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JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, M&O Insulation Company (M&O), appeals the trialcourt's judgment in favor of defendant, Harris Bank Naperville(Harris Bank), after Harris Bank refused to honor a check issued toM&O from third-party defendant Quality Insulation Company, Inc.(Quality). We affirm.

The following facts are taken from the record. M&O is aninsulation contractor that was subcontracted by Quality in July1997 to install insulation at the Nabisco Chicago Bakery for aprice of $76,000.

On May 5, 1995, Harris Bank extended a line of credit througha promissory note to Quality in the sum of $250,000. Pursuant tothe promissory note, Harris Bank had a possessory security interestin the general deposit account opened by Quality at Harris Bank. The promissory note provided that, upon default, Harris Bank coulddeclare the balance of the line of credit immediately due andpayable and Harris Bank could exercise a setoff against Quality'sgeneral deposit account.

On June 14, 1995, Quality opened a checking account at HarrisBank and agreed to follow Harris Bank's terms and conditionsgoverning the account, which, in part, gave Harris Bank the rightto set off money on deposit against any matured indebtedness toHarris Bank.

On several occasions Quality failed to honor the paymentschedules, and Harris Bank granted Quality extensions. The lastextension Harris Bank granted was on July 28, 1997, with a changein the terms of the agreement that extended the maturity date ofthe loan to October 31, 1997, with the condition that Qualitystrictly comply with the payment schedule. The agreement containedthe same default provisions as the promissory note and reiteratedHarris Bank's possessory security interest in Quality's bankaccounts and Harris Bank's right to freeze Quality's accounts andexercise a setoff. The agreement contained a new payment scheduleand provided that on the date of maturity, October 31, 1997,Quality would pay Harris Bank $238,000 plus interest.

On September 17, 1997, Quality deposited $77,200 into itsHarris Bank checking account. The deposit was comprised of thefunds Quality received for the M&O insulation work at Nabisco.

Quality failed to comply with the new payment schedule, and onSeptember 18, 1997, Harris Bank deemed itself insecure, declaredQuality in default, and declared the balance of the loanimmediately due and payable.

Also on September 18, 1997, Arthur Gneuh, a Harris Bank loanofficer, met with Kent and Barbara Duffy of Quality. According toGneuh's notes, the Duffys agreed to pay down the debt and reducethe credit line by $10,000 by September 23, 1997, and another$10,000 by October 5, 1997, with the entire amount to be paid byOctober 31, 1997. This meeting resulted in a commercial loanworkout and settlement agreement.

On September 23, 1997, Quality delivered a check to M&O for$76,000 as payment for M&O's work at Nabisco. On the same day, M&Odeposited Quality's check into M&O's bank, LaSalle, N.A., ofChicago.

On September 24, 1997, Quality deposited $112,000 into itsHarris Bank checking account. On the same day, Harris Bank placedan administrative hold or freeze on Quality's checking account andexercised a $10,000 setoff against Quality's account. According toGneuh's notes, he left a message with Quality regarding the hold onthe account. Later, on September 24, a $76,000 check issued to M&Owas presented to Harris Bank for payment on Quality's account.

The following day, September 25, 1997, Quality's accountstatement showed a balance sufficient to pay the M&O check. However, before 11:59 p.m., Harris Bank returned the $76,000 checkissued to M&O as dishonored for insufficient funds. Subsequently,Harris Bank honored two "forced" checks in the amounts of $10,000and $2,276.04. In a forced check situation, Harris Bank reviewsthe check and decides whether to pay it.

On September 26, Harris Bank debited Quality's account as asetoff against the outstanding loan in the amount of $90,000. OnSeptember 26, 1997, Harris Bank again honored other "forced" checksin the amounts of $4,835.58, $4,455.99, $1,605.12, $468.66, and$70.

On September 29, 1997, the M&O check was again presented todefendant for payment. The following day, September 30, 1997,before 11:59 p.m., Harris Bank returned the dishonored check forinsufficient funds. M&O recovered $22,000 from Quality and filedsuit against Harris Bank to collect the rest of the funds.

On March 3, 1999, M&O filed its second amended complaintalleging fraud (count I) and negligent misrepresentation (countII). On April 22, 1999, the trial court struck M&O's claim fornegligent misrepresentation. M&O amended its second amendedcomplaint, realleging negligent misrepresentation.

On July 25, 1999, the trial court denied Harris Bank's motionfor summary judgment.

A bench trial commenced on September 7, 2000. M&O filed itssecond amended complaint as amended, adding two counts, allegingviolation of section 4--303 of the Uniform Commercial Code--BankDeposits and Collections (Code) (810 ILCS 5/4--303 (West 1998))(count III) and unjust enrichment (count IV).

At the close of M&O's case in chief, Harris Bank moved for adirected finding on all four claims. Counts I and II (fraud andnegligent misrepresentation, respectively) were voluntarilydismissed with prejudice.

On November 21, 1999, the trial court granted Harris Bank'smotion to dismiss as to count IV (unjust enrichment). On January9, 2001, after the parties submitted memoranda, the trial courtentered judgment in favor of Harris Bank on the remaining count III(breach of statutory duty).

M&O argues that the trial court erred by entering judgment inHarris Bank's favor on count III, breach of statutory duty undersection 4--303(a)(5) of the Code. M&O argues that the trial courterroneously found that the Code did not apply to this case becausethe check was not honored by Harris Bank.

In reviewing a bench trial, we defer to the trial court'sfactual findings unless they are against the manifest weight of theevidence. Wildman, Harrold, Allen & Dixon v. Gaylord, 317 Ill.App. 3d 590, 599 (2000). A judgment is against the manifest weightof the evidence only when an opposite conclusion is apparent orwhen findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based onevidence. Amcore Bank, N.A. v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., 326 Ill.App. 3d 126, 135 (2001). However, we review a question of law denovo. Hendricks v. Riverway Harbor Service St. Louis, Inc., 314Ill. App. 3d 800 (2000).

In interpreting statutory language, we must give effect tothe intent of the legislature. Stokes v. Colonial Penn InsuranceCo., 313 Ill. App. 3d 202, 204 (2000). The best indication of thelegislature's intent is the language of the statute in question,and we must give clear and unambiguous terms their plain andordinary meaning. Stokes, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 204. Further, wemust read the statute as a whole and in a manner that no term isrendered meaningless or superfluous. M.A.K. v. Rush-Presbyterian-

St. Luke's Medical Center, 198 Ill. 2d 249, 257 (2001).

Section 4--303 of the Code provides:

"When items subject to notice, stop-payment order, legalprocess, or setoff; order in which items may be charged orcertified.

(a) Any knowledge, notice, or stop-payment order receivedby, legal process served upon, or setoff exercised by a payorbank comes too late to terminate, suspend, or modify thebank's right or duty to pay an item or to charge itscustomer's account for the item if the knowledge, notice,stop-payment order, or legal process is received or served anda reasonable time for the bank to act thereon expires or thesetoff is exercised after the earliest of the following:

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(5) with respect to checks, a cutoff hour no earlier thanone hour after the opening of the next banking day after thebanking day on which the bank received the check and no laterthan the close of that next banking day or, if no cutoff houris fixed, the close of the next banking day after the bankingday on which the bank received the check." (Emphasis added.) 810 ILCS 5/4--303 (West 1994).

M&O argues that because the check at issue arrived at HarrisBank on September 24 and the setoff was exercised on September 26,the check won the race and Harris Bank had a duty to honor thecheck. Harris Bank argues, and the trial court determined, thatHarris Bank never accepted the check and, therefore, it was neverobligated to honor it. We agree with Harris Bank and the trialcourt.

Section 3-408 provides:

"A check or other draft does not of itself operate as anassignment of funds in the hands of the drawee available forits payment, and the drawee is not liable on the instrumentuntil the drawee accepts it." (Emphasis added.) 810 ILCS5/3--408 (West 1994).

Under M&O's interpretation, Harris Bank was obligated to honorthe check even though it was not accepted by Harris Bank and nostep had been taken by Harris Bank to indicate it intended toprocess the check. Thus, M&O's interpretation of section 4--303(a)(5) renders section 3--408 meaningless. M&O's interpretationmakes Harris Bank liable on the instrument even though it neveraccepted the instrument and returned the instrument unpaid.

M&O's assertion that the passage of the cutoff hourconstitutes one of the steps of the payment process ignores theplain and ordinary meaning of the word "receive." "Receive" means,inter alia, "to accept as true or valid" and "to knowingly accept." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1894 (1993). Thus,when applying the plain and ordinary meaning to the word "receive"and reading section 4--303(a)(5) in context with section 3--408, abank must accept a check in order for it to be received within themeaning of the statute. Here, Harris Bank did nothing to acceptthe check. Rather, it placed a freeze on the account before thecheck was presented, indicating that it would not automaticallyaccept a check upon presentment, and then returned the checkunpaid. Therefore, we agree with the trial court's interpretationof the statute and determine that it properly found in favor ofHarris Bank on count IV of M&O's complaint.

Further, contrary to M&O's assertion, the fact that HarrisBank honored certain checks presented after the account was frozendoes not mean that it had to honor M&O's check. Harris Bank hadthe discretion to accept certain checks and refuse to acceptothers. Harris Bank became liable for a check only after itaccepted it. 810 ILCS 5/3--408 (West 1994).

M&O also argues that the trial court erred by granting HarrisBank's motion for a directed finding in Harris Bank's favor on theunjust enrichment claim.

In ruling on a motion for directed finding, the court followsa two-part analysis. Estate of Price v. Universal Casualty Co.,322 Ill. App. 3d 514, 517 (2001). The court first determineswhether the plaintiff presented a prima facie case; if not, thecourt enters judgment in favor of the defendant. Price, 322 Ill.App. 3d at 517. If the plaintiff has presented a prima facie caseand there is sufficient proof to satisfy the required burden ofproof, the court denies the motion. Price, 322 Ill. App. 3d at517. The trial court's decision under the second part of thisanalysis will not be disturbed unless it is against the manifestweight of the evidence. Price, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 517.

To present a prima facie case based on a theory of unjustenrichment, a plaintiff must present evidence that the defendantunjustly retained a benefit to the plaintiff's detriment and thatthe defendant's retention of that benefit violated fundamentalprinciples of justice, equity, and good conscience. B&B LandAcquisition, Inc. v. Mandell, 305 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 1073 (1999). Here, M&O's unjust enrichment claim is an alternative theoryof recovery based on an alleged violation of section 4--303(a)(5). Citing HPI Health Care Services, Inc. v. Mt. Vernon Hospital, Inc.,131 Ill. 2d 145, 161-62 (1989), M&O contends that Harris Bankreceived a benefit from M&O through wrongful conduct, i.e., thesetoff against the Quality account and the failure to honor thecheck issued by Quality to M&O. M&O's argument is premised on theclaim that Harris Bank's conduct was wrongful because it violated section 4--303(a)(5) of the Code. Because we have determined thatHarris Bank did not violate the Code by refusing to honor thecheck, M&O did not present a prima facie case on its claim forunjust enrichment. Accordingly, the trial court properly dismissedthe unjust enrichment count.

The judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County isaffirmed.

Affirmed.

O'MALLEY and BYRNE, JJ., concur.