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January 11, 2001

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

The defendant, Elston A. Henry, appeals from his conviction ofa violation of section 407(b)(1) of the Illinois ControlledSubstances Act (720 ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 1998)). We affirm.

Defendant was charged with four counts of selling substancescontaining cocaine. Following a jury trial, defendant wasconvicted of selling between 1 and 15 grams of cocaine to anundercover police officer while in the parking lot of an elementaryschool. Defendant's posttrial motion was denied, and defendant wassentenced to a term of 13 years and 3 months in prison. Thisappeal followed.

Defendant raises two issues on appeal. First, defendantcontends that the State shifted the burden of proof and standard ofreview in its closing argument. Second, defendant contends thatthe court erred in refusing to tender an instruction regarding alesser-included offense of possession with intent to deliver. Inneither instance did defendant object at trial. In fact, defendantnever tendered an instruction regarding a lesser-included offense;the issue was brought up only after the State completed itsrebuttal closing argument. In his posttrial motion, defendantnever mentioned improper argument by the State and only made thefollowing allegation regarding instructions not given to the jury:

"4. That the Court erred in refusing to give thefollowing instruction to the jury, submitted by thedefendant."

No instruction is then listed. The motion concludes with "[s]uchother grounds and each and every error as may appear from thereport of proceedings of the trial, which is not presentlyavailable to defendant or his counsel." No amended motion was everfiled. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel, when askedif he wished to argue, stated, "No, Your Honor. I'll be standingon the argument from the trial and the motion, of course."

Both a trial objection and a written posttrial motion raising the complained-of issue are required to preserve alleged errorsthat could have been raised at the trial. People v. Enoch, 122Ill. 2d 176, 186 (1988). The failure to specifically raise analleged error in a written posttrial motion results in the waiverof the issue, as general allegations of error do not alert thetrial court to alleged errors that can be corrected at the trialcourt level. See People v. Walensky, 286 Ill. App. 3d 82, 96(1996). However, where errors affect substantial rights, denyingthe accused a fair and impartial trial, or where the evidence isclosely balanced, a reviewing court may choose to consider anotherwise waived issue. People v. Rivera, 277 Ill. App. 3d 811,818 (1996).

Here, we conclude that defendant has waived the issue of theState's closing argument. Our review of defendant's argumentreveals statements by the prosecutor that do not shift the burdenof proof to the defendant as much as they fail to address fully theissue of entrapment. Defendant argues that the State's closingargument did not "frame the legal issue" properly and that theState presented "little if any evidence" that defendant waspredisposed to selling drugs on school property. However,prosecutors are afforded substantial latitude in closing argumentand, even when the argument may be improper, such arguments willnot warrant reversal unless they result in substantial prejudice tothe defendant. People v. Nolan, 291 Ill. App. 3d 879, 886 (1997). Here, according to defendant, the State had little evidence ofdefendant's propensity to sell drugs on school property, and theState did not argue regarding that propensity in closing argument. We believe that the State is to be given latitude to determinewhich aspects of its case to accentuate in its closing argument. Furthermore, defendant argued the law of entrapment to the jury,and there is no allegation that the jury was improperly instructedby the court on the issue of entrapment. We do not conclude thatdefendant was denied a fair trial by the prosecutor's closingargument and, therefore, will not address that issue as plainerror.

However, this court has held that a defendant's right totender a lesser-included-offense instruction affects a substantialright. See People v. De Paolo, No. 2--99-0387, slip op. at 14(November 17, 2000). Therefore, we will review defendant's secondcontention of error.

In general, a defendant may not be convicted of an offense forwhich he has not been charged. People v. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d 475,485 (1995). However, a defendant may, where appropriate, beentitled to have the jury instructed concerning less seriousoffenses that are included in the charged offense. Landwer, 166Ill. 2d at 485-86. Such a jury instruction is not appropriatewhere an entrapment defense has been raised. See Landwer, 166 Ill.2d at 486-89. The defense of entrapment requires a defendant toadmit to committing all the elements of the charged offense. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d at 488. There can be no dispute regardingmental state or the facts necessary to support any element of thecrime because they must be admitted as part of the entrapmentdefense; the only remaining disputed factual inquiry is whether thedefendant was entrapped. Landwer, 166 Ill. 2d at 489. The logicbehind this is that it is both factually and legally inconsistentfor a defendant to deny committing the offense and then assert thedefense that he committed the offense, but only because ofincitement or inducement by the authorities. People v. Gillespie,136 Ill. 2d 496, 501 (1990).

Here, defendant sought to instruct the jury on the offense ofpossession with intent to deliver 1 to 15 grams of cocaine, with nomention of the location of the delivery of the cocaine, which wouldbe punishable as a Class 1 felony instead of a Class X felony. See720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2), 407(b)(1) (West 1998). He also raised theentrapment defense, arguing that "he was entrapped into deliveringdrugs on school grounds." Defendant cites no precedent, and we areaware of none, in which a defendant is allowed to argue that he wasentrapped into committing only certain elements of an offense. Entrapment is an all-or-nothing proposition. A defendant mustchoose either to raise the entrapment defense and admit tocommitting the charged offense or abandon the entrapment defenseand seek the lesser-included-offense instruction. See Landwer, 166Ill. 2d at 488-89. That, too, is an all-or-nothing proposition. Defendant cannot have it both ways.

Defendant's reliance on Landwer is misplaced. In Landwer, theevidence supported the defendant's claim that he solicited anundercover officer to commit an aggravated battery in addition tosoliciting the officer to commit murder, the offense with which thedefendant was charged. In this case, unlike Landwer, defendant isnot arguing that there were facts indicating that he committed someother, uncharged offense; he is not contending that he sold drugson other than school property. Instead, he is arguing that hemerely did not have the intent to sell drugs on school property. Defendant here is attempting to distinguish between alleged statesof intent rather than different factual situations, as was the casein Landwer. Defendant chose to argue that he was entrapped intocommitting this offense. He cannot also seek to be found guilty ofa lesser offense for which there is no evidentiary support in therecord. Therefore, the court did not err in refusing defendant'srequest for a lesser-included-offense instruction.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court ofWinnebago County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

COLWELL and RAPP, JJ., concur.