People v. Bagley

Case Date: 05/05/2003
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-01-1104 Rel

No. 2--01--1104


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT


THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County.
)
                 Plaintiff-Appellee, )
)
v. ) No. 99--DT--4684
)
JOSEPH BAGLEY, ) Honorable
) Jane Hird Mitton,
                Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE CALLUM delivered the opinion of the court:

The State charged defendant, Joseph Bagley, with driving underthe influence of alcohol (625 ILCS 5/11--501(a)(1), (a)(2) (WestSupp. 1999)). After the jury was sworn but before the firstwitness was called, the State located a videotape of defendant'sarrest that was believed to be lost. The trial court sua spontedeclared a mistrial and scheduled a new trial. Defendant appealsfrom the denial of his motion to dismiss on double jeopardygrounds. We affirm.

The State commenced the prosecution on November 22, 1999. OnApril 19, 2000, defendant sought a dismissal or alternatively someother discovery sanction because the State failed to turn over avideotape of defendant's arrest. During the June 19, 2000, hearingon defendant's motion, the State informed the court that it wasunable to locate the tape. Judge Mehling barred the State frompresenting testimony about the events appearing on the video. OnDecember 14, 2000, Judge Mehling granted the State's motion toreconsider and ordered as a sanction that the jury would beinformed that the police department lost the videotape and that thearresting officers' testimony "should be judged with caution andsuspicion." On the same date, the cause was reassigned to JudgeMitton.

On July 11, 2001, a six-person jury was selected and sworn. Shortly thereafter, but before the first witness was called, theState informed the trial court that it located the videotape. Outside the jury's presence, the assistant State's Attorneyexplained that the arresting officer had the tape during thehearing on the petition to rescind the summary suspension ofdefendant's driving privileges. After the hearing, the officerlocked the tape in his filing cabinet. Prosecutors attempting tolocate the tape went to the police department evidence technician,who reported that the tape was not in the evidence room. The Statewas unaware of the tape's location until the officer arrived incourt to testify during the trial.

Defense counsel stated that "viewing the videotape at thistime sort of throws a total wrench in the works for me. This sortof situation would be deserving of a mistrial ***." Accordingly,defense counsel asked the court to exclude the tape, leave JudgeMehling's ruling intact, and proceed with the trial. The Stateresponded that it did not act in bad faith and asked the court toadmit the tape and proceed with the trial. In response to thecourt's inquiry, defense counsel stated that if the tape wereadmitted, he would need additional time to prepare.

The trial court stated:

"There was no order ever barring the evidence. All ofthese rulings were based on the presumption that the tape wasnot available. Because this is a truth-seeking process, ifthe evidence is available and otherwise admissible to imposea sanction barring it because it was presumed to be lost Ithink is overly harsh.

*** So understanding that it is an unfair surprise atthis point, I will declare a mistrial. *** I will reset thismatter for trial.

*** [T]o go further and *** bar the video and then tellthe jury that it had been destroyed would be a lie."

After dismissing the jury, the trial court asked defensecounsel if he wanted a trial date, and counsel responded that hedid. The court set an October 9, 2001, trial date.

On July 27, 2001, defendant moved to dismiss. He argued that,because the trial court improperly terminated the trial after thejury was sworn, any further prosecution would violate doublejeopardy principles. The trial court denied the motion, anddefendant timely appealed. See 188 Ill. 2d R. 604(f).

On appeal, defendant argues that there was no manifestnecessity for the mistrial and therefore that a second trial wouldviolate double jeopardy principles. The fifth amendment to theUnited States Constitution states in relevant part, "nor shall anyperson be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardyof life or limb." U.S. Const., amend. V. The same principles areembodied in the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,