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PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of thecourt:

On December 6, 2000, defendant, Bruce Laster, filed his noticeof appeal, seeking review of his conviction and sentence, both inabsentia. His appellate counsel moves this court to remand thecause to the trial court so that defendant may receive properadmonishments to perfect his appeal. The State argues that thiscourt lacks jurisdiction to entertain this appeal. We agree withthe State and, therefore, we must dismiss this appeal.

In April 1999 defendant, Bruce Laster, was charged byindictment with the offense of unlawful possession of a controlledsubstance with the intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(c) (West1998)). Defendant and his counsel appeared in court on April 22,1999, and the trial court advised defendant that, if he failed toappear at any time his case was set for trial, the trial couldproceed without him, and if he was found guilty, he could also besentenced without being present. Defendant acknowledged hisunderstanding to the trial court. On December 7, 1999, defendantwas tried in absentia before a jury and subsequently found guilty. On March 15, 2000, the trial court sentenced defendant in absentiato a term of six years' imprisonment. Next, the trial court readthe admonishments concerning defendant's right to appeal. Therecord reflects that no notice of appeal was filed at this time.

The record on appeal next reflects that defendant was presentin court, but before a different judge, on July 10, 2000. Thetrial court informed defendant that he had been tried and sentencedin his absence and, because he had failed to appear, a warrant forhis arrest had been issued. On October 5, 2000, defendant appearedwith counsel before the judge who had previously presided overdefendant's trial in absentia and his sentencing in absentia. Defendant informed the trial court that he was in Louisville,Kentucky, because his aunt had passed away. He added that he hadthe papers but his counsel advised him that it was too late for himto file an appeal. Defendant asked the trial court whether it wastoo late for him to file an appeal, and the trial court responded:

"THE COURT: I don't know. *** I can't advise you. Anattorney could.

The issue is are you entitled to an attorney. I suppose. You might be able to file *** a post-conviction petition. Youhave a right to confer with [your] attorney about that.

As far as your appeal rights on the charge itself, Istated to you earlier that you have a right to appeal. Anynotice of appeal must be in writing and must be filed within30 days. You may request the clerk of the circuit court tofile the notice of appeal. You would be entitled to a freelawyer and a free transcript.

The problem is more than 30 days has gone by since March15.

DEFENDANT: Right. I thought that you said if I wasrepresented--

THE COURT: *** I can't advise you. You know, you mightbe able to talk to [defense counsel], and he might be able togive you some advice. He was your attorney, and you certainlyhad the right to confer with him in reference to whathappened."

On November 7, 2000, defendant pro se moved the trial courtfor a substitution of counsel, and on November 15, 2000, the trialcourt conducted a hearing. The trial court advised defendant tosend a copy of his motion to counsel so counsel would have anopportunity to respond. On November 22, 2000, defense counselappeared and informed the trial court that he was doing researchand filing a notice of appeal. Defense counsel requested anotherdate for a status hearing. On December 6, 2000, defense counselappeared in court and filed defendant's notice of appeal and movedthe court to appoint the office of the State Appellate Defender. The trial court allowed the filing and the appointment of appellatecounsel.

Defendant's appellate counsel (counsel or appellate counsel)now moves this court to remand this case for further proceedings incompliance with section 115--4.1(e) of the Code of CriminalProcedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/115--4.1(e) (West 2000)). Counsel asserts that the trial court misled defendant or,alternatively, failed to inform him regarding the procedural stepsnecessary to perfect his appeal. Counsel likens the trial court'sprocedural violation in the present case to circumstances in which a trial court fails to properly admonish a defendant upon a plea ofguilty. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 605(b). Counsel also indicates byinference that defendant relied on the trial court's misleadingadvice. Counsel argues that, because defendant filed his notice ofappeal more than 30 days after the trial court sentenced him, ourjurisdiction hinged on his filing of a motion for a new trial orsentencing hearing on the ground that he was not wilfully absent. See 725 ILCS 5/115--4.1(e) (West 2000). Appellate counsel admitsthat defendant failed to file a section 115--4.1(e) motion butargues that, because of the trial court's failure to properlyadmonish him, the just remedy is to remand the cause so the trialcourt may inform him of the proper procedures he must undertakebefore filing a notice of appeal.

Supreme Court Rule 605 (188 Ill. 2d. R. 605) addresses theadmonishments that a trial court is required to provide a defendantupon a judgment and sentence following a plea of not guilty (Rule605(a)), a plea of guilty (Rule 605(b)), and a negotiated plea ofguilty (Rule 605(c)). In the present case, defendant entered aplea of not guilty; therefore, Rules 605(b) and 605(c) do notapply. A jury found defendant guilty following his trial inabsentia. At defendant's sentencing hearing in absentia, the trialcourt provided the proper admonishments pursuant to Rule 605(a)pertaining to defendant's right to appeal. Defendant failed totake advantage of his opportunity for a direct review to thiscourt. Therefore, defendant is limited to the methods provided insection 115--4.1(e) of the Code to obtain review of his sentence. See People v. Woolridge, 292 Ill. App. 3d 788 (1997) (concludingthat the defendant, who pleaded guilty, was sentenced in absentia,and failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 604(d), waslimited to the provisions contained in section 115--4.1(e) of theCode to obtain review of the sentence, despite the trial court'sfailure to provide Rule 605(b) admonishments at the time ofsentencing).

Appellate counsel cites People v. Wright, 311 Ill. App. 3d1042 (2000), and People v. Foster, 171 Ill. 2d 469 (1996), for theproposition that a trial court should advise a defendant of theproper procedures to perfect an appeal and a reviewing court shouldexcuse a defendant's failure to follow such procedures when suchfailure rested upon the trial court's misleading or inaccuratecomments in the first place. We find the cases inapposite because,in both cases, the defendants were present at their sentencinghearings, which were predicated upon a plea or negotiated plea ofguilty, thus triggering the applicable rules providing for a trialcourt to provide proper admonishments (145 Ill. 2d Rs. 604(d),605(b)). In the present case, defendant, who had pleaded notguilty and was convicted by a jury, absented himself from thesentencing hearing where the trial court provided the properadmonishments. Because defendant failed to appear at his ownsentencing hearing, the relevant and governing authority lies inthe statutes providing for such circumstances.

Section 115--4.1(e) of the Code provides:

"(e) When a defendant who in his absence has been ***both convicted and sentenced appears before the court, he mustbe granted a new trial or new sentencing hearing if thedefendant can establish that his failure to appear in courtwas both without his fault and due to circumstances beyond hiscontrol. A hearing with notice to the State's Attorney on thedefendant's request for a new trial or a new sentencinghearing must be held before any such request may be granted. At any such hearing both the defendant and the State maypresent evidence." 725 ILCS 5/115--4.1(e) (West 2000).

Accordingly, under section 115--4.1(e) of the Code, defendant mayobtain review of his sentence if he "can establish that his failureto appear in court was both without his fault and due tocircumstances beyond his control." 725 ILCS 5/115--4.1(e) (West2000). This provision is " 'part of a statutory scheme to afforddue process to persons tried in absentia.' " Woolridge, 292 Ill.App. 3d at 793, quoting People v. Williams, 274 Ill. App. 3d 793,799 (1995). The time for presenting such a motion to invoke itsprovisions is when the formerly absented defendant "appears beforethe court." 725 ILCS 5/115--4.1(e) (West 2000).

We believe that, in the present case, the proper date wasOctober 5, 2000, when defendant appeared before the judge who hadpresided over his trial in absentia and his sentencing in absentia. See People v. Lozada, 323 Ill. App. 3d 1015 (2001) (dismissingappeal of a defendant who was sentenced in absentia for lack ofjurisdiction). Defendant informed the trial court that his aunt inKentucky had passed away and asked whether he could appeal hissentence. The trial court specifically stated that it could notadvise him and suggested that he confer with counsel, who waspresent at the hearing. Upon our reading of the record, we findthe trial court's comments were not misleading but, rather,instructive in that defendant was afforded an opportunity to conferwith his counsel to discuss the proper procedures to appeal thelength of his sentence. Nowhere in section 115--4.1 of the Codedoes our legislature impose a duty upon the trial court or directthe trial court to inform a defendant of any remaining proceduresto accomplish a judicial review, and we decline to create such anobligation now. Therefore, appellate counsel's request for aremand is denied.

On November 22, 2000, defense counsel informed the trial courtthat it was conducting research and planning to file a notice ofappeal. It was not until December 6, 2000, that defense counselfiled a notice of appeal, which we deem untimely. Becausedefendant failed to timely present any motion pursuant to section115--4.1(e) upon which he could have received an appealable ruling,this court is without jurisdiction to consider his appeal.

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack ofjurisdiction.

Appeal dismissed.

McLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.