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Defendant, Ruben R. Bustamante, was indicted with one countof criminal damage to government-supported property, a Class 4felony

(count I) (720 ILCS 5/21--4(1)(a) (West 2000)), and one count ofreckless conduct, a Class A misdemeanor (count II) (720 ILCS 5/12--5(a), (b) (West 2000)). The charges arose out of an incident inwhich defendant threw a beer bottle at a parked police car. Thejury returned guilty verdicts on the two charges. Defendant fileda posttrial motion, arguing, inter alia, that the jury renderedlegally inconsistent verdicts by finding that defendantsimultaneously had mutually inconsistent culpable mental states. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant was subsequentlysentenced to 24 months' probation conditioned on spending threeweekends of confinement in the county jail, the completion of 40hours of community service, and the payment of restitution andfines. Defendant timely appeals, arguing that the two verdictsare legally inconsistent and must be reversed and that the causemust be remanded for a new trial. We affirm.

At trial, Officer Donald Flowers of the Aurora policedepartment testified that he was on duty on the evening of May 20,2000, in the downtown area of the city. At 7:38 p.m., he was inhis squad car parked on the north side of the street at 44 EastDowner Place. He was checking the notes on his computer when theback window of the car shattered. Downer Place is a one-waystreet in a business district and has parking spaces on both sidesof the street. There are two lanes of travel, each of which iseight feet wide. Flowers referred to a diagram to show the squadcar's location. Down the street is a bridge and the Fox River.The river is approximately 30 feet from where his squad car hadbeen parked. Flowers' squad car was parked directly in front ofcity hall at 44 East Downer Place. There were no public parkingspaces immediately behind him, and Flowers did not remember anycar parked behind him. There were some vehicles parked ahead ofhim a few spaces away.

As Flowers was checking his computer, he heard a loud crash,and glass hit him in the back of the head. He ducked down becausehe thought someone had shot at him. He rolled out of the vehicleand saw a gray Oldsmobile speeding away. There was not a lot oftraffic in the area. Flowers got back into his car and pursuedthe Oldsmobile traveling west on Downer Place. Flowers followedit to Lake Street, where the vehicle turned left and he lost sightof it. Flowers went on to Woodlawn Avenue, where at the 200 blocka citizen waved him down and stated that a gray vehicle had gonesouthbound on Woodlawn Avenue at a high rate of speed. Flowerscontinued southbound to the 300 block and found a gray vehiclematching the suspect's vehicle in the driveway of 312 WoodlawnAvenue. Flowers inspected the suspect's vehicle and found a 12-pack of Miller Genuine Draft beer in bottles on the floorboardbehind the driver's seat. There were only 11 bottles in the pack. When Flowers inspected his squad car, he found pieces of a MillerGenuine Draft beer bottle on the floor behind the passenger'sseat. The glass from the rear window was everywhere; there wassome on his clothing, on his back, and on the dashboard. Hisclothing was sticky and smelled of beer.

Flowers then went to the One-Stop at the corner of Lake andGale Streets. Sergeant Davis and another unit were there withdefendant and his friends. Flowers also spoke with a personnamed Enrique Cacique at 317 Woodlawn Avenue.

Cacique testified that he lived at 317 Woodlawn Avenue, whichwas near 312 Woodlawn Avenue. He heard squealing tires and sawa big car speeding by. It turned into the driveway of the houseacross the street, and then he saw two people jump a fence. Thepolice came behind this car within a few seconds.

Jim Coursey was a detective of the Aurora police departmentat the time of the incident. He testified that he intervieweddefendant after defendant signed a waiver of his rights. Courseyrecorded a statement by defendant, which was played in court. (The tape is not included in the record on appeal.) Courseyfurther testified on cross-examination that defendant offered topay for the window. Defendant stated he did not see the squadcar, and he was attempting to throw the bottle out of the car sohe would not have an empty beer bottle in his vehicle. Defendantsaid he threw the bottle toward the river and got scared when hesaw that he had hit a squad car and when he saw the officer. Defendant did not try to blame anyone else during the interview.

The parties stipulated that the squad car belonged to theAurora police department and was purchased and maintained usingstate and/or federal funds administered through state agencies.

Defendant testified that, while driving around downtown, hewas drinking beer. He was a passenger in the car. He drank abeer quickly so that only suds were left in the bottle. He hadconsumed one beer. He did not want it in the car, so he stuck hishand out of the window and threw the bottle toward the river. (The court noted that he gestured with his arm fully extended asif he were pitching a baseball.) He did not want any emptybottles in the car because he had his license taken away forhaving empty bottles in the car. It was not too dark out. He didnot see the police car and did not intend to throw the bottle ata police car. He got scared when he found out he hit a policecar.

Defendant stated that the police car was closer to the riverthan was shown in the State's diagram. He saw a white van parkedbehind the police car. There were vehicles also parked in frontof the police car. He was located on the south side of the streetclosest to the river. He told the police what had happened andtook responsibility for it. He never intended to throw a beerbottle at a squad car driven by the officer. Defendant heard anoise when he threw the bottle, and he left when he saw theofficer get out. He did not stop because he was scared.

On cross-examination, defendant admitted that, when he was atthe police station within three hours of the incident, he statedhe had not been drinking during the previous eight hours. He thenconceded in his testimony that he had had one Miller Genuine Draftbeer out of the pack. He had no idea how far he was from theriver. When the officer got out of the squad car, defendant toldhis friend to take off. When they got to the stop sign, he sawthe officer behind him but still took off and then went to hisfriend's house at 312 Woodlawn Avenue. Once there, they jumpedover a fence. The car traveled 30 to 40 miles per hour in a 20-or 25-mile-per-hour zone. He admitted they were trying to runaway from the police and that he took responsibility for theincident only after being caught.

While the jury was deliberating, it sent the court thefollowing question: "On the charge of reckless conduct, does thedefendant have to have an intent to harm the officer?" The courtconsulted the parties. The court's answer to the jury stated:

"You have previously been given the definition ofreckless conduct. As to your specific question as to intent,you must confine your deliberations to the law that I'vepreviously given to you and the following:

A person is reckless when he consciously disregards asubstantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances existor that a result will follow and such disregard constitutesa gross deviation from the standard of care which areasonable person would exercise in this situation."

See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.01 (3d ed.Supp. 1996).

With respect to the knowledge element of the criminal damagecharge, the court had instructed the jury as follows: "A personknows the result of his conduct when he is consciously aware thatsuch result is practically certain to be caused by his conduct." See Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No. 5.01B (3ded. Supp. 1996).

The jury returned a guilty verdict on each charge. Inpresenting his posttrial motion, defendant argued that theverdicts were legally inconsistent because defendant could notsimultaneously act knowingly and recklessly. The trial courtdenied the motion, reasoning that defendant could have actedrecklessly with respect to the officer and knowingly with respectto the property.

On appeal, defendant again argues that the jury verdicts werelegally inconsistent and that he is entitled to a new trial. Where inconsistent verdicts of guilty are returned, a reversal anda new trial on all counts must follow. People v. Hoffer, 106 Ill.2d 186, 195 (1985). In Hoffer, the jury convicted the defendantof murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughterin a case where the defendant shot his sister's former boyfriend. The defendant testified that he thought the boyfriend, who oftencarried a handgun, was reaching for a gun at the time of theshooting.

In Hoffer, various definitional and issues instructions weregiven to the jury. The issues instructions for murder andvoluntary manslaughter required the State to prove that thedefendant acted intending to kill or do great bodily harm, orknowing that his acts created a strong probability of death orgreat bodily harm. The issues instructions for involuntarymanslaughter required the State to prove that the defendant actedrecklessly in performing the acts that caused the victim's death. Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d at 192-93.

The court pointed out that the jury received an issuesinstruction on murder that required the State to prove thedefendant did not believe circumstances existed that justified theuse of force. By finding the defendant guilty of murder, the juryspecifically found that the defendant did not believe his conductwas justified. At the same time, by finding him guilty ofvoluntary manslaughter, the jury determined that he did believe,although unreasonably, that his conduct was justified. Additionally, the jury concluded that the defendant killedanother, intentionally or knowingly (murder, voluntarymanslaughter) while simultaneously finding that the defendantrecklessly but unintentionally caused the death of the victim(involuntary manslaughter). Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d at 195.

Because a finding that the defendant acted intentionally orknowingly contradicts a finding that the defendant actedrecklessly but unintentionally, the supreme court concluded thatthe mental states involved in these offenses were mutuallyinconsistent. The court noted, "Where a determination is madethat one exists, the others, to be legally consistent, must befound not to exist." Hoffer, 106 Ill. 2d at 195. The supremecourt affirmed the appellate court's decision to reverse all threeconvictions and to remand the cause for a new trial.

In People v. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d 523 (1997), the defendantwas charged with the aggravated discharge of a firearm and theunlawful use of a weapon in connection with the shooting of hisfiancée. The jury returned verdicts of guilty of aggravateddischarge of a firearm, which required proof of a knowing mentalstate, and an uncharged count of reckless conduct (which requiredproof of a reckless mental state) that the jury was instructed toconsider, at the defendant's request, as a lesser-included offenseof aggravated battery. The defendant was acquitted of theaggravated battery charge.

There was evidence that the defendant shot his fiancéemultiple times. Count I (aggravated battery with a firearm)charged that, in committing a battery, the defendant knowingly andwithout legal justification caused an injury to the victim byshooting her in the chest. Count II charged that the defendantcommitted the aggravated discharge of a firearm in that heknowingly discharged a firearm in the direction of the victim. The jury was instructed, however, that reckless conduct could beproved by a finding that the defendant recklessly performed an actthat caused bodily harm to another.

The State argued that one shot that was fired in thedirection of the victim was a knowing act of discharge, while asecond act consisted of the defendant then firing the gun directlyat the victim, striking her. The State asserted that the jurymust have felt that the defendant fired this second shotrecklessly, causing bodily harm. However, the supreme courtrejected this argument, noting that there was no evidence tosupport the State's hypothesis that the defendant's mental statechanged during the shootings. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d at 533. Thesupreme court also rejected the State's argument that the mentalstate of knowledge "includes" the mental state of recklessness,an argument the court had previously rejected. Fornear, 176 Ill.2d at 531, citing People v. Spears, 112 Ill. 2d 396, 407-08(1986). The supreme court held that recklessness and knowledgeare mutually inconsistent mental states and declined to " 'blur[]the distinction between the mental state of knowledge and the lessculpable mental state of recklessness by assuming that the twoinvariably coexist.' " Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d at 531, quotingSpears, 112 Ill. 2d at 408.

The Fornear court further pointed out that, where neither theState's proof at trial nor the jury instructions distinguishedbetween the defendant's intent when he fired the shots, there wasnothing to alert the jury that the State or the defense wasclaiming different mental states as to different shots. The courtconcluded that the jury could not have rationally found separableacts accompanied by different mental states to support both theaggravated discharge of a firearm and the reckless conductverdicts as legally consistent. Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d at 534.

The Fornear court pointed out that Spears provided theessential framework for analyzing the consistency of jury verdictsin the "troublesome context of multiple shots or victims" whereit stated:

" '[W]here a claim of inconsistent guilty verdicts involvesmultiple shots or victims, the question is whether the trierof fact could rationally find separable acts accompanied bymental states to support all of the verdicts as legallyconsistent. ***

*** We believe that the substance of the allegationscharging the defendant, as an unequivocal expression ofprosecutorial intent [citation], and what the evidence showedin relation to those charges, are of particular importance indetermining whether guilty verdicts could rationally andconsistently be based upon separable acts accompanied by therequisite mental states.' " Fornear, 176 Ill. 2d at 531-32,quoting Spears, 112 Ill. 2d at 405-06.

In the present case, defendant was charged with criminaldamage to government-supported property. The offense is committedwhen a person "[k]nowingly damages any property supported in wholeor in part with State funds, funds of a unit of local government*** or Federal funds administered or granted through Stateagencies without the consent of the State." 720 ILCS 5/21--4(a)(West 2000). The charge stated in pertinent part that "defendantknowingly damaged, without the consent of the City of Aurora, therear window of a City of Aurora squad car, which is supportedwholly or in part with State of Illinois funds or Federal Fundsadministered or granted through State agencies."

The offense of reckless conduct is defined as follows: "Aperson who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safetyof an individual by any means, commits reckless conduct if heperforms recklessly the acts which cause the harm or endangersafety, whether they otherwise are lawful or unlawful." 720 ILCS5/12--5 (West 2000). The reckless conduct charge alleged inpertinent part

that defendant "endangered the bodily safety of Officer Flowersin that, while acting in a reckless manner, he threw a beer bottleat the squad car driven byu [sic] Officer Flowers which shatteredthe rear window of the squad car and caused glass to fly and hitOfficer Flowers."

Obviously, the criminal damage offense requires a mentalstate of knowledge while the reckless conduct charge requires amental state of recklessness, a less culpable mental state. However, while Fornear was concerned with mutually incompatiblemental states regarding a defendant's act or course of conducttoward one victim, we are confronted with that "troublesome" areaof determining whether two seemingly incompatible mental statescan exist contemporaneously or nearly contemporaneously withrespect to two victims or harms even though there was but one act. We believe defendant could have knowingly caused harm to thegovernment property and could have recklessly endangered thesafety of a person. Fornear is therefore distinguishable. Therecord here shows that defendant was charged separately with twocrimes, and the jury was instructed as to the mental state foreach crime. Based on the evidence presented, the jury rationallycould have concluded that defendant acted knowingly in damagingthe government-supported property but acted recklessly in causingthe consequential endangerment to the safety of the officer asevidenced by the shattered glass spraying the officer. Thevictims and the harms are clearly separable, and the Stateintended to charge and prove two separate crimes. The jury'squestion to the court showed that it was considering the mentalstate for each crime separately, and there is no suggestion thatthe jury might have confused the mental states as they relatedrespectively to each of the two charges.

We find additional support for our conclusion in reviewingcases declining to apply the one-act, one-crime rule. It ispossible to carve two crimes out of one act. Courts havedetermined that, in certain cases, one act can constitute twoseparate crimes where one offense is not a lesser-included offense of the other. People v. Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d 129 (1994),discussed cases where one act constituted two crimes. In Britt,the reviewing court concluded that the defendant committed twocrimes in that he committed aggravated arson where, by means offire or an explosive, he knowingly damaged real property withoutthe owner's consent, knowing that one or more persons were in thebuilding, and he also committed murder by intentionally andunlawfully causing the death of another. The Britt courtdetermined that aggravated arson was not a lesser-included offenseof first-degree murder because each offense had an element notcontained in the other, and thus both convictions were sustainedeven though the defendant committed but one act.

In People v. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d 317 (1987), the defendant wasconvicted of both feticide and murder based upon his single shotthat killed both a woman and her fetus. The supreme court statedthat it was well settled that separate victims require separateconvictions and sentences. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 363. The courtdetermined that, because feticide was not a lesser-includedoffense of murder, separate convictions were proper even thoughthey were based on one act. Shum, 117 Ill. 2d at 364.

In the present case, reckless conduct is not a lesser-included offense of knowingly damaging government-supportedproperty. As we have explained, each has a distinct mental state,a separate kind of harm, and a separate victim. Analogizing toBritt, we determine that knowingly damaging government-supportedproperty without the consent of the owner can be committed withoutrecklessly endangering the bodily safety of a person. As inBritt, each offense has an element not contained in the other. See Britt, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 149-51.

We conclude that, based on the facts of this case, the juryrationally could have found separate crimes supported by separatemental states and that the verdicts were legally consistent.

The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

McLAREN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.