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Plaintiff, Kathleen M. Martin, filed suit against defendant,Joel D. Sally, seeking to recover damages for personal injuriesallegedly sustained from a motor vehicle accident. Defendantadmitted negligence but denied that plaintiff's preexisting injurywas aggravated from the accident and denied that plaintiffsustained any injuries by the accident. After hearing theevidence, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant. Weaffirm.

Before trial began, both parties filed motions in limine. Plaintiff's motion requested that the trial court bar defendantfrom eliciting testimony from his expert engineering witness, MarkStrauss, that no human could be injured in this type of occurrenceand that plaintiff could not have been injured in this occurrence. The trial court denied her motion.

Defendant's motion in limine requested that plaintiff bebarred from presenting evidence that, following the collision, herson was crying, was claiming to have been injured in the accident,was taken by ambulance to the hospital, or was evaluated andtreated. Plaintiff argued that the evidence was relevant because she would be testifying at trial that she was so concerned atthetime of the accident that her son might be injured due to hisrecent appendectomy surgery that she focused her attention on herson's condition rather than her own, and she therefore did notcomplain of any injuries to the investigating police officer at thescene of the accident. The trial court granted defendant's motion.

Based on the trial court's ruling that defendant could presenttestimony from his engineer that no human body could have beeninjured in the accident, plaintiff filed a motion in limine inwhich she sought to be allowed to present in rebuttal the testimonythat her son was crying, he claimed to have been injured, he wastaken by ambulance to a hospital, and he received treatment at thehospital for possible injuries. The motion was denied.

The trial court, however, allowed plaintiff to make an offerof proof on the issues as to why she did not complain of her owninjury at the scene of the accident and as to whether the impactwas such that a person could have been injured in the accident. Plaintiff testified that her 11-year-old son, Cory, was a frontseat passenger in the van at the time of the accident. At themoment of impact, she witnessed his body move back and forth. Immediately after the accident, she had a brief conversation with defendant, and whenplaintiff finished speaking with him, shenoticed Cory crying. She noticed that Cory's head was down and hewas leaning forward. Cory told her that his back and neck hurt. Plaintiff "freaked out," wondering what to do, because Cory hadjust undergone an appendectomy weeks before. Plaintiff then called911 and an ambulance took Cory to the hospital. Cory was evaluatedand released that same day. Cory was "uncomfortable" and took aTylenol but never required any further medical care.

The following facts were presented at trial. On July 10,1998, plaintiff was driving a 1990 Dodge Caravan westbound onHalsted Street in Rockford and brought her van to a stop at a redlight at the intersection of Huffman Boulevard. Cory was seated in the front passenger seat ofthe van. Defendant was driving a 1988Chevrolet 1500 pick-up truck westbound on Halsted Street behind plaintiff. It had been raining andthe pavement was wet. As defendant approached the red light at the intersection, he sawplaintiff's van in front of him. He applied the brakes, but histires began skidding on the wet pavement and the front of his truckstruck the rear of plaintiff's van. According to defendant, histruck was traveling between five and seven miles per hour when it"squarely" impacted the rear end of plaintiff's van.

Following the accident, both plaintiff and defendant lefttheir vehicles and looked to see if there was any damage. Plaintiff's van was equipped with a trailer hitch at the time. Both parties agreed that there was no damage done to eithervehicle, although defendant did see a small dimple in his licenseplate. Plaintiff admitted that she told defendant that she was allright and she did not complain of any symptoms at the time.

Prior to the accident, plaintiff twice had injured her backwhile working, once in 1997 and again in March 1998. Plaintiffinjured her back on a third occasion in April 1998, while helpingher family move. Following these injuries, plaintiff was treatedby Drs. Robert Porter, Melinda Carter, and Charles Wright. An MRIof plaintiff's lumbar spine taken on May 6, 1998, showed a discprotrusion at the L4-L5 level. Because of the back injury inApril, plaintiff had stopped working and she was not working at thetime of the accident at issue. Plaintiff had been in physicaltherapy treatment and taking medication as prescribed by Dr. Wrightdue to her injury.

Plaintiff did not seek any medical attention on the day of theaccident or within three days following the accident. She admittedtelling the therapist on July 13, 1998, that she was feelinggradually improved. On July 14, 1998, four days after theaccident, plaintiff attended a physical therapy appointment, which had been scheduled before the accident. She did not see Dr. Wrightafter the accident until August 6, 1998, and that appointment alsohad been scheduled before the accident. Plaintiff continued goingto her regularly scheduled physical therapy appointments.

Plaintiff explained that her back and neck were sore from theaccident but because she already was under a doctor's care andalready was taking pain medication, she did not go to a doctor orhospital for extra care. Plaintiff noticed that her symptoms weregetting progressively worse, more than she had ever experienced. Immediately before the accident, plaintiff had been improving to the point where she was feeling like returning to work on a part-time basis.

Dr. Carter, plaintiff's family practitioner, ordered a secondMRI of the lumbar spine, which was taken on July 23, 1998. Whenshe ordered the second MRI, Dr. Carter was not aware that plaintiffhad been involved in the accident on July 10, 1998. On August 11,1998, plaintiff's surgeon, Dr. Wright, performed a lumbardiscectomy at the L4-L5 level.

At trial, Dr. Wright testified for plaintiff by way of anevidence deposition. He opined that the surgery he performed wascausally related to the accident at issue. On cross-examination,however, Wright conceded that his initial clinical examination of plaintiff on May 15, 1998, did not correlate withthe MRI of thelumbar spine that had been done on May 6, 1998, because he expectedto see a greater degree of disc protrusion and more nerve rootcompression to the left side. Wright also conceded that any typeof heavy physical exertion such as gardening can cause a discprotrusion to progress.

Wright further testified on cross-examination that when heinitially gave his opinion that the accident aggravated plaintiff'sinjuries, as shown by the preaccident and postaccident MRIs, plaintiff had not given him any specific information abouttheaccident. He did not know whether it was a front-end or a rear-endcollision or the severity of the impact between the two vehicles. When questioned, Wright admitted that the greater the force oftrauma, the greater the likelihood of having a disc protrusionprogress and that the lighter the impact between the vehicles, theless likely it would be for a disc protrusion to progress. Wrightobserved that if, in fact, a patient experienced progression of adisc protrusion as a result of a single traumatic event, it is morecommon than not that the patient would notice increased symptomsimmediately following the impact or quite shortly thereafter. After viewing the photographs of the vehicles, defense counselasked whether it remained "very possible that [plaintiff's] diskwas not injured or aggravated in any way as a result of theaccident at issue?" Wright responded that, if he was going solelyon the basis of the presence or absence of damage to the vehicles,that would be a "fair statement," although it ignored certainvariables that could magnify or limit the effect of an impact, andthat information was unavailable.

By way of a videotaped evidence deposition, defendant calledDr. Steven Delheimer. Delheimer believed that plaintiff haddegenerative disc disease, which can produce herniated discs ordisc bulges and which can progress or worsen with age. Incomparing the preaccident and postaccident MRIs of plaintiff'slumbar spine, Delheimer believed that there was not a significantdifference between them. He believed that the extruded discfragment seen by Wright during the surgery performed on plaintiffwas probably present in May 1998 before the accident at issue. Healso believed that the surgery performed on plaintiff would havebecome necessary even if plaintiff had not been involved in a motorvehicle accident, because of the degenerative disc disease and thefact that the extruded disc fragment was probably present in Maybefore the accident. Delheimer explained that symptoms of pain can"wax and wane on their own," and an example of this was inplaintiff's medical records, which revealed that on July 9, 1998,she reported to her physical therapist that she had increasedsymptoms of pain and wondered whether they were related togardening. Delheimer also remarked that plaintiff wassignificantly overweight, which he believed was an ongoing materialfactor in her complaints of low back pain.

Based upon a review of the medical records, the two MRIs, and the photographs ofthe vehicles involved in the accident, Delheimerconcluded that plaintiff's injury was due to an extruded discfragment that was present prior to the accident. The symptoms fromthat disc fragment were waxing and waning, and if she had hadsurgery at the time of Wright's initial evaluation, an extrudeddisc fragment would have been found, even in the absence of theaccident. He saw no damage to the vehicles and found it difficultto believe, based upon common sense, that the accident was amaterial factor in plaintiff's need for surgery or her furthersymptoms.

Defendant also called Mark Strauss by way of a videotapedevidence deposition. Strauss is an accident reconstructionist andbiomechanicist. His training and professional experience involvedthe study of how humans may or may not be injured in differenttypes of vehicular accidents. Strauss testified that he reviewed the police report, deposition transcripts, and photographs taken ofboth vehicles after the accident. He also researched measurementsof an exemplar Dodge Caravan such as the one operated by plaintiff,and he testified about studies of whether the human body could beinjured in low-speed, rear-end impacts.

Strauss was able to determine that the materials he reviewedsupported defendant's estimation that his vehicle was travelingbetween five and seven miles per hour when it struck plaintiff'svehicle. He stated there was nothing in the photographs that wouldindicate that the contact between the two vehicles was anythingother than a low-speed impact and that the "delta V" of plaintiff'svehicle (the maximum speed that plaintiff's vehicle achieved due to the impact) was approximately three to five miles per hour.

Strauss further testified as to the results of studies done in the field of biomedical engineering, which attempted to determinewhat injuries would result to humans in low-speed impacts. Hetestified that these studies and tests were all subjected to a peerreview process, used methodology or techniques firmly establishedin the field of biomechanical engineering, and were scientificallyperformed. He also testified that the tests were performed notonly by independent researchers, but also by university labs and by the government to establishthe safety of vehicles. These tests,which were empirical, showed that in rear-end impacts involvingspeeds of 10 miles per hour from one vehicle into the back ofanother, the human volunteers showed either no symptoms or onlymuscle tension or slight damage to the tissues in the neck and theshoulder, and sometimes the volunteers experienced headaches. However, Strauss noted that in none of the human volunteers wasthere any injury or damage sustained to the lower back, even involunteers who had abnormalities of disc degeneration in theirlumbar spines according to pretesting MRIs. Strauss noted that,compared to the neck area, the back is a totally differentstructure, which is stronger than the neck and is supported by thevehicle's seat back and its foam. Based on his review of thematerials and scientific research, Strauss was of the opinion that the impact or contact betweenthe two vehicles in the accident atissue was not sufficient to aggravate any condition in plaintiff'sback that existed prior to the accident, including her protrudingdisc at the L4-L5 level.

After hearing evidence, the jury returned a verdict in favorof defendant. Following the denial of her motion for a new trial, plaintiff timely appeals. She contends thatthe trial court erredby granting and denying certain motions in limine because it: (1)allowed defendant's expert witness to testify that no human couldhave been injured in the accident and that the impact wasinsufficient to aggravate any preexisting condition in plaintiff'sback; and (2) barred plaintiff from presenting evidence that herson was crying or injured after the accident to rebut defendant'sexpert witness's testimony that no human could have been injuredand to explain why she did not complain of her own injuries to thepolice officer at the scene of the accident.

At issue are several evidentiary rulings rendered by the trialcourt in its consideration of the motions in limine brought by theparties to this appeal. Motions in limine are designed to producea trial without the introduction of prejudicial material. Konieczny v. Kamin Builders, Inc., 304 Ill. App. 3d 131, 136(1999). On review, a trial court judge maintains broad discretionin the admission of evidence and in ruling upon a motion in limine. Green v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 269 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1082(1995). A trial court's decision on a motion in limine will not bedisturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Hallowell v. Universityof Chicago Hospital, 334 Ill. App. 3d 206, 210 (2002). In case oftrial court error, a reversal is called for only if the evidenceimproperly admitted was sufficiently prejudicial to change theoutcome of the trial. Cairns v. Hansen, 170 Ill. App. 3d 505, 511(1988).

1. Testimony of Defendant's Expert Witness

In the first issue on appeal, plaintiff contends that thetrial court erred in allowing Strauss to testify that the impact orcontact between the two vehicles was not sufficient to injure anyhuman or aggravate any condition in plaintiff's back that existedprior to the accident, including her protruding disc. Plaintiffasserts that Strauss should not have been allowed to testify on thesubject because his testimony was irrelevant and based onspeculation and matters of common knowledge.

Expert testimony is admissible at trial when the expert hasknowledge or experience not common to a layperson and thatknowledge or experience would aid the trier of fact in determining the facts at issue. In re Detention of Tittlebach, 324Ill. App.3d 6, 10 (2001); Augenstein v. Pulley, 191 Ill. App. 3d 664, 681(1989). The critical issue is whether the expert's legal testimonyaids the trier of fact by explaining a factual issue beyond its ordinary knowledge or whether the opinion merely recites a legalconclusion. Eychaner v. Gross, 321 Ill. App. 3d 759, 779 (2001). The admission of expert testimony is within the discretion of thetrial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse ofdiscretion. In re Detention of Tittlebach, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 10.

Strauss was qualified as an accident reconstructionist,biomechanicist, and biomedical engineer. Part of his professionalexperience as a biomedical engineer included the study of howhumans may be injured in different types of vehicular traumas. Strauss opined that no human could have been injured in theaccident. Strauss was also asked "whether the impact or contactbetween these vehicles would have been sufficient to aggravate anypreexisting condition that the plaintiff had in her back such as aprotruding disc at the L4-5 level." He believed that this couldnot have aggravated her preexisting condition because "this is acase where the back is cradled and cushioned by the seat back and the foam, and the delta V, that is,the speed of impact and thechange in velocity of the [plaintiff's] van, is approximately in the range of a person walking briskly. This is not at all a highspeed impact. This is very low."

We find that Strauss was improperly allowed to testify becausehe rendered an opinion as to individuals in general, which had norelevance to plaintiff. That other individuals might not sufferinjuries in low-impact vehicular crashes has no bearing on whetherthis particular plaintiff might have suffered injury in thisparticular crash.

Moreover, the trial court erred in allowing Strauss to testifythat plaintiff could not have been injured in the accident. Theadmission of an expert's testimony requires the proponent to lay anadequate foundation establishing that the information upon which the expert bases his opinion is reliable. Hiscott v. Peters, 324Ill. App. 3d 114, 122 (2001). There is no indication in the recordthat, in rendering his opinion, Strauss considered plaintiff'sweight, height, and age, whether plaintiff wore a seat belt, howshe was seated, or how extensive her preexisting injuries were at the time of the crash. In short, the focus of his opinion wasbased on generalities that were not tied to plaintiff specifically. Accordingly, we find thatthe trial court abused its discretion inallowing Strauss to testify that the low-speed impact of the crashcould not have injured humans and erred in allowing Strauss totestify that the accident did not exacerbate plaintiff'spreaccident injury or condition.

Although we find error, we do not find that a reversal iscalled for in this case because we determine that the error herewas not prejudicial under the circumstances. We will not reversean erroneous ruling unless the error was prejudicial or the resultof the trial was materially affected. Stricklin v. Chapman, 197Ill. App. 3d 385, 388 (1990). The burden is on the party seekingreversal to establish prejudice. Cairns, 170 Ill. App. 3d at 511.

Examination of the record discloses several facts from whichwe determine that the error was not prejudicial and did not affectthe outcome of the trial. Dr. Delheimer, the neurosurgeon whoexamined plaintiff and reviewed her medical records and films on defendant's behalf, believed thatthe surgery performed byplaintiff's treating physician had no causal relationship to theaccident. It was his belief that, prior to the accident, plaintiffhad a degenerative disc disease of her lumbar spine and an extrudeddisc fragment present, which eventually led her to surgery. Thisbelief was also based on the lack of damage to the vehicles, asshown by the photographs. He also believed that plaintiff'sobesity was a major contributing factor to her ongoing problems. In addition, plaintiff's surgeon, Dr. Wright, testified that whenhe first gave his opinion he did not know any specific details ofhow the accident occurred and did not know the severity of theimpact between the two vehicles. He admitted, after viewing thephotographs of the vehicles taken after the accident, that it wasvery possible that plaintiff's disc was not injured or aggravatedas a result of the accident at issue.

Furthermore, the jury was aware that, at the time of theaccident, defendant's vehicle rear-ended plaintiff's vehicle at thespeed of between five and seven miles per hour, the vehicles werenot damaged, and plaintiff did not complain of any injuries at thetime or for several days thereafter. Thus, given these facts andthe testimony of the other expert witnesses, the jury's verdictwould not have been different if Strauss had been barred fromtestifying.

2. Evidence of Crying or Injury to Plaintiff's Son

Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred in barringher from presenting evidence to rebut Strauss's opinion that nohuman could have been injured in the accident. Plaintiff assertsthat "if it was error to allow Defendant's engineer to testify thatno human could have been injured in the accident, the error wascompounded by the court's refusal to allow Plaintiff to presentrebuttal evidence on that very point." Plaintiff alleges that herson was prepared to testify that he was injured in the accident.

The trial court gave plaintiff the opportunity to presentevidence to rebut the testimony of defendant's expert witness. Insubmitting only her own self-serving and unqualified statements, plaintiff offered insufficient proof. On that basis, we find noerror.

Plaintiff also asserts that the trial court erred by barring her from presenting evidence that her son was crying or injuredafter the accident to show her state of mind and to explain herreason for not complaining of her own injury to the police officerat the scene of the accident.

In her discovery deposition, plaintiff stated that, after shetold defendant that she was not injured following the accident, shereturned to her van and noticed that her son, who had recentlyundergone appendectomy surgery, was crying. She told defendantthat she was going to call the police and an ambulance for her sonas a precautionary measure. Based on this deposition testimony,defendant filed a motion in limine to bar any evidence at trialthat plaintiff's son was "crying, claimed to have been injured andwas taken by ambulance to a hospital and evaluated or receivedtreatment at the hospital for possible injuries or as aprecautionary measure" because plaintiff had not disclosed anyopinion witness who believed that plaintiff's son was injured.

At the hearing on the motion, plaintiff explained that she wasso concerned for her son's welfare that she paid no attention toher own condition. Plaintiff argued that such evidence wasrelevant to her case because it gave her a reason as to why shetold the investigating police officer at the scene that she was notinjured. In her offer of proof, plaintiff testified that Cory wascrying and complained that his back and neck hurt, but she did notprovide any medical documentation of his injury and stated thatCory never required any medical care other than a Tylenol.

The trial court granted defendant's motion, but only on thecondition that defendant be barred from calling the investigatingpolice officer to testify that plaintiff told him at the scene thatshe had not been injured. The trial court based its decision on the probative value of the evidence versusthe prejudicial effectit could have on defendant's case. The court also based itsdecision on the fact that plaintiff never disclosed any opinionwitnesses or documentation that Cory had sustained any injuries asa proximate result of the accident. The court stated, "I thinkthat in balancing the equities and looking at the testimony and itsprobative value, and I was looking at it in the context that welooked at it yesterday in terms of showing [plaintiff's] state ofmind and with the exclusion of the police officer being able tocome in and say that she made no complaints, I think that balances the equities betweenthe parties and allows the case to go forwardin a fair fashion."

We agree with the trial court's determination. Here, Corymade no claim of any injuries in the case. There was no competentopinion testimony of injuries sustained or whether such injurieshad any causal relationship to the accident. Generally, thedetails about the nature and severity of personal injuries tononlitigants in automobile cases are not admissible. See Keil v.McCormick, 5 Ill. App. 3d 523, 526 (1972); Vujovich v. ChicagoTransit Authority, 6 Ill. App. 2d 115, 118-19 (1955) (there is widediscretion to exclude evidence for reasons of trial expediency, aswhere the evidence is so remotely related that its probative valueis inconsequential or leads to collateral issues). Whether Corysustained any injuries as a proximate result of the accident was acollateral issue upon which no discovery had been conducted. However, it is clear that the court did find some probative valuein the fact that Cory was crying after the accident, which is why the trial court grantedthe motion with the condition that defendant be barred from calling the police officer to testify thatplaintiff denied sustaining injuries at the scene of the accident. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the trial courtabused its discretion in barring evidence of alleged crying orinjuries.

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuitcourt of Winnebago County.

Affirmed.

GROMETER, J., concurs.

JUSTICE BOWMAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

I respectfully dissent in part.

I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the testimonyof defendant's accident reconstruction expert, Mark Strauss,amounts to harmless error. The majority argues that the totalityof the evidence in this matter excluding Strauss's testimonyresults in a conclusion that "the jury's verdict would not havebeen different if Strauss had been barred from testifying." Slipop. at 13. I believe the majority incorrectly assumes that, in theabsence of Strauss's testimony, the outcome of the trial wascertain to favor defendant.

The central issue in dispute is whether there exists a causalconnection between the aggravation of plaintiff's injury, whichrequired surgery, and the parties' car accident. In the absence ofStrauss's testimony, the evidence pertinent here consists of thetestimony of two expert physicians with conflicting opinions on thecentral issue in controversy.

Dr. Wright opined that, at the time of the May 6 MRI,plaintiff was not a surgical candidate. Then, after the accident,plaintiff reported a significant worsening of her symptoms. Uponreviewing the July 23 MRI, Wright noticed there was a dramaticworsening of the disc protrusion at the L4-L5 level.

Wright testified that there was a causal connection betweenthe accident and the worsening of plaintiff's injury. He stated:

"[S]he was doing reasonably well and holding her own up untilthe time of this reported car accident. And it was only afterthe accident occurred that she reported the dramatic worseningof her symptomatology. That would seem to correlate well withwhat we saw in terms of changes in the MRI. And predicated onthat history I would have to believe that it coincided withthe accident."

Wright continued that, more likely than not, the worsening symptomswere a result of the car accident.

On cross-examination, as the majority notes, Wright statedthat common sense would seem to dictate that a lower impact speedof the vehicles would correlate with a lower probability of injuryoccurring to the passengers. He also stated that based on the lackof perceivable damage to the vehicles the accident appeared to bea low-speed impact. However, Wright qualified his answer regardingthe possible inferences that could be drawn from the lack of damageto the vehicle by stating that he did not know what kind of damageto expect from the accident. In addition, on redirect examination,plaintiff's counsel posed a hypothetical to Wright based onplaintiff's testimony that her car moved forward one-half to a fullcar length when she was hit from behind. The question asked: ifplaintiff was unexpectedly thrust forward against her seat beltwhen the vehicle came to a rest, would that force cause the kind oftrauma that was present in the July 23 MRI? Wright responded that such forward movement and then sudden snap back would probably beadequate to cause plaintiff's disc to herniate. Wright also opinedthat some patients who incur significant trauma may take days toexperience a herniated disc.

Contrary to Wright's testimony, Dr. Delheimer testified thathe believed that there was no significant difference between theMay 6 MRI and the July 23 MRI. He opined that the condition ofplaintiff's disc protrusion at the L4-L5 level on July 23 wasbasically the same as it was back in May. Based on his review ofthe damage to the vehicles, he found it hard to believe that theaccident was a material factor in plaintiff's need for surgery orher worsening symptoms. However, on cross-examination, Delheimeradmitted that he did not know what movement occurred with respectto plaintiff's body at the point of impact and immediatelythereafter.

We will reverse a trial court's ruling regarding theadmissibility of an expert's opinion when the error was prejudicialor the result of the trial was materially affected. See Turner v.Williams, 326 Ill. App. 3d 541, 553 (2001). In Hiscott v. Peters,324 Ill. App. 3d 114, 123 (2001), we considered the testimony of anaccident reconstruction expert. There, we held that there was noconcrete factual basis to support the expert's opinion becausethere was insufficient physical evidence to provide him with thebasic data needed to reconstruct an automobile accident. Hiscott,324 Ill. App. 3d at 124. Thus, we held that the expert's opinionthat hypothesized how the parties' automobile accident occurredamounted to pure speculation and could not assist the jury inunderstanding the evidence. Hiscott, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 124.

After we concluded that the court erred in admitting theopinion testimony of the reconstruction expert, we stated that theexpert's testimony related directly to the central controversy ofthe case: how the collision took place, who was at fault, and thedegree of fault assigned to the defendants. Hiscott, 324 Ill. App.3d at 124. We then stated:

"Accordingly, the admission of [the expert's] testimony cannotbe said to have had no effect on the outcome of the trial. Webelieve that this error may have tipped the scales with regardto the jury's assignment of liability between the defendants." Hiscott, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 124.Thus, we reversed and remanded the matter for a new trial. Hiscott, 324 Ill. App. 3d at 124.

I believe that Hiscott is controlling here. In a sweepinggeneralization, Strauss opined that, based on research in the fieldof biomedical engineering, a person cannot be injured in anaccident in which the impacting vehicle is traveling at five toseven miles per hour. He further bolstered his conclusion bypointing to the "numerous studies and numerous tests" thatsupported it. Moreover, when defendant's counsel asked Strauss ifthe impact from the accident was "sufficient to aggravate anypreexisting condition that the plaintiff had in her back," Straussresponded, "I do not believe that this can aggravate a preexistingcondition." (Emphasis added.) Then, when defendant's counselasked Strauss if the impact from the accident between the twovehicles here "would have been sufficient to cause any injury tothe plaintiff in this case," in a similar manner Strauss responded,"there is no way the back is going to be injured in this type ofaccident." Thus, even Strauss's response to a specific questionabout plaintiff was laced with generality.

Strauss's testimony related directly to the centralcontroversy in this matter: whether there exists a causalconnection between the aggravation of plaintiff's injury and theaccident. The evidence on this central controversy hinged on thejury's consideration of the conflicting opinions of two expertphysicians and Strauss's powerful, but impermissible, testimony. The admission of Strauss's testimony cannot be said to have had noeffect on the outcome of the trial. I believe that this error mayhave tipped the scales in defendant's favor. Thus, I cannot agreewith the majority's conclusion that in the absence of the error theoutcome in this matter was certain to be the same. Accordingly, Iwould remand this case for a new trial.