thejudgment of the circuit court of Ogle County to reflect a $15credit against defendant's fines.

Affirmed in part as modified; vacated in part.

McLAREN and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.