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JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

Defendant, Carlos Arroyo, was convicted of first-degree murder(720 ILCS 5/9--1 (West 1996)) and was subsequently sentenced to 60years' imprisonment. This court reversed that conviction andsentence and remanded the cause for a new trial. People v. Arroyo,No. 2--97--0158 (1998) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule23). Defendant was retried before a jury, was convicted, and wassentenced to 54 years' imprisonment. This court reverseddefendant's conviction and remanded for new trial in People v.Arroyo, 328 Ill. App. 3d 861 (2002). Our supreme court denied theState's petition for leave to appeal but, under its supervisoryauthority, directed this court to vacate its opinion and reconsiderits judgment in light of the substantial prejudice standard setforth in People v. Williams, 192 Ill. 2d 548 (2000). We now vacateour opinion pursuant to that order and file this opinion in itsstead.

After reconsidering our judgment in light of Williams, we nowconclude that defendant did not suffer substantial prejudice as aresult of the prosecutor's improper comments during openingstatement. Having so concluded, it is necessary to addressdefendant's second and third arguments on appeal. We rejectdefendant's second and third arguments and, therefore, affirm thejudgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor remarked that Diana Zuniga, an eyewitness who testified at defendant's firsttrial, was serving a 20-year prison sentence. Following the trialcourt's sustaining of defendant's objection to that remark, theprosecutor told the jury that Zuniga was convicted of being thegetaway driver in this homicide. Defendant objected to the remarksand moved for dismissal or a mistrial. The motion was denied. Thepropriety of these statements is contested on appeal.

At trial, the State called Kelly Peterson, who testified thaton May 7, 1996, she saw a man in a brown jacket walking alongWashington Street as she drove home from work. According toPeterson, a man wearing a red, hooded sweatshirt jogged up behindthe man in the brown jacket. Peterson looked away and then hearda crash from the direction of the two men. She looked back and sawthe man in the red, hooded sweatshirt raise his right arm and firetwo or three shots at the man in the brown jacket. Petersontestified that she did not see the shooter's face but that he wasabout 5 feet 7 inches or 5 feet 8 inches tall, and shorter than theman who was shot.

Angela Demoe testified that she was working at Enterprise CarRental on Washington Street on May 7, 1996. Shortly after 6:15p.m., she was pulling out of the Enterprise parking lot in a whiteNissan Pathfinder. Demoe noticed two men approaching. One man waswearing a brown jacket and was walking along the curb. The otherman was wearing a red sweatshirt and approached at a diagonal,walking fast. As Demoe turned out of the parking lot ontoWashington Street, she heard two pops, which she thought werefirecrackers. At that point, Demoe looked into her rearview mirrorand saw the man in the red sweatshirt heading back in the directionhe came from. Demoe saw the man in the red sweatshirt from about25 feet. At the time, it was still daylight and she made eyecontact with him. According to Demoe, the hood of the redsweatshirt was up tightly around the man's face, but she could seehis eyebrows, eyes, nose, and mouth for five or six seconds. Demoesaid that the man in the brown jacket was taller than the man inthe red sweatshirt, who was about 5 feet 3 inches or 5 feet 4inches tall.

On May 7, 1996, a detective showed Demoe an array of sixphotographs that did not include defendant's picture. Demoe didnot identify the shooter from any of the photographs but didindicate that one individual pictured looked similar to the man inthe red sweatshirt. On May 9, 1996, Detective Mark Tkadletz showedDemoe a different array of six photographs that also did notinclude a picture of defendant. Demoe pointed to the man picturedin the lower left-hand corner of the array and indicated that shewas pretty sure that was the man. Later testimony established thatshe pointed to a picture of Juan Salgado.

On May 13, 1996, Detective Yancey showed Demoe yet anothersix-photograph array. Demoe identified the man pictured inphotograph No. 5 as the man in the red sweatshirt. Demoe said thatthe man in photograph No. 3 was the same man she identified in thephotograph array showed to her on May 9, 1996. Demoe also saidthat the man pictured in photograph No. 5 was not in the first twoarrays that were shown to her. Later testimony established thatdefendant was the man pictured in photograph No. 5 and that JuanSalgado was pictured in photograph No. 3. In court, Demoeidentified defendant as the man she saw in the red sweatshirt onMay 7, 1996. On cross-examination, Demoe said that she may havetold Detective Tkadletz on May 9, 1996, that she was 98% sure theman pictured in the lower left-hand photograph of the second arraywas the shooter.

Detective Thomas Luka testified that defendant gave a writtenstatement to him and Detective Yarc on May 11, 1996. The statementconsisted of defendant's answers to the detectives' questions. Defendant made no mention of the May 7, 1996, shooting in thisstatement.

Detective Tkadletz testified that he and Detective Yarcinterviewed defendant at noon on May 13, 1996. Just before theyinterviewed defendant, Detectives Tkadletz and Yarc had obtained avideotaped statement from Juan Salgado indicating that defendantwas the shooter. When confronted with that information, defendantbecame upset, began raising his voice, and called the detectivesliars. Detective Tkadletz said that they then showed defendant thevideotape of Salgado's statement naming defendant as the shooter. Shortly thereafter, defendant demanded to be put back into hiscell.

Sergeant Richard Davis testified that on May 13, 1996, atapproximately 2:30 p.m., defendant knocked on his cell door andindicated that he was ready to tell the truth. According toSergeant Davis, Detectives Tkadletz and Yarc were at a meeting atthe State's Attorney's office, so Sergeant Davis and LieutenantHendley took a statement from defendant. Sergeant Davis identifiedthe typed statement that defendant gave on May 13, 1996, at 2:40p.m. This statement was admitted into evidence and was read to thejury as follows:

"I'm not going to lie to you guys anymore. I was withJuan Salgado, we were supposed to be going to pick up mycousin Diane [sic], and we were driving down Washington St. toGreenleaf and Juan saw a guy and said is that Fonzie. I said I don't know. Instead of turning right on Greenleaf he turnedleft and came up behind him and as we drove by, Juan said yathat's Fonzie we got to take care of him. I said no we haveto pick up Diane [sic] at the dentist office.

We drove over to the dentist office where Diane [sic]works on Greenleaf, and we picked up Diane [sic]. I got intothe backseat. Juan then drove back to Washington St. and saidwhere did he go, where did he go. *** Juan drove toWashington and Teske and said where is he, where is he, do yousee him.

I didn't see him, then Juan said there he is, and heturned right on Washington and then made a left at the firststreet. Juan gave me the gun and said you take care of him. I'm going down to 41 and I'll come back around and pick you upon this street.

Juan left and I saw Fonzie coming on Washington. I juststood there and I couldn't do it, so I started walking back upthat street toward Grand Ave. Juan had pulled around and Igot into the backseat and he said did you hit him. I said no,but I told Juan that there was a police car by Waukegan Tire,so I couldn't. Juan said your [sic] just scared. And hedrove back to Washington St. and turned into the next blockafter we passed Fonzie. Juan said give me the gun I'll do it.

Juan got out of the car and he told Diane [sic] to driveand said go to the next street and turn left and pick me up bythe apartments. Diane [sic] and I were in the first drivewayon that street across from where they are building that newbuilding. Juan was walking up toward Fonzie and I heard theshots and then saw Fonzie fall. Fonzie then got up and fellagain.

Diane [sic] turned into the street by the apartments, andthen we saw this lady in a white truck, who we thought waswatching Juan, so we made a u-turn on the street and went backto Washington St. and Juan was running through the grasstoward the apartments.

We turned right and then turned right on the first streetwhere we first dropped Juan off. We pulled into the samedriveway, and then Juan came running up to the car and got inand said I hit him. I knew he hit him, cause I saw Fonziedrop.

Juan said lets [sic] go to Antioch, so we drove over byWadsworth and got some water for Juan and we drove toAntioch."

In this typed statement, defendant also indicated that "Diane[sic]" is his cousin "Diane [sic]" Zuniga; that the gun was a .25-caliber automatic, and that "Fonzie" is Jose Soto.

According to Detective Tkadletz, at about 2:30 p.m. on May 13,1996, he and Detective Yarc received a phone call at the State'sAttorney's office informing them that defendant wanted to make astatement. Detectives Tkadletz and Yarc returned to the Waukeganpolice station and spoke to defendant at approximately 3:30 p.m. Detective Tkadletz said that they asked defendant to write out infull detail and in his own handwriting the events that he hadrelated to Detectives Davis and Hendley. Defendant's handwrittenstatement was admitted into evidence at trial and was substantiallythe same account he gave to Sergeant Davis and Lieutenant Hendley. In his handwritten statement, defendant additionally indicated thatat Salgado's direction he hid the gun in the basement of the housein which defendant was living in Zion.

Defendant took the detectives to the address in Zion andretrieved the gun. After retrieving the gun, the detectives returned with defendant to the Waukegan police department. Detective Tkadletz said that he and Detective Yarc receivedinformation from Detective Yancey that Angela Demoe had identifieddefendant as the shooter. According to Detective Tkadletz, whendefendant was confronted with that information he put his head downand shortly thereafter said the words, "I shot him." At thatpoint, defendant told the detectives that it happened as hedescribed in the handwritten statement except he was the shooter. The detectives then had defendant go through the whole story again. According to Detective Tkadletz, defendant declined an offer towrite out another statement and told them, "I just want you guys toput it down and I will sign it." At that point, DetectivesTkadletz and Yarc put together the information defendant providedand typed out defendant's statement. Detective Tkadletz said that,after he typed out the statement, defendant appeared to read it,and then signed the statement. Detective Tkadletz identified thestatement that he typed out on May 13, 1996, at 6 p.m.; it wasadmitted into evidence at trial and reads as follows:

"Juan and I were in his purple Chevy Cavalier. We weregoing to pick up my cousin, Diana[,] who was working in ParkCity. Juan was driving and we were going down Washington St. We stopped in at the dentist office and Diana said that shewas going to be late. We were hungry so we went to Wendy's inGurnee. Juan ordered and we went back to the dental office. We were on Washington St., and we saw a guy in a brown jacketwalking down the street. Juan looked at me and said, 'That'shim!' Juan told me to get out and take care of this. I saidno because we had to pick up Diana at the office. Juan thenwent to the dental office and picked up Diana while I stayedin the car. I jumped into the back and Diana got in the frontof the car. We pulled out of the lot and turned left ontoGreenleaf St. He went up to [sic] streets and turned left.[H]e said, 'this isn't the road that I want to be on, I needto get on Teske.['] He made a U-turn and turned left ontoGreenleaf. He went up to Belvidere and drove east to Teske. He turned left onto Teske and went to Washington St. We sawFonzie walking and Juan said that you gotta take care of this. Juan said that they, (the gang), would take care of me or myfamily if I didn't take care of this. Juan dropped me off. I had the .25 cal. gun with me as I got out of the car. Idon't know what road we were on. I waited for Fonzie to getthere. I just couldn't do it so I walked up towards Grandwhere Juan said that he would pick me up. When I got in thecar he said, [']Did you hit him?['] I said no. I told himthat I saw a police car pull into the parking lot of the tireplace. Juan told me that I needed to take car [sic] of thisand that I knew why. Juan pulled out onto Washington St., andturned left. We passed Fonzie and turned left onto the nextstreet. I got out and waited for Fonzie to pass. Juan saidthat he would pick me up on the next street. I got out andstarted to walk up behind Fonzie. I was wearing a red hoodedsweatshirt and I pulled the hood over my head as I got closerto him. I cut across the parking lot and ran up behindFonzie. That is where I shot him.

After I shot him I ran back the way I came. I wasrunning across the parking lot when I saw a white truck. Istopped for a moment and noticed that Juan had pulled a U-turnand went back out onto Washington St. I ran through theapartments and over to the driveway off of the other streetwhere they dropped me off. I ran up to the car and got in onthe passenger side of the car. Juan was driving and he wasdriving the whole day. I never saw Diana driving the car, butshe could have switched with him when they turned around. Igot into the car and they backed out of the driveway. We thendrove towards Grand Av. While we were driving I took off thered sweatshirt. The sweatshirt was thrown out of the car aswe passed some apartments. We then drove to Antioch to seeRobert and Ramon.

Carlos[,] did Diana know what you guys were going to do?

Yeah we told her when she got into the car.

Carlos[,] the gun that was recovered[,] was that the gunthat you used to shoot Jose Soto?

Yes.

Carlos[,] is there anything else you can add to thestatement?

No, that's it.

Carlos[,] now is this the truth about what happened.

Yes, I know I lied before, but this is the truth."

Detective Tkadletz further testified that, shortly aftersigning the statement, defendant began to cry and said that Salgadomade him do it. Defendant got down on one knee and asked for helpand also asked if he could get probation.

Sergeant Robert Kerkorian testified that in May 1996, he wasthe supervisor of the Waukegan police department's gang unit. According to Sergeant Kerkorian, Jose Soto was a self-admittedmember of the Maniac Latin Disciples street gang, and defendant wasa self-admitted member of the Latin Lovers. Sergeant Kerkoriantestified that in May 1996, the Latin Lovers were at war with theManiac Latin Disciples. Sergeant Kerkorian explained that,approximately a year before this shooting, a Maniac Latin Disciplekilled a Latin Lover at a party in Chicago. After that, the LatinLovers and the Maniac Latin Disciples began shooting each other. Also, in September or October 1995, the then-leader of the LatinLovers, Francisco Aguillar, was shot. According to the Waukeganpolice department's investigation, Soto was a suspect in theshooting of Aguillar.

The first witness called by the defense was Patrick Fischer,who testified that he was a manager at Enterprise Car Rental on May7, 1996. Fischer said that he observed a man in a red sweatshirtrunning eastbound on Washington Street on the day of the shooting. Fischer said the man was a black male approximately 6 feet tall,180 pounds, and in his late 20s or early 30s. Fischer also saidthat he had a conversation with Angela Demoe on May 7, 1996, andshe told him that she saw the man in the red sweatshirt get into awhite Corolla or Corsica.

The defense also called Juan Morales, who testified that he isa member of the Latin Lovers street gang. Morales said that he isa friend of defendant, and his sister has a child by defendant. Morales also said that he is a friend of Juan Salgado. In 1996,Morales was second in command of the Latin Lovers in Waukegan andMorales's cousin, Francisco Aguillar, was the leader. Defendantwas also a member of the Latin Lovers in 1996 and went by the name"Mouse" because he was short. In 1996, Juan Salgado was the chiefenforcer of the Latin Lovers in Waukegan, which meant that he wasin charge of all the violent crimes for the gang.

Morales testified that on May 17, 1996, he had a conversationwith Juan Salgado about the shooting of Jose Soto. Theconversation took place at Morales's cousin's house in Waukegan,and another Latin Lover named Freddy Zuniga was also present. According to Morales, Freddy Zuniga telephoned Morales and said hewas bringing someone over to speak to Morales. Morales heard Salgado in the background. Morales set up a video recorder in theliving room where it could not be seen. Morales said that he setup the camera for his protection because he had heard that Salgado"tricked" on defendant to get out of jail, and Morales was afraidthat Salgado was going to try to implicate him in the shooting. Morales said that "tricked" meant to blame the murder on defendant. Shortly after Morales set up the video camera, Freddy Zuniga and Salgado came to the house. At trial, Morales identified thevideotape that he made of the conversation. The videotape wasadmitted into evidence and played for the jury.

In the videotape, Salgado and Freddy Zuniga entered the houseand Morales told Salgado to get out of his house. Salgadorepeatedly stated that he wanted to "explain" and at one pointasked Morales, "Can you spare two minutes of your time, bro',before I break?" Morales then told Salgado that he did not knowwhy Salgado did what he did, and said, "You gonna blame the man ons--- that he didn't even f---ing do?"

Morales said to Salgado that "you guys" killed "the guy," thatSalgado blamed Mouse, and that Mouse said that Salgado threatenedto kill Morales's sister.

Salgado again said that he wanted to explain, and continued,"Look, bro'. I know if I got out, bro', if I put, you know, putthe blame on him, I'll get out. My parents would put the moneyup." Salgado also said, "Look bro', look, I feel bad, bro',blaming this brother. His birthday's f---ing coming up, you know." Morales informed Salgado that defendant's birthday was "f---ingtoday." Salgado said, "[B]ro', I know, bro', that's why I feelbad, bro'. That's why I got to talk to you bro'. He has a baby onthe way, bro'. You don't think I feel like s---?" Salgado andFreddy Zuniga left the house, and the tape ended.

Morales said that when Salgado said he was going to "break"that meant he was going to leave the country. When asked whereSalgado was currently, Morales said that he was in Mexico.

Louise Battinus witnessed the shooting from her vehicle as shedrove on Washington Street. Battinus said the shooter wore a rednylon jogging coat. Battinus was able to observe the shooter'sface and described him as 5 feet 7 inches or 5 feet 8 inches talland 175 to 180 pounds. After observing defendant in court,Battinus said that defendant was "absolutely not" the shooter. When Battinus was shown the videotape made by Morales, sheidentified Salgado as the shooter.

Defendant testified that on May 7, 1996, he and Juan Salgadowere members of the Latin Lovers street gang. Salgado was "chiefsecurity," meaning that he was responsible for all of the shootingsand violence of the gang. On the day in question, Salgado anddefendant went in Salgado's purple Cavalier to pick up defendant'scousin Diana Zuniga at the dental office where she worked. Uponlearning that Zuniga was not ready to leave work, Salgado anddefendant drove to a Wendy's restaurant. On their way back to pickup Zuniga, Salgado saw a person in a brown jacket walking alongWashington Street and asked defendant if the person was Fonzie. Defendant said that he did not know. Salgado turned around to getanother look, and then said that it was Fonzie.

According to defendant, Salgado gave him a hooded sweatshirtand told him to put it on. Defendant put the hooded sweatshirt onand then Salgado reached under the seat, pulled out a gun, andsaid, "[H]ere, take this and take care of business." Defendantunderstood Salgado to mean he should go and shoot Jose Soto. Defendant told Salgado "no," indicating that they had to go pick upZuniga from work. Defendant said that they picked up Zuniga, atwhich point he got into the backseat, Zuniga sat in the frontpassenger seat, and Salgado continued to drive.

Defendant testified that, after relocating Soto, Salgado toldhim to get out of the car and take care of Soto. Salgado tolddefendant to go near some bushes, wait for Soto to come by, andtake care of him. Salgado gave defendant a gun and said that hewould pick him up when he was done. Defendant said that he went tothe bushes but could not do it because he had never shot anyonebefore. Defendant said that when Salgado picked him up he lied toSalgado, saying that there was a policeman nearby so he did notshoot Soto. Salgado turned around and looked at him and said,"[Y]ou are just scared, give me that," and Salgado snatched the gunfrom him. Defendant explained that if he had told Salgado that hejust could not do it, Salgado would have done something to him. Salgado pulled into a driveway, turned around, and said, "[G]ive methat hood." Defendant said that he took the sweatshirt off andgave it to Salgado. According to defendant, Salgado turned around,pointed the gun at him, and said, "I will take care of you later."

Defendant further testified that Salgado got out of the carand told Zuniga to drive. Salgado ran toward Washington Street. Zuniga pulled out of the driveway, and when they got back ontoWashington Street, defendant saw Salgado run up behind Soto andshoot him. Salgado returned to the car and said, "[L]ets [sic] go,drive toward Antioch." Defendant said that he did not leave afterSalgado left the car because Salgado threatened him, his family,and his pregnant girlfriend.

Defendant said that he was arrested on May 10, 1996. He wasplaced in a holding cell at the Waukegan police department, andDetectives Luka and Yarc came and talked to him the next morning. Defendant said that he initially failed to be truthful with thedetectives because, after the shooting, Salgado pulled him andZuniga aside and told them what to say in the event they werequestioned by the police.

A couple of days later, Detective Yarc told him that Salgadoblamed him for the murder. Detective Yarc showed defendant avideotape of Salgado saying that defendant was the one who killedJose Soto. Defendant testified that he got upset, asked for anattorney, and said he did not want to speak to the detectivesanymore. Defendant was put back in a cell where he saw Salgadowalk past with a detective. Defendant stated that Salgado laughedwhen he saw defendant. A couple of minutes later, defendantstarted to bang on his cell door. Defendant told the sergeant thathe wanted to tell the truth and that he was not going to lieanymore. Defendant testified that he told Lieutenant Hendley andSergeant Davis that Salgado shot Jose Soto. Defendant identifiedthe typed statement Lieutenant Hendley and Sergeant Davis preparedand indicated that he signed the typed statement and that it wasthe truth.

Defendant testified further that at 3:30 p.m. that same day,Detectives Tkadletz and Yarc asked him to write a statement byhand. Defendant wrote out a statement indicating that Salgado shotSoto. Defendant identified his handwritten statement, said that hesigned it, and that it was the truth. According to defendant, thedetectives told him that they already had an eyewitness thatidentified Salgado as the shooter and that they were thankful forhis help, and they asked if he knew where the gun used to shootSoto was located. Defendant indicated that the detectives told himthat he would be charged only with mob action because they had aneyewitness that said Salgado was the shooter. Defendant said thatthe detectives told him that if he took them to the gun they wouldtake him to bond court when they got back. Defendant took thedetectives to the house where he lived and showed them the place inthe basement where Salgado had hidden the gun.

Defendant said that when they returned to the Waukegan policedepartment, Detective Yarc came in and said, "Okay, well, Carlos,we have a problem." Detective Yarc said that they had one personsaying that she saw Salgado do the shooting and that defendant'sstatements were consistent with that account. Yarc also said,"[O]n the other hand, Salgado says you did the shooting and thereare eyewitnesses saying they saw you do the shooting." Accordingto defendant, Detective Yarc began telling him to tell the truth. Defendant testified that he told the detectives that he alreadytold them the truth. The detectives kept telling him that he waslying. Defendant testified that at 6 p.m. Detectives Yarc andTkadletz gave him another typed statement and told him that it washis handwritten statement all typed up. Defendant said that hesigned the statement without reading it and that no one read it tohim. Defendant also said that the detectives told him that afterhe signed the statement he would be taken to bond court andreleased.

After resting defendant's case, one of defendant's attorneysstated for the record that they did not call Diana Zuniga as anexculpatory witness, even though she was called to exculpatedefendant and corroborate defendant's testimony in the first trial,because of the comments made by the State in its opening statementthat she was convicted as the getaway driver and was sent toprison. The defense renewed its motion to dismiss or for amistrial, arguing that the State's comments during its openingstatement shifted the burden of proof and rendered defendant unableto call an exculpatory witness. When asked to further explaindefendant's position, one of defendant's attorneys said:

"But now in [the jurors'] minds, the bottom line is well,if she just drove the car and they convicted her and they senther to prison, well, yes, [defendant] was in the car, I guessif they convicted her, I guess we better convict [defendant].*** Even if in good faith they thought for sure we were goingto call her, there is not a person in this room that doesn'tknow that you can never bring up imprisonment; impeachment ofa prior if she testifies is solely as that.

You can bring up the fact that she was convicted of acrime and now obviously within the case law about the specific crime versus say a felony, but that is it, I can't go intosentencing or anything else."

The trial court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss or for amistrial, and characterized the decision not to call Zuniga astrial strategy. In addition to arguing that defendant was theperson who shot Jose Soto thereby causing his death, the Stateargued that defendant was accountable for the actions of Salgado,if Salgado was the shooter, and was therefore guilty of first-degree murder by accountability. The jury was given anaccountability instruction over defendant's objection.

After deliberating, the jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder, signing the verdict form indicating the finding wasbased on defendant's own actions, not on his accountability for theacts of Salgado. The trial court sentenced defendant to 54 years'imprisonment. Defendant appeals his conviction.

Defendant makes three arguments on appeal: (1) that theprosecutor made improper comments during opening statement; (2)that the prosecutor made improper comments during closing argument;and (3) that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel attrial.

Defendant argues that the comments made by the prosecutorduring the State's opening statement deprived him of a fair trial. An opening statement may include a discussion of the evidence andmatters that may reasonably be inferred from the evidence. Peoplev. Smith, 141 Ill. 2d 40, 63 (1990). Counsel may summarily outline the expected evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence,but no statement may be made in opening that counsel does notintend to prove or cannot prove. People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d81, 127 (1998). Reversible error occurs only where the remarks,referring to evidence that later proves to be inadmissible, areattributable to the deliberate misconduct of the prosecutor andresult in substantial prejudice to the defendant. Kliner, 185 Ill.2d at 127.

During the State's opening statement, the prosecutor made thefollowing remarks:

"You are going to hear evidence in this case, ladies andgentlemen, about the two other gang members that were with thedefendant that day; Juan Salgado and a woman named, Diane[sic] Zuniga. They were also members of the Latin Loversstreet gang, same gang as the defendant.

You are going to hear evidence that Diane [sic] Zunigaand Juan Salgado too were involved in the shooting. Diane[sic] Zuniga is going to testify, she is currently in prisonserving a twenty year sentence."

At that point in the State's opening statement, defense counselposed an objection and asked to be heard outside the presence ofthe jury. Defense counsel argued that informing the jury thatZuniga was serving a sentence was improper and that even if Zunigatestified and was impeached with her conviction, it would beimproper to disclose her prison sentence to the jury. The defensemoved for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. The trialcourt sustained the objection but denied the motion for a mistrial. The jury was not advised of any of these arguments, motions, orrulings. The trial court then instructed the jury that what theattorneys say in opening statements is not evidence.

Next, the prosecutor said:

"You will hear evidence, Diana Zuniga is expected totestify in this case. She has been convicted of being theget-a-way [sic] driver of this homicide."

At that point, defense counsel objected again and asked to be heardoutside the presence of the jury. The State informed the trialcourt that it did not intend to call Zuniga as a witness. Thetrial court sustained the defendant's objection and told theprosecutor not to talk about Zuniga. Defense counsel again movedfor a mistrial. That motion was denied. The trial court did notinform the jury of its ruling on the objection, nor did the trialcourt advise the jury to disregard the comment. The prosecutorcontinued with his opening statement without further mentioningZuniga. The defense renewed its objection to the remarks the Statemade during opening statement multiple times during the trial andmoved for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. The trialcourt denied the motion each time.

Defendant contends that the above comments deprived him of afair trial because (1) they amounted to deliberate misconduct andsubstantially prejudiced defendant by alleging facts that were notproduced at trial; (2) they concerned improper impeachment of apotential defense witness and undermined the presumption ofinnocence; and (3) they were improper comment on the possiblesentence defendant was facing. The State contends that theprosecution, in good faith, expected Zuniga to testify andexculpate defendant as she did at defendant's first trial and,therefore, she would be properly impeached with her conviction ofmurder.

We begin by noting, as did the trial court, that the State'sremark that Zuniga was serving a 20-year prison sentence wasimproper. This is so because it disclosed or suggested thepotential sentence defendant faced if the jury found him guilty. The specific sentence received by an accomplice is properlyexcluded where such disclosure would reveal the possible sentencefacing defendant. People v. Brewer, 245 Ill. App. 3d 890, 892(1993). A jury is the trier of fact and does not have theresponsibility of imposing a sentence; therefore, the possiblepenalty facing defendant is irrelevant and immaterial to the jury. People v. Lake, 61 Ill. App. 3d 428, 431 (1978). These concernsare addressed in Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Criminal, No.1.01 (4th ed. 2000):

"You are not to concern yourself with possible punishmentor sentence for the offense charged during your deliberation. It is the function of the trial judge to determine thesentence should there be a verdict of guilty."

Having determined that the prosecutor's first remark wasimproper, we now turn to a discussion of the second remark. At thetime of its opening statement, the State was not entitled toconclude that it would be permitted to impeach Zuniga with herprior conviction. The rule for impeachment by prior convictionadopted in People v. Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d 510 (1971), includingits balancing test, applies to impeachment by prior conviction ofwitnesses other than the accused. See Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at516 (the then-proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 609 (51 F.R.D. 315,393 (1971)) that was adopted in Montgomery speaks to impeachment ofwitnesses). In this case, neither party moved in limine for adetermination of the admissibility of Zuniga's prior conviction toimpeach her testimony. Therefore, even if the State assumed thatdefendant was going to call Zuniga, it was presumptuous to mentionan impeaching conviction in the opening statement when there hadnot been a determination by the trial court, as required byMontgomery, that the probative value of the conviction was notsubstantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice(Montgomery, 47 Ill. 2d at 516-19).

If we were to assume for the sake of argument that Zuniga'sprior conviction would have been admissible to impeach hertestimony, it would have been improper to disclose to the jury thatZuniga's murder conviction arose out of the same incident as didthe allegations of murder against defendant. It is well settledthat evidence of an alleged accomplice's conviction of an offensefor which the defendant is being tried is inadmissible as proof ofthe guilt of the defendant. People v. Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d 36, 42(1978). "A defendant who is separately tried is entitled to havehis guilt or innocence determined upon the evidence against himwithout being prejudged according to what has happened to another." Sullivan, 72 Ill. 2d at 42.

In clarifying the Sullivan ruling that an accomplice'stestimony can be impeached with that accomplice's prior convictionof the same offense for which the defendant is on trial, oursupreme court explained that Sullivan "merely articulates theholding in *** Montgomery" and is "limited to the definedstandards set forth in *** Federal Rule 609." People v. Stover, 89Ill. 2d 189, 195 (1982). In other words, Sullivan does not providea basis to admit a prior conviction to impeach a witnessindependent of the rule stated in Montgomery. See Stover, 89 Ill.2d at 195.

Unlike a defendant, who can be impeached only with the publicrecord of his conviction during the State's rebuttal case (Peoplev. Coleman, 158 Ill. 2d 319, 337 (1994)), convictions of witnessesother than the accused may be proved on cross-examination (Peoplev. Roche, 389 Ill. 361, 368-69 (1945); People v. Kellas, 72 Ill.App. 3d 445, 450 (1979)). Generally, the limit to which a witnessmay be impeached on cross-examination with prior convictions is theintroduction of certified copies of the convictions. People v.Enoch, 146 Ill. 2d 44, 55 (1991). The trial court has thediscretion to inquire into any matters appearing in the publicrecord, including the court, date, nature of the offense, andsentence received. Enoch, 146 Ill. 2d at 55. Care must be taken,however, to delete irrelevant and prejudicial surplusage such asthe details of the nature of the crime of which the witness wasconvicted. See People v. Dudley, 217 Ill. App. 3d 230, 232 (1991). If the details appearing on the documents necessary to authenticatea prior conviction are unfairly prejudicial, their admission mightconstitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion. People v.Johnson, 173 Ill. App. 3d 998, 1012-13 (1988). We fail to see how the trial court could have concluded, in the exercise of itsdiscretion, that Zuniga's impeachment should include informing thejury that she was convicted of being the getaway driver in thisincident.

A prosecutor may impeach the testimony of a former codefendantor accomplice by informing the jury that the codefendant oraccomplice has previously been convicted of a crime. See Sullivan,72 Ill. 2d at 42. This is so even in a situation where the factsand circumstances of the impeaching offense are the same as thosethat give rise to the charges for which the defendant is on trial. In this situation, however, even though the impeaching offense maybe designated by name (here, first-degree murder), it cannot beidentified as having any connection to the charges pending againstthe accused (in this case, that the conviction was the result ofthe witness acting as the getaway driver in the same incident).

Accordingly, we conclude that had Zuniga been called bydefendant, the State may have been able to impeach her with herprior conviction of first-degree murder, if the Montgomerybalancing test was met, but it would have been improper to discloseto the jury that the prior first-degree murder conviction was forthis murder. The State's comment during its opening statement thatZuniga "has been convicted of being the get-a-way [sic] driver ofthis homicide" was therefore improper.

The State argues that if the prosecutor's comment during itsopening statements was error, we should find it to be harmlessbecause defendant was not substantially prejudiced due to the trialcourt's sustaining of defendant's objection and its admonishmentsto the jury that opening statements are not evidence. We agreethat defendant did not suffer substantial prejudice as a result ofthe complained-of remarks, but we conclude that there areadditional reasons for reaching this result.

In Williams, our supreme court stated:

"Even if prosecutorial comment exceeds the bounds of properargument, the verdict must not be disturbed unless it can besaid that the remark caused substantial prejudice to thedefendant [citation], taking into account 'the content andcontext of the language, its relationship to the evidence, andits effect on the defendant's right to a fair and impartialtrial' (Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d at 152). '[E]rrors in openingstatements or closing argument must result in substantialprejudice such that the result would have been differentabsent the complained-of remark before reversal is required.' People v. Cloutier, 156 Ill. 2d 483, 507 (1993)." Williams,192 Ill. 2d at 573.

In this case, defendant's defense incorporated the factualproposition that Zuniga was the getaway driver and Salgado was theshooter. Therefore, the challenged remark that "she has beenconvicted of being the get-a-way [sic] driver of this homicide"buttressed defendant's case. While defendant's guilt might havebeen prejudged according to Zuniga's fate, as the rule in Sullivanattempts to prevent (see Sullivan 72 Ill. 2d at 42), if the jury inthis case were to conclude that Zuniga was in fact the getawaydriver in this homicide, such conclusion supports defendant'sversion of the facts. Moreover, as the different scenarios in thiscase unfolded, if Salgado was the shooter, Zuniga was the getawaydriver. By finding defendant guilty as a principal, that is,guilty as the shooter rather than as an accomplice to Salgado's actof shooting, the jury demonstrated that it was unswayed by theprosecutor's reference to Zuniga as the getaway driver.

Defendant's attorney concluded that Zuniga, who had givenexculpatory testimony at defendant's first trial, was tainted bythe prosecutor's opening remarks to such a degree that he wasunable to call her as a defense witness. However, the improperremarks in and of themselves did not bar the defense from callingZuniga. Defendant remained free to do so. Any prejudice that resulted from not calling Zuniga as a defense witness was theresult of the decision not to call her. It was defendant'sattorney's assessment of the effect of those remarks that promptedhim to exercise his discretion to forego calling Zuniga as awitness.

In any event, we cannot conclude that had Zuniga taken thewitness stand she would have changed the outcome of the trial. Itis important to keep in mind that, even with Zuniga's testimony,defendant was convicted in his first trial. And unlike Zuniga'stestimony at defendant's first trial, where she testified whilemurder charges were pending against her, Zuniga's testimony in thiscase would have been subject to impeachment for her conviction offirst-degree murder.

The trial court informed the jury before and during openingstatements that opening statements are not evidence. Also, thejury received a written instruction indicating that openingstatements are not evidence and that any statement made that is notbased on the evidence should be disregarded. Illinois Pattern JuryInstructions, Criminal, No. 1.03 (3d ed. 1992). The giving of thisinstruction alone is not always curative, but it is a factor to beconsidered in determining the prejudice to defendant. People v.Flax, 255 Ill. App. 3d 103, 109 (1993). It is also important toconsider that there was evidence other than Zuniga's testimony,including Louise Battinus's testimony and the videotape made byMorales, to corroborate defendant's trial testimony.

Based on these observations, we cannot conclude that theprosecutor's improper comments during opening statement led tosubstantial prejudice such that the result of this trial would havebeen different. See Williams, 192 Ill. 2d at 573.

The material in this section is nonpublishable under SupremeCourt Rule 23 (166 Ill. 2d R. 23).

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Defendant's last argument on appeal is that he was denied theeffective assistance of counsel where his attorney failed to callDiana Zuniga as a witness even though she had testified atdefendant's first trial that Salgado was the shooter. The Statecontends that the decision not to call Zuniga was a matter of trialstrategy made with defendant's consent and, therefore, defendant'sineffective assistance of counsel argument is without merit. Weagree with the State.

To succeed on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,defendant must show (1) that "counsel's performance was deficient"in that "it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,"and (2) that the "deficient performance prejudiced the defense"such that defendant was deprived of a fair trial whose result wasreliable. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 80 L.Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). The failure tosatisfy either prong of the Strickland test precludes a finding ofineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Patterson, 192 Ill.2d 93, 107 (2000).

With respect to the first prong of Strickland, defendant mustovercome a "strong presumption" that his counsel's conduct fallswithin the wide range of reasonable professional assistance andthat the challenged conduct constitutes sound trial strategy.Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694-95, 104 S. Ct. at2065. Strategic choices made by defense counsel following athorough investigation into the law and facts relevant to adefendant's plausible options are virtually unchallengeable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693-95, 104 S. Ct.at 2064-66; People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill. 2d 312, 347 (2000); Peoplev. Towns, 182 Ill. 2d 491, 514 (1998). Accordingly, "[c]ounsel'sdecision whether to present a particular witness is generally astrategic choice which cannot support a claim of ineffectiveassistance of counsel." People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 414(2000). Counsel's performance is measured by an objective standardof competence under prevailing professional norms. People v.Smith, 195 Ill. 2d 179, 188 (2000).

Defendant points to People v. King, 316 Ill. App. 3d 901, 913(2000), and the cases cited therein, for the proposition that counsel's tactical decisions may be deemed ineffective when theyresult in counsel's failure to present exculpatory evidence ofwhich he or she is aware, including the failure to call witnesseswhose testimony would support an otherwise uncorroborated defense. In King, the court held that trial counsel's failure to call anavailable alibi witness who would have bolstered an otherwiseuncorroborated defense was the result of incompetence because trialcounsel failed to provide an explanation for failing to call theexculpatory witness and the court could not conceive of any soundtrial strategy for failing to do so.

King is distinguishable from this case because defendant'stestimony that Salgado was the shooter was not uncorroborated inthe absence of Zuniga's testimony. In defendant's first twowritten statements given to the police on May 13, 1996, defendantrelated that Salgado was the shooter. There was the videotape madeby Morales that showed Salgado implicating himself as the shooterand admitting that he falsely blamed defendant. Lastly, LouiseBattinus testified that defendant was "absolutely not" the shooterand identified Salgado as the shooter.

King is also distinguishable because the defense in this caseprovided a specific explanation as to why Zuniga was not called. After defendant rested his case, one of defendant's attorneys madethe following comment:

"We are resting, but I want for the record to make clearthat we did not call Diane [sic] Zuniga and as was pointed outthroughout the trial and throughout the months that she hasbeen in custody here pursuant to the writ that we asked thiscourt to issue, she was going to be called in this case as anexculpatory witness, as a witness that testified this lasttime this case was brought to trial and in fact corroboratedthe testimony as put forth by [defendant] at that time, and Iwould ask judicial notice be taken of what her testimony wasin that prior trial.

The only reason she is not being brought to testify atthis time is because of the comments because of the--by theState's Attorney's office in their opening statement in whichthey made mention that she would be called as a witness, shein fact was convicted as the getaway driver in this case, shein fact went to prison because of that.

Number one, I objected at that point, I asked for amistrial at that point based upon prosecutorial misconduct. Subsequent to that, I asked that the case, not only there bea mistrial but that there--it be dismissed because of thatprosecutorial misconduct, because at one point the priorwitness as I set forth on the record, I was precluded to do aproper impeachment of her because I didn't want to go into aprior proceedings for fear that the jury might think it wasthat trial of Diane [sic] Zuniga because the State's Attorneysaid she was convicted of it. Even though she pled guilty, hemade it sound as if there was a trial, I couldn't take thechance of letting them think she was convicted for merelydriving the automobile. We could not put her on.

What they did when they made those comments knowing thatthey were not going to call her themselves, knowing--in factthey made the statement, they were under the impression wewere going to call her. What it did there is shift the burdenof proof. As you know, we don't have to put on any case. Forthem to make comments on what we might do, we don't have anyburden.

Between that, and again now, there is a 6th Amendmentproblem with ineffectiveness of counsel. We are precludedfrom calling her. They are both due process issues. She isan exculpatory eye witness to this offense he is charged with,which we are now barred, in our opinion, from calling herbased upon the State's comments."

The jury found defendant guilty. Looking at the case inhindsight, one could speculate that it would not have hurtdefendant's case to put Zuniga on the stand. However, this is notthe appropriate test. The Supreme Court warned in Strickland:

"It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guesscounsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, andit is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defenseafter it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that aparticular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable.[Citation.] A fair assessment of attorney performancerequires that every effort be made to eliminate the distortingeffects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances ofcounsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct fromcounsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at689, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.

It was not outside the realm of reasonable defense strategy toconclude at the time of trial that Zuniga, who was impeachable witha first-degree murder conviction, was so incredible that it wasbetter not to call her. This is an even more reasonable conclusionwhere there was other evidence admitted at trial corroboratingdefendant's testimony such as the videotape, which was not admittedat defendant's first trial, and defense counsel knew from theprevious trial that defendant was found guilty in spite of Zuniga'sexculpatory testimony. Defendant is entitled to competentrepresentation, not perfect representation. People v. Stewart,104 Ill. 2d 463, 491-92 (1984). Other defense attorneys may haveadvised differently, but we cannot say that counsel's decision wasso irrational and unreasonable that no reasonably effective defenseattorney, facing the same situation, would have decided thatdefendant was better off submitting the case to the jury withoutZuniga's testimony.

We also conclude that defendant has not established theprejudice prong of Strickland. In light of the previously notedproblems with Zuniga's testimony and the other evidencecorroborative of defendant's trial testimony, defendant has failedto show that the failure to call Zuniga prejudiced his case suchthat he was deprived of a fair trial.

For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court ofLake County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.