People v. Daniels
Case Date: 09/25/1996
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-95-1190
________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS SECOND DISTRICT ________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) No. 95--CF--544 ) v. ) ) JOE C. DANIELS, ) Honorable ) Eugene A. Wojcik, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ________________________________________________________________ JUSTICE COLWELL delivered the opinion of the court: In March 1995, defendant, Joe C. Daniels, was indicted with one count of unlawful delivery of more than 15 grams but less than 100 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1992)); and two counts of unlawful delivery of more than 1 gram but less than 15 grams of a controlled substance (cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/401(c)(2) (West 1992)). Defendant moved to dismiss the criminal prosecution against him on the basis of former jeopardy, arguing that, because a vehicle titled in his name and seized at the time of his arrest was forfeited, the seizure and forfeiture constituted punishment for the same conduct as the criminal offenses and barred further prosecution against him. After a hearing on September 14, 1995, the circuit court denied defendant's motion, and he timely appealed (see 145 Ill. 2d R. 604(f)). We affirm and remand for further proceedings. The operative facts gleaned from the record are brief and undisputed. When defendant was arrested, a 1978 Oldsmobile Coupe bearing the vehicle identification number 3N37K8C149983 was seized. The State sent defendant a notice of a pending forfeiture, but he did not file a claim for the vehicle. Defendant subsequently received a declaration of forfeiture advising him that the car was forfeited on May 26, 1995, pursuant to the Illinois Drug Asset Forfeiture Procedure Act (Forfeiture Act) (725 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 1992)). Under the provisions of the Forfeiture Act, the State's Attorney may initiate a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding against personal property subject to forfeiture in connection with a drug offense if the property does not exceed $20,000 in value, excluding the value of any conveyance. 725 ILCS 150/6 (West 1992). The State's Attorney gives statutory notice of the pending forfeiture to known and unknown owners and interest holders of the property who may then file a claim against the property within 45 days of the effective date of the notice. 725 ILCS 150/4, 6(B), 6(C)(1) (West 1992). If the claimant properly files a claim, the State's Attorney then initiates a judicial in rem forfeiture proceeding for the court to adjudicate whether the property should be forfeited. If no claim is timely made, the State's Attorney declares the property forfeited administratively and disposes of the property in accordance with the law. 725 ILCS 150/6(C), 6(D) (West 1992). Here, defendant did not file a claim against the forfeited automobile, and it was administratively forfeited. On appeal, defendant argues that, under the holding of our State supreme court in In re P.S., 169 Ill. 2d 260 (1996), the forfeiture of defendant's automobile must be deemed punishment for double jeopardy purposes, and defendant's right to dismissal of the criminal charges should not have been denied on the ground that defendant did not claim the property, since the forfeited auto was a titled vehicle which, according to defendant, distinguishes this case from this court's ruling in People v. Towns, 269 Ill. App. 3d 907, 918-19 (1995), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom. In re P.S., 169 Ill. 2d 260 (1996), vacated in part & remanded sub nom. Illinois v. Kimery, 518 U.S.___, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1092, 116 S. Ct. 2577 (1996) (mem.). Defendant also relies on United States v. Ursery, 59 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 1995) (where government instituted civil forfeiture action against Ursery's property alleging it had been used to facilitate drug offenses and defendant agreed to settle the claim, appeals court concluded that forfeiture and criminal conviction were punishment for the same offense and violated prohibition against double jeopardy; jeopardy attached when forfeiture judgment was entered; conviction and sentence vacated). However, during the pendency of this appeal the appellate decision in Ursery was reversed by United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. ___, 135 L. Ed. 2d 549, 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). In P.S., a consolidated case, our State supreme court affirmed this court's judgment (No. 2--93--1212) with respect to defendant John Kimery, who was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 56 |