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PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of thecourt:

In September 2000 plaintiff, the Illinois Attorney General,filed a nine-count complaint against defendants, Dixon-MarquetteCement, Inc. (Dixon-Marquette) and Prairie Material Sales, Inc.(Prairie Material), seeking injunctive relief and civil penaltiesbased on alleged violations of the Illinois EnvironmentalProtection Act (the Act) (415 ILCS 5/1 et seq. (West 2000)) and thePollution Control Board's (the Board) waste-disposal regulations(35 Ill. Adm. Code Sub Title G (2000)). At issue in this appealare counts VI through IX, which are premised on defendants' failureto obtain a permit from the Illinois Environmental ProtectionAgency (the Agency) to conduct a waste-storage, waste-treatment, orwaste-disposal operation (415 ILCS 5/21(d)(1) (West 2000)). Thetrial court granted defendants' motion to dismiss (735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2000)), determining that the plain language of section21(d)(1) of the Act exempted defendants from the permitrequirement. The trial court further made a finding pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)), and plaintifftimely appeals. We reverse and remand.

Plaintiff's complaint alleged that defendant Dixon-Marquetteoperates a cement production business on property in Dixon; theproperty is owned by defendant Prairie Material. Dixon-Marquette'scement manufacturing process generates a waste by-product calledcement kiln dust, which is deposited on the property. Defendantshave been depositing cement kiln dust in a pile on the propertysince at least 1970. The cement kiln dust pile covers an areaapproximately 30 acres in size and reaches approximately 70 feethigh. An analysis of the cement kiln dust revealed that itcontains arsenic, barium, chromium, lead, manganese, selenium, andcadmium. The Rock River runs approximately 200 yards from the dustpile, and the wet weather runoff from the dust pile discharges intothe river.

Section 21(d)(1) of the Act provides:

"No person shall:

* * *

(d) Conduct any waste-storage, waste-treatment, orwaste-disposal operation:

(1) without a permit granted by the Agency or inviolation of any conditions imposed by such permit, ***as may be necessary to assure compliance with this Actand with regulations and standards adopted thereunder;provided, however, that, except for municipal solid wastelandfill units that receive waste on or after October 9,1993, no permit shall be required for (i) any personconducting a waste-storage, waste-treatment, or waste-disposal operation for wastes generated by such person'sown activities which are stored, treated, or disposedwithin the site where such wastes are generated ***." 415 ILCS 5/21(d)(1) (West 2002).

Plaintiff's complaint alleged causes of action againstdefendants for water pollution, water pollution hazard, offensiveconditions, open dumping, and causing or allowing litter as aresult of the open dumping. Count VI of plaintiff's complaintalleged a cause of action based on defendants' conducting a waste-disposal operation without a permit, in violation of section 21(d)of the Act (415 ILCS 5/21(d) (West 2000)). Count VII allegednumerous violations of the Board's waste-disposal regulations,premised on defendants' failure to apply for and obtain a permit. Count VIII alleged that defendants, without a permit, have disposedof waste at the site. Count IX alleged that defendants violatedsection 21(d) of the Act and the Board's waste-disposal regulationsby failing to provide a properly certified operator to supervisethe operations of the facility.

Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to section2--615 of the Code of Civil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--615(West 2000)). In their motion, defendants argued that section21(d)(1) of the Act exempted from the permit requirement facilitiesthat dispose of their own waste at the site where it is generated. Defendants argued that, because Dixon-Marquette generates cementkiln dust at its facility on the property and disposes of the kilndust on the same property, section 21(d)(1) of the Act does notrequire them to obtain a permit. Defendants concluded that,because they were not required to obtain a permit, each ofplaintiff's counts that were based on defendants' alleged failureto obtain a permit should be dismissed.

The parties fully briefed the issue of whether defendants werestatutorily required to obtain a permit to conduct waste storage,treatment, or disposal operations. In support of their motion todismiss, defendants argued that the plain language of section21(d)(1) of the Act served to exempt from permitting requirementstheir on-site disposal operations. In response, plaintiff reliedon two appellate court decisions that construed the exemption,Reynolds Metals Co. v. Pollution Control Board, 108 Ill. App. 3d156 (1982), and Pielet Bros. Trading, Inc. v. Pollution ControlBoard, 110 Ill. App. 3d 752 (1982).

In Reynolds Metals, the First District considered whether acompany was subject to the Act's permit requirements for the on-site disposal of its wastes generated from its aluminum metal andaluminum alloys fabrication operation. The company's landfillcovered 3