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Following a jury trial, defendant, Sharlean Lewis Bogan, wasconvicted of first-degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(2) (West1996)) in connection with the stabbing death of her husband, KarlA. Bogan (Karl). The circuit court of Kane County subsequentlysentenced defendant to a prison term of 38 years. Defendant nowappeals, contending (a) that the second-degree murder instructiontendered to the jury (see Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions,Criminal, No. 7.06A (3d ed. 1992) (hereinafter IPI Criminal 3d)) isunconstitutional and (b) that her trial counsel provided her withineffective assistance by proposing IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A. We affirm defendant's conviction and also grant the State's requestfor $50 in fees.

On January 22, 1997, a Kane County grand jury returned anindictment against defendant, charging her with alternative countsof first-degree murder. See 720 ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West1996). The jury trial was held on April 14 and 15, 1998, duringwhich the following evidence was admitted.

At 4:30 a.m. on January 1, 1997, defendant pounded on the doorof the Carpentersville fire department and awoke firefighter StevenGuetschow. Hysterical, defendant told Guetschow that her husbandwas sick and in need of medical assistance. Guetschow called foran ambulance while several firefighters went to defendant'sapartment, which was located directly behind the fire department. There they found Karl, lying supine on the floor just inside theapartment door. He had been stabbed to death.

At 9:41 that same morning, defendant gave a statement toOfficer Michael O'Brien of the Carpentersville police department. In that statement, which was audiotaped, defendant told O'Brienthat she and Karl were at home the previous evening (New Year'sEve), watching a movie and drinking liquor. At some point in theevening or early morning, defendant went with Karl to a gas stationto purchase crack cocaine. Defendant, who was six months'pregnant, brought her two-year-old baby with them. After returningto the apartment and smoking some of the crack, defendant and Karlbegan arguing. Defendant did not want to continue smoking crackwhile pregnant, and she threatened to leave Karl. As the argumentescalated, defendant obtained a knife from the kitchen and wentinto the bedroom. She said she took the knife because she wasscared. Later, Karl entered the bedroom, placed two other kitchenknives on the bed in front of defendant, and told her, "[O]ne of usis going to die tonight."

A short while later, having decided to leave the apartment,defendant grabbed two of the knives. She argued with Karl in thefront room and then began walking down a hallway toward her baby'sroom. Karl took a lamp and threw it in defendant's direction. Although the lamp shattered near her feet, defendant said she didnot believe Karl was trying to hurt her with the lamp. After thelamp broke, defendant turned around and began swinging the knives. Karl then picked up a vacuum cleaner and "touched" her on the backwith it. According to defendant's statement, the "touch" was "nothard, like . . . nothing that would hurt me." Yet defendant turnedaround and began swinging the knives again. After stabbing Karl inthe chest, defendant ran to the fire station. She told O'Brien shedid not sustain any injuries during the altercation.

An autopsy revealed that Karl sustained 26 stab wounds, 4 ofthem exceeding 2 inches in depth. The worst was a chest wound, sixto seven inches deep, penetrating into Karl's heart. Karl alsosuffered a two-inch-deep wound to his right shoulder, a three-inch-deep wound to his right armpit, and a four-inch-deep wound to theback of his right shoulder.

Defendant asserted a self-defense theory at trial. Severalwitnesses testifying for defendant stated that Karl was a cocaineaddict and a threatening individual with a violent temper. Karl'sex-wife testified that Karl was an abusive husband who becameaddicted to crack in the mid-1980s.

Defendant testified that Karl physically abused her duringtheir six-month marriage, causing her to leave him two or threetimes. Defendant's testimony regarding the New Year's eventsdiffered slightly from her January 1, 1997, statement to OfficerO'Brien. According to defendant's trial testimony, Karl beganchoking her with one hand after putting the knives on the bed. Defendant further testified that she then kneed Karl in the groinand went into the front room carrying the knives. Karl followed,took the lamp, and hit her in the back with it. After physicallystruggling with defendant and threatening to cut her throat, Karlpicked up the vacuum cleaner and beat defendant on the back andhead with it. Still holding the knives, defendant fell into afetal position on the ground to protect her unborn child. At thatpoint, Karl told defendant he was hurt, and it was then thatdefendant ran to the fire department. Defendant testified that shesimply told the firefighters her husband was sick because she didnot see any blood and because she was too far away from Karl tohave stabbed him. She stated on cross-examination that shesustained bruises from being hit with the vacuum cleaner, contraryto her statement to Officer O'Brien.

The jury received instructions on first-degree murder (720ILCS 5/9--1(a)(1), (a)(2) (West 1996)), second-degree murder (720ILCS 5/9--2 (West 1996)), and involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS5/9--3 (West 1996)). Taken from IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A, thesecond-degree murder instruction stated in relevant part:

"To sustain either the charge of first degree murder orthe charge of second degree murder, the State must prove thefollowing propositions:

First Proposition: That the defendant performed the actswhich caused the death of Karl A. Bogan; and

Second Proposition: That when the defendant did so,[she] knew that such acts created a strong probability ofdeath or great bodily harm to Karl A. Bogan; [and]

Third Proposition: That the defendant was not justifiedin using the force which [she] used.

* * *

You may not consider whether the defendant is guilty ofthe lesser offense of second degree murder until and unlessyou have first determined that the State has proved beyond areasonable doubt each of the previously stated propositions.

The defendant has the burden of proving by apreponderance of the evidence that a mitigating factor ispresent so that [she] is guilty of the lesser offense ofsecond degree murder instead of first degree murder. By thisI mean that you must be persuaded, considering all theevidence in this case, that it is probably more true than nottrue that the following mitigating factor is present: thatthe defendant, at the time [she] performed the acts whichcaused the death of Karl A. Bogan, believed the circumstancesto be such that they justified the deadly force [she] used,but [her] belief that such circumstances existed wasunreasonable.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidencethat the defendant has proved by a preponderance of theevidence that a mitigating factor is present so that [she] isguilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder insteadof first degree murder, you should find the defendant guiltyof second degree murder.

If you find from your consideration of all the evidencethat the defendant has not proved by a preponderance of theevidence that a mitigating factor is present so that [she] isguilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder insteadof first degree murder, you should find the defendant guiltyof first degree murder." (Emphasis added.)

See IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A.

The jury also received instructions on the use of force in thedefense of person (self-defense) (720 ILCS 5/7--1 (West 1996)) andthe use of force by an aggressor (720 ILCS 5/7--4(c)(1) (West1996)). The self-defense instruction stated:

"A person is justified in the use of force when and tothe extent that he reasonably believes that such conduct isnecessary to defend himself against the imminent use ofunlawful force.

However, a person is justified in the use of force whichis intended or likely to cause death or great bodily harm onlyif he reasonably believes that such force is necessary toprevent imminent death or great bodily harm to himself."

See IPI Criminal 3d No. 24-25.06.

The use-of-force-by-aggressor instruction stated:

"A person who initially provokes the use of force againsthimself is justified in the use of force only if the forceused against him is so great that he reasonably believes he isin imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and he hasexhausted every reasonable means to escape the danger otherthan the use of force which is likely to cause death or greatbodily harm to the other person."

See IPI Criminal 3d No. 24-25.09.

The jury deliberated for five hours. During itsdeliberations, the jury sent the trial judge a note asking for a"ruling [as] to self-defense." With the attorneys' consent, thejudge informed the jury that it was to decide the case based on theevidence submitted and instructions given. The jury subsequentlyreturned a guilty verdict on the first-degree murder charge. Defendant's posttrial motion was denied, and she was sentenced to38 years' imprisonment. Defendant filed this timely appeal.

Defendant's first argument is that IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06Aviolates a criminal defendant's fourteenth amendment right to dueprocess. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV. Specifically, defendantcomplains that IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A, as read, isunconstitutional in that it forces a defendant to prove himselfguilty of second degree murder by placing on him the burden ofproving a mitigating factor. Furthermore, according to defendant,"the instruction does not express the plain language of the statutedefining the offense," the second-degree murder statute (720 ILCS5/9--2 (West 1996)).

The second-degree murder statute states in pertinent part asfollows:

"(a) A person commits the offense of second degree murderwhen he commits the offense of first degree murder *** andeither of the following mitigating factors are present:

***

(2) At the time of the killing he believes thecircumstances to be such that, if they existed,would justify or exonerate the killing under theprinciples stated in Article 7 of this Code, buthis belief is unreasonable.

***

(c) When a defendant is on trial for first degree murderand evidence of either of the mitigating factors defined insubsection (a) of this Section has been presented, the burdenof proof is on the defendant to prove either mitigating factorby a preponderance of the evidence before the defendant can befound guilty of second degree murder. However, the burden ofproof remains on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubteach of the elements of first degree murder and, whenappropriately raised, the absence of circumstances at the timeof the killing that would justify or exonerate the killingunder the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code. In ajury trial for first degree murder in which evidence of eitherof the mitigating factors defined in subsection (a) of thisSection has been presented ***, the jury must be instructedthat it may not consider whether the defendant has met hisburden of proof with regard to second degree murder until andunless it has first determined that the State has provenbeyond a reasonable doubt each of the elements of first degreemurder." (Emphasis added.) 720 ILCS 5/9--2 (West 1996).

Article 7 of the Criminal Code of 1961 is entitled "Justifiable Useof Force; Exoneration." Self-defense and the use of force by aggressor are two of the defenses listed under Article 7. See 720ILCS 5/7--1, 7--4(c)(1) (West 1996).

Our supreme court has upheld the constitutionality of thesecond-degree murder statute (720 ILCS 5/9--2 (West 1996)). Peoplev. Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d 104, 107 (1995). Before Jeffries wasdecided, several appellate court decisions had reached the sameconclusion, finding that section 9--2 did not violate a defendant'sdue process rights. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 218 Ill. App. 3d890 (1991); People v. Jerome, 206 Ill. App. 3d 428 (1990); Peoplev. Buckner, 203 Ill. App. 3d 525 (1990). The courts in all ofthese decisions relied on the United States Supreme Court decisionin Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 53 L. Ed. 2d 281, 97 S. Ct.2319 (1977), wherein the Court approved a statute requiring adefendant charged with second-degree murder to prove by apreponderance of the evidence an affirmative defense of emotionaldisturbance in order to reduce the crime to manslaughter. In linewith Patterson, the Jeffries court held, "The due process clause ofthe fourteenth amendment *** does not forbid a State from requiringa defendant to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, themitigation necessary to reduce the severity of a homicide charge." Jeffries, 164 Ill. 2d at 116. Based on Jeffries and Patterson, wereject defendant's fourteenth amendment due process argument thatIPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A unconstitutionally instructs the jurythat the defendant bears the burden of proving a mitigating factorby a preponderance of the evidence.

We also reject defendant's argument that IPI. Criminal 3d No.7.06A fails to instruct a jury in accordance with section 9--2. IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A sets forth the elements of first-degreemurder, then directs the jury to end its deliberations and returna not guilty verdict on the first-degree murder charge if itconcludes that the State failed to prove each element beyond areasonable doubt. If it concludes that the State sustained itsburden as to each element, the jury is instructed to continue itsdeliberations and decide whether the defendant proved the existenceof a mitigating factor so as to reduce a first-degree murderconviction to second-degree murder. I.P.I. Criminal 3d No. 7.06Ainstructs the jury, "You may not consider whether the defendant isguilty of the lesser offense of second degree murder until andunless you have first determined that the State has proved beyonda reasonable doubt each of the previously stated propositions." (Emphasis added.)

IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A next states, "The defendant has theburden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence *** that thefollowing mitigating factor is present: that the defendant, at thetime he performed the acts which caused the death of ______,believed the circumstances to be such that they justified thedeadly force he used, but his belief that such circumstancesexisted was unreasonable." The instruction directs the jury tofind the defendant guilty of second-degree murder if it determinesthat the defendant proved the existence of a mitigating factor bya preponderance of the evidence; if not, the instruction directsthe jury to find the defendant guilty of first-degree murder. Thus, contrary to defendant's assertion, we conclude that IPICriminal 3d No. 7.06A accurately states the law of second-degreemurder.

Defendant's reliance on People v. Reddick, 123 Ill. 2d 184(1988), is misplaced. In Reddick, the court reversed the murderconvictions of two defendants, since their jury instructionsincorrectly stated the law of voluntary manslaughter. Reddick, 123Ill. 2d at 203-04. The General Assembly, however, abolished theoffense of voluntary manslaughter in 1987 and replaced it with theoffense of second-degree murder. Pub. Act 84--1450, eff. July 1,1987. As we have already found, IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06Aaccurately instructs a jury as to second-degree murder. Reddick,therefore, is inapplicable to the instant case.

Defendant also complains that IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A islacking in that it fails to provide the jury with a "clearstatement that the State [has] the burden to disprove defense ofself or provocation beyond a reasonable doubt." (We will ignoredefendant's reference to the defense of provocation (720 ILCS 5/9--2(a)(1) (West 1996)), since defendant did not assert that defenseat trial and since IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A by its terms does notcover provocation.) Defendant's argument overlooks the portion ofIPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A instructing the jury of the State'sburden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt "[t]hat the defendant wasnot justified in using the force which he used." (Emphasis added.) A person is justified in the use of deadly force only if he or shereasonably believes that such force is necessary to preventimminent death or great bodily harm. 720 ILCS 5/7--1 (West 1996). As stated in Brown, "If evidence of self-defense is raised, theState has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that thedefendant did not have a reasonable belief in the necessity ofusing deadly force." Brown, 218 Ill. App. 3d at 898. Byinstructing the jury that the State bears the burden of provingbeyond a reasonable doubt that the force defendant used was "notjustified," IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A adequately states the proofnecessary for the State to negate a claim of self-defense.

Defendant also contends that her attorney's proposal of IPICriminal 3d No. 7.06A constituted ineffective assistance ofcounsel. However, since section 9--2 is constitutional, and sinceIPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A accurately instructs a jury in accordancewith section 9--2, defendant's trial counsel could not have beenineffective for proposing IPI Criminal 3d No. 7.06A.

Next, defendant asserts in a one-sentence argument that weshould reduce her conviction to second-degree murder and remand thecase for resentencing. Defendant does not provide any reasons whyher conviction should be reduced, and she even fails to identifythe precise legal question at issue (i.e., whether she believed,albeit unreasonably, the use of deadly force was necessary). Supreme Court Rule 341(e)(7) (177 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)) providesthat arguments made in support of issues raised on appeal "shallcontain the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefor,with citations of *** the pages of the record relied on." Based ondefendant's failure to comply with Rule 341(e)(7), we deemdefendant's argument waived. See People v. Sauer, 177 Ill. App. 3d870, 881 (1988).

Finally, we grant the State's request to assess the sum of $50against defendant as costs for this appeal. See 55 ILCS 5/4--2002(a) (West 1998); People v. Nicholls, 71 Ill. 2d 166, 173-76(1978); People v. Flynn, 291 Ill. App. 3d 512, 524-25 (1997).

For the foregoing reasons, defendant's conviction in thecircuit court of Kane County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

INGLIS and RAPP, JJ., concur.