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Defendant, Duwain E. Eggert, was convicted of the offenses ofaggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1) (West 1998)) and driving while license revoked(625 ILCS 5/6-303 (West 1998)). He was sentenced to three years'imprisonment on each offense, to run concurrently. We affirm inpart, reverse in part, and remand the cause.

BACKGROUND

The sole testimony presented at trial was that of Statewitness Officer Robert Woodford. On November 28, 1999, Woodfordresponded to a 911 call that a pickup truck was on the sidewalk andthat the driver had passed out. As Woodford approached thelocation of the pickup truck, the truck was moving and had traveledoff the sidewalk. Woodford observed the truck drift over the laneline four or five times.

Woodford pulled over the truck. The driver, defendant DuwainEggert, exited the driver's side door. He staggered and trippedseveral times. When Woodford asked for defendant's driver'slicense, he responded that it had been revoked in the State ofIllinois.

As he spoke with defendant, Woodford noticed defendant'sbloodshot, glassy eyes and smelled alcohol on defendant's breath. Defendant swayed back and forth while he stood, and he refusedfield sobriety tests. Woodford placed defendant under arrest fordriving under the influence of alcohol. Defendant was handcuffedand taken to the public safety building.

At the public safety building, defendant refused abreathalyzer test. After he was given Miranda warnings, defendantwas questioned. Defendant stated that he consumed seven or eight12-ounce cans of beer between 3:30 and 7:30 p.m.

On cross-examination, Woodford admitted that his writtenreport contained two omissions: (1) that he observed defendantweaving over the lane while driving; and (2) that defendant refusedfield sobriety tests. Woodford admitted that he did not testifybefore the grand jury that defendant drove over the lane line andcould not recall if he testified at the same proceeding thatdefendant refused field sobriety tests.

The following certified statement of revocation by theSecretary of State's office was read to the jury:

"This is a certified statement of revocation from theSecretary of State's Office showing that Duwain E. Eggert'sdriver's license was revoked, the revocation in effect onNovember 28, 1999."

Defendant tendered Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,Criminal, No. 3.11 (4th ed. 2000) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 4th)concerning the believability of a witness. The instruction wasrefused.

Defendant was found guilty of the offenses of aggravateddriving under the influence of alcohol and driving while licenserevoked. He was sentenced to three years' imprisonment on eachoffense, to run concurrently.

I 

Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretionby refusing IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 regarding prior inconsistentstatements. The tendered instruction read as follows:

"The believability of a witness may be challenged onevidence that on some former occasion he made a statement thatwas not consistent with his testimony in this case. Evidenceof this kind may be considered by you only for the limitedpurpose of deciding the weight to be given the testimony youheard from the witness in this courtroom.

It is for you to determine what weight should be given tothat statement. In determining the weight to be given to anearlier statement, you should consider all of thecircumstances under which it was made."

The function of jury instructions is to convey to the jury theappropriate principles of law so that it may apply the correctlegal principles to the facts of the case and arrive at the properconclusion according to the law and the evidence. People v. Finke,204 Ill. App. 3d 748, 759 (1990). When evidence of a witness'sprior inconsistent statement is admissible to impeach hiscredibility, such evidence is admitted not as proof of the truth ofthe facts stated out of court but as doubt cast on the testimony byshowing the witness's inconsistency. People v. Larry, 218 Ill.App. 3d 658, 666 (1991). An instruction regarding the credibilityof a witness's testimony in light of inconsistencies is cautionary. People v. Luckett, 273 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1035 (1995). As such,the trial court is vested with discretion in determining whether togive the proffered instruction. Luckett, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 1035.

In refusing IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11, the trial court statedas follows:

"Based on the testimony presented, I don't believe therewas any inconsistent--testified--for example, if the officerwould have testified that in the grand jury hearing he noticedbloodshot eyes and testified today I didn't notice anybloodshot eyes that would be an inconsistency, but what youpointed out on cross-examination is that he failed to put inhis report the fact that he had observed or asked theDefendant to do some field sobriety tests, and the other issuewas whether or not he had improperly changed lanes, they'reinconsistent based on the testimony."

Since the impeachment consisted of an omission, the trialcourt apparently believed that IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 did notapply.

In People v. Smith, 67 Ill. App. 3d 672 (1978), the court heldthat an earlier version of IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 encompassesomissions as well as affirmative statements. See also Finke, 204Ill. App. 3d at 759; People v. Svoboda, 75 Ill. App. 3d 487, 489(1979). The pattern jury instruction regarding inconsistentstatements is appropriately given when two statements areinconsistent on a material matter. People v. Thomas, 172 Ill. App.3d 172, 177 (1988). The committee comments to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 indicate that the materiality of the prior inconsistentstatement is an issue for the trial court to determine. It hasbeen stated that an issue is material when the contradictionreasonably tends to discredit the testimony of the witness on suchfacts. Finke, 204 Ill. App. 3d at 759.

The sole evidence presented by the State on the charge ofaggravated driving under the influence of alcohol was the testimonyof Officer Woodford. There were no breathalyzer, field sobriety,or blood tests performed. Based on the trial court's comments inrefusing IPI Criminal 4th No. 311, it appears that the court didnot determine whether the omissions in Woodford's report werematerial.

In our view, Woodford's trial testimony that he observeddefendant weaving across the lane was material because it isdirectly relevant to the issue of whether defendant was capable ofdriving a vehicle. Likewise, the issue of whether defendantrefused field sobriety and breathalyzer tests was material becausethe jury could infer guilt due to his refusal. Woodford's trialtestimony that defendant was weaving and that he refused testingwas impeached by the omission of these observations in his policereport.

Unlike People v. Luckett, cited by the State, we do not deemIPI Criminal 4th No. 1.02 to be a sufficient cautionary instructionon the manner in which the jury was able to consider the evidenceof Woodford's omissions. Woodford was the sole witness presentedon the charge of driving while under the influence of alcohol. Therefore, the credibility of his testimony was essential to theState's case. Since the omissions in his police report related tomatters material to the issue of whether defendant was drivingunder the influence of alcohol and the State's case was basedsolely on the testimony of this witness, the trial court's refusalto give IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 was an abuse of discretion anddeprived defendant of a fair trial. See People v. Mitchell, 27Ill. App. 3d 117, 121 (1975) (regarding an earlier version of IPICriminal 4th No. 3.11 with prior inconsistent statement by keywitness). Therefore, we reverse defendant's conviction ofaggravated driving under the influence of alcohol and remand thecause to the trial court for a new trial on this charge.

Defendant also contends that, while IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11should have been given to instruct the jury on Woodford'scredibility, it should also have been given to instruct thatWoodford's omissions could be considered as substantive evidence.Although the instruction was not tendered in this fashion,defendant asserts that the following portion of IPI Criminal 4thNo. 3.11 should have been given:

"However, you may consider a witness's earlierinconsistent statement as evidence without this limitationwhen

[1] the statement was made under oath at a trial.

or

[2] the statement narrates, describes, or explains anevent or condition the witness had personal knowledge of;

and

[a] the statement was written or signed by thewitness.

or

[b] the witness acknowledged under oath that he madethe statement.

or

[c] the statement was accurately recorded by a taperecorder, videotape, recording, or a similar electronicmeans of sound recording.

It is for you to determine what weight should be given tothat statement. In determining the weight to be given to anearlier statement, you should consider all of thecircumstances under which it was made." IPI Criminal 4th No.311.

Since defendant did not tender the instruction in thisfashion, he urges us to consider the issue as plain error.

Defendant failed not only to tender IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11concerning the admissibility of Officer Woodford's omissions assubstantive evidence but also to introduce Woodford's arrest reportor transcript of his grand jury testimony into evidence. Due toour determination that IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 should have beengiven to instruct the jury that the evidence of Woodford'somissions could be considered for the purpose of determining theweight attributed to his testimony, we decline to address thisissue on the merits under the plain error doctrine. On remand,however, the litigants and the court should be mindful of thecomments to IPI Criminal 4th No. 3.11 in determining what evidenceto admit and instructions to give. Since the comments to IPICriminal 4th No. 3.11 advise that there is no need to give thisinstruction when the prior inconsistent statement is offered assubstantive evidence rather than solely for the purpose ofimpeachment, it appropriately would not be given if the arrestreport is admitted as substantive evidence and Woodford isimpeached by its omissions.

II

Next, defendant contends that he was deprived of a fair trialdue to comments made by the State during closing argument.Generally, prosecutors are given wide latitude during closingargument. People v. Williams, 181 Ill. 2d 297, 330 (1998). Thetrial court's determination of the propriety of the closingargument will generally be followed on appeal absent a clear abuseof discretion. People v. Cisewski, 118 Ill. 2d 163, 175 (1987). To constitute reversible error, the complained-of remarks must haveresulted in substantial prejudice to the accused such that absentthose remarks the verdict would have been different. People v.Armstrong, 183 Ill. 2d 130, 145 (1998).

Defendant's contentions relate to comments made by theprosecutor concerning his personal opinion and the credibility ofOfficer Woodford. The record reveals that two of defendant'sobjections to the prosecutor's use of the pronoun "we" weresustained and that the jury was admonished to disregard anypersonal opinions of the prosecutor and to rely on the evidencepresented. Defendant's objection to the State's characterizationof the burden of proof as "beyond any doubt" was also sustainedwith admonishment on the proper burden of proof. Defendant'sobjection to the prosecutor's comment concerning the credibility ofOfficer Woodford was also sustained, with admonishment to confineargument to the evidence presented.

Since we remand the cause to the trial court for a new trialon charges of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol, itis unnecessary to address whether the jury's verdict on this chargewould have been different. However, defendant's conviction ofdriving while license revoked was supported by a certification bythe Illinois Secretary of State. In our view, defendant would havebeen convicted of the offense of driving while license revokedregardless of the comments by the prosecutor. Therefore, there wasno substantial prejudice to defendant by the prosecutor's commentsduring closing argument as they relate to the conviction of drivingwhile license revoked. We affirm the judgment and sentence on theconviction of driving while license revoked.

The judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County isaffirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.

O'MALLEY and CALLUM, JJ., concur.