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Following a jury trial in the circuit court of McHenry County,defendant, Kurt W. Cleveland, was convicted of unlawful possessionof a controlled substance with intent to deliver (720 ILCS570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 1998)) and was sentenced to 18 years'imprisonment. We affirmed the conviction. People v. Cleveland,No. 2--99--0719 (2001) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule23). Defendant then filed a pro se petition for relief under thePost-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122--1 et seq. (West2000)), alleging, inter alia, that he received ineffectiveassistance of counsel at trial because his attorney instructed himto testify falsely. The trial court summarily dismissed thepetition (see 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(a)(2) (West 2000)), and defendantappeals. We affirm.

Defendant was arrested on the morning of December 23, 1998,after police executed a warrant to search for controlled substancesat the home of Rebecca Colborn in Algonquin. The police enteredthe home by force and found defendant in bed with Colborn. Anofficer asked defendant where the drugs were. Defendant pointed toa pillowcase, which was found to contain cocaine and two bundles ofcash totaling close to $700. The police also found an electronicscale, some spoons, and a mirror. In addition, some checks andother papers belonging to defendant were discovered during thesearch, as were Christmas presents from "Wolf" (defendant'snickname) to Colborn's children.

A police informant testified that two days earlier he hadpurchased cocaine from Colborn. The transaction took place inColborn's bedroom and defendant was present at the time. Asked ifhe had previously seen defendant at Colborn's home, the informantresponded, "No, not really."

Defendant testified that he was a friend of Colborn and shehad hired him to help remodel her house. On the night before hewas arrested, defendant stayed with Colborn in her bedroom,drinking and using cocaine that belonged to Colborn. Defendanttestified that he was addicted to cocaine. According to defendant,when the police entered Colborn's home, she took drugs that weresitting on a table in the bedroom and placed them in a pillowcase. Defendant pointed at the pillowcase when the police asked him wherethe drugs were. On cross-examination, defendant testified thatColborn provided him with cocaine in exchange for companionship. On redirect examination, defendant explained that "companionship"meant sex.

In his pro se postconviction petition, defendant alleged,inter alia, that his attorney had told him to falsely testify thatColborn had given him cocaine in exchange for sex. According todefendant, his attorney expressed the view that Colborn was ugly. Defendant's attorney allegedly told him that "once the jury sees[Colborn], they will know you could have done a lot [sic] better,and you were there for the drugs and sex only." The trial courtsummarily dismissed this and other ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on the basis that the issue of ineffectiveassistance of counsel was "previously dealt with by the AppellateCourt." This appeal followed.

Postconviction proceedings are designed to permit inquiry intoconstitutional issues involved in the original conviction andsentence that were not, nor could they have been, adjudicatedpreviously on direct appeal. People v. Lucas, 203 Ill. 2d 410,417-18 (2002). As such, issues considered on direct appeal arebarred by the doctrine of res judicata, and issues that could havebeen raised on direct appeal are deemed waived. Lucas, 203 Ill. 2dat 418. The Act provides that if the trial court finds that apostconviction petition is "frivolous or is patently withoutmerit," the court shall summarily dismiss the petition "in awritten order specifying the findings of fact and conclusions oflaw it made in reaching its decision." 725 ILCS 5/122--2.1(a)(2)(West 1998).

Here, the trial court's written order indicates that itdismissed the claim at issue--that counsel instructed defendant totestify falsely--on res judicata grounds. In his direct appeal,defendant argued that trial counsel was ineffective because hefailed to move for substitution of judges, failed to interviewColborn, and failed to object to certain prosecutorial comments. We agree with defendant that the postconviction claim presentlyunder consideration is sufficiently different from the issuesraised on direct appeal that the doctrine of res judicata does notapply.

The State argues, however, that dismissal was proper becausethe claim is waived. The facts underlying defendant's claim--thathis attorney instructed him to give false testimony--were not partof the record in defendant's direct appeal. The waiver rule doesnot apply to claims that depend on evidence outside the record. People v. Wright, 329 Ill. App. 3d 462, 467 (2002). Nevertheless,the State contends that this principle does not apply here. In hisposttrial motion, defendant contended that trial counsel wasineffective and the trial court appointed a different attorney toassist defendant in presenting the motion. The State argues thatbecause defendant was aware that trial counsel directed him totestify falsely, his new attorney could have raised the issue inthe trial court and the issue therefore could have been raised ondirect appeal. It is unnecessary to address the question ofwaiver, however, because we have held that waiver is not a properbasis for summarily dismissing a postconviction petition. Peoplev. Stivers, 338 Ill. App. 3d 262, 264 (2003).

As noted, summary dismissal is proper when the trial courtdetermines that a postconviction petition is frivolous or patentlywithout merit. To avoid dismissal at this stage, the petition muststate the gist of a meritorious claim. Stivers, 338 Ill. App. 3dat 264. Some controversy exists, however, as to whether areviewing court can make this determination when the trial courthas improperly entered a summary dismissal on some other basis. People v. Blair, 338 Ill. App. 3d 429, 432 (2003), held that it wasinappropriate to consider for the first time on appeal whether thepetition was frivolous or patently without merit. On the otherhand, in Stivers, this court reached the question of whether thepetition stated the gist of a constitutional claim, as did thecourt in People v. Little, 335 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 1051 (2003),which observed that a reviewing court may affirm on any basissupported by the record.

In our view, Little and Stivers represent the better reasonedapproach. It is a long-standing principle that "it is not thetrial court's reasoning which is the subject of this court'sreview, but, rather, its judgment" (People v. Norks, 137 Ill. App.3d 1078, 1082 (1985)), and we see no sound reason not to apply theprinciple in the present setting. We recognize that in People v.Brothers, 179 Ill. App. 3d 788, 791 (1989), this court stated thatit had no jurisdiction to initially determine whether apostconviction petition was frivolous or patently without merit. Brothers cited People v. Day, 152 Ill. App. 3d 416, 421 (1987),which, in turn, cited section 122--1 of the Act for the propositionthat "[j]urisdiction to determine whether [the defendant's]petition is frivolous or patently without merit is vested in 'thecourt in which the conviction took place.' " Day, 152 Ill. App. 3dat 421, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 38, par. 122--1. Inactuality, the quoted portion of the statute merely indicates wherethe petition must be filed and has no bearing on the jurisdictionof the reviewing court. Accordingly, we overrule Brothers to theextent that it held that a reviewing court lacks jurisdiction toinitially determine whether a postconviction petition is frivolousor patently without merit, and we turn our attention to thatquestion in this case.

Defendant contends that his petition stated the gist of aclaim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Under the two-prongtest set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 80 L. Ed.2d 674, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), a defendant claiming ineffectiveassistance of counsel must show that his counsel's performance"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that thedeficient performance was prejudicial in that "there is areasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessionalerrors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 698, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2068.

Defendant argues that counsel's alleged strategy based on theuse of false testimony was necessarily unreasonable. Defendantmaintains that he suffered prejudice because his embellishedtestimony undermined his credibility in the jurors' eyes. Hecontends that the State's evidence was not particularly compellingand that, but for his false testimony, there is a reasonableprobability that the jury would have acquitted him. We concludethat the claim is patently without merit as a matter of law. Alldefendants must be presumed to know that if they choose to testifythey must testify truthfully. Defendants are not entitled to relyon a lawyer's advice to testify falsely, and if they do so, thereis no sound reason to treat them any differently from defendantswho testify falsely entirely on their own initiative. If theallegations of defendant's postconviction petition are true, hiscomplicity with his attorney in presenting false testimonyforecloses a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. People v.Martin, 143 Ill. App. 3d 818, 821 (1986).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof McHenry County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and McLAREN, J., concur.