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JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a bench trial, defendant, Leo Dobbs, was convicted of residential burglary (720ILCS 5/19--3 (West 2002)) and sentenced to 64 months' imprisonment. On appeal, defendantcontends that (1) the trial court erred when it relied upon matters not in evidence in reaching itsverdict; (2) he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial; and (3) the trial court lackedauthority to impose a fine for the Driver's Education Fund (625 ILCS 5/16--104a (West 2002)). Weaffirm in part and vacate in part.

On January 7, 2003, defendant was charged by indictment with residential burglary (720 ILCS5/19--3 (West 2002)). The indictment charged that, on or about December 1, 2002, defendantknowingly and without authority entered into the dwelling place of the victim, Maelean Williams,located at 3025 Kentshire Circle, in Naperville, with the intent to commit a theft. Also on January7, 2003, Selwyn Coleman, defendant's privately retained counsel, filed his appearance.

On April 16, 2003, defendant waived his right to a jury trial. The case proceeded to benchtrial that same day. The victim testified that she had met defendant in 2000 and they dated untilapproximately June 2002, although she had spent the night with defendant as recently as September2002. The victim testified that, during the course of their relationship, she owned a townhouselocated at 3025 Kentshire Circle in Naperville, where she lived with her son. While she and defendantwere dating, defendant would often spend the night at the townhouse but he did not live with her. The victim testified that she did not give defendant a set of keys to her townhouse.

The victim further testified regarding an earlier incident on June 14, 2002, when she was ata rental property she owned in Chicago and defendant arrived to talk to her. The victim testified thatdefendant went into her car and took her house keys from her purse. She attempted to take the keysback from him but he left. The victim testified that she called the police, and officers came to thetownhouse. Defendant arrived and gave the officers the keys.

The victim testified that on November 28, 2002, she was in Chicago at her rental property. Defendant arrived, wanting to speak with her, but she declined. The victim testified that defendantspoke with her son and learned that she was planning to go to her mother's house in Rantoul. Thevictim testified that defendant threatened to harm her and her son if he could not accompany them. The victim testified that she allowed defendant to accompany them in her rental car to her mother'shouse. The victim, her son, and defendant stayed at her mother's house that evening.

The victim further testified that the next day, she and defendant got into an argument becausehe wanted to stay at a hotel. The victim testified that defendant attacked her, took the keys to therental car, and left. The victim went to the hospital and then remained in Rantoul for several moredays. The victim testified that defendant telephoned her every day after the incident wanting toreconcile.

The victim testified that on December 1, 2002, she returned to her Naperville townhouse forapproximately 30 minutes to retrieve some clothes, then went back to Rantoul to stay with hermother. The victim admitted that she may have forgotten to set her alarm system when she left. Thevictim acknowledged that a t-shirt and a pair of pants defendant had left in the townhouse earlier inthe year were still in the Naperville townhouse.

The victim further testified that defendant called her on December 4, 2002, asking her toreturn home and spend time with him. She testified that, after she told him no, he became upset andtold her that he had taken three things from the townhouse. He told her that she would "find him"when she realized they were gone and that he was going to "ruin" her. The victim testified thatdefendant called her again the following day, wanting to reconcile. When she said no, defendant toldher he was going to kill her and that he could "come home" any time he wanted because he had keys.

The victim testified that she returned to the townhouse the evening of December 9, 2002. Shenoticed that the drawers of her nightstand and her closet door were open but she thought she had leftthem open when she was in the townhouse on December 1, 2002. That evening, she received a callfrom the North Riverside police department. She returned the call the next day and learned that theywere in possession of her birth certificate, social security card, and checkbook. The victim testifiedthat she looked in her nightstand and closet where she normally kept these items and realized theywere missing, as was a diamond tennis bracelet.

The victim further testified that the police had recovered a state identification card and adriver's license, both issued December 6, 2002. She admitted that both of the cards had herphotograph on them, but they did not belong to her nor were they ever in her possession. The victimidentified a check drafted to Carson Pirie Scott from her checkbook, although she had not issued it. She testified that she did not know Carolyn White, the person whom the police had discovered withthe victim's items, did not know why White would have possessed the items, and had not given herpermission to do so. The victim further testified that no one else had been given permission topossess them either.

Carolyn White testified that she was an acquaintance of defendant. White testified that, atapproximately noon on December 9, 2002, defendant met with her and Nakesha Hargrove, themother of one of defendant's children. White testified that defendant showed her the victim'sidentification cards and checkbook, and they discussed going shopping. White testified that defendantgave her the victim's state identification card, driver's license, checkbook, social security card, andbirth certificate. White practiced writing the victim's signature, and they all went to the mall. Whitetestified that at Carson Pirie Scott (Carson's) in North Riverside, defendant picked out clothes andgave them to her to purchase.

The State introduced a surveillance videotape and a photograph from Carson's, which showeddefendant holding clothes while White was at the counter making purchases. White further testifiedthat she was arrested at Carson's and charged with forgery. At the time of her arrest, White told thepolice that she and Hargrove had found the victim's identification on the street about four weeksearlier. White testified that she told this story to the police because she was scared at the time. Whitetestified that she pleaded guilty to forgery and received a sentence of 18 months' probation.

Defendant testified on his behalf. He acknowledged that he had two prior felony convictions. Defendant testified that in 2000 he owned two businesses and was attending college to obtain hisaccounting degree. That year, he met the victim, began spending nights at her house, and graduallymoved in. Defendant acknowledged that he never had a key to her house. Defendant testified thatthey were engaged to marry and they obtained a marriage license. Defendant testified that he changedhis mind about marriage because the victim told him that, if she married him, she did not want to dealwith his five children.

Defendant further testified that in October 2002 he and the victim were together in a car atthe 3300 block of Madison Street in Chicago. As defendant drove, they were arguing. Defendanttestified that he threw a folder belonging to the victim out of the window. He testified that she toldhim that the folder contained important information, including a birth certificate, a social securitycard, and a checkbook. Defendant testified that they drove around the block to retrieve the items andfound the folder, but the contents were gone.

Defendant further testified that he and the victim spent the night prior to Thanksgiving,November 27, 2002, at the Naperville townhouse. At that time, they were together as a couple, andtheir relationship was strong. They left Naperville together around 5 p.m. Defendant testified thatthe victim set her security alarm when they left the townhouse. They drove to the victim's mother'shouse in Rantoul in the rental car.

Defendant testified that on November 29, 2002, he asked the victim for the car keys so hecould return to Chicago and be with his children. He testified that the victim was drunk and beganhitting and kicking him. Defendant testified that he took the keys and left, without harming thevictim. He drove the rental car back to Chicago.

Defendant further testified that, after this incident, he knew that the victim did not want himin the Naperville townhouse. Defendant denied entering the townhouse and removing the items. Defendant testified that he spoke with the victim only twice afterward. He testified that he called herand asked for his clothes back. Defendant also denied being involved in the December 9, 2002,incident at Carson's and knowing Carolyn White. Defendant testified that on December 14, 2002,the victim called him and told him he could come to the townhouse and pick up his clothes. Whenhe met her there, the police arrested him. Defendant testified that he considered himself to be datingher until that time.

In rebuttal, the State called Garron Wright, who testified that on December 9, 2002, he wasworking as a security guard at Carson's in North Riverside. While he was monitoring the camerasystem, he observed defendant randomly picking up clothes. He observed defendant give all of theclothes to Carolyn White, who was one of the two women defendant was with, and leave the store. Wright testified that a photograph and videotape of defendant with White at the cash register weretaken via the security system. Wright further testified that Carson's security department verified thatthe check White presented was stolen and apprehended her leaving the store. Wright recovered twoof the victim's identification cards, her social security card, her birth certificate, and her checkbook.

The trial court found defendant guilty. In discussing the evidence, the trial court reflected onthe differing testimony presented by the victim and defendant. The trial court also reflected on theevidence as it pertained to defendant's testimony. The trial court stated that the identification cardand driver's license could not have been thrown out the window in October 2002 as defendant hadtestified, because they had not yet been created. It also discussed the method by which one mightobtain a driver's license. The trial court stated:

"We know you get a birth certificate, you get a driver's license. What else do youhave to have to get a driver's license? You've got to have a picture. ***

This is [the victim's] picture. The picture wasn't in the manila envelope that wasthrown out the car window.

Remember what [defendant] said was in the envelope? These three items and somebusiness papers. No pictures.

Where would pictures come from most likely in reasonable people assuming? Theycome from somebody else's house.

And someone who had familiarity because he had been a guest in that home and mighthave some familiarity with where certain items were kept. So I see that as a major issue.

These documents were created with these items and with photographs of the victim."

The trial court further reflected on the contents of the checkbook and the individual check White usedat Carson's. The trial court noted that the check used at Carson's was number 515, and in the victim'scheckbook, check number 501 remained, but the duplicate checks indicated that checks 502 through513 were used. The trial court noted that these checks were dated December 6 through 9, 2002, andappeared to be written in amounts of $200, $269, $276, $851, $350, $254, $254, $200, and $1,360. The trial court stated, "That's a lot of money that might cause somebody ruin, for example, financialdistress, and so that sort of is consistent" with the victim's testimony that defendant told her he would"ruin" her.

On May 19, 2003, defense counsel Coleman filed a motion for a new trial. In the motion, hestated, in pertinent part:

"2. That [Williams's] testimony was difficult to be heard and at times impossible tohear, even though the attorney for the Defendant, proceeded to try to find a place in thecourtroom where he could hear her, but to no avail. The attorney for [defendant] called toand indicated that he could not hear the testimony of *** Williams, but to no avail.

3. That after her testimony the State put on some witnesses, whose testimony couldbe heard.

8. That this Defendant's attorney, asks that the trial be repeated, and the complainingwitness[] be made to speak up so that her testimony, if any, could be challenged.

This defendant *** did not have an attorney who could hear the testimony of theprincipal complaining witness, and therefore could adequately attach [sic] the testimony ofthe complaining witness, Maelean Williams, all to the detriment of the Defendant ***."

On May 28, 2003, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's posttrial motion. Defense counsel Coleman stated that, although he hated to admit it, "some of it is very true." Thetrial court found that defense counsel had done a competent job and that defendant was notprejudiced by "a couple of occasions" when defense counsel did not hear properly, and denied themotion. The trial court sentenced defendant to 64 months' imprisonment. Defendant timely appeals.

Defendant presents three issues for review: (1) whether his conviction must be reversedbecause the trial court relied upon facts not in evidence; (2) whether he was denied the effectiveassistance of counsel because his trial counsel was unable to hear portions of the testimony; and (3)whether the trial court erroneously imposed a penalty for the Driver's Education Fund that was notstatutorily authorized.

As to defendant's first contention, defendant argues that the trial court improperly speculatedthat the photographs used to obtain a driver's license and state identification card in the victim's namewere stolen from her home by someone who had familiarity with where she kept them. Defendantargues that the source of those photographs was not discussed in trial testimony. Defendant alsoasserts that the trial court improperly concluded that checks 502 through 513 were fraudulentlywritten from the victim's checking account and then used. Defendant notes that the only checkdiscussed in testimony was number 515. Defendant requests that we review this issue for plain error(see 134 Ill. 2d R. 615(a)). Defendant concludes that the trial court's statements show that itconsidered matters not in evidence when it found defendant guilty of residential burglary.

To preserve an issue for appellate review, a defendant must make a timely objection at trialand include the ground for the objection in a written posttrial motion. People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d176, 186 (1988). Here, because the record indicates that defendant failed to object or otherwise callattention to the trial court's statements, either during its ruling or in a posttrial motion, defendant haswaived this issue for appeal. However, as previously mentioned, defendant requests that we considerthe merits of the issue under the plain error rule, on the ground that the error implicates hisfundamental due process rights. See People v. Rowjee, 308 Ill. App. 3d 179, 186 (1999).

The plain error rule is a limited exception to the waiver doctrine that permits appellate reviewin an instance where a reviewing court finds that an error is of such magnitude that the defendant wasdenied a fair trial or where the evidence is closely balanced. People v. Beasley, 307 Ill. App. 3d 200,208 (1999). Because the issue presented implicates defendant's due process rights and because theState's evidence was primarily circumstantial, we will consider defendant's contention.

When conducting a bench trial, the trial court is presumed to consider only admissibleevidence. People v. Harris, 182 Ill. 2d 114, 156 (1998); People v. Soteras, 295 Ill. App. 3d 610, 619(1998). This presumption is overcome, however, if it affirmatively appears from the record thatimproper evidence was considered by the court. People v. Devalle, 182 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3 (1989),citing People v. Cepolski, 79 Ill. App. 3d 230 (1979). A trial court's determination based upon aprivate investigation or private knowledge, untested by cross-examination or any of the rules ofevidence, constitutes a denial of due process of law. People v. McBride, 157 Ill. App. 3d 955 (1987).

To prove defendant guilty of the offense of residential burglary, the State was required toestablish and prove that defendant, knowingly and without Maelean Williams' permission, entered orremained in her townhouse, or any part thereof, intending to commit therein a felony or theft. See720 ILCS 5/19--3 (West 2002). The trier of fact bears the responsibility to assess the credibility ofwitnesses, weigh the evidence presented, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and draw reasonableinferences from the evidence. People v. Williams, 193 Ill. 2d 306, 338 (2000).

Here, the victim testified that, in a telephone conversation with defendant on December 4,2002, defendant told her he took three items from her townhouse and he was going to "ruin" her. The victim also testified that, in a telephone conversation with defendant on December 5, 2002,defendant told the victim that he was going to kill her and that he could "come home" any time hewanted because he had keys. The victim testified that, on December 9, 2002, the drawers of hernightstand and her closet door were open. The following day, the victim checked her answeringmachine and received a message from the North Riverside police department. Upon calling the policedepartment, she was informed that the police were in possession of her birth certificate, social securitycard, and checkbook. The victim confirmed that her birth certificate and social security card weremissing from her nightstand and that a book of checks was missing from her closet. Among otheritems, the State introduced into evidence an Illinois driver's license, duplicate type, issued December6, 2002, and bearing the victim's photograph; an Illinois identification card, duplicate type, issuedDecember 6, 2002, and bearing the victim's photograph; and a blue checkbook holder containing acheck register and a book of checks. The victim identified the photographs of herself on the duplicatedriver's license and duplicate identification card but testified that the documents were not issued toher and were never in her possession.

We believe that all of the trial court's comments were proper inferences based on the evidencepresented. In assessing the credibility of the witnesses, the trial court rejected defendant's version ofthe events. It noted that the duplicate driver's license and the duplicate identification card could nothave been thrown out of the car window in October 2002 because they were not yet in existence, asthey were issued December 6, 2002. The trial court noted that the duplicate license and stateidentification card bore the victim's photograph, and it correctly deduced that, in order to have theseitems created, one would need a photograph. In discussing where "reasonable people" would obtaina photograph for that purpose, the trial court made a proper inference from the evidence presentedthat the photograph would come from someone's home. The trial court also made a proper inference,from the victim's testimony as to where she kept her birth certificate and social security card, thatsomeone who had some familiarity with the home and its occupants might have some knowledge ofwhere those documents were located. Based on these proper inferences, the trial court concludedthat the duplicate driver's license and duplicate state identification card were created with the birthcertificate, social security card, and photographs of the victim. We find no error.

We also believe that the trial court's comments with respect to the individual checks containedin the victim's checkbook were based on the State's evidence presented and were, therefore, proper. The victim testified that she was using checks numbered in the 300s, and the book of checksreflecting numbers 501 through 530 was kept in her "closet on a shelf in a box." The victim alsotestified that, during a telephone conversation on December 4, 2002, defendant told her he was goingto "ruin" her. The State also presented evidence that, on December 9, 2002, defendant gave CarolynWhite the victim's identification cards and checkbook, and they later went to Carson's together, whereWhite attempted to purchase items that defendant gave her.

The State introduced the victim's blue checkbook holder, which contained a check registerand a book of checks. The checks in the book were numbered from 501 through 530. Followingeach numbered check was carbon-type paper, which appeared to reproduce whatever was written onthe numbered check. Checks number 502 through 508, 510, 512, 513, and 515 were missing, but thecarbon paper reflected what had been written on the checks. Check numbered 511 and its carbonpaper were altogether missing from the book. The State also introduced into evidence check number515, which was dated December 9, 2002, and made payable to Carson's in the amount of $387.85. We note that the carbon paper in the checkbook also reflected what was written on check number515.

All of the trial court's comments regarding the contents of the checkbook were properinferences based on what the State placed into evidence. The carbon paper in the checkbookreflected that check number 502 appeared to be dated December 9, 2002, and written forapproximately $200. The carbon paper corresponding with check number 503 appeared to be datedDecember 9, 2002, and written for approximately $269. The carbon paper corresponding with checknumber 504 appeared to be dated December 9, 2002, made payable to "Leather images," and writtenfor approximately $276. The carbon paper corresponding with check number 505 appeared to bedated December 9, 2002, made payable to "Marshall Fields," and written for approximately $851. The carbon paper corresponding with check number 506 appeared to be dated December 9, 2002,made payable to "Nordstrom," and written for approximately $350. The carbon paper correspondingwith check number 507 appeared to be written for approximately $254. The carbon papercorresponding with check number 508 appeared to be dated December 9, 2002, and written forapproximately $254. The carbon paper corresponding with check number 510 appeared to be datedDecember 9, 2002, made payable to "Marshall Fields," and written for approximately $254. Thecarbon paper corresponding with check number 512 appeared to be dated December 9, 2002, madepayable to "Circuit City," and written for approximately $2,130. The carbon paper correspondingwith check number 513 appeared to be dated December 6, 2002, made payable to "Carolyn White,"with a memo reflecting "Rental Deposit," and written for $1,360. The trial court commented on thenumbered carbon papers that corresponded with the numbered checks. Contrary to defendant'sassertions, the trial court did not find that the checks were fraudulently written--it simply found theevidence "interesting." The trial court properly inferred from this evidence that the checks "might"cause somebody "ruin" or "financial distress," and noted that the State's evidence was consistent withthe victim's testimony that defendant was going to "ruin" her. Based on our review of the record, wefind that the trial court clearly considered only competent evidence.

Defendant's cited authority on this issue is distinguishable. In People v. Wallenberg, 24 Ill.2d 350 (1962), after a bench trial, the defendant was convicted of robbery. The defendant stated thathis alibi for the time of the robbery was that he was looking for, but could not find, a gas station ina particular part of the City of Chicago. The trial court, in finding the defendant guilty, stated thatit knew for a fact that there were gas stations on the particular stretch of road the defendantdescribed. Our supreme court held that it was error for the trial court to make a determination basedon its personal knowledge. Wallenberg, 24 Ill. 2d at 354.

In this case, however, the trial court did not improperly consider evidence based on itspersonal knowledge but rather considered all the evidence presented and the inferences therefrom. Thus, Wallenberg has no application to the facts in this case. Therefore, for the above reasons, wesee no reason to disturb the trial court's judgment.

Defendant's second contention is that he was denied the effective assistance of counselbecause his trial counsel admittedly was unable to hear the victim's testimony. The standard fordetermining whether defense counsel was ineffective is well established. Generally, a defendant mustshow both that his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and thathe suffered prejudice as a result of counsel's errors. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill. 2d 504, 525 (1984)(adopting Strickland). With respect to the performance prong, a defendant must demonstrate thathis counsel's performance was deficient in that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was notfunctioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the [s]ixth [a]mendment." Strickland, 466U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064. Neither mistakes in strategy nor the fact thatanother attorney with the benefit of hindsight would have proceeded differently is sufficient toestablish ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Vera, 277 Ill. App. 3d 130, 138 (1995).

Appellate counsel states in defendant's brief that he could not locate any authority specificallyaddressing the effectiveness of trial counsel who is impaired to the extent counsel is unable to hearportions of a trial. Defendant then analogizes the circumstances in the present case to those in Javorv. United States, 724 F.2d 831 (9th Cir. 1984). In Javor, the defense counsel not only slept duringthe trial, but he also failed to participate when evidence against his client was being presented. Javor,724 F.2d at 834. The Javor court recognized that, "when an attorney for a criminal defendant sleepsthrough a substantial portion of the trial, such conduct is inherently prejudicial and thus no separateshowing of prejudice is necessary." Javor, 724 F.2d at 833. We also note that, in Burdine v.Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 349 (5th Cir. 2001), counsel was deemed ineffective because he slept througha portion of a capital trial. Burdine, 262 F.3d at 349. However, the Burdine court did not adopt aper se rule but, rather, limited its holding to the "egregious" facts of the case. Burdine, 262 F.3d at349.

We recognize People v. Dean, 28 Ill. App. 3d 196 (1975), where the reviewing court rejecteda claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under a set of circumstances more egregious than in thepresent case. In Dean, the defendants, who were represented by privately retained counsel, wereconvicted of the offense of rape (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38, par. 11--1) and each was sentenced toa term of 40 to 60 years' imprisonment. Dean, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 197. In their second amendedpostconviction petition, they alleged they were entitled to a hearing based on, inter alia, their privatelyretained trial counsel's incompetence. Dean, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 197. Attached to the petition was anaffidavit of the retained trial attorney's son, himself an attorney who had attended portions of thedefendants' trial, who stated that, around the time of the trial, his father had shown signs of generaldeterioration and was found to be a diabetic and to have arteriosclerosis. Dean, 28 Ill. App. 3d at198. Also attached to the petition was an affidavit of the attorney's layman assistant, who stated thatcounsel was nearly blind, hard of hearing, and suffered from diabetes and bladder stones, and thatcounsel's physical impairments and handicaps precluded proper representation. Dean, 28 Ill. App.3d at 198. The trial court denied the defendants' petition without an evidentiary hearing. Dean, 28Ill. App. 3d at 197.

The reviewing court affirmed the trial court's denial of the petition. Dean, 28 Ill. App. 3d at201-02. The reviewing court, using the "farce" test (People v. McNeil, 53 Ill. 2d 187 (1972)),concluded that the defendants failed to establish that counsel's infirmities prevented him fromrepresenting them in a reasonably professional manner. Dean, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 199-201. Thereviewing court considered significant that (1) counsel's son made no statement in his affidavit thathis father's ailments interfered with proper representation, and (2) the layman's affidavit declared thatcounsel's ailments did not visibly appear to affect his mental acuity. Dean, 28 Ill. App. 3d at 200.

In recognizing Dean, however, we must also recognize the subsequent federal habeas corpusproceeding, where the federal court concluded that the defendants had been denied the effectiveassistance of counsel. See United States ex rel. Castleberry v. Sielaff, 446 F. Supp. 451, 454-55(N.D. Ill. 1978). In that proceeding, the federal court clearly considered the then 72-year-old trialattorney's physically deteriorating condition to be significant, pointing out that, inter alia, there werenumerous instances during the trial where counsel asserted his inability to hear the witnesses and theprosecutor's closing argument. Castleberry, 446 F. Supp. at 453-54.

In the present case, employing the Strickland standard, we determine that defense counselColeman's performance did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Our review of therecord shows that defense counsel explored the substance of the victim's direct examination testimonyin a thorough cross-examination, which comprised nearly 21 pages of transcript, and in a re-cross-examination, comprising an additional 2 pages of transcript. Although defense counsel admitted tothe court at the conclusion of the State's direct examination of the victim, "I don't think I heard 10percent of what the witness testified to," he then continued, "so I'll have to repeat everything." Defense counsel then engaged in an extensive question-and-answer examination with the victim,oftentimes repeating her response as if he were inquiring whether what he heard was correct, and thevictim would then respond in the affirmative or correct him. In defendant's posttrial motion, defensecounsel complains that he could not hear only the victim's testimony. Defense counsel acknowledgesthat he could hear the other witnesses. We do not believe that defense counsel's inability to hear onewitness, while acknowledging the ability to hear other witnesses, can at any objective level beconsidered "so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant bythe [s]ixth [a]mendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

In so holding, we must also recognize that in People v. Coss, 45 Ill. App. 3d 539 (1977), thereviewing court reflected the policy concern that allowance of an ineffective representation claimmight induce collusion between an accused and his lawyer to purposely commit an error in the hopeof procuring reversal of an adverse disposition. Courts must guard against trial attorneys'intentionally feigning incompetence. See People v Ortiz, 22 Ill. App. 3d 788 (1974). In the presentcase, we do not believe that defendant raised this issue for an improper purpose. Defendant,however, does not identify any evidence that should have been challenged or objected to, and he doesnot point to a topic or line of questioning that defense counsel failed to inquire about on cross-examination. As a result, we conclude that defendant has failed to show that he was prejudiced bycounsel's admitted hearing impairment. The trial court properly denied defendant's posttrial motion,and we determine here that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel.

Last, defendant contends that the fine levied against him for the Driver's Education Fund (625ILCS 5/16--104a (West 2002)) should be vacated. Defendant argues that the penalty was notstatutorily authorized, and the State confesses error. We agree with defendant, and we vacate thatportion of defendant's sentencing order assessing the penalty.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmedin part and vacated in part.

Affirmed in part and vacated in part.

BOWMAN and CALLUM, JJ., concur.