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JUSTICE BYRNE delivered the opinion of the court:

Following a jury trial, defendant, Joshua Boand, was convicted of the drug-induced homicide (720 ILCS 5/9--3.3(a) (West 2004)) and involuntary manslaughter (720 ILCS 5/9--3(a) (West 2004)) of Nicole Levin and the criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/12--13(a)(2) (West 2004)) of Tavia Shepherd. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of 20 years for drug-induced homicide, 5 years for involuntary manslaughter, and 11 years for criminal sexual assault.

Defendant appeals, alleging that several trial errors entitle him to a new trial or a reversal of his convictions. He contends that (1) the trial court erroneously declined to sever the criminal-sexual-assault count from the homicide counts; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of other uncharged sex offenses that he committed before the night of the incident; (3) the trial court denied him the right to confront Shepherd and Paul Hoerer, his codefendant, about their motives to testify for the State; (4) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal sexual assault; (5) the trial court erroneously permitted the State to cross-examine another witness, Becky Goldman, about her telephone conversation with Shepherd three days after the incident; (6) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that suicide qualifies as an intervening cause of death that would relieve defendant of criminal liability for a homicide; and (7) the drug-induced-homicide statute is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad. The State addresses each of these issues and raises another, asserting that we must remand the cause for the trial court to impose mandatory consecutive sentences. We conclude that the trial court erred in denying the motion to sever the criminal-sexual-assault charge from the drug-induced-homicide and involuntary-manslaughter charges. This error was compounded by the erroneous admission of evidence of defendant's other sex crimes and the corresponding jury instruction. Therefore, we reverse defendant's convictions and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. This disposition also considers other issues raised in this appeal that might arise again on remand.

I. FACTS

Defendant was charged by indictment with "committ[ing] the offense of drug-induced homicide in that he violated subsection (a) of section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act [(720 ILCS 570/401(a) (West 2004))] by knowingly delivering methadone, a controlled substance, to Nicole Levin and Nicole Levin thereafter died as a result of the ingestion of a portion of that methadone into her body, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/9--3.3(a) [(West 2004)]." Defendant was also charged with involuntary manslaughter in that he, "acting in a reckless manner, performed an act likely to cause death or great bodily harm to Nicole Levin, in that [he] failed to request emergency medical assistance for Nicole Levin, knowing Nicole Levin was suffering from a possible overdose of drugs, in violation of 720 ILCS 5/9--3(a) [(West 2004)]." Finally, defendant was charged with committing criminal sexual assault, in that he, "knowing Tavia Shepard [sic] was unable to give knowing consent, committed an act of sexual penetration with Tavia Shepard [sic], in that [he] placed his penis in the vagina of Tavia Shepard [sic], in violation of 720 ILCS 5/12--13(a)(2) [(West 2004)]."

By the date of her death, May 26, 2002, Levin was 19 years old and had a history of abusing antidepressants and street drugs including cocaine. In February 2002, Levin's relationship with her boyfriend ended and she suffered a miscarriage. From February 17, 2002, to April 2, 2002, Levin was hospitalized four times for attempting suicide and intentionally overdosing on alcohol and prescription medication.

Two days before her death, Levin, Shepherd, Paul Hoerer, and a person named Jason went to a drug party, where they ingested cocaine, marijuana, and muscle relaxers. Levin and Hoerer left to purchase more drugs, but Levin veered off the road and struck a tree, destroying her new car. Levin was treated for chest and back pain and released from the hospital. Hoerer also was treated.

On May 26, 2002, the date of the incident, Levin and Shepherd retrieved some of Levin's personal belongings from the car and returned to Levin's home, where they prepared to go out for the evening. Shepherd testified that Levin was noticeably upset about her recent breakup with her boyfriend and the damage to her car. Shepherd testified that Levin declared that "[s]he had nothing left to live for." In contrast, Levin's father testified that his daughter did not appear suicidal on the night of her death and, in fact, she expressed enthusiasm for her recent decision to enroll in nursing school.

Later that evening, Levin, Shepherd, and Hoerer went to the home of Hoerer's cousin where they all smoked marijuana. Levin also ingested Vicodin that Hoerer had been prescribed for injuries suffered in the car accident. Defendant and Jennifer Donfris, with whom he lived, arrived at the party a short time later. Defendant and Shepherd had dated briefly two years earlier. Defendant testified that, while they dated, he and Shepherd shared drugs and engaged in consensual sexual intercourse. Hoerer, who had been friends with defendant since childhood, testified that defendant told him that he planned to have sex with Shepherd that night and would "make it happen if he could get her back to his house." Hoerer waited approximately one year before disclosing defendant's statement to the police.

Shepherd, Levin, defendant, and Hoerer went to defendant's home between 8 and 9 p.m. Hoerer testified that the group went to defendant's home because Levin was "expressing *** in rather strong terms" that she wanted cocaine and defendant told her that he could provide it. Shepherd testified that she, not Levin, wanted drugs.

There is further dispute as to what occurred next. Shepherd testified that the four sat in defendant's living room, where defendant walked to a bookshelf and retrieved a hollowed-out book and a gray lockbox. Defendant removed some small bottles from the lockbox, placed them on a glass table, and told the group that the bottles contained methadone and that methadone is a safer form of heroin. According to Shepherd, she drank only half of her bottle because she disliked the taste. The other three each drank an entire bottle, and when Shepherd placed her half-full bottle on the table, Levin grabbed it and ingested the remaining methadone in that bottle as well. Hoerer corroborated this portion of Shepherd's testimony.

Defendant admitted that he had been prescribed methadone to treat his heroin addiction and that he stored the bottles in the lockbox and the book. Defendant testified that he provided the group pills, but he denied providing any of the methadone that was ingested on the night of Levin's death. Defendant explained that he always left the key in the lock of the box and that Levin must have taken the methadone without his knowledge or permission.

Shepherd and Hoerer testified that Levin was disappointed and angry because the methadone was not getting her high enough. Levin became irate and demanded more drugs, including crack cocaine. Shepherd became uncomfortable with Levin's demands, so she left the party with defendant and went to the west side of Chicago, where they traded some of Hoerer's marijuana for cocaine. Shepherd admitted that she and defendant "might have kissed and touched each other" while in Chicago, but she denied engaging in sexual intercourse. Detective Raymond Peters testified that, the day after Levin's death, Shepherd told him that she engaged in a sex act with defendant while in Chicago. At trial, Shepherd denied making such a statement.

Defendant testified that he and Shepherd drove around Chicago using the cocaine, and at one point, Shepherd attempted to perform oral sex on defendant but did not because he could not achieve an erection. Defendant believed that Levin found and took the methadone at some point during the five hours that he and Shepherd were driving around Chicago.

Hoerer testified that, while he was alone with Levin, they had sexual intercourse on defendant's living room couch. Soon thereafter, Levin became agitated and wanted defendant and Shepherd to "hurry up" and return from Chicago with the cocaine. To appease Levin, Hoerer called defendant to inquire about the cocaine. Approximately one hour after placing the first call, Hoerer called defendant again to inform him that Levin was passing out from the methadone. Hoerer testified that defendant was not concerned with Levin's condition and did not instruct him to summon medical assistance. Defendant denied receiving any phone calls from Hoerer about Levin's condition while he and Shepherd were in Chicago.

Shepherd testified that, upon returning to defendant's home, she saw Levin sitting on the living room couch. Levin was unresponsive, but Hoerer and defendant told Shephard that Levin would be "fine" and was merely sedated from the methadone. The group attempted to revive Levin by placing her in a cold shower, but when she remained unresponsive, they returned her to the couch. Shepherd saw that Levin was unconscious but breathing. Shepherd testified that she believed that Levin needed medical assistance when the shower failed to awaken her. Shepherd suggested dialing 911, but Hoerer and defendant refused. Hoerer became infuriated, pushed Shepherd, cursed her, and yanked the telephone cord from the wall to prevent her from calling for help. Hoerer told Shepherd that he had seen Levin's type of reaction to the methadone "a million times" and knew that she would be fine. At one point, defendant placed himself between Hoerer and Shepherd to calm the situation. Defendant told Shepherd to go upstairs to avoid further contact with Hoerer.

Defendant generally corroborated Shepherd's testimony about the group's efforts to revive Levin, but he insisted that only Hoerer objected to calling for help. Defendant testified that, when he and Shepherd initially returned to his home with the cocaine, Hoerer immediately stated that Levin had "gotten into some of [defendant's] medication either when [Hoerer] went to the bathroom or fell asleep." Defendant corroborated Shepherd's description of Hoerer's profane and physical threats.

Hoerer offered yet another account of the group's discussion about summoning help. Hoerer testified that he, defendant, and Shepherd smoked crack cocaine for several hours before Shepherd suggested calling 911. Defendant objected and Hoerer agreed with his assessment of Levin's condition. When the effort to revive Levin in the shower failed, Hoerer stated that it was ultimately defendant's decision not to call 911 because, if help were summoned, the police would likely enter defendant's home. Hoerer denied threatening or making any physical contact with Shepherd.

Shepherd testified that, after her altercation with Hoerer, she went to defendant's bedroom, where she sat on the bed. She testified that defendant gave her a second bottle of methadone because she was "freaking out." Shepherd ingested all of the methadone, became dizzy, and quickly passed out. She recalled waking up with defendant on top of her. Defendant was naked, and it appeared to Shepherd that "he was attempting to have sex with [her]." However, Shepherd admitted that defendant could not achieve an erection and that she was unsure whether "he even had sex with [her]." Shepherd was awakened when Hoerer banged on the bedroom door and said that they had "a f------ problem" because Levin was dead. Shepherd immediately called 911.

Defendant testified that, when he joined Shepherd in his bedroom, she was holding a condom and asked him whether he could "perform," which defendant interpreted as a request for sex. Defendant could not achieve an erection, and Shepherd's attempts to stimulate him orally were unsuccessful. According to defendant, he and Shepherd fell asleep without having sex, and he denied bringing methadone into the bedroom.

A forensic pathology report indicated that Levin died of cocaine and methadone intoxication. Officer Michael Nash interviewed defendant and Shepherd at the scene. Officer Nash testified that defendant told him that Shepherd had wanted to call 911, but Hoerer threatened both of them not to call. Defendant also allegedly told Officer Nash that he and Shepherd engaged in "sex" in his bedroom at about 6 a.m. Officer Nash was not sure whether defendant called the contact "sex" or "sexual intercourse." While at the scene, Officer Nash saw defendant consume an entire bottle of methadone. The police found opened condom wrappers in defendant's bedroom.

Defendant, Shepherd, and Hoerer were transported to the police station where defendant and Shepherd were placed alone in a room together. Shepherd testified that defendant told her "if you protect me, I will protect you. We are in big trouble here and we need to get our stories straight." Defendant allegedly told Shepherd not to mention the methadone and to blame Hoerer for "everything."

Shepherd testified that, following the interview at the police station, she and defendant returned to defendant's home and the two "remained together" until May 29, 2002, when Shepherd stopped speaking to him. Shepherd admitted that for several weeks she did not disclose Levin's methadone use or the alleged criminal sexual assault. However, in July 2002, Shepherd agreed to be interviewed again "to make things right and tell the truth." During this interview she failed to mention defendant's alleged instruction to "protect" him.

Defendant testified that he did not "sexually penetrate" Shepherd, and he denied telling Officer Nash that he had done so. Defendant further denied that he prevented Shepherd from calling 911 or instructed her to "protect him" during the investigation. Defendant insisted that he never believed that Levin would die. Detective Raymond Peters testified that he interviewed defendant at the police station on May 28, 2002. During that interview, defendant provided a statement that was consistent with his testimony at trial.

The jury returned a guilty verdict on all three counts, and the trial court imposed concurrent prison terms of 20 years for drug-induced homicide, 5 years for involuntary manslaughter, and 11 years for criminal sexual assault. Defendant's timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

The State has moved to strike the footnotes that defendant included in his brief, and we ordered the motion taken with the case. Supreme Court Rule 341(a) limits an appellant's brief to 75 pages and prohibits the use of footnotes to evade the page limitation. 188 Ill. 2d R. 341(a). In this case, defendant has submitted a 64-page brief containing 20 footnotes. The State contends that the footnotes are excessive and contain improper substantive argument with citation to authority. Mindful of the serious nature of the case and the numerous issues presented, we have carefully reviewed the footnotes and conclude that sanctions are unnecessary. We deny the State's motion, accordingly.

We next turn to defendant's allegations of error. He contends that (1) the trial court erroneously declined to sever the criminal-sexual-assault count from the homicide counts; (2) the trial court erroneously admitted evidence of other uncharged sex offenses; (3) the trial court denied him the right to confront Shepherd and Hoerer about their motives to testify for the State; (4) the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of criminal sexual assault; (5) the trial court erroneously permitted the State to cross-examine another witness about her telephone conversation with Shepherd three days after the incident; (6) the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that suicide qualifies as an intervening cause of death that relieves a defendant of criminal liability for a homicide; and (7) the drug-induced-homicide statute is unconstitutionally vague and overly broad.

The State and defendant each begin with an analysis of the constitutionality of the drug-induced-homicide statute. However, we recognize that " '[a] court should avoid constitutional questions where the case may be decided on other grounds.' " In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, 218 (2004), quoting In re S.G., 175 Ill. 2d 471, 479 (1997); see also People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 565 (2003) (supreme court will not consider a constitutional issue in a criminal case if it can be decided on other grounds). We review each of defendant's allegations of trial error and determine that the trial court committed reversible error. In the interest of certitude, we address defendant's constitutional challenge to the drug-induced-homicide statute because he should not be forced to submit to a new trial on that charge if his constitutional arguments are meritorious.

A. Severing the Criminal-Sexual-Assault Charge From the Two Homicide Charges

Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his motion to sever the criminal-sexual-assault charge from the drug-induced-homicide and involuntary-manslaughter charges. In denying defendant's motion to sever the criminal-sexual-assault charge, the trial court found that the three charges could be tried together because the facts supporting each were "intertwined," occurred at approximately the same time, and were part of the same comprehensive transaction.

A court may order two or more charges to be tried together if the offenses charged are based on the same act or on two or more acts that are part of the same comprehensive transaction. 725 ILCS 5/111--4(a) (West 2004). There are no precise criteria for determining whether separate offenses are part of the same comprehensive transaction. People v. Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d 937, 942 (1996). Generally, the joinder of two or more charges is appropriate if the offenses are of a similar nature or are part of a single transaction or common scheme. People v. Weston, 271 Ill. App. 3d 604, 612 (1995). Among the factors to consider are the proximity in time and location of the offenses, the identity of evidence linking the offenses, the degree to which the offenses share a common method, and whether the severance will promote judicial efficiency. Gapski, 283 Ill. App. 3d at 942; People v. Patterson, 245 Ill. App. 3d 586, 588 (1993). The circuit court has substantial discretion in deciding whether to sever separate charges, and its decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Weston, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 612.

Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the joinder of the sex offense and homicide charges because they allegedly arose from distinct acts affecting two different victims. Defendant also contends that his trip with Shepherd to Chicago is an intervening event that attenuated the connection between the sex-offense and homicide charges. Defendant argues that People v. Willer, 281 Ill. App. 3d 939 (1996), requires a reversal of his convictions and a remand for separate trials on the sex-offense and homicide charges. We agree, concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the criminal sexual assault and the two homicide counts arose from the same comprehensive transaction.

In Willer, the defendant was charged with two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse for vaginally penetrating and fondling one of his daughters several times over an eight-year period. The defendant was charged with one additional count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse for touching another daughter's buttocks once during that period. Defendant was convicted on all counts, and he argued on appeal that the trial court should have severed the charges so that the allegations regarding each daughter would be tried separately. On appeal, this court reversed the defendant's convictions and remanded the cause for separate trials, holding that the charges pertaining to the two girls were not based on acts that were part of the same comprehensive transaction. Willer, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 955.

In Willer, we emphasized that, although both daughters were molested in the family home during a single eight-year period, the offenses were only peripherally connected in time and place because one of the daughters was regularly and frequently assaulted while the other was fondled only once. Willer, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 951. In this case, the drug-induced homicide was attenuated from the criminal sexual assault. Contrary to the State's assertion, Hoerer's insistence that he called defendant in Chicago and informed him of Levin's condition does not sufficiently connect the drug-induced homicide to the criminal sexual assault because the former allegedly was completed when Levin ingested the methadone, which occurred approximately five hours before defendant allegedly committed the assault. Thus, this factor weighs in favor of severing the drug-induced-homicide charge from the criminal-sexual-assault charge. However, the involuntary manslaughter was not so attenuated from the criminal sexual assault because defendant was accused of sexually assaulting Shepherd in his bedroom while at the same time failing to help Levin, who was dying in the living room. Thus, this factor weighs against severing the involuntary-manslaughter charge from the criminal-sexual-assault charge. However, an analysis of the remaining factors indicates that the best course clearly would be to sever both homicide charges from the criminal-sexual-assault charge.

In Willer, we held that the evidence necessary to prove the sex offenses was different for the two victims. Three of the charges alleged that the defendant fondled and had vaginal and oral sex with one of the girls. The fourth charge alleged only that the defendant fondled the other girl's buttocks. Therefore, the evidence necessary to prove each charge was the same only for the two aggravated-criminal-sexual-assault charges. We concluded that there was no similarity between the evidence necessary to prove the aggravated criminal sexual assault of one daughter and the aggravated criminal sexual abuse of the other. Willer, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 952. Like in Willer, the evidence necessary to prove defendant's guilt differed for the sexual-assault count and the homicide counts.

The alleged drug-induced homicide was completed when defendant knowingly delivered the methadone to Levin and she ingested it. Therefore, no subsequent conduct by defendant, including the alleged criminal sexual assault, was probative to any issue regarding the drug-induced homicide. Whether defendant assaulted Shepherd is irrelevant to whether he committed the drug-induced homicide of Levin.

Defendant's alleged commission of involuntary manslaughter by failing to assist Levin is explained in part by his focus on assaulting Shepherd. However, proof of defendant's failure to assist Levin is satisfied by the undisputed evidence that he assessed Levin's condition and did not help her. The recklessness of this conduct was all that was at issue. Thus, only evidence of defendant's omission was relevant; and evidence of defendant's affirmative act of assaulting Shepherd in the bedroom was unnecessary to proving the involuntary manslaughter. Therefore, the identity-of-evidence factor weighs in favor of severing the sexual-assault charge from the homicide counts.

In Willer, we held that the evidence did not establish a common method in the defendant's perpetration of the sex offenses. The evidence showed that, over an eight-year period, the defendant would regularly become intoxicated, enter one daughter's room at 3 a.m., wake her, rub her back and buttocks, remove her pajamas, rub her chest, kiss her, and then penetrate her vaginally. The defendant also attempted oral sex with her approximately 10 times after she turned 8 or 9 years old. By contrast, the defendant fondled the other daughter only once, rubbing her back and bare buttocks one evening at 8 p.m. before she had gone to sleep. Willer, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 952. Even though each of the assaults was initiated with a back rub and occurred in the victim's bedroom, we concluded that there were "marked differences" in how the defendant perpetrated the offenses. Willer, 281 Ill. App. 3d at 952.

In this case, like in Willer, the indictment did not allege that defendant used a common method in committing criminal sexual assault, drug-induced homicide, and involuntary manslaughter. The drug-induced-homicide and involuntary-manslaughter counts were each based on Levin's drug overdose, while the criminal-sexual-assault count was based on Shepherd's inability to consent to sexual penetration. Defendant's initial delivery of methadone to Levin caused her drug overdose, but the second delivery of methadone in the bedroom several hours later caused Shepherd's inability to consent to sexual penetration. We conclude that the two distinct deliveries of methadone do not qualify as a common method of perpetrating the offenses because defendant did not intend for Shepherd and Levin to be victimized in the same way.

Finally, in Willer, we accorded little weight to the judicial efficiency achieved by trying the charges together. We noted that judicial efficiency cannot be the main factor in a trial court's decision not to sever charges because the question will always be present when the severance issue arises. We acknowledged that protecting young victims from being forced to testify twice is a worthy goal of judicial efficiency; however, we concluded that this factor was not implicated because the testimony of each girl would not be admissible in the other's trial if the charges were tried separately. As in Willer, the goal of judicial efficiency does not weigh heavily in favor of a single trial in this case. Shepherd, an adult, would have been better equipped than a child to testify twice to the traumatic events of the night in question. Moreover, it is possible that a trial court would exclude as prejudicial any testimony about the assault during a separate trial on the homicide counts.

Despite the deferential standard of review applied to a trial court's decision on these issues, we conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion to sever the criminal-sexual-assault charge from the homicide charges. We next discuss how the court's error on the severability issue was compounded by the admission of the other-crimes evidence and the corresponding jury instruction.

B. Admission of Uncharged Sex Offenses

Over defendant's objection, the trial court allowed Debra Brounstein and Nicole Semmen to testify to uncharged sex offenses allegedly committed by defendant two to three years before Levin's death. Defendant's challenge to the other-crimes evidence is twofold: he argues that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and that the jury was instructed to consider it for improper purposes. The comparison of prejudicial effect and probative value is best determined in light of the purposes for which the evidence was admitted.

At trial, Brounstein testified that she and defendant had a physical, romantic relationship that ended in December 1999 when she began dating another person. Brounstein became pregnant but chose to terminate her pregnancy in April 2000. One or two days after the procedure, defendant called Brounstein and she agreed to go out with him. On the evening of the date, defendant offered Brounstein a pill that he said would help her sleep. Brounstein took the pill, fell asleep, and awoke with defendant straddling her with his penis in her vagina. Brounstein pleaded for defendant to stop because she was experiencing pain from the abortion, but defendant ignored her and continued until he ejaculated. On cross-examination, Brounstein admitted that she dated defendant several more times and reported the incident only at the request of her boyfriend, who was seeking leniency in his own drug case.

Semmen testified that she met defendant in 2001 and soon began an intimate physical relationship with him. Semmen and defendant shared and abused many drugs during the relationship, including alcohol, cocaine, methadone, and heroin. Four or five times, defendant provided Semmen with drugs that made her tired and lethargic. Defendant would engage in sexual intercourse with her while she was unconscious from the drugs. On cross-examination, Semmen admitted that she had sexual intercourse with defendant several times when no drugs were involved. Semmen also disclosed that she was once engaged to Levin's uncle and that she reported defendant's sexual misconduct only after Levin died.

Defendant testified that, at the time he met Brounstein in 1997, she routinely used pain killers, cocaine, and possibly heroin. They had consensual sex both with and without sharing drugs, but defendant insisted that he never gave her drugs to facilitate sex. Defendant denied seeing Brounstein in 2000, the year she had an abortion, and he denied that she told him she had one. Brounstein contacted defendant in 2001 or 2002, and they went out several times socially. Defendant denied having sex with Brounstein, Semmen, or anyone else who was in a drugged or unconscious state.

In reviewing the trial court's decision to admit evidence of defendant's other crimes, we briefly summarize the hearings on the issue. Before trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude evidence that he "provided drugs to women for the purpose of overcoming any resistence to his sexual advances." Defendant argued that the evidence was remote and irrelevant to whether he delivered methadone to Levin. Defendant conceded that there was an issue as to whether he provided methadone to Levin or Shepherd, and the State characterized this issue as one of identity, which could be shown with other-crimes evidence. After hearing extensive argument, the trial court ruled as follows:

"[T]he State, for purposes of [proving] modus operandi, will be permitted to introduce in rebuttal or to refute any issues of identity should they arise during the defendant's presentation of the case or for impeachment purposes. *** I will bar the State from introducing during their case-in-chief any evidence of other crimes that were committed two to three years prior to the commission of the present offense. However, the State will be allowed to introduce evidence of those crimes in their rebuttal or to refute or during, perhaps, cross-examination of the defendant, should the defendant take the stand, for impeachment purposes and/or to refute the defendant's defense that it wasn't he that gave the methadone."

The court revisited the other-crimes issue at trial when the State called Brounstein and Semmen in its case in chief. Defense counsel argued that evidence of defendant's prior criminal sexual assaults was irrelevant to whether he delivered methadone to Levin. The court stated, "I want to reiterate that there is testimony that the defendant has denied that he gave the methadone, and as to the identity as to who gave the methadone, it's certainly admissible and relevant." The court also ruled that the other-crimes evidence was admissible to show defendant's propensity to commit criminal sexual assault.

The trial court admitted the testimony of Brounstein and Semmen over defendant's objection. The court initially provided an oral jury instruction, stating "evidence of other crimes as it is presented now before you is received for a limited purpose, and that limited purpose is to establish identity, intent, and motive, so you must at this time *** consider it for that limited purpose." (Emphasis added.) The court later told the jury that it could "also consider this testimony *** regarding the defendant's propensity to commit the crime of criminal sexual assault." The trial court provided an even broader written instruction:

"Evidence has been received that the defendant has been involved in offenses other than that charged in the indictment. This evidence has been received on the issues of the defendant's propensity to commit the offense of criminal sexual assault, modus operandi, motive, intent, opportunity and identity and may be considered by you only for those limited purposes.

It is for you to determine whether the defendant was involved in the offenses, and, if so, what weight should be given to this evidence on the issues of propensity to commit the offense of criminal sexual assault, modus operandi, motive, intent, opportunity, and identity."

We note that the written instruction regarding other-crimes evidence distinguishes among the three charged offenses only once. It informs the jury that the evidence is relevant to defendant's propensity to commit criminal sexual assault. From this the jury was to infer correctly that the evidence was not relevant to defendant's propensity to commit drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter. See, e.g., People v. Heard, 187 Ill. 2d 36, 70 (1999) (evidence of other crimes is not admissible for the purpose of showing the defendant's propensity to engage in criminal activity).

In contrast, the remaining issues cited in the instruction (i.e., modus operandi, motive, intent, opportunity, and identity) are not linked to any of the three charged offenses. This lack of particularity in the instruction suggests that the jury was to consider the other-crimes evidence when determining defendant's modus operandi, motive, intent, opportunity, and identity in committing criminal sexual assault as well as drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter. During the instruction conference, defendant objected to the written instruction, asserting that the jury should be instructed to disregard the other-crimes evidence entirely.

On appeal, the State has completely glossed over the nuances of the written jury instruction. Instead, the State argues that defendant waived any challenge to Brounstein's "unfairly graphic and highly inflammatory" testimony about her terminated pregnancy because he did not object to this "specific testimony" at trial. However, the State concedes that defendant objected generally to all of the other-crimes evidence both in his motion in limine and at trial. An issue is preserved for appeal if it is raised either in an objection at trial or in a motion in limine and it is also raised in a posttrial motion. People v. Hudson, 157 Ill. 2d 401, 434-35 (1993). Because defendant moved in limine to exclude the evidence and raised the issue at trial and again in his posttrial motion, he has properly preserved the issue for appeal.

We next turn to the admissibility of the evidence for each of the purposes mentioned in the written jury instruction. A trial court's ruling on the admissibility of other-crimes evidence will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Childress, 338 Ill. App. 3d 540, 545 (2003). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's ruling is arbitrary or fanciful, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. Childress, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 545.

1. Criminal Sexual Assault

Defendant contends that his alleged assaults of Brounstein and Semmen were inadmissible to show propensity, modus operandi, motive, intent, opportunity, and identity regarding the criminal sexual assault. It is well settled that evidence of other offenses is inadmissible for showing the defendant's disposition or propensity to commit crimes. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 62 (1995). However, in People v. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d 159, 176 (2003), the supreme court found that section 115--7.3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/115--7.3 (West 2004)) permits a court to admit evidence of other crimes to show a defendant's propensity to commit sex offenses. To be admissible under the statute, the other-crimes evidence should have some threshold similarity to the charged crime. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184. As factual similarities increase, so does the relevance or probative value. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184. However, where such evidence is offered for something other than modus operandi, mere general areas of similarity will suffice. Donoho, 204 Ill. 2d at 184.

Section 115--7.3 of the Code provides as follows:

"(a) This Section applies to criminal cases in which:

(1) the defendant is accused of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, aggravated criminal sexual abuse, criminal sexual abuse, or criminal transmission of HIV;

(2) the defendant is accused of battery or aggravated battery when the commission of the offense involves sexual penetration or sexual conduct as defined in Section 12--12 of the Criminal Code of 1961; or

(3) the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses formerly known as rape, deviate sexual assault, indecent liberties with a child, or aggravated indecent liberties with a child.

(b) If the defendant is accused of an offense set forth in paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (a) or the defendant is tried or retried for any of the offenses set forth in paragraph (3) of subsection (a), evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses set forth in paragraph (1), (2), or (3) of subsection (a), or evidence to rebut that proof or an inference from that proof, may be admissible (if that evidence is otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence) and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.

(c) In weighing the probative value of the evidence against undue prejudice to the defendant, the court may consider:

(1) the proximity in time to the charged or predicate offense;

(2) the degree of factual similarity to the charged or predicate offense; or

(3) other relevant facts and circumstances.

(d) In a criminal case in which the prosecution intends to offer evidence under this Section, it must disclose the evidence, including statements of witnesses or a summary of the substance of any testimony, at a reasonable time in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown." 725 ILCS 5/115--7.3 (West 2004).

In this case, the other sex offenses occurred within three years of the alleged criminal sexual assault of Shepherd. Furthermore, the offenses were nearly factually identical. Each case involved a dating encounter in which defendant provided the woman with a powerful sedative, waited for her to lose consciousness, and then sexually penetrated her while she was unconscious. These similarities support the trial court's decision to admit the other sex offenses as evidence of defendant's propensity to commit criminal sexual assault, and we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

We further conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the other-crimes evidence to show defendant's modus operandi, motive, intent, and opportunity. Defendant's modus operandi, motive, intent, and opportunity were identical in the assaults of Shepherd, Brounstein, and Semmen. Defendant garnered the women's trust in a romantic context and then intentionally delivered a powerful sedative to incapacitate them for the purpose of sexually assaulting them. The other-crimes evidence was relevant to and probative of the disputed issue of whether defendant incapacitated Shepherd with the methadone to facilitate the assault.

However, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury to consider the other-crimes evidence to determine the issue of identity. No one disputes that defendant was in the bedroom with Shepherd at the time of the alleged sexual assault. Therefore, the identity of the accused is not at issue. When a trial court instructs a jury to consider other-crimes evidence to determine unimportant issues, the court diminishes the important questions that are at issue. See People v. Lenley, 345 Ill. App. 3d 399, 409 (2003) (because only the issue of the burglar's identity was at issue, the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury to consider evidence of the defendant's other burglaries as they related to intent, motive, design, and absence of mistake in the present burglary). In this case, the trial court diminished the importance of the issues of modus operandi, motive, intent, and opportunity by instructing the jury to also consider the other-crimes evidence to determine the offender's identity.

As to the criminal-sexual-assault charge, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the probative value of the evidence of modus operandi, motive, intent, and opportunity outweighed its prejudicial effect. However, we reach the opposite conclusion regarding the drug-induced-homicide and involuntary-manslaughter charges.

2. Drug-Induced Homicide and Involuntary Manslaughter

Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the evidence of his other sex crimes was inadmissible to show modus operandi, motive, intent, opportunity, and identity regarding the drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter. While section 115--7.3 of the Code applies to the criminal-sexual-assault charge, the common-law rules of other-crimes evidence apply to the drug-induced-homicide and involuntary-manslaughter charges. "Other-crimes evidence is relevant for any purpose other than to show a defendant's propensity to commit a crime." (Emphasis in original.) People v. Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d 793, 796 (2001). "This type of evidence is prejudicial because a jury might convict the defendant because it believes that he is a bad person and deserves punishment." Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 796. Other-crimes evidence may be relevant and admissible, however, for any other legitimate purpose, such as to prove modus operandi, the defendant's state of mind, consciousness of guilt, the absence of an innocent frame of mind or the presence of criminal intent, the circumstances or context of the defendant's arrest, the circumstances of the crime charged that would otherwise be unclear, how an otherwise implausible fact relating to the crime charged arose, the placement of the defendant in proximity to the time and place of the crime, the identification of the weapon used in the crime, whether the crime charged was actually committed, opportunity or preparation, a dislike for or an attitude toward the victim, knowledge, intent, identity, motive, or the absence of mistake or accident. This list should not be taken to mean that these are the only purposes for which evidence of other crimes may be admitted. Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 797. In fact, our supreme court "has stated that evidence of other crimes is admissible if it is relevant to establish any material issue other than the propensity to commit crime." Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 797, citing People v. Stewart, 105 Ill. 2d 22, 62 (1984). However, the evidence is admissible only if its probative value outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice. Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 796-97.

"Evidence is relevant if it tends to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable than without the evidence." Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 797. "It is within the sound discretion of the circuit court to determine whether the evidence of other crimes is relevant to a material issue and whether the probative value outweighs its prejudicial impact." Tolbert, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 797.

Other-crimes evidence, although relevant, must not become a focal point of the trial. People v. Thigpen, 306 Ill. App. 3d 29, 37 (1999). The trial court should prevent a "mini-trial" of a collateral offense. People v. Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d 427, 432 (1995). This can be accomplished by the careful limitation of the details of the other crimes to what is necessary to "illuminate the issue for which the other crime was introduced." Nunley, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 432.

We conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the other-crimes evidence for the jury to consider in determining defendant's modus operandi in committing drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter. "Modus operandi, or 'method of working,' refers to a pattern of criminal behavior so distinct that separate crimes are recognized as the work of the same person. [Citation.] If evidence of other crimes is offered to prove modus operandi, there must be some clear connection which creates a logical inference that if defendant committed the former crime, he may have committed the crime charged." People v. Colin, 344 Ill. App. 3d 119, 127 (2003).

In this case, there is no connection between defendant's alleged sexual assault of Brounstein and Semmen and the drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter of Levin. Only defendant's delivery of sedatives is common to the offenses, and this delivery is not so distinct that only defendant could have completed it. The other-crimes evidence was irrelevant to defendant's modus operandi in committing the drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter, and there is little question that the prejudicial impact of the evidence was substantial.

We further conclude that the other-crimes evidence was irrelevant to defendant's motive, intent, and opportunity to commit drug-induced homicide and involuntary manslaughter. Nothing suggests that, on the night of the incident, defendant acted with homicidal or romantic motives regarding Levin. When defendant allegedly delivered the methadone to Levin and declined to assist her after the overdose, he did so without the desire or intent to kill or sexually assault her. However, defendant's delivery of sedatives to Brounstein and Semmen was allegedly motivated by his romantic interest in the women. The prejudicial impact of the other-crimes evidence greatly outweighed its relevance to the issues of defendant's motive, intent, and opportunity.

Finally, we conclude that the other-crimes evidence was marginally relevant to the issue of identity, but its prejudicial effect greatly outweighed its probative value. There was no question that defendant is the only person who could have assaulted Brounstein and Semmen as they alleged. Furthermore, it is unquestioned that defendant was present at his home on the night of Levin's death. The only question common to the other crimes and the drug-induced-homicide and involuntary-manslaughter charges is whether the offenses were committed. Because there is no issue that Levin ingested defendant's methadone, the identity of the owner of the methadone is not at issue. However, according to defendant's theory of the case, Hoerer might have delivered the methadone to Levin or she might have found it herself, and therefore, the identity of the possible perpetrator is at issue. Moreover, defendant asserts that Hoerer recklessly failed to assist Levin. Identity was not at issue for the assaults of Brounstein and Semmen, but it is possible that Hoerer could be at least partially culpable for the homicides with which defendant was charged. However, this case does not involve a victim's allegedly mistaken identification of the perpetrator, which would place identity squarely at issue; and the other-crimes evidence is very serious and prejudicial. Therefore, the prejudicial effect of the other-crimes evidence outweighed the probative value of proving identity.

C. Restriction of Cross-Examination on Witnesses' Motives to Testify

1. Shepherd

Defendant argues that the trial court committed reversible error in excluding evidence of Shepherd's motive to testify against him. Defendant contends that, by testifying to her delay in summoning help for Levin, Shepherd exposed herself to criminal liability and would not have done so if she feared prosecution. At trial, defendant attempted to show that Shepherd's former attorney negotiated an agreement with the State, pursuant to which Shepherd would receive immunity in exchange for her testimony. Rather than calling the attorney as a defense witness, defense counsel attempted to introduce this agreement through the cross-examination of Shepherd, who was not a party to the alleged negotiations. The trial court barred the cross-examination, ruling that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay.

Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel then presented a handwritten note in which the assistant State's Attorney stated: "This is to confirm that Tavia Shepherd is not going to be charged with any criminal offense as a result of the evening during which Ms. Levin died. Our office views her as a victim of the actions of Mr. Hoerer and [defendant]." The note postdated several of Shepherd's statements regarding the group's use of methadone on the night of the incident. The assistant State's Attorney stated that the note did not "suggest anything other than what it says, which is that [the State] did not view [Shepherd] as a potential defendant; that [the State] viewed her as a victim, period."

The right to cross-examine a witness concerning his biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives is protected by both the federal and the state constitutions. U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,