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27 July 2000

JUSTICE COLWELL delivered the opinion of the court:

The State appeals the order of the circuit court of McHenryCounty suppressing as evidence cocaine seized from the briefcase ofdefendant, Joseph M. Evans. The State contends that the policeofficer's warrantless search of the briefcase was justified as (a)an inventory search of a detainee, (b) a search incident to arrest,and (c) a consent search. Because we believe the cocaine wasseized pursuant to a valid inventory search, we reverse and remand.

On November 4, 1997, Algonquin police officers stopped theCadillac defendant was driving and arrested him for driving on asuspended license. The officers found a stun gun and a pair ofbrass knuckles in defendant's car and, upon searching defendant'sbriefcase at the police station, recovered the cocaine. Defendantwas subsequently charged with unlawful possession of a controlledsubstance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1996)); unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 1996)); unlawful use of weapons by a felon(720 ILCS 5/24--1.1(a) (West 1996)); and unlawful use of weapons(720 ILCS 5/24--1(a)(4) (West 1996)).

Defendant moved to suppress the cocaine, stun gun, and brassknuckles, prompting the circuit court to hold an evidentiaryhearing on the matter. The evidence from that hearing was largelyundisputed and established the following facts.

Officers Jeffery Sutrick and George Harms of the Algonquinpolice department were in the same squad car on the evening ofNovember 4, 1997. They were on North Harrison Street, facing southand stopped at a light at Algonquin Road (Route 62). In front ofthem was a Cadillac, which was also facing south. When the trafficlight on North Harrison Street turned green, the driver of theCadillac attempted to turn right into one of Route 62's westboundlanes. However, because of traffic congestion on Route 62, thedriver of the Cadillac could not complete his right-hand turn. Consequently, when it came to a halt, the Cadillac was straddlingthe two westbound lanes of Route 62. Believing this was a trafficviolation, Officer Sutrick ran a computer check of the Cadillac'slicense plate. The check revealed that the license plate was validbut that the registered owner had a suspended driver's license.

The officers ultimately pulled the Cadillac over onto theshoulder of Route 62. Harms approached the Cadillac and askeddefendant for his driver's license. Defendant complied, and Harmsran the license number through the dispatcher. The check confirmedthat defendant was the owner of the Cadillac and that his licensewas suspended. Harms therefore asked defendant to exit the car,placed him under arrest, and handcuffed him. After his pat-downsearch of defendant's person uncovered nothing, Harms placeddefendant in the backseat of the squad car. Defendant was stillhandcuffed. Meanwhile, a squad car driven by Officer Steve Carmadaarrived on the scene.

Sutrick asked defendant if he needed anything from theCadillac. Defendant said that he had a check in his briefcase andasked if he could get it. Sutrick replied "no" and told defendantthat he (Sutrick) would get the check out of the briefcase. Sutrick therefore entered the passenger door of the Cadillac andlooked through the briefcase, which he described as an accordian-style briefcase with no closure on top. Sutrick was unable to findthe check in the briefcase. He then returned to the squad car andinformed defendant that he could not find the check. According toSutrick, defendant responded, "[F]ine, leave it there, and I willjust go ahead and sue you for it later." Sutrick replied that theofficers would bring the briefcase to the station and thatdefendant could get the check at the station. Sutrick retrievedthe briefcase and placed it in the front seat of the squad car.

Sutrick testified that, because the Cadillac would have to betowed, he returned to the vehicle to conduct an inventory search. He entered the vehicle on the passenger side, and Carmada enteredon the driver's side. During the search, Carmada found a stun gununder the driver's seat and brass knuckles in the center console. Sutrick testified that the Cadillac was towed pursuant to standarddepartmental procedure, for the safety of the driving public, andfor the protection of the Cadillac.

Sutrick and Harms then transported defendant to the Algonquinpolice station for processing. Sutrick spoke with the McHenryCounty State's Attorney's office and received permission to file afelony charge of unlawful use of weapons against defendant. Because of the felony charge, the officers knew that defendantwould be transferred to the McHenry County jail. Sutrick thereforedecided to conduct a second search of the briefcase "to make sureno illegal contraband was in the briefcase prior to [defendant's]transfer to County Jail." Defendant did not consent to thissearch. Sutrick nevertheless searched the briefcase in defendant'spresence and without a search warrant. Inside the briefcaseSutrick found cocaine.

Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit courtspecifically found as follows: the stop and arrest of defendantwere proper, the officers had the authority to have the Cadillactowed, and the officers conducted a valid inventory search of theCadillac. The circuit court therefore refused to suppress the stungun and brass knuckles. At that time, however, the court tookunder advisement the issue of whether the search of the briefcasewas legitimate.

On March 26, 1999, the circuit court issued its ruling on thatissue. The court determined that (a) defendant did not consent tothe search of his briefcase; (b) the search of the briefcase didnot qualify as a valid inventory search because the briefcase wasat the police station and in the control of the police officerswhen it was searched the second time; and (c) the search did notqualify as a search incident to arrest because the officers hadcomplete control over the briefcase after the arrest and were notin fear of their safety when they arrested defendant or when theysearched the briefcase at the police station. The court thereforebarred the introduction of the cocaine into evidence.

The State moved the circuit court to reconsider its decisionto suppress the cocaine. Attached to the State's motion toreconsider was the Algonquin police department's official policy on"motor vehicle inventories." After allowing the introduction ofthe inventory policy, the circuit court denied the State's motionto reconsider. The court issued a written order on April 23, 1999,reiterating its previous factual findings and legal conclusions. The State filed a notice of interlocutory appeal and a certificateof impairment on April 23, 1999. See 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1).

On appeal, the State contends that the circuit court erred ingranting defendant's motion to suppress the cocaine. According tothe State, Sutrick searched the briefcase pursuant to one or moreof the following exceptions to the warrant requirement: as a validinventory search, as a valid search incident to arrest, and as avalid consent search.

On a motion to suppress, the defendant bears the burden ofestablishing the unlawfulness of the search and seizure. People v.Dillon, 102 Ill. 2d 522, 526 (1984); People v. Mannozzi, 260 Ill.App. 3d 199, 202 (1994). Generally, a circuit court's ruling on amotion to suppress evidence is subject to reversal only ifmanifestly erroneous. People v. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d 195, 201(1996). However, where neither the facts nor the credibility ofthe witnesses is questioned, the issue becomes a question of lawand is subject to a de novo review. Dilworth, 169 Ill. 2d at 201. Here, defendant neither disputes the officers' testimony norchallenges their credibility. We therefore will review thegranting of defendant's motion to suppress de novo.

The fourth amendment provides, "The right of the people to besecure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, againstunreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ***." U.S. Const., amend. IV. Subject to certain exceptions, warrantlesssearches are generally unreasonable and unconstitutional. Peoplev. Bailey, 159 Ill. 2d 498, 503 (1994). One exception to thewarrant requirement is the inventory search, which is "anincidental administrative step following arrest and precedingincarceration." Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 644, 77 L.Ed. 2d 65, 69-70 103 S. Ct. 2605, 2608 (1983).

As stated in Lafayette, "At the stationhouse, it is entirelyproper for police to remove and list or inventory property found onthe person or in the possession of an arrested person who is to bejailed. *** Examining all the items removed from the arrestee'sperson or possession and listing or inventorying them is anentirely reasonable administrative procedure." (Emphasis added.) Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 71, 103 S. Ct. 2609-10. Predetention inventory searches serve four legitimate governmentalobjectives: (1) protecting the owner's property while it is inpolice custody; (2) protecting the police from false claimsregarding property taken from an arrestee at the station house; (3)protecting the police, the arrestee, and other detainees from beinginjured by dangerous objects or substances; and (4) allowing thepolice to ascertain or verify the identity of the arrestee. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 646, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 71, 103 S. Ct. 2609-10. Inventory searches must be made "in accordance with establishedinventory procedures." Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648, 77 L. Ed. 2d at73, 103 S. Ct. at 2611. While written policies on inventorysearches are preferred, there is no requirement that such policiesbe in writing. 3 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure