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Defendant, Randell R. Hall, was charged with unlawful possession of cannabis (720 ILCS550/4(b) (West 2002)). He moved to quash his arrest and suppress the evidence. The trial courtgranted the motion. The State filed a certificate of impairment and appealed. We affirm.

On October 7, 2002, Officer Eric Hefel and Sergeant Mickey Huseman effected a traffic stopof a vehicle that had one of its headlights out. Defendant was the driver of the vehicle. Hefelapproached the vehicle on the driver side and Huseman approached on the passenger side. Hefelinformed defendant of the reason for the stop and asked defendant for his driver's license andinsurance information. Defendant complied, and Hefel ran a computer check and discovered nooutstanding warrants. He then returned the license to defendant, issued him a verbal warning, andtold him that he was free to go. Defendant then asked Hefel whether he was going to be pulled overagain because of the nonfunctioning headlight. Hefel responded that it was possible that otherofficers might pull him over. Hefel then asked defendant if he had alcohol, drugs, or weapons in thevehicle. Defendant stated that he did not. Hefel asked defendant for consent to search the vehicle,and defendant refused, stating that he was in a hurry to get home. After defendant refused to allowHefel to search the vehicle, Hefel noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers and several plastic"baggies" in defendant's shirt pocket. Hefel asked defendant to exit the vehicle. After defendantexited, Hefel demanded that defendant hand him the items in his shirt pocket. Defendant did so, andHefel discovered no contraband. Hefel then searched the vehicle and found nothing illegal. Husemanthen conducted a pat-down search of defendant and found marijuana in his pants pocket, and theofficers placed defendant under arrest.

Defendant moved to quash his arrest and to suppress the evidence, arguing that he wasunconstitutionally seized when Hefel asked him for consent to search his vehicle. The court grantedthe motion, finding that defendant was unconstitutionally seized when the officers searched thevehicle and conducted a pat-down search.

On appeal, the State argues that the search of the vehicle and the pat-down search ofdefendant did not result in an unconstitutional seizure because the officers had a reasonable suspicionof criminal activity, based on Hefel's observation of the cigarette papers and plastic baggies. Inreviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we reverse the trial court's findings of fact only if theyare against the manifest weight of the evidence. See People v. Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d 34, 38 (2001). We review de novo the ultimate question of whether reasonable suspicion justified the stop and theofficer's subsequent actions. See Rush, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 38. Here, the material facts areundisputed, and thus we address only the ultimate question.

The temporary detention of drivers or passengers during a vehicle stop constitutes a "seizure"of "persons" within the meaning of the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. Peoplev. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d 220, 225 (2003). Therefore, vehicle stops are subject to the fourthamendment's requirement of reasonableness. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226. Because a traffic stop ismore analogous to a Terry investigative stop (see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 88S. Ct. 1868 (1968)) than to a formal arrest, the reasonableness of a traffic stop is analyzed underTerry principles. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 226.

Under Terry, a law enforcement officer may, within the limits of the fourth amendment,conduct a brief investigative stop of individuals, absent probable cause to arrest, provided that theofficer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 227. Ifa detention exceeds what is permissible as a Terry stop, a subsequent consent to a search may befound to be tainted by the illegality. People v. Brownlee, 186 Ill. 2d 501, 519 (1999). A Terryanalysis involves a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and (2)whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the interference in thefirst place. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 228. Here, there is no issue as to the lawfulness of the initial stopof the vehicle. Rather, this appeal concerns only the lawfulness of the officers' conduct following theinitial stop. Therefore, only the second prong of the Terry analysis is at issue.

The State devotes its argument on appeal to the legality of the search of the vehicle and thepat-down search of defendant. However, in addressing whether the detention was valid under Terry,we must first consider Hefel's questioning of defendant. In determining whether police questioningduring the course of a traffic stop satisfies the second prong of the Terry analysis, we follow theframework set out in Gonzalez. Under that framework, we must first determine whether thequestioning was related to the initial purpose of the stop. If so, no fourth amendment violationoccurred. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235. If the questioning was not reasonably related to the purposeof the stop, we must next consider whether the law enforcement officer had a reasonable, articulablesuspicion that justified the questioning. If the questioning was justified, no fourth amendmentviolation occurred. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235. Finally, in the absence of a reasonable connectionto the purpose of the stop or a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct, we must considerwhether, in light of all the circumstances and common sense, the questioning impermissibly prolongedthe detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop. Gonzalez, 204 Ill. 2d at 235.

Applying the Gonzalez framework, we hold that Hefel's questioning fails to satisfy the secondprong of the Terry analysis. After Hefel stated that defendant was free to go, he asked whetherdefendant had any contraband and asked for consent to search the vehicle. These questions wereclearly unrelated to the initial purpose of the stop, the nonfunctioning headlight.

Because the questions were not related to the initial purpose of the stop, we next considerwhether Hefel had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that justified the questioning. The State, whichconfines its argument on appeal to the legality of the search of the vehicle and the pat-down search,does not offer any justification for these questions. Moreover, the State's proffered reasons for thesubsequent search and pat-down, Hefel's observation of the cigarette papers and plastic baggies, donot help the State here. Hefel's observation of these items did not occur until after he had askeddefendant about contraband and for consent to search the vehicle, and thus cannot constitutereasonable suspicion to justify those questions.

Because Hefel's questions were not related to the purpose of the stop and were not supportedby a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal conduct, we next consider whether the questioningprolonged defendant's detention or changed the fundamental nature of the stop. In People v. Bunch,207 Ill. 2d 7, 17 (2003), the court held that questioning that occurred after the purpose of the stophad concluded impermissibly prolonged the detention of the defendant. Such is the case here. Hefelstopped the vehicle because one of its headlights was out. Once Hefel gave defendant a warning andsaid he was free to go, the purpose of the stop was complete. Hefel then asked defendant whetherhe had contraband and for consent to search the car. Because these questions occurred after thepurpose of the stop was completed, the questions impermissibly prolonged defendant's detention. See Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 17.

Moreover, the questioning changed the fundamental nature of the stop. To issue defendanta warning for a nonfunctioning headlight, Hefel needed only to obtain defendant's license andregistration, run a computer check, and issue a warning. By asking whether defendant hadcontraband and asking to search the car, Hefel converted a routine traffic stop into a fishingexpedition. See People v. Leigh, 341 Ill. App. 3d 492, 497 (2003).

Accordingly, defendant's detention, following the conclusion of the purpose of the traffic stop,was unreasonable within the meaning of the fourth amendment and tainted the resulting discovery ofthe marijuana. See Bunch, 207 Ill. 2d at 20.

The judgment of the circuit court of Jo Daviess County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.