People v. King

Case Date: 04/13/2004
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-03-0300 Rel

No. 2--03--0300


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT


THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE
OF ILLINOIS,

          Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

CORDELL KING,

          Deendant-Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Du Page County.



No. 01--CF--2703

Honorable
George J. Bakalis,
Judge, Presiding.



JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

On October 30, 2001, defendant, Cordell King, was charged by indictment with forgery (720ILCS 5/17--3(a)(2) (West 2000)). On November 7, 2002, defendant moved the court to dismiss thecharge on former jeopardy grounds. On January 24, 2003, the court denied the motion. On March13, 2003, defendant filed a pro se notice of appeal, arguing that the trial court erred by denying hismotion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we dismiss the appeal.

Supreme Court Rule 604 (188 Ill. 2d R. 604) authorizes certain interlocutory appeals incriminal cases. Rule 604(f) permits a defendant to file an interlocutory appeal from a trial court'sdenial of a motion to dismiss on former jeopardy grounds. The State claims that this provision isgoverned by the 30-day period for filing a notice of appeal provided in Supreme Court Rule 606(b)(188 Ill. 2d R. 606(b)). Defendant disagrees, arguing that Rule 604(f) does not specify what appealperiod governs, so a notice of appeal may be filed at any time. The question of whether the 30-dayperiod for appeals in Rule 606(b) applies to interlocutory appeals under Rule 604(f) is an issue of firstimpression. The issue presents a question of law that we review de novo. Lo v. Provena CovenantMedical Center, 342 Ill. App. 3d 975, 982 (2003).

A supreme court rule is interpreted in the same manner as a statute; that is, the primaryobjective is to ascertain and give effect to the drafters' intent. Roth v. Illinois Farmers Insurance Co.,202 Ill. 2d 490, 493 (2002). The best indication of the drafters' intent is the rule's language, givenits plain and ordinary meaning. Roth, 202 Ill. 2d at 493. Where the rule's language is clear, it mustbe applied as written; however, if the language is susceptible of more than one interpretation, thecourt may look beyond the language to consider the rule's purpose. Reda v. Advocate Health Care,199 Ill. 2d 47, 55 (2002). The drafters' intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the entirescheme, its nature, its object, and the consequences resulting from different constructions. Fumarolov. Chicago Board of Education, 142 Ill. 2d 54, 96 (1990). A court should not construe a rule in amanner that would lead to consequences that are absurd, inconvenient, or unjust. McMahan v.Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill. 2d 499, 513-14 (1998).

Specifically, Rule 604(f) provides, "The defendant may appeal to the Appellate Court thedenial of a motion to dismiss a criminal proceeding on grounds of former jeopardy." 188 Ill. 2d R.604(f). According to defendant, the rule does not provide a period for when the appeal must betaken, so an interlocutory appeal may be filed at any time. In this case, he filed a notice of appeal 48days after the order's entry. To the contrary, the State contends that the 30-day period for filing anotice of appeal in Rule 606(b) also governs an interlocutory appeal under Rule 604(f). We find thatthe language in question is ambiguous.

When a rule is ambiguous, we may look beyond the language as written to discern thedrafters' intent and consider the purpose of the rule and the evils that it was designed to remedy. Inre B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 542-43 (1997). Rule 604(f) concerns a defendant's right to be protectedfrom former jeopardy for the same offense. Interlocutory appellate review from the denial of adefendant's former jeopardy challenge helps to assure that an individual will not be forced "to endurethe personal strain, the public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than once for thesame offense." Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 661-62, 52 L. Ed. 2d 651, 661-62, 97 S. Ct.2034, 2041-42 (1977) (concluding that a motion to dismiss the indictment was immediatelyappealable under 28 U.S.C.