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In September 1999 defendant, Bryce Jamesson, was charged by complaint withthe offenses of unlawful contact with a street gang member (720 ILCS 5/25--1.1(West 1998)) and unlawful consumption of alcohol by a minor (235 ILCS 5/6--20(West 1998)). At a bench trial, defendant was convicted of the unlawful contactoffense and acquitted of the alcohol offense. The trial court sentenced defendantto a term of two years' probation. Defendant appeals, challenging the sufficiencyof the evidence and the constitutionality of the statute under which he wascharged and convicted. We find the statute constitutional and affirm the trialcourt's judgment.

The record reflects that on September 22, 1999, defendant pleaded guilty tothe offense of possession of cannabis (720 ILCS 550/4(a) (West 1998)). On thesame date, the trial court sentenced defendant to a term of six months' courtsupervision and imposed an express condition of supervision that, during the termof supervision, "[d]efendant must have no contact with Samuel Banuelos," threeother named individuals, "or any other known gang members."

On September 25, 1999, defendant was charged with the offenses in thepresent case. On February 8, 2000, defendant filed a motion to dismiss thecomplaint. Defendant argued that the statute creating the offense of unlawfulcontact with street gang members (720 ILCS 5/25--1.1 (West 1998)) wasunconstitutional. The State filed its response to defendant's motion, and thetrial court denied defendant's motion. The cause proceeded to a bench trial.

The State's witness was Russell Schecht, a patrolman with the Addison policedepartment assigned to the gang tactical unit. Schecht testified that his dutiesas a tactical officer with gang units include collecting intelligence, training,teaching, and educating other police and nonpolice personnel regarding gangs. Heteaches classes on a regular basis and trades information on gangs with otherpolice departments twice weekly. Schecht also participates in continuingeducation about gangs, attends gang intelligence meetings, and has attendedseminars of the Midwest Gang Investigators for approximately 10 years. Schechtadded that he had been qualified to testify in court as a gang expert on 15 to 20prior occasions.

Schecht further testified regarding his familiarity with the structuredgangs in Addison, which include the Latin Counts, Latin Kings, Vice Lords, andInsane Deuces. With respect to the Latin Counts, Schecht testified that they area "People" gang under the "People" nation, and his department began to havecontact with them a couple of years ago. He explained that gang members from theCicero area came to Addison and began heavily recruiting members several yearsago. Schecht described the Latin Counts as a violent street gang in Cicero and,in Addison, they have been in numerous violent incidents involving narcotics,batteries, aggravated batteries, assaults, and numerous other criminal activities.

Schecht testified that the Latin Counts are identified by the colors red andblack. He described the many different ways they display their colors and"represent" to the left side of the body. For example, they may wear their hatstilted to the left side or wear bandannas on their heads with the knot turned tothe left. Schecht also testified regarding his knowledge of the hierarchy andstructure of the Latin Counts. The State tendered Schecht as an expert, and thetrial court accepted the tender.

The State continued with its examination of Schecht. Schecht testified thathe was familiar with defendant and had numerous contacts with him. Schechtdescribed an area called Michael Lane, where there had been a recent concentrationof Latin Counts gang members who maintained a presence in that neighborhood. Schecht testified that defendant admitted to him and other officers on a numberof occasions that he is a Latin Counts gang member.

Schecht testified that on September 24, 1999, at approximately 11 p.m., hewas on routine patrol with another officer in the Michael Lane neighborhooddriving through an alley when he saw two known gang members, George Soria and SamBanuelos, standing between two apartment buildings. He observed Soria attired ina black and red sweatshirt and noted they were in an area where they have had"literally" hundreds of gang contacts at the apartment building in numerousincidents, so Schecht and the other officer stopped to make contact with them. Initially, Schecht thought Soria and Banuelos were the only two individualsoutside, but then he realized someone was standing behind Soria. Schecht observedthe third individual walk behind Soria, then turn around and walk away. Schechtcalled to the third individual and, when he turned around, Schecht recognized himas defendant. Schecht testified that defendant was wearing a red jacket, a redCincinnati Reds hat tilted to the left, and a red bandanna on the left side of hispants or belt loop. Schecht knew that, by court order, defendant was not allowedto have contact with any other gang members, specifically Banuelos. Banuelos hadadmitted to Schecht that he was a gang member; additionally, Schecht has hadnumerous contacts with Banuelos. He also noted that Banuelos wears gang colorsand is usually with or associated with other gang members.

Schecht next testified regarding gang contact cards, which are used to keepa record of contacts between officers and gang members. One card reflected thaton August 27, 1999, an officer had a contact with Banuelos, defendant, and anothergang member. That contact resulted in both Banuelos and defendant being chargedwith unlawful possession of cannabis and the other gang member being served witha failure-to-appear warrant. Another card reflected that on September 24, 1999,Schecht and his partner had a contact with Soria at approximately 11 p.m. Alsonoted on the card was that Soria was with defendant, who had a court order for nogang contact. Soria admitted being a Latin Counts gang member to Schecht, anddefendant was arrested. A third card reflected that on June 4, 1999, three otherofficers had a contact with Soria, who was with defendant and another individual,and the officers issued loitering tickets. A fourth contact card reflected thaton September 3, 1999, Banuelos, who was with defendant and another individual, waswearing gang colors and loitering. Banuelos was issued a ticket for loitering.

Schecht opined that, based on previous contacts with Banuelos and hisassociates, previous records, and the area where Banuelos was observed, Banueloswas a Latin Counts gang member on September 24, 1999. Schecht also opined thatSoria was a Latin Counts gang member on September 24, 1999. He based his opinionon Soria's style of dress, location, and contacts prior to and since September 24.

Schecht also testified regarding his conversation with defendant onSeptember 24, 1999. Defendant admitted to Schecht that he knew he had a no-gang-contact order and was not supposed to be with Soria or Banuelos but explained toSchecht that he was waiting for a ride from someone named Robert. Schecht noticeddefendant's breath emitted an odor of alcohol. Schecht knew that defendant wasunder the age of 21 and knew defendant had a no-gang-contact order, so he placeddefendant under arrest.

The parties rested, and the trial court granted defendant's motion for adirected finding as to the alcohol offense but denied the motion as to theunlawful-contact offense. On March 28, 2000, the trial court found defendantguilty of committing the offense of unlawful contact with a street gang member. Following the denial of his posttrial motion, defendant timely appeals.

We will first address the constitutionality of the statute under whichdefendant was charged and convicted because, in the event that the statute atissue is declared unconstitutional on its face, the ultimate outcome would be tovacate defendant's conviction based upon that statute. See People v. Zeisler, 125Ill. 2d 42, 48 (1988) (noting that the doctrine of void ab initio declares anunconstitutional statute null and void as of the date of its enactment, "whichresults in the court's vacating a conviction based upon such statute"); see alsoPeople v. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d 1, 24 (2000).

The statute, section 25--1.1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 (the CriminalCode) reads, in relevant part:

"(a) A person commits the offense of unlawful contact with streetgangmembers when:

(1) He or she knowingly has direct or indirect contact with astreetgang member as defined in Section 10 of the Illinois StreetgangTerrorism Omnibus Prevention Act after having been sentenced to ***supervision for a criminal offense with a condition of such sentencebeing to refrain from direct or indirect contact with a streetgangmember or members[.]" 720 ILCS 5/25--1.1 (West 1998).

Our review of the merits of defendant's constitutional challenge is guidedby the following principles. A statute is presumed to be constitutional, and theparty challenging it bears the burden of establishing its unconstitutionality. Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24; People v. Jung, 192 Ill. 2d 1, 4 (2000). A reviewingcourt has a duty to construe a statute in a manner that upholds itsconstitutionality, if that can be reasonably done. People v. Fisher, 184 Ill. 2d441, 448 (1998). The objective of statutory construction is to give effect to thelegislature's intent, and, when presented with conflicting interpretations, courtswill avoid a construction that creates constitutional difficulties, absurdity,inconvenience, or injustice. People v. Berg, 277 Ill. App. 3d 549, 552 (1996). Any doubts must be resolved in favor of upholding the statute. People v. Cochran,323 Ill. App. 3d 669, 675 (2001). Our standard of review is de novo. People v.Maness, 191 Ill. 2d 478, 483 (2000).

A law can be facially unconstitutional under two different theories. First,laws that inhibit the exercise of first amendment rights can be invalidated underthe overbreadth doctrine. Fuller v. Decatur Public School Board of EducationSchool District 61, 251 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 2001), citing Broadrick v.Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830, 93 S. Ct. 2908 (1973). Second, a lawcan be found to be impermissibly vague, even if it does not reach a substantialamount of constitutionally protected conduct, if it fails to define the offensewith sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct isprohibited and it fails to establish standards to permit enforcement in anonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory manner. Fuller, 251 F.3d at 666, citing Kolenderv. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903, 103 S. Ct. 1855 (1983).

We will first address defendant's contention that the unlawful-contactstatute is facially overbroad and, therefore, unconstitutional because it failsto contain a mental state element beyond passive contact with another citizen. Because the statute exposes an accused to punishment for innocent contact withothers, defendant concludes that the statute violates a citizen's right to freeassembly.

The doctrine of overbreadth was designed to protect first amendment freedomof expression from laws written so broadly the fear of punishment might discouragetaking advantage of that freedom. People v. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210, 226 (1995);People v. Rokicki, 307 Ill. App. 3d 645, 652 (1999). A statute regulating conductis overly broad if it (1) criminalizes a substantial amount of protected behavior,relative to the law's plainly legitimate sweep, and (2) is not susceptible to alimiting construction that avoids constitutional problems. Rokicki, 307 Ill. App.3d at 652. The overbreadth doctrine should be employed sparingly and only whena challenger can prove that a statute's overbreadth is real and substantial. People v. Anderson, 148 Ill. 2d 15, 26 (1992).

In the present case, we reject defendant's argument that the statute can beapplied to innocent or constitutionally protected conduct. While the offense ofunlawful contact with street gang members does contain an element of association,this type of association does not fall within the ambit of the first amendment. Where the association is an integral part of the unlawful conduct, it has noconstitutional protection. See, e.g., Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d 210 (1995) (addressinga constitutional challenge to a stalking statute). Here, the trial court imposeda limitation on defendant's association with others as a part of a valid criminalsentence. See People v. Laughlin, 293 Ill. App. 3d 194, 198 (1997) (recognizingthe State's power to restrict an individual's right to travel when the restrictionis rationally related to the imposition of a proper punishment or remedy). Theelement of association in the unlawful contact statute is an integral part of theoffense. The offense cannot be committed without the prior condition ofsupervision, a gathering of street gang members, and defendant's knowing decisionto place himself within the assemblage of those street gang members. Therefore,the element of association in the unlawful contact with street gang members is notconstitutionally protected.

Moreover, the unlawful-contact statute is directed only at that type ofknowing contact that is unlawful. Defendant was not issued a complaint becausehe happened to be in close proximity to two other Latin Count gang members whilewaiting for a ride from someone named Robert. Rather, defendant was issued acomplaint because Officer Schecht recognized defendant in the company of two knowngang members; Schecht knew defendant had just been sentenced to a term ofsupervision based upon a criminal offense; Schecht knew that the trial court hadordered defendant to have no contact with street gang members, specificallyBanuelos; and defendant admitted that he knew he was not supposed to be withBanuelos.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, section 25--1.1 does not lack a mentalstate element. Section 25--1.1 expressly provides that the mental state for theoffense of unlawful contact with street gang members is knowledge. A person maybe convicted under this statute only if that person knowingly and unlawfullyviolates a specific court sentencing order. Any other individual who has not beenthe subject of a criminal prosecution and who has not been specifically orderedin a sentencing decree to avoid knowing contact with street gang members isclearly not subject to punishment under this statute. See Anderson, 148 Ill. 2dat 26. Therefore, no person could reasonably believe that punishment would bereal and substantial for any conduct not in violation of a specific court order. We conclude that the Illinois criminal offense of unlawful contact with streetgang members is not unconstitutionally overbroad.

We next address defendant's contention that the unlawful-contact statute isunconstitutionally vague because the term "contact" is a concept about whichreasonable people will have to speculate to give meaning. A facial challenge todetermine whether a statute is impermissibly vague is limited. Fuller, 251 F.3dat 666. To prevail on a vagueness challenge to a statute that does not implicatefirst amendment concerns, as is the case here, a party must demonstrate that thestatute was vague as applied to the conduct for which the party is beingprosecuted. Bailey, 167 Ill. 2d at 228. Due process requires that a statute notbe so vague that persons of common intelligence must necessarily guess at itsmeaning or application. People v. Ramos, 316 Ill. App. 3d 18, 26 (2000). Thedetermination of whether a statute is void for vagueness must be made in thefactual context of each case. People v. Falbe, 189 Ill. 2d 635, 639 (2000);People v. Kershner, 291 Ill. App. 3d 1024, 1027 (1997), citing People v. Bales,108 Ill. 2d 182, 189 (1985).

The unlawful-contact-with-street-gang-members statute must satisfy tworequirements to comport with the standards of due process. First, the statute'sprohibitions must be sufficiently definite, when measured by common understandingand practices, to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is lawfuland what conduct is unlawful. People v. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d 109, 113 (2001). Second, the statute must provide sufficiently definite standards for lawenforcement officers and triers of fact that its application does not dependmerely on their private conceptions. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d at 113. So long as adefendant's conduct clearly falls within the statutory proscription, a defendantmay be prosecuted under the statute in harmony with due process, even though thestatute may be vague as to other conduct. Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d at 113, citingAnderson, 148 Ill. 2d at 28.

In the present case, we determine that the unlawful-contact statute is notvague. We recognize that criminal acts cannot always be defined with absoluteprecision. City of Chicago v. Powell, 315 Ill. App. 3d 1136, 1147 (2000), citingPeople v. Burpo, 164 Ill. 2d 261 (1995). The word "contact" bears definitions of"association, relationship," "connection, communication," and "to get incommunication with." See Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 282 (1990). Section 25--1.1 of the Criminal Code requires a defendant to knowingly havecontact with a gang member, despite an explicit prohibition in a trial court'ssentencing order, for a violation to occur. 720 ILCS 5/25--1.1 (West 1998). Webelieve that a person of ordinary intelligence would reasonably know that she orhe could not knowingly communicate with, meet with, or associate with those gangmembers as set out in the sentencing order. Moreover, trial courts have long usedtheir discretion to impose "no contact" conditions in imposing sentences. See,e.g., People v. Kimbrell, 291 Ill. App. 3d 605 (1997); People v. Rymut, 216 Ill.App. 3d 920 (1991).

Defendant relies upon City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 144 L. Ed.2d 67, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999), in support of his vagueness argument. In Morales,the Supreme Court considered a facial challenge to a Chicago ordinance thatprohibited criminal street gang members from loitering with one another or withother persons in any public place. The ordinance required a police officer, uponobserving a person the officer reasonably believed to be a criminal street gangmember loitering in a public place with one or more persons, to order all of thepersons to disperse, and it made the failure to obey the order a violation. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, recognized that theordinance did not have a sufficiently substantial impact on conduct protected bythe first amendment to subject it to a facial overbreadth challenge. Morales, 527U.S. at 55, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 79, 119 S. Ct. at 1858. Rather, the ordinance wascharacterized as a criminal law that contained no mens rea requirement and thatinfringed on the constitutionally protected right to liberty. The Court concludedthat, when "vagueness permeates the text of such a law, it is subject to facialattack." Morales, 527 U.S. at 55, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 79, 119 S. Ct. at 1858.

The Morales Court held that the ordinance was impermissibly vague in partbecause it failed to establish minimal guidelines for law enforcement. Morales,527 U.S. at 60-63, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 82-84, 119 S. Ct. at 1861-62. It noted thatthe prohibited conduct was loitering, that is, remaining in one place with noapparent purpose, and concluded that the ordinance failed to give an ordinarycitizen adequate notice of what conduct was forbidden and what conduct waspermitted. The Court further reflected that, because the ordinance required noharmful purpose, it applied to any individuals who remained in one place with asuspected gang member as long as their purpose was not apparent to an officer. The Court noted that the ordinance required an officer to order the dispersal ofsuch persons without first inquiring into their possible purposes. Morales, 527U.S. at 57-63, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 80-84, 119 S. Ct. at 1859-62. Here, however, themeaning of the term "contact" is not so vague that the ultimate decision as to itsmeaning is left to the private conceptions of police officers. Moreover, theunlawful-contact statute requires an unlawful purpose. Contra Morales, 527 U.S.at 60-63, 144 L. Ed. 2d at 82-84, 119 S. Ct. at 1861-62.

Defendant also presents a hypothetical situation in which he argues that,had he been attending school and sitting in a classroom alongside another gangmember, he would have been exposed to a conviction of the unlawful-contactoffense. He also asserts that the State's evidence established that defendant wasmerely standing in a public place in proximity to persons who were members of theLatin Counts gang. Our supreme court has held, however, that a statute is notunconstitutionally vague merely because one can imagine hypothetical situationsin which the meaning of some terms might be called into question. Izzo, 195 Ill.2d at 113. Again, the validity of the law must be judged in light of theparticular facts of the present case. The innocent school classroom scenarioposited by defendant is not at issue here. Rather, the events giving rise todefendant's prosecution involve a knowing contact following a trial court's orderto refrain from being in contact with certain street gang members.

Defendant was charged with the specific unlawful act of knowingly havingcontact with a street gang member after having been sentenced to supervision withan explicit condition to refrain from having any contact with Banuelos or othergang members, a violation of our Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/25--1.1 (West 1998)),and not with any vague conduct. If defendant was confused as to what the trialcourt meant by "no contact with Samuel Banuelos *** or any other known gangmembers," he could have inquired at his sentencing hearing following his guiltyplea. See Izzo, 195 Ill. 2d at 114-15. The record clearly reflects that noconfusion existed on the part of defendant then or on appeal now as to the meaningof the trial court's proscription against contact with Banuelos or other knowngang members.

Inasmuch as defendant is the party challenging the constitutionality of astatute, he bears the burden of clearly establishing the constitutional violation. See Wright, 194 Ill. 2d at 24; People v. DePalma, 256 Ill. App. 3d 206, 210(1994). Upon our review of the issues presented, we determine that defendant hasfailed to satisfy that burden.

Defendant next contends that the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism OmnibusPrevention Act (the Act) (740 ILCS 147/1 et seq. (West 1998)) is unconstitutionalbecause it allows for one of its definitions, "streetgang," to be proved by apreponderance of the evidence in a prosecution for the offense of unlawful contactwith a street gang member (720 ILCS 5/25--1.1 (West 1998)). The State respondsthat defendant has incorrectly interpreted the statute and, further, nothing inthe record supports the inference that the trial court used a standard of proofother than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard. We agree with the State'sposition and find that defendant's contention is meritless.

Section 10 of the Act defines "streetgang" as:

"[A]ny combination, confederation, alliance, network, conspiracy,understanding, or other similar conjoining, in law or in fact, of 3 or morepersons with an established hierarchy that, through its membership orthrough the agency of any member engages in a course or pattern of criminalactivity." 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2000).

The paragraph following the definition of "streetgang" reads:

"For purposes of this Act, it shall not be necessary to show that aparticular conspiracy, combination, or conjoining of persons possesses,acknowledges, or is known by any common name, insignia, flag, means ofrecognition, secret signal or code, creed, belief, structure, leadership orcommand structure, *** when the conspiracy's existence, in law or in fact,can be demonstrated by a preponderance of other competent evidence. However, any evidence reasonably tending to show or demonstrate, in law orin fact, the existence of or membership in any conspiracy, confederation,or other association described herein, or probative of the existence of ourmembership in any such association, shall be admissible in any action orproceeding brought under this Act." 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2000).

The preceding paragraph clearly reflects that it is limited to actions orproceedings brought under the Act, a civil cause of action. See 740 ILCS 147/15(West 2000). Section 5 of the Act sets out the legislative findings, whichinclude the legislative intent to create a civil remedy against street gangs andtheir members. 740 ILCS 147/5 (West 2000). Section 20 of the Act sets out theprocedures to commence an action under the Act, "as in civil cases" (740 ILCS147/20 (West 2000)), and the other sections provide for venue, service of process,and relief (740 ILCS 147/25, 30, 35 (West 2000)). No provision in the Actreferences a preponderance-of-the-evidence burden of proof to be incorporated intooffenses contained in the Criminal Code.

All statutes are presumed to be constitutionally valid. People v. Sanders,182 Ill. 2d 524, 528 (1998). We must affirm the enactment's validity andconstitutionality if reasonably possible. Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d at 528. Defendantin the present case bears the burden of clearly establishing its constitutionalinfirmity. See Sanders, 182 Ill. 2d at 528-29. Any doubts about the enactment'svalidity are resolved in favor of the statute. People v. Shephard, 152 Ill. 2d489, 499 (1992). We find nothing in the Act to support defendant's contention.

Due process requires that a defendant be proved guilty beyond a reasonabledoubt before being punished for a crime. People v. Weston, 271 Ill. App. 3d 604,615 (1995), citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 375, 90S. Ct. 1068, 1072-73 (1970). Although a trial court is presumed to know the lawand apply it properly, when the record affirmatively shows the contrary, thatpresumption is rebutted. Weston, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 615, citing People v.Virella, 256 Ill. App. 3d 635, 638 (1993). In the present case, nothing in therecord suggests that the trial court used any standard other than the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, and defendant does not claim that it did. Accordingly,defendant's claim fails.

Last, defendant challenges the sufficiency of the State's evidence presentedat trial. He argues that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonabledoubt. Specifically, he asserts that the State failed to prove that the LatinCounts were a street gang as defined in the Act (740 ILCS 147/10 (West 1998)).

The standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trialis the same as it is in a jury trial. People v. Herring, 324 Ill. App. 3d 458,460 (2001), citing People v. Howery, 178 Ill. 2d 1, 38 (1997). Our role is notto retry the defendant. People v. Cochran, 323 Ill. App. 3d 669, 678 (2001). Inassessing whether the evidence against a defendant was sufficient to prove guiltbeyond a reasonable doubt, a reviewing court must determine " 'whether, afterviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rationaltrier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond areasonable doubt.' " (Emphasis omitted.) People v. Thomas, 178 Ill. 2d 215, 232(1997), quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560, 573,99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). The trier of fact bears the responsibility to assessthe credibility of the witnesses, weigh the evidence presented, resolve conflictsin the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. People v.Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338 (2000); Cochran, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 678-79. Weafford the trier of fact great deference. People v. DePaolo, 317 Ill. App. 3d301, 306 (2000). We will not reverse a defendant's conviction unless the evidenceis so improbable or unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of thedefendant's guilt. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d at 338.

To find defendant guilty of the offense of unlawful contact with street gangmembers, the State must prove, and the trier of fact must find, that defendant hadbeen previously convicted of a criminal offense; defendant had been sentenced toprobation, conditional discharge, or supervision for that criminal offense; as acondition of the sentence, defendant was to refrain from direct or indirectcontact with a street gang member or members; and defendant thereafter knowinglyhad direct or indirect contact with a street gang member. See 720 ILCS 5/25--1.1(West 1998). Defendant in the present case does not dispute his prior conviction,sentence, or condition of the sentence that he have no direct contact with SamuelBanuelos or any other known gang members. Defendant contends that the Statefailed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Latin Counts organization wasa "streetgang" as defined in the Act.

Section 10 of the Act defines "streetgang" as:

"[A]ny combination, confederation, alliance, network, conspiracy,understanding, or other similar conjoining, in law or in fact, of 3 or morepersons with an established hierarchy that, through its membership orthrough the agency of any member engages in a course or pattern of criminalactivity." 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 1998).

"Course or pattern of criminal activity" is defined as:

"2 or more gang-related criminal offenses committed in whole or inpart within this State when:

(1) at least one such offense was committed after the effectivedate of this Act;

(2) both offenses were committed within 5 years of each other;and

(3) at least one offense involved the solicitation to commit,conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or commission of any offensedefined as a felony or forcible felony under the Criminal Code of1961." 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 1998).

At trial, the State presented evidence establishing that on September 24,1999, two days after the trial court sentenced defendant to supervision with thecondition that he have no contact with Banuelos or any other known gang members,Officer Schecht saw defendant in the presence of Banuelos and Soria, another knowngang member. Banuelos and Soria had previously admitted to Schecht that they wereLatin Counts gang members. Defendant purportedly admitted to Schecht hisawareness of the no-gang-contact order and his knowledge that he was not supposedto be with Banuelos and Soria. Schecht testified as an expert witness on gangsand as an occurrence witness. Schecht described the location of the incident,Michael Lane, as an area where "literally hundreds of gang contacts" occurred. Schecht described their clothing, the significance of the colors, and the mannerin which they were attired.

Schecht further testified regarding his duties, which included collectingand trading information and educating others about gangs. As an expert witness,Schecht testified regarding his familiarity with the structured street gangs inAddison and, specifically, the Latin Counts. Schecht testified regarding hisknowledge of the hierarchy and structure of the Latin Counts, which include apresident and a type of treasurer. He was aware that ledgers existed and showedwhether dues were paid. He testified that the Latin Counts are a People gangunder the People nation and the Addison police department began to have contactwith them a couple of years ago. He explained the recruitment efforts of theLatin Counts. Schecht described the Latin Counts as a violent street gang inCicero and, in Addison, they had been involved in numerous violent incidents. Their involvement includes narcotics, batteries, aggravated batteries, assaults,and numerous other criminal activities. Schecht opined that the Latin Countsorganization was a street gang and that Banuelos and Soria were Latin Counts gangmembers.

In Richardson v. Chapman, 175 Ill. 2d 98 (1997), our supreme court held thata witness, whether expert or lay, may provide an opinion on an ultimate issue ina case. Richardson, 175 Ill. 2d at 107. This rule also applies to criminalcases. See People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467, 496-97 (1998). The Terrell courtreasoned that, because the trier of fact is not required to accept the witness'sconclusion, the testimony cannot be said to usurp the province of the trier offact. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d at 496-97, citing Richardson, 175 Ill. 2d at 107-08.

In the present case, Schecht's testimony was necessary to establish theessential element that defendant knowingly had contact with a street gang and theLatin Counts were a street gang as defined in the Act. Although Schecht did nottestify as to specific dates or specific incidents, the trial court was free toaccept or reject Schecht's opinions that the Latin Counts were a street gang thatengaged in a course or pattern of criminal activity. Schecht described hisfamiliarity with the Latin Counts organization and its members, specificallyBanuelos and Soria. Schecht testified that the police department began to havecontact with the Latin Counts "a couple of years ago" and that the Latin Countshave been involved in numerous violent incidents. The trial court could haveproperly determined that the criminal activity occurred after the effective dateof the Act, January 1, 1993. Further, because the Latin Counts began theircriminal activity in Addison only a couple of years ago, the trial court properlycould have found that the offenses occurred within five years of each other. Schecht's testimony also established that the Latin Counts were involved in, interalia, aggravated batteries (see, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12--4 (West 2000)). The trialcourt, thus, properly could have determined that at least one of the criminaloffenses Schecht testified to was a felony. Therefore, based upon Schecht'stestimony, the trial court properly could have determined that the Stateestablished that the Latin Counts engaged in a course or pattern of criminalactivity. See 740 ILCS 147/10 (West 2000). At the end of the trial, the trialcourt concluded that the State had met its burden of proof beyond a reasonabledoubt, and it found defendant guilty of the unlawful-contact offense. Based onSchecht's testimony, his opinions, and the reasonable inferences therefrom, weconclude that a rational trier of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubtthat the Latin Counts organization was a street gang as defined in the Act.

After a review of the record in the light most favorable to the prosecution,we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have determined beyond areasonable doubt that defendant was guilty of the offense of unlawful contact withstreet gang members (720 ILCS 5/25--1.1 (West 1998)). We hold that the evidencesupports the trial court's guilty verdict.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du PageCounty is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.