People v. Ernst
Case Date: 02/16/2000
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-98-1489
People v. Ernst, No. 2-98-14892nd District, 16 February 2000
JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court: The State appeals the November 5, 1998, order of the circuit court of McHenry County granting defendant Brian Ernst'smotion to suppress evidence and quash arrest. The defendant had been arrested and charged with driving a vehicle while hisblood-alcohol concentration was .08 or more (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 1998)). The trial court ruled that thedefendant's emergency health care providers had improperly reported the defendant's blood-alcohol test results to thearresting officer in violation of the physician-patient privilege (735 ILCS 5/8--802 (West 1998)). We reverse and remandthe cause for trial. On January 31, 1998, the defendant was charged by complaint with driving a vehicle while his blood-alcohol concentrationwas .08 or more (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 1998)). On March 23, 1998, the defendant filed a motion to quash arrestand suppress evidence. In his motion, the defendant argued that the arresting officer had no probable cause to believe thathe had committed an offense. On May 8, 1998, the trial court held a hearing on the defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. At thehearing, the defendant called Deputy William Henninger of the McHenry County sheriff's police. Deputy Henningertestified that, on January 31, 1998, at approximately 2:45 a.m., he received a call regarding a one-vehicle accident. When hearrived at the scene, he observed a Chevrolet Camaro off to the side of the road and against a tree. Lieutenant Tom Monday,who had already arrived on the scene, told him that the Camaro belonged to the defendant. Deputy Henninger observed thatthe defendant had facial and scalp injuries that were bleeding. An ambulance was called, and Deputy Henninger had thedefendant sit in the front seat of the squad car to wait, while Deputy Henninger completed an accident report. In response toDeputy Henninger's questioning about the accident, the defendant explained that he had driven around a curb too fast andcould not control the car. Deputy Henninger testified that the defendant was in the squad car for four to five minutes. During this time, thedefendant's speech was clear and coherent. Although the defendant's eyes were bloodshot and glassy, Deputy Henningerattributed this condition to the defendant's head injuries. The defendant did not smell of alcohol. Deputy Henninger testified that the defendant was then taken by ambulance to Woodstock Memorial Medical Center. At thehospital, Deputy Henninger continued to work on his report while the defendant was behind a curtain in a treatment room.After completing the report, he gave the defendant a copy, obtained the telephone number of the defendant's parents, calledthem, and then advised the defendant that his parents were on their way. Deputy Henninger testified that, later during the morning of January 31, 1998, he was advised that the hospital had calledthe police station and that the results of the defendant's blood-alcohol screening were available. Deputy Henninger andLieutenant Monday returned to the hospital and received a report in an envelope from nurse Kathy Harrison. The officerswere unable to decipher the results of the report, and Harrison told them that the defendant's blood-alcohol level was .254.Although Deputy Henninger did not believe that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of his accident, LieutenantMonday directed him to arrest the defendant because the reading was over .08. After the defendant indicated that he had no further evidence to introduce on his motion to quash arrest and suppressevidence, the State moved for a directed finding. The trial court granted the State's motion, finding that the blood-alcoholtest results provided sufficient probable cause to support the arrest of the defendant. On June 5, 1998, the defendant filed a motion to reconsider the trial court's ruling. In reliance upon Village of ArlingtonHeights v. Bartelt, 211 Ill. App. 3d 747, 750 (1991), the defendant argued that it was improper for the trial court to utilizeblood-alcohol test results in determining whether the officers had probable cause to arrest. In Bartelt, the court held that,although blood-alcohol tests may be admitted at trial pursuant to section 11--501.4 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (the Code)(625 ILCS 5/11--501.4 (West 1998)), there was no specific authority permitting the use of oral statements made by medicalpersonnel to establish probable cause. Bartelt, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 750. The defendant argued that the results of the bloodtests performed on January 31, 1998, were protected under the physician-patient privilege (735 ILCS 5/8--802 (West 1998))and that the officers needed some other independent basis to establish probable cause. In response to the motion to reconsider, the State argued that section 11--501.4--1 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11--501.4--1(West 1998)) permitted the use of blood-alcohol test results to establish probable cause for arrest. The State argued thatsection 11--501.4--1 specifically authorized medical personnel to report the results of blood tests to the Department of StatePolice or local law enforcement agencies. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.4--1 (West 1998). The State argued that Bartelt was notapplicable to the instant case because section 11--501.4--1 was enacted after that case was decided. On August 25, 1998, following a hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to reconsider and denied the State'smotion for a directed finding. The trial court found that, although section 11--501.4--1 allowed the admission of blood-alcohol test results at trial, it did not permit the use of such evidence in probable cause hearings. The trial court thereforeruled that the enactment of section 11--501.4--1 had not overruled Bartelt and that the physician-patient privilege did notpermit ex parte disclosures of blood-alcohol test results by medical personnel to the police. Rather, the trial court ruled thatsuch evidence could only be used in prosecutions and only after such evidence had been disclosed pursuant to judiciallyauthorized methods of discovery. See Bartelt, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 750. On November 5, 1998, the trial court resumed the hearing on the defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence.The State presented the testimony of Kathleen Harrison, the registered nurse assigned to the emergency room on January31, 1998. Harrison testified that she provided Deputy Henninger and Lieutenant Moody a copy of the defendant's blood-alcohol test results. When the State asked Harrison to explain the contents of the report, the trial court sustained thedefendant's objection on the basis of the physician-patient privilege. At the close of the hearing, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence. The trialcourt found that, although the State had shown sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant, the defendant's blood-alcohol test results had been improperly obtained as a result of an ex parte disclosure. The trial court ruled that this was aviolation of the principles articulated in Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581 (1986). The State filed atimely notice of appeal. On appeal, the State argues that nurse Harrison's disclosure of the defendant's blood-alcohol test results was expresslypermitted by section 11--501.4--1 of the Code and was not a violation of the physician-patient privilege. The State arguesthat medical personnel may report blood test results to law enforcement officers without prior court authorization and thatthe results can be used to establish probable cause for an arrest. A trial court's ruling on a motion to quash arrest and suppress evidence is generally subject to reversal on appeal only if it ismanifestly erroneous. People v. Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d 546, 551 (1999). The trial court's determination regarding factualmatters, including the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the witnesses' testimony, is entitled to deference by areviewing court. People v. Safunwa, 299 Ill. App. 3d 707, 710-11 (1998). However, where only a question of law isinvolved, the circuit court's ruling is subject to de novo review. People v. Wright, 183 Ill. 2d 16, 21 (1998). In this case, theissue raised is a question of law, and our review is therefore de novo. Carlson, 185 Ill. 2d at 551. Section 11--504.4--1 of the Code relates to the reporting of blood test results performed in the regular course of providingemergency medical treatment. That section provides, in relevant part, as follows: "(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the results of blood or urine tests performed for the purpose ofdetermining the content of alcohol *** in an individual's blood or urine conducted upon persons receiving medicaltreatment in a hospital emergency room for injuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident may be reported to theDepartment of State Police or local law enforcement agencies. Such blood or urine tests are admissible in evidence asa business record exception to the hearsay rule only in prosecutions for any violation of Section 11--501 of this Codeor a similar provision of a local ordinance, or in prosecutions for reckless homicide brought under the Criminal Codeof 1961. (b) The confidentiality provisions of law pertaining to medical records and medical treatment shall not be applicablewith regard to tests performed upon an individual's blood or urine under the provisions of subsection (a) of thisSection." 625 ILCS 5/11--501.4--1 (West 1998). Our research has revealed no previous decision interpreting this statutory language. In interpreting the meaning of a statute,our primary concern is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. People v. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d 250,261 (1994). The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plainand ordinary meaning. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). Where the meaning of an enactment is unclear from thestatutory language itself, the court may look beyond the language employed and consider the purpose behind the law.Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 533-34 (1997). Where statutory language is ambiguous, it is appropriate to examine thelegislative history. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d at 261. However, when the language is clear, it will be given effect without resortto other aids for construction. Hickman, 163 Ill. 2d at 261. Here, the language of the statute at issue is clear and unequivocal. Subsection (a) of section 11--501.4--1 plainly providesthat the results of blood-alcohol tests conducted upon persons receiving medical treatment in a hospital emergency room forinjuries resulting from a motor vehicle accident may be reported to local law enforcement agencies. Subsection (b)additionally provides that the confidentiality provisions of the law shall not apply with regard to such blood-alcohol tests.These provisions therefore permit the direct disclosure of blood-alcohol test results by medical personnel to lawenforcement agencies under the narrow circumstances delineated in subsection (a). Such a disclosure may be made withoutviolating any statutory physician-patient privilege. Additionally, section 11--501.4--1 contains no limitation that blood-alcohol test results only be disclosed pursuant tojudicially authorized methods of court discovery. We believe that to impose such a requirement would be contrary to thepurpose of the statute as evidenced by its plain language. The statute authorizes the reporting of blood-alcohol test results tolaw enforcement authorities. A common definition of the word "report" is "to make known to the authorities." Merriam-Webster Dictionary 625 (5th ed. 1997). By using the word "report," we believe that the legislature intended medicalpersonnel to initially alert police of the presence of alcohol in the blood of individuals receiving emergency treatment frommotor vehicle accidents, even in instances where the police might not otherwise suspect the use of alcohol. Requiring thepolice to obtain such information through judicially authorized methods of discovery would defeat the primary reportingfunction created by the statute. Moreover, as already noted, the legislature has specifically provided that the physician-patient confidentiality requirementsare inapplicable with regard to the reporting of blood-alcohol test results. 625 ILCS 5/11--501.4--1(b) (West 1998)). Thesource of the physician-patient privilege is statutory and the scope of that privilege is generally a matter for the legislature.See Kunkel, 179 Ill. 2d at 533; People ex rel. Birkett v. City of Chicago, 292 Ill. App. 3d 745, 750 (1997); Parkson v.Central DuPage Hospital, 105 Ill. App. 3d 850, 852 (1982). Here, the legislature has chosen to limit the scope of thestatutory privilege such that, under the narrow circumstances delineated in the statute, medical personnel may communicatedirectly with the police. On appeal, the defendant does not argue that such a limitation is unconstitutional. Accordingly, webelieve that the trial court erred in relying upon Petrillo to find that the prohibition against ex parte communication wasapplicable in the instant case. As the defendant correctly notes, other Illinois courts have held that a defendant's blood-alcohol test results can only bedisclosed pursuant to judicially authorized authority. See People v. Wilber, 279 Ill. App. 3d 462, 465 (1996); Bartelt, 211Ill. App. 3d at 750. However, these cases were decided prior to the enactment of section 11--501.4--1 in 1997. Althoughblood-alcohol test results were admissible into evidence in prosecutions prior to the enactment of section 11--501.4--1 (see625 ILCS 5/11--501.4 (West 1998)), there was no statutory provision permitting the direct reporting of blood-alcohol testresults to police. We therefore believe that the trial court erred in applying these authorities to the instant case. Rather, forthe reasons detailed above, we believe that the plain language of section 11--501.4--1 permits the disclosure of blood-alcohol test results without court order. We also agree with the State that blood-alcohol test results reported pursuant to the statute may be used in formulatingprobable cause to arrest. We believe that, by permitting these results to be reported to the police in the first instance, thelegislature intended that the police would utilize these results in determining whether to effectuate an arrest. A prohibitionagainst the use of blood-alcohol test results at a probable cause hearing would therefore undermine a primary purpose of thestatute. In construing a statute, a court should not apply an interpretation that would produce results that the legislaturecould not have intended. People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316 (1985). The defendant objects to such an interpretation, relying on that portion of section 11--501.4--1 that provides that blood-alcohol test results "are admissible in evidence as a business record exception to the hearsay rule only in prosecutions forany violation of Section 11--501 of this Code or a similar provision of a local ordinance, or in prosecutions for recklesshomicide brought under the Criminal Code of 1961." (Emphasis added.) 625 ILCS 5/11--501.4--1(a) (West 1998). Thedefendant argues that this language limits the admissibility of such evidence to trial and does not authorize its use duringprobable cause hearings. We disagree. The defendant misinterprets the phrase "only in prosecutions." When the phrase is read with the remainder of the sentence,it becomes clear that the phrase was intended to limit the types of cases in which blood test results could be admitted. Inother words, the statute provides that such evidence may only be admitted in prosecutions for violations of section 11--501of the Code or similar provision of a local ordinance, or in prosecutions for reckless homicide. Therefore, the statute limitsthe use of such evidence according to the nature of the offense, as opposed to the nature of the hearing. We therefore holdthat blood-alcohol test results reported pursuant to section 11--501.4--1 may be utilized during probable cause hearings. In so holding, we acknowledge that our conclusion is contrary to that reached in Bartelt. As noted above, in Bartelt, thereviewing court held that, absent specific statutory authority, oral statements by medical personnel could not be used for thepurpose of establishing probable cause. Bartelt, 211 Ill. App. 3d at 750. However, Bartelt was decided prior to theenactment of section 11--501.4--1. As medical personnel are now permitted to report blood-alcohol test results directly tothe police pursuant to section 11--501.4--1, we find no reason to prevent the State from utilizing the information as a basisto find probable cause. We therefore decline to apply Bartelt to the instant case and instead hold that, under the narrowcircumstances delineated in section 11--501.4--1, blood-alcohol test results may be used in establishing probable cause. In closing, we note that there was sufficient evidence introduced at the hearing demonstrating that the police had sufficientprobable cause to arrest the defendant. The blood test results demonstrated that the defendant had a blood-alcohol level over.08. On the night in question, the defendant lost control of his vehicle, drove off the road, and hit a tree. Additionally,Deputy Henninger noted that the defendant's eyes were bloodshot and glassy. We believe that, under the totality of thecircumstances, there was sufficient probable cause to arrest the defendant for driving a vehicle while his blood-alcoholconcentration was .08 or more. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order quashing the defendant's arrest and suppressing the evidence and remand thiscause for trial. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of McHenry County is reversed, and the cause is remanded. Reversed and remanded. INGLIS and THOMAS, JJ., concur. |
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