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PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of thecourt:

Following a traffic stop, defendant, Connie K. Leyendecker,was charged with the offense of driving while her license wassuspended (625 ILCS 5/6--303(a) (West 2000)). She moved tosuppress the fruits of the stop, arguing that the police did nothave a reasonable suspicion that she had committed a trafficoffense prior to stopping her vehicle. The trial court grantedthat motion, and the State appeals. We affirm.

At the hearing on defendant's motion, the only witness wasKeith Brandel, a Jo Daviess County deputy sheriff. On defendant'sdirect examination, Brandel testified that on October 6, 2000, atapproximately 2:40 p.m., he was on stationary patrol observingtraffic on U.S. Route 20 near the bottom of what is known locallyas "Sand Hill." The highway was a two-lane, two-way roadway, andthe eastbound lane had a white fog line on the right side. Brandelobserved defendant's vehicle pass his location traveling eastboundon Route 20. Brandel followed defendant's vehicle at an intervalof three to four car lengths for a distance of approximately twomiles. As defendant maneuvered her vehicle through a curve to theleft, Brandel observed defendant's vehicle cross the fog line. Brandel estimated that defendant's vehicle crossed the fog line bya width of one foot. Brandel testified that the speed limit onthis stretch of the highway was 65 miles per hour. Brandel alsotestified that the road had many curves and that it had "poorvisibility around the curves."

Brandel testified that after he stopped defendant he "told herthe reason why [he] had stopped her." Brandel testified that herecognized defendant from a previous encounter when she had beeninvolved in "a domestic situation." Brandel asked defendantwhether she had a driver's license, and she replied that it wassuspended. After issuing defendant a ticket for driving while herlicense was suspended, Brandel asked defendant the whereabouts ofTony Peacock. Peacock was defendant's boyfriend or ex-boyfriend,and he was "wanted on a warrant."

On cross-examination, Brandel described defendant's crossingof the fog line as "single" and "momentary." Brandel testifiedthat he had observed no obstructions on the roadway that would havecaused defendant to cross the fog line. Brandel claimed that hestopped defendant only because her vehicle crossed the line. Brandel denied that the stop had anything to do with Peacock'swhereabouts. The record contains no traffic citation fordefendant's alleged crossing of the fog line.

The trial court entered a written order granting defendant'smotion to suppress. In its order, the trial court made severalfactual findings. The trial court found that Brandel was onstationary patrol observing traffic on U.S. Route 20 near thebottom of "what is known locally as 'Sand Hill.' " The trial courtfound that Brandel observed defendant's vehicle pass his locationtraveling eastbound ascending "Sand Hill" into "curves and hillyterritory." The trial court found that Brandel "briefly" crossedthe fog line by a distance of one foot as she drove through "acurve to the left."

Based on these factual findings, the trial court explained itsruling as follows:

"[I]t is not reasonable for a policeman to effect atraffic stop of a motorist for a single, brief crossing of alane 'fog line' on the hilly and curvy eastbound lanes ofHighway Number 20. This was mid-afternoon (not early morning)and no erratic driving of any kind was observed. A policemanmust have more than mere suspicion or a hunch to exercise hisauthority to intrude on a motorist who is presentingabsolutely nothing in the way of dangerous or menacing orillegal conduct. This officer may have had other reasons toeffect the traffic stop in this instance, but the record issilent as to any other than the single, brief crossing of the'fog line,' described in his testimony." (Emphasis inoriginal.)

In denying the State's motion for reconsideration, the trial courtstated that crossing a fog line "is not a traffic violation perse." The State timely appeals.

In general, a trial court's ultimate determination regardingthe legality of a traffic stop is subject to de novo review. People v. Perez, 288 Ill. App. 3d 1037, 1043 (1997). However, atrial court's determination concerning factual matters, includingthe reasonable inferences to be drawn from the witnesses'testimony, is entitled to deference by the reviewing court. Perez,288 Ill. App. 3d at 1043. The United States Supreme Court hasdescribed our standard of review in these cases as follows:

"[D]eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probablecause should be reviewed de novo on appeal. *** [However,]a reviewing court should take care both to review findings ofhistorical fact only for clear error and to give due weight toinferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and locallaw enforcement officers." Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S.690, 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d 911, 920, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663(1996). A traffic stop requires reasonable suspicion that the vehicleor occupant is subject to seizure for a violation of law. Peoplev. Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d 34, 39 (2001). An officer may make avalid investigatory stop provided the officer's decision is basedupon specific and articulable facts and reasonable inferencestherefrom that warrant the investigative intrusion. Village ofLincolnshire v. DiSpirito, 195 Ill. App. 3d 859, 863 (1990). Amere suspicion or hunch is insufficient. Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d at39. The officer must have knowledge of specific, articulable factswhich, when combined with the rational inferences from them, createa reasonable suspicion that the person in question has committed oris about to commit a crime. DiSpirito, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 863. We review the propriety of a traffic stop using an objectivestandard: whether the facts available to the officer would warranta reasonable person to believe that the action that the officertook was appropriate. DiSpirito, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 863.

On appeal, the State argues that defendant's crossing of thefog line gave Brandel a reasonable suspicion that defendant hadviolated section 11--709(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code)(625 ILCS 5/11--709(a) (West 2000)). The State asserts that evena single, momentary crossing of a fog line constitutes a violationof section 11--709(a), and that the stop was therefore valid. Section 11--709(a) provides:

"Whenever any roadway has been divided into 2 or moreclearly marked lanes for traffic the following rules *** shallapply.

(a) A vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicableentirely within a single lane and shall not be moved from suchlane until the driver has first ascertained that such movementcan be made with safety." 625 ILCS 5/11--709(a) (West 2000).

The Illinois Supreme Court has construed this provision asestablishing two separate and distinct requirements for lane usage. See People v. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d 289, 296-97 (1996). First, thestatute requires a motorist to drive a vehicle as nearly aspracticable entirely within one lane. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 297. Second, a motorist may not move a vehicle from a lane of trafficuntil the motorist has determined that the movement can be safelymade. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 297. Our supreme court has held thata motorist violates section 11--709(a) when the motorist "crossesover a lane line and is not driving as nearly as practicable withinone lane." Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 297.

Therefore, the inquiry in this case is whether Brandel had areasonable suspicion that (1) defendant had crossed over a laneline, and (2) defendant was not driving as nearly as practicablewithin one lane. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 297. The evidenceintroduced at the hearing indicated that defendant's vehicle momentarily crossed the fog line. However, Brandel failed totestify whether he believed that defendant was driving "as nearlyas practicable" within one lane at the time she momentarily crossedthe fog line. Although Brandel testified that he did not believethat "[defendant] swerved for a reason," Brandel acknowledged thatdefendant crossed the fog line as she was maneuvering her vehiclethrough a roadway curve to the left. Brandel testified that theroad in this area had "curves" and that the road had "poorvisibility around the curves." The speed limit in the area wheredefendant was driving was 65 miles per hour. Other thandefendant's momentary crossing of the fog line, Brandel testifiedthat defendant had driven properly during the two miles that hefollowed her vehicle.

Based upon this evidence, the trial court concluded thatBrandel could not have reasonably suspected that defendant hadviolated section 11--709(a) prior to stopping her. Although wereview the question of "reasonable suspicion" de novo, we must give"due weight to inferences drawn from [the] facts by residentjudges." Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 699, 134 L. Ed. 2d at 920, 116 S.Ct. at 1663. Here, as is evident from its ruling, the trial judgewas familiar with the roadway conditions on U.S. Route 20 whereBrandel stopped defendant, and we must give considerable weight tothe inferences that the trial court drew from Brandel's descriptionof the area in question. The trial court found that, given thecurvy and hilly roadway conditions, Brandel did not have a validbasis to effectuate a traffic stop.

Based on the record before us, we conclude that Brandel didnot have a reasonable suspicion that defendant had violated section11-709(a) of the Code prior to stopping her vehicle. Defendant'smomentary one-foot crossing of the fog line as she maneuvered hervehicle through a left-hand curve on a hilly road with poorvisibility would not cause a reasonable person to suspect thatdefendant was not driving "as nearly as practicable" within herlane. 625 ILCS 5/11--709(a) (West 2000). As noted above, Brandelfollowed defendant for approximately two miles and did not observeanything other than defendant exhibiting proper driving skills. Cf. Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 293 (police officer had reasonablesuspicion to stop the defendant for violation of section 11--709(a)where the defendant weaved across the center line for 150 yards andthen weaved across the fog line for 150 yards). Indeed, the recorddoes not contain a traffic citation for defendant's allegedviolation of section 11--709(a). Deferring to the trial court'sknowledge of the roadway in question, and coupled with the evidencepresented, we hold that Brandel did not have a reasonable suspicionthat defendant had violated section 11--709(a) of the Code.

In so holding, we find the authorities relied upon by theState distinguishable from the case at bar. In United States v.Fiala, 929 F.2d 285, 286 (7th Cir. 1991), the reviewing court heldthat police had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant afterobserving her vehicle cross the fog line by half the width of hervehicle for a considerable period of time. Given the otherrelevant factors involved, the conduct at issue in Fiala is notcomparable to defendant's momentary crossing of the fog line inthis case. We also note that the Fiala court did not indicatewhether the defendant in that case was maneuvering through hillyand curvy roadway with poor visibility at the time she crossed thefog line.

The State's remaining authorities concern a motorist'scrossing of the yellow center line as opposed to the crossing ofthe fog line. See Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 36 (defendant crossedthe center line twice and the fog line once); Perez, 288 Ill. App.3d at 1040 (defendant crossed center lane several times with halfof the vehicle's width); DiSpirito, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 861(defendant drove his entire vehicle across the center lane for adistance of 100 feet). These cases consider whether police hadreasonable suspicion to believe that motorists violated section 11--701(a) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11--701(a) (West 2000)), whichrequires a motorist to stay to the right of the center line. Asthe statutory provisions of section 11--701(a) of the Code do notpertain to the crossing of fog lines, we find that theseauthorities are inapposite to the situation presented in this case.

Rather, for the reasons discussed above, we hold that thetrial court properly granted defendant's motion to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of JoDaviess County.

Affirmed.

McLAREN, J., concurs.

JUSTICE CALLUM, dissenting:

By its plain terms, section 11--709(a) requires a motorist to"drive a vehicle as nearly as practicable entirely within onelane." Smith, 172 Ill. 2d at 297. The majority appears to concedethat, although she made only a single, momentary crossing of thefog line, defendant did not drive entirely within one lane. However, the majority determines that, because the road was hillyand curvy and had "poor visibility around the curves," Brandelcould not have reasonably suspected that defendant did not drive"as nearly as practicable" entirely within one lane. 625 ILCS5/11--709(a) (West 2000). I disagree with that conclusion, as theroad's hilliness or curviness did not make it impracticable todrive entirely within one lane. Thus, I respectfully dissent.

In my view, the majority disregards the plain language ofsection 11--709(a). See People v. Woodard, 175 Ill. 2d 435, 443(1997) (a "court is not free to depart from the plain language andmeaning of [a] statute"). What is "practicable" is what "may bedone, practiced, or accomplished; that which is performable,feasible, [or] possible." Black's Law Dictionary 1172 (6th ed.1990). Thus, the crucial issue is whether defendant crossed thefog line when she possibly could have driven entirely within thelane. If so, then defendant did not drive "as nearly aspracticable" entirely within the lane. 625 ILCS 5/11--709(a) (West2000).

Had defendant crossed the fog line to avoid an obstruction inthe lane, such as a boulder or a deer, I would quickly hold thatshe drove "as nearly as practicable" entirely within the lane. 625ILCS 5/11--709(a) (West 2000). Such is not the case. Instead,defendant crossed the fog line merely because the road was hillyand curvy and had "poor visibility around the curves." I mightconcede that those conditions rendered more difficult the task ofdriving entirely within the lane. However, they clearly did notmake the task impossible. Indeed, to drive entirely within thelane, all defendant had to do was drive more carefully.

Thus, I would hold that Brandel reasonably suspected thatdefendant did not drive "as nearly as practicable" entirely withinone lane. 625 ILCS 5/11--709(a) (West 2000). Accordingly, I wouldvalidate the traffic stop, reverse the trial court's grant ofdefendant's motion to suppress, and remand the cause.