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JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

After a bench trial, defendant, Rashaad J. Dexter, was foundguilty of unlawfully possessing, with the intent to deliver, 1 gramor more but less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine,a Class 1 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)). However,because the trial court found that defendant committed the offensewhile he was on a public way within 1,000 feet of a public park,defendant was convicted of a Class X felony under section 407(b)(1)of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (section 407(b)(1)) (720ILCS 570/407(b)(1) (West 1998)). The trial court sentenceddefendant to six years and six months in prison.

Defendant appeals, arguing that the State failed to provebeyond a reasonable doubt that he committed the offense while hewas on a "public way." We agree, reduce defendant's conviction tothe lesser included Class 1 felony, and remand for resentencing.

We summarize those facts needed to frame the issue on appeal. The State's first witness, Rockford police officer Brian Shimaitis,testified as follows. At about 11:50 p.m. on November 14, 1999,Shimaitis and fellow officer Douglas Palmer were positioneddirectly west of and across the street from a privately ownedapartment building at 1028 Kishwaukee. A police tactical team wasnearby. The police suspected that the building was a drug house.A sidewalk about 20 feet long ran from the public sidewalk towardthe building; two or three steps then led to a concrete porch padwhich in turn led to the main door, which was made of glass and waslocated between two apartments. Plants were also on either sideof the door about two feet out from the building.

When Shimaitis first arrived, four men, including defendant,were in the "stairwell area" of the building. Within about 20minutes, 8 people came up one at a time to the building. Eachspoke to one of the four men, made a hand-to-hand exchange, andleft. As the tactical team moved in, Shimaitis and Palmer startedacross the street toward the house.

Shimaitis testified on direct examination that, when thetactical team started to move, defendant was standing outside thedoorway at 1028 Kishwaukee. On cross-examination, Shimaitis addedthat, just before he and Palmer got across the street, defendantwas standing left of the front door, leaning against a window. Shimaitis then testified that defendant was standing "up on theconcrete pad [and] leaning against the building."

After Shimaitis and Palmer crossed the street, Shimaitis sawthat defendant was on the ground, fighting with two other officers. Shimaitis, Palmer, and three other officers entered the buildingand escorted people from the stairway foyer to the outside. WhenShimaitis exited the building, defendant was handcuffed outside.

Officer Randy Berke testified as follows. At about 11:50 p.m.on November 14, 1999, he was with the tactical unit on the northeast corner of the apartment building. Berke could not seethe front of the building. Palmer and Shimaitis radioed that thetarget of the surveillance was standing in the doorway. Afterabout 20 minutes, the tactical officers approached the building. Two officers entered. Four or five seconds later, Berke and twoother officers approached the front entrance. Defendant wasstanding "right by the doorway." Berke said "Rockford police."Defendant ran south, dropping a paper bag. Berke soon helped totackle defendant and retrieved the bag, which defendant had dropped"more towards the building side" of the bushes than to the "streetside." Later, Berke ascertained that a sign marking a public parkwas 420 feet from where defendant was arrested.

Officer Palmer testified that, from his surveillance post, hesaw about eight people approach the apartment building, "go intothe stairwell foyer area," and make hand-to-hand transactions withdefendant while defendant stood "in front of a little side windownext to the door." After Palmer and Shimaitis crossed the street,Palmer saw defendant on the ground being subdued.

The State introduced expert testimony that the bag defendantdropped contained 6.8 grams of a substance containing cocaine andthat the amount of cocaine, the packaging, and the presence of $100cash on defendant showed that he intended to deliver the drugs.

Defendant introduced testimony Julius Ross gave at an earlierhearing. Ross testified that, when he arrived at 1028 Kishwaukee,nobody was outside the building. Ross entered a hallway or porch-like area but did not enter an apartment. Defendant was in thehallway. As Ross started up the stairs to the second floor, thepolice entered and arrested defendant and others in the hallway.

Defendant testified that, at about 11:20 p.m. on November 14,1999, he and two friends walked to 1028 Kishwaukee to buy marijuana. Defendant went in through the front door, saw somepeople inside, and stepped back onto the front porch. At thatpoint, police raided the house. While at 1028 Kishwaukee,defendant never possessed the paper bag that had cocaine.

Defendant contends that the foregoing evidence does not provebeyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of possessing acontrolled substance with the intent to deliver while he was on anypublic way as section 407(b)(1) uses that term. According todefendant, the State proved only that, when he possessed thecocaine, he was either inside a private apartment building or onthe building's stoop and that neither location was a "public way." The State responds that the stairwell, foyer, and sidewalk of theprivately owned apartment building were "public ways" because theywere accessible to the public.

In evaluating a reasonable doubt claim, we must affirm theconviction as long as all the evidence, when viewed most favorablyto the prosecution, is sufficient to convince any rational factfinder that the elements of the offense have been proved beyond areasonable doubt. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d 254, 265-66 (2000). However, to decide whether the evidence in this case proved thatdefendant committed his offense while he was on a "public way," wemust first define that term as it is used in section 407(b)(1).

The meaning of a statute is a question of law that we reviewde novo. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d 96, 103 (2001). Weaim to ascertain and effectuate the legislature's intent. In reMarriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001). The best evidenceof this intent is the statute's language itself. Paris v. Feder,179 Ill. 2d 173, 177 (1997). Statutory terms that are notspecifically defined should receive their ordinary and popularlyunderstood meanings. People v. Hicks, 101 Ill. 2d 366, 371 (1984). The dictionary is one guide to these meanings. People v. Barash,325 Ill. App. 3d 741, 745 (2001).

As section 407(b)(1) does not define "public way," we mustgive that term its plain meaning if that is possible. Fortunately,"public way" does indeed have a well established popularlyunderstood meaning. According to the dictionary, a "way" is "athoroughfare used or designed for traveling or transportation fromplace to place: path, road, street" (Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 2587 (1993)). Therefore, as logicallyfollows, a "public way" is defined as "any passageway (as an alley,road, highway, boulevard, turnpike) or part thereof (as a bridge)open as of right to the public and designed for travel" (Webster'sThird New International Dictionary 1836 (1993)). By contrast, a"private way" is privately owned, controlled, and maintained.Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1805 (1993).

The distinction between a public way and a private way isequally well established in legal lexicography. Although a privateway is necessarily located on private property (Black's LawDictionary 1587 (7th ed. 1999)), a highway is not public unless itis "controlled and maintained by governmental authorities forgeneral use." Black's Law Dictionary at 734 (7th ed. 1999)⁽¹⁾. A"private way" does not become a public way merely because it isaccessible to the public.

The distinction of which we write was firmly established inthe time of Blackstone, who carefully distinguished the latter from"the king's highways" and "common ways" (see 1 William Blackstone,Commentaries 129-30 (J.W. Ehrlich ed. 1959)). The limiteddefinitions of "public way" and "public highway" persist into thepresent era in judicial rulings from a variety of jurisdictions. See, e.g., Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 11 F.3d 1559, 1566 (10thCir. 1993) (under Oklahoma law, private parking lot was not "publicway" absent clear evidence that owner intended to dedicate lot topublic use); McKinney v. Ballard, 352 S.W.2d 200, 202-03 (Ky. App.1961) (private driveway not "public way"); Lucianelli v. City ofNewton, 288 Mass. 535, 193 N.E. 354 (1934) (grass plot next toroadway was not "public way" merely because public used itpermissively); W.D. Cowls, Inc. v. Woicekoski, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 18,385 N.E.2d 521 (1979) ("private way" did not become "public way"merely because owner allowed public to use it); Osburn v. SupremeExpress & Transfer Co., 590 S.W.2d 360, 363 (Mo. App. 1979)(atcommon law, quitclaim deed did not create "public way").

At least until recently, Illinois courts consistentlyrecognized that a "public way" or "public highway" is a route ofpassage maintained or controlled by public authorities for the useof the general public as a matter of right. The test of whetherproperty is a "public way" has not been merely whether it isaccessible to the public. Thus, in 1858, the supreme courtapproved a jury instruction that stated that a road was not a"common" or "public highway" unless the public had acquired thelegal right to travel thereon. Champlin v. Morgan, 20 Ill. 181(1858). Our supreme court has also written that "the term 'publichighway' includes public ways of every description which the publichave a right to use for travel." (Emphasis added.) Mammina v.Alexander Auto Service Co., 333 Ill. 158, 167 (1928). Theappellate court also stated, "Public ways are commonly termedhighways; a private way is either an easement or a customaryright." Schmisseur v. Penn, 47 Ill. App. 278, 284 (1892).

In more recent contexts, we have also recognized the limitedscope of the term "public way." Thus, our courts have held that,although "public highways" under the Illinois Vehicle Code (625ILCS 5/1--100 et. seq. (West 2000)) include privately owned parkinglots that are actively controlled or maintained by government(People v. Culbertson, 258 Ill. App. 3d 294 (1994); People v.Bailey, 243 Ill. App. 3d 871, 874 (1993)), they do not includepurely private parking lots (People v. Montelongo, 152 Ill. App. 3d518 (1987); People v. Kissel, 150 Ill. App. 3d 283, 285-86 (1986),overruled in part on other grounds, People v. Brown, 175 Ill. App.3d 725 (1988); People v. Jensen, 37 Ill. App. 3d 1010, 1013 (1976);People v. Kozak, 130 Ill. App. 2d 334 (1970)). In Illinois, aselsewhere, mere public accessibility traditionally has beeninsufficient to make private land a "public way."

Our opinion in People v. Ward, 95 Ill. App. 3d 283 (1981), inno way expanded the judicial definition of "public way." In Ward,the defendant attacked and beat a woman while they were in theparking lot of a hotel. The defendant was convicted of aggravatedbattery rather than simple battery because, applying the pertinentenhancing statute, the jury found that, at the time of the offense,either the defendant or the victim was "on or about a public way,public property, or public place of amusement" (Ill. Rev. Stat.1979, ch. 38, par. 12--4(b)(8)). Ward, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 287. Originally, the information alleged that the defendant committedthe offense "about public property." At the jury instructionsconference, the trial court allowed the State to amend theinformation to allege that the offense occurred at a "place ofpublic accommodation." The court also gave the jury an instructionthat incorporated the language of the amended information ratherthan the original one. Ward, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 283.

We held that the amendment was proper because, under the governing statute, the change was one of form only. The statuteenhanced battery to aggravated battery if the offense occurred "onor about a public way, public property or public place ofaccommodation or amusement ***." (Emphasis added.) Ward, 95 Ill.App. 3d at 287. We explained:

"Obviously, our legislature was of the belief that a batterycommitted in an area open to the public, whether it be apublic way, public property or public place of accommodationor amusement, constitutes a more serious threat to thecommunity than a battery committed elsewhere. [Citations.] Aswe interpret this statutory language, the essential allegationfor a charge *** is that the battery occurred in a publicarea. Whether the property was actually publicly owned and,therefore 'public property' rather than a privately owned'public place of accommodation' is irrelevant; what issignificant is that the alleged offense occurred in an areaaccessible to the public." (Emphasis added.) Ward, 95 Ill.App. 3d at 287-88.

It is crucial to understand what Ward holds and what it does nothold. Nowhere does Ward state that the hotel parking lot waseither a "public way" or "public property." Indeed, according tothe passage that we have quoted at length, the private lot was a"public place of accommodation or amusement" but not "publicproperty." Ward does not even discuss, much less decide, whethera privately owned parking can be a "public way."

Ward does state that a "public way" is necessarily open to thepublic. Ward, 95 Ill. App. 3d at 287. But of course that does notimply the converse, i.e., that any area open to the public isnecessarily a "public way." Nothing in Ward changed the long-standing definition of "public way." Several opinions recognizethat Ward holds only that private property may sometimes beconsidered a "place of public accommodation or amusement" under theaggravated battery statute. See People v. Logston, 196 Ill. App.3d 96, 99 (1990); People v. Lee, 158 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 1035-36(1987); People v. Murphy, 145 Ill. App. 3d 813, 815 (1986).

We acknowledge that several appellate court opinions do saythat Ward defines "public way" to include any private propertyaccessible to the public. See People v. Jones, 288 Ill. App. 3d293, 297-98 (1997); People v. Wicks, 283 Ill. App. 3d 337 (1996);People v. Pennington, 172 Ill. App. 3d 641, 644 (1988); People v.Pugh, 162 Ill. App. 1030, 1034 (1987). However, by confusing a"public way" with a "place of public accommodation or amusement,"these opinions simply misread Ward. (Wicks similarly errs instating that Lee broadly defines "public way." See Wicks, 283 Ill.App. 3d at 341-42.) These opinions also ignore the settled andwell understood meaning of the term "public way." Therefore, wedecline to follow Jones, Wicks, Pennington, or Pugh.

In arguing for an expansive definition of "public way," theState relies heavily on our opinion in People v. Rodriguez, 276Ill. App. 3d 33 (1995). There, the issue was whether the minordefendant could be prosecuted in adult court for allegedly havingdelivered illegal drugs while he was in a gas station parking lot. Section 5--4(7)(A) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS405/5--4(7)(A) (West 1992)) allowed the prosecution in adult courtif the offense was alleged to have been committed "on a public waywithin 1,000 feet of the real property comprising any school,regardless of the time of day or the time of year." (705 ILCS405/5--4(7)(A) (West 1992)). In holding that the private parkinglot was a "public way," Rodriguez relied heavily--but we believemistakenly--on Ward and Lee.

The Rodriguez majority conceded that section 5--4(7)(A) spokeonly of a "public way" while the aggravated battery statutereferred to a "public way, public property or public place ofaccommodation or amusement." Rodriguez, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 38. However, the majority discounted this difference because it readWard and Lee to state that "the key factor in determining whetheran aggravated battery occurred is that [sic] the offense occurredin an area or place accessible to the public." Rodriguez, 276 Ill.App. 3d at 38. Also, because section 5--4(7)(A) was intended toprotect children from drug dealers by making the areas near schools"zone[s] of safety," the legislature could not have intended it toreach only offenders "who choose to position themselves on a publicthoroughfare maintained by a public entity." Rodriguez, 276 Ill.App. 3d at 38.

The dissenting justice in Rodriguez argued that the majorityhad disregarded section 5--4(7)(A)'s plain meaning in favor of themuch broader phraseology of the aggravated battery statute. Rodriguez, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 42 (McLaren, J., dissenting). Citing Mammina and Culbertson, the dissenting justice concludedthat the "public way" plainly means a publicly maintainedpassageway, road, or street that any citizen has the right to use. Thus, as the gas station was neither publicly maintained nor apassageway, road or street, it was not a "public way." Rodriguez,276 Ill. App. 3d at 41-42 (McLaren, J., dissenting). Also, thedissenting justice noted that Ward and Lee held only that privatelymaintained parking lots could be "public places of accommodation oramusement" and not that such properties could be "public ways." Rodriguez, 276 Ill. App. 3d 42 (McLaren, J., dissenting). Finally,the dissenting justice invoked a familiar maxim of statutoryconstruction, "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius," and explainedthat the legislature's deliberate choice of words reflected itsintention to give section 5--4(7)(A) a lesser reach than theaggravated battery statute. Rodriguez, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 42-43(McLaren, J., dissenting).

We agree with the dissent in Rodriguez, and we think itsreasoning applies as well to section 407(b)(1) of the IllinoisControlled Substances Act as it does to the similarly phrasedsection 5--7(4)(A) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987. In passingeach law, the legislature deliberately eschewed broad language ithad used elsewhere and chose narrow language with a plain meaning. Courts may not rewrite legislation merely because it seemsappropriate to do so. Village of Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises,Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 494 (2001). This rule applies with specialforce when the legislature has deliberately omitted language thatit used before in similar or related legislation. Village ofBloomingdale, 196 Ill. 2d at 494. Surmising that the GeneralAssembly must have meant what it did not say, the Rodriguezmajority rewrote the law by inserting terms that the legislaturechose to leave out. This was not statutory construction butstatutory transmogrification.

Two other considerations compel us to reject Rodriguez. First, by equating "public way" with "public way, public property,or public place of accommodation or amusement," Rodriguez impliesthat most of the words in the aggravated battery statute wereinserted needlessly. However, the established (and logical) ruleis that we must construe a statute so that no term is renderedsuperfluous or meaningless. Yang v. City of Chicago, 195 Ill. 2d96, 106 (2001). Second, at most, "public way" is ambiguous; onecan reasonably give the term the meaning that most courts andcommentators have given it for centuries. Ambiguities in criminalstatutes are to be construed strictly in favor of the accused. People v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc., 31 Ill. 2d 535, 539 (1964);People v. Carillo, 323 Ill. App. 3d 367, 372 (2001). Yet, inviolation of this established maxim, Rodriguez chooses a very broadconstruction that favors the State.

For all of these reasons, we conclude that Rodriguez waswrongly decided. Therefore, we now overrule Rodriguez.

We return to the case at hand. To prove defendant guilty ascharged of the Class X felony, the State had to prove beyond areasonable doubt that he committed his offense while he was on apassageway that was controlled or maintained by the government forthe general use of the public as a matter of right. We concludethat the State did not meet its burden. The State's witnessesplaced defendant right next to the apartment building's front door,on the concrete porch pad leading up to the door, or in the"stairwell area" of the privately owned and maintained apartmentbuilding. At the very most, the evidence might allow an inferencethat defendant stood on the privately maintained and controlledwalkway when he possessed the bag of cocaine. None of theselocations could be considered a "public way." All were privateproperty. Members of the general public went there permissively,not as of right, and there is no evidence that any unit ofgovernment controlled or maintained the private property on whichdefendant committed his offense. Thus, the State did not provethat defendant acted while he was on a public way. Defendant'sconviction of the Class X felony cannot stand.

Defendant does not raise any other issues, and he concedesthat the evidence is sufficient to convict him of the lesserincluded offense of unlawful possession, with the intent todeliver, of 1 to 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine (720ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1998)). Therefore, we do not reversedefendant's conviction outright. However, as defendant now standsconvicted of only a Class 1 felony, we must remand this cause sothat the trial court may sentence him accordingly.

The judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County isaffirmed as modified, and the cause is remanded for resentencing.

Affirmed as modified and remanded.

BYRNE and KAPALA, JJ., concur.

1. The use of "highway" instead of "way" makes no difference.Courts frequently treat the terms as interchangeable. See Mamminav. Alexander Auto Service Co., 333 Ill. 158, 167 (1928); Schmisseurv. Penn, 47 Ill. App. 278, 284 (1892); Okemo Mountain, Inc. v. Townof Ludlow Zoning Board of Adjustment, 164 Vt. 447, 454, 671 A.2d1263, 1269 (1995). At most, the difference between a "way" and a"highway" is simply that, as "high" means principal or important(see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1067 (1993)), a"highway" is just a "high road," i.e., "any main route on land, onwater, or in the air." Black's Law Dictionary 734 (7th Ed. 1999). Whether one takes the high road or the low road, he treads a"public way" as long as he is on a governmentally controlled ormaintained passageway.