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JUSTICE GROMETER delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals from an order of the circuit courtsuppressing the evidence and quashing the arrest of defendant,William E. Jackson. The State argues that the circuit court erredby concluding that the police officer lacked a valid basis for theinvestigatory stop of defendant's car. We reverse and remand.

Defendant was indicted by a grand jury for the offense ofdriving while his driver's license was revoked (625 ILCS 5/6--303(West 2000)). He subsequently moved the court to quash his arrestand suppress the evidence obtained from it. At the July 20, 2001,hearing on the motion, the following evidence was introduced by the hearing's sole witness, police officer Steve Cadle of the CarolStream police department.

Cadle testified that on May 16, 1999, at approximately 5 p.m.,he stopped at an intersection during a routine patrol. He observeddefendant drive past him in the opposite direction. As defendantpassed him, Cadle "saw what appeared to be a large obstruction in[defendant's] front windshield" in violation of section 12--503(c)of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code) (625 ILCS 5/12--503(c)(West 2000)). He then turned his squad car around and initiated aninvestigatory stop of defendant's vehicle. He testified that thewindshield obstruction was the only reason for the stop and that heobserved no other violations of the law at that time.

When asked by defense counsel to describe the windshieldobstruction, Cadle stated that "[t]wo air fresheners [were] hangingfrom the rear-view [sic] mirror." He later added the detail thatthe air fresheners were "tree or leafy-shaped." Defense counselthen showed some air fresheners to Cadle and asked him if they werethe same air fresheners that he had observed in defendant'svehicle. Cadle was not able to identify whether they were the sameair fresheners, but he stated that "it's possible" that they were. He also noted that he only observed defendant's vehicle forapproximately two seconds prior to initiating the stop.

At the end of the testimony, the court indicated that it found Cadle to be a "very honest, credi[ble] witness doing his job." However, it also noted that Cadle did testify that "the[windshield] obstructions were similar in nature" to the airfresheners presented by the defense. It concluded that Cadlelacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify theinvestigatory stop and granted defendant's motion. On July 31,2001, the State moved the court to reconsider its decision. Thetrial court denied the State's motion and this timely appealfollowed.

As an initial matter, the parties dispute which standard thiscourt should apply in reviewing the circuit court's grant ofdefendant's motion. Their dispute concerns whether we are requiredto review the circuit court's factual determinations. Under suchcircumstances, we accord great deference to the court's factualfindings and credibility assessments and will reverse thosefindings only if they are against the manifest weight of theevidence. People v. Sorenson, 196 Ill. 2d 425, 431 (2001). "However, suppression motions are best characterized as raisingmixed questions of fact and law, and if all factual disputes in thecase have been resolved, only a question of law remains." Peoplev. Bascom, 286 Ill. App. 3d 124, 126 (1997). When a case's factsand witnesses' credibility are uncontroverted, we are presentedwith only a legal question that we review de novo. People v.Wardlow, 183 Ill. 2d 306, 309 (1998), rev'd on other grounds, 528U.S. 119, 145 L. Ed. 2d 570, 120 S. Ct. 673 (2000); see alsoBascom, 286 Ill. App. 3d at 127; People v. Frazier, 248 Ill. App.3d 6, 15 (1993). Those circumstances are present in the instantcase. At the motion hearing, the arresting officer was the onlytestifying witness, and the circuit court explicitly found histestimony credible. We will, therefore, review the court's legaldetermination de novo.

The only issue on appeal is whether the circuit courtcorrectly found that the arresting officer lacked a reasonablesuspicion of criminal activity to justify his investigatory stop ofdefendant's vehicle. An investigatory stop is proper when a policeofficer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminalactivity is taking place or is about to take place. People v.Repp, 165 Ill. App. 3d 90, 94 (1988). A reasonable suspicion iscreated when a police officer has knowledge of specific,articulable facts that, when combined with the rational inferencesfrom them, suggest that the person in question has committed or isabout to commit a crime. Repp, 165 Ill. App. 3d at 94.

The State contends that the court's determination that thearresting officer lacked a reasonable suspicion of criminalitycontradicts the holding of United States v. Smith, 80 F.3d 215 (7thCir. 1996). In Smith, the defendant was stopped for the solereason of having an air freshener hanging from the car's rearviewmirror. Smith, 80 F.3d at 219. The Smith court held that theofficer had probable cause to stop the defendant becauseobjectively the air freshener could be considered a materialobstruction between the driver and the windshield in violation ofsection 12--503(c) of the Code (625 ILCS 5/12--503(c) (West 1994)). Smith, 80 F.3d at 219.

Likewise, in People v. Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d 826 (1992), the court held that an investigatory stop was not pretextualbecause the officer "was quite adamant that, in her opinion, the[fuzzy dice hanging from the rearview mirror of defendant's car]would have materially obstructed the driver's view in somedirections." Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 838. We find Smith andMendoza controlling.

In the present case, the court found the arresting officer'stestimony credible. The officer testified that, in his opinion,the air fresheners hanging from defendant's rearview mirror werematerial windshield obstructions. After finding the officer'stestimony credible, the court, nevertheless, determined that helacked a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. The courtapparently concluded that the air fresheners in defendant's vehiclewere the same as the ones displayed in court and, in its view, werenot material obstructions of the windshield. We cannot agree withthis determination.

The court's inquiry during a suppression hearing concernswhether, prior to making the investigatory stop, the arrestingofficer had knowledge of specific, articulable facts which suggestedthat the person in question had committed or was about to commit acrime. Smith instructs us that an air freshener hanging from arearview mirror can create a reasonable suspicion that section 12--503(c) of the Code is being violated. Smith, 80 F.3d at 219. Moreover, as Mendoza states, when considering whether the arrestingofficer had a reasonable suspicion of criminality to justify thestop, we look to the officer's opinions and beliefs at the time heor she made the stop. Mendoza, 234 Ill. App. 3d at 838. Thecourt's determination should not focus on whether an offense wasactually committed but, instead, on whether the arresting officer reasonably suspected at the time of the stop that criminal activitywas taking place or about to take place. See People v. Ross, 289Ill. App. 3d 1013, 1016 (1997). We conclude that the uncontrovertedevidence presented at the suppression hearing established that,according to Smith and Mendoza, the air cleaners observed by thearresting officer constitute a legal basis for a reasonablesuspicion of criminality.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Du Page County is reversed, and the cause is remanded for furtherproceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

McLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.