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JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

The issue in this appeal is whether an estate of homesteadasserted by a condominium unit owner who is in arrears on condominium assessments is a defense to a condominium association'saction in forcible entry and detainer. The circuit court ruledthat an estate of homestead is not a defense to a forcible entryand detainer action in such circumstances. We reverse the ruling.

On December 27, 1999, the plaintiff, Knolls CondominiumAssociation, filed a complaint in forcible entry and detaineragainst the defendant, Mary E. Harms. The complaint alleged thatthe plaintiff was entitled to possession of 6161 Knoll Way Drive,No. 105, in Willowbrook (the property), a condominium unit, becausethe defendant was indebted to the plaintiff for unpaid maintenanceassessments related to the property in the amount of $2,326.40 pluscosts and attorney fees. The complaint also alleged that thedefendant was unlawfully withholding possession of the propertyfrom the plaintiff.

In her answer to the complaint, the defendant denied that theplaintiff was entitled to possession of the property or that shewas unlawfully withholding possession of the property from theplaintiff. The defendant also asserted, as an affirmative defense,that she was the owner and resident of the property; that she wasentitled to an estate of homestead in the property; and that herestate of homestead was a proper defense to the plaintiff's actionin forcible entry and detainer.

At a hearing on the matter, the parties stipulated that thedefendant owed the plaintiff past-due maintenance assessments inthe amount of $2,326.40. The trial court ruled that an estate ofhomestead was not a proper defense to the plaintiff's forcibleentry and detainer action. The trial court also found that theplaintiff's request for attorney fees in the amount of $287.50 wasreasonable.

Following the hearing, the trial court issued a written orderthat denied the defendant's affirmative defense; found that theplaintiff was entitled to possession of the property; and enteredjudgment in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $2,326.40 plus$287.50 in attorney fees. The defendant's timely notice of appealfollowed.

On appeal, the defendant contends that she is entitled to areversal of the trial court's order because her claim of homesteadwas a proper defense to the plaintiff's forcible entry and detaineraction. The defendant argues that an estate of homestead is apossessory right that cannot be divested by a forcible entry anddetainer action.

The plaintiff acknowledges that, as a general rule, an estateof homestead is a proper defense to a forcible entry and detaineraction. However, the plaintiff points to various sections of theCode of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/1--101 et seq. (West2000)) and argues that these statutes show that a forcible entryand detainer action may be maintained in circumstances such asthose in this case regardless of an estate of homestead.

The statute governing the estate of homestead is also a partof the Code (735 ILCS 5/12--901 et seq. (West 2000)). Citingvarious sections of this homestead statute, defendant responds byasserting that her estate of homestead in the property was a properdefense to the plaintiff's forcible entry and detainer action.

The parties agree, and appear to be correct, that theirdispute raises an issue of statutory construction that is an issueof first impression. The primary rule of statutory construction isto ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co. v. Pappas, 194 Ill. 2d 99, 106 (2000). The language of the statute generally provides the best indicationof the legislature's intent. In re Consolidated Objections to TaxLevies of School District No. 205, 193 Ill. 2d 490, 496 (2000). Where the language used leaves uncertainty as to its interpretationin a particular context, a court can consider the purpose behindthe statute and the evils that the statute was designed to remedy. Phoenix Bond, 194 Ill. 2d at 106. A court should not construe astatute in a way that would defeat its purpose or yield an absurdor unjust result. Phoenix Bond, 194 Ill. 2d at 107. Because theconstruction of a statute is a question of law, our review is denovo. Consolidated Objections to Tax Levies, 193 Ill. 2d at 496.

The plaintiff relies on various sections of the part of theCode that governs a forcible entry and detainer action (735 ILCS5/9--101 et seq. (West 2000)). One of these is section 9--102(a)(7), which provides, in relevant part, that an action inforcible entry and detainer may be maintained "[w]hen any propertyis subject to the provisions of the Condominium Property Act [and]the owner of a unit fails or refuses to pay when due his or herproportionate share of the common expenses of such property." 735ILCS 5/9--102(a)(7) (West 2000). The plaintiff also cites section9--111(a), which provides, in relevant part:

"As to property subject to the provisions of the'Condominium Property Act', *** if the court finds that theexpenses or fines are due to the plaintiff, the plaintiffshall be entitled to the possession of the whole of thepremises claimed, and judgment in favor of the plaintiff shallbe entered for the possession thereof and for the amount founddue by the court including interest and late charges, if any,together with reasonable attorney's fees, if any, and for theplaintiff's costs." 735 ILCS 5/9--111 (West 2000).

The defendant does not dispute the general applicability ofsections 9--102(a)(7) and 9--111(a) to the facts of this case. Rather, the defendant contends that, under the statute that governsthe estate of homestead, her estate of homestead is a defense tothe plaintiff's forcible entry and detainer action.

Part 9 of article XII of the Code (735 ILCS 5/12--901 et seq.(West 2000)) creates and governs estates of homestead. Among thesections of part 9 of article XII that the defendant relies on issection 12--901, which provides, in relevant part, that "[e]veryindividual is entitled to an estate of homestead to the extent invalue of $7,500 of his or her interest in *** a condominium ***owned or rightly possessed by lease or otherwise and occupied byhim or her as a residence" and that the "homestead and all right inand title to that homestead is exempt from attachment, judgment,levy, or judgment sale for the payment" of the estate holder'sdebts "except as provided in this Code" or in a section of theProbate Act of 1975 (755 ILCS 5/20--6 (West 2000)) that is notapplicable here. 735 ILCS 5/12--901 (West 2000). The defendantalso cites section 12--904, which provides that, generally, only awritten release, waiver, or conveyance of the exempted homesteadestate is valid. 735 ILCS 5/12--904 (West 2000).

It is undisputed that the statutes cited by the plaintiffgenerally allow a condominium association to maintain a forcibleentry and detainer action where, as in this case, a unit ownerfails to pay her proportionate share of the condominium's commonexpenses, including maintenance expenses. However, the statutescited by the plaintiff are silent as to whether an estate ofhomestead is a defense to a forcible action brought in suchcircumstances.

On the other hand, by their explicit language, the statutescited by defendant make it clear that the estate of homesteadapplies to condominium property; is exempt from attachment,judgment, levy, or judgment sale for the payment of debts; and canonly be waived, released, or conveyed by a signed writing or byabandonment. 735 ILCS 5/12--901, 12--904 (West 2000). Moreover,in listing the few exceptions to the applicability of an estate ofhomestead, the homestead statute explicitly addresses thenonpayment of common expenses related to condominium property. Section 12--903 of the Code provides:

"No property shall, by virtue of Part 9 of Article XII ofthis Act, be exempt from sale for nonpayment of taxes orassessments, or for a debt or liability incurred for thepurchase or improvement thereof, or for enforcement of a lienthereon for nonpayment of common expenses pursuant to the'Condominium Property Act', approved June 20, 1963, asamended." (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/12--903 (West 2000).

Thus, the homestead statute specifies its own exceptions andone of the specified exceptions is the enforcement of a lien by acondominium association for the nonpayment of common expenses by aunit owner. The homestead statute does not provide for anexception to an estate of homestead with respect to a forcibleentry and detainer action, including such an action brought by acondominium association.

Under the principle of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,the enumeration of exceptions in a statute is construed as anexclusion of all others. People v. $8,450 United States Currency,276 Ill. App. 3d 952, 956 (1995). Moreover, exceptions in astatute are to be strictly construed. People v. Watson, 187 Ill.2d 448, 459 (1999) (Rathje, J., dissenting).

We believe that the principle of inclusio unius est exclusioalterius applies in this case. Under this principle, when thelegislature expressly made foreclosure of a lien by a condominiumassociation an exception to a claim of an estate of homestead butdid not make an action in forcible entry and detainer an exception,the legislature expressed an intent that an estate of homesteadshould not apply to a lien action brought by a condominiumassociation against a unit owner who has not paid her commonexpenses but should apply to other remedies available to acondominium association, including a forcible entry and detaineraction.

This construction of the statutes in question is in accordwith the purpose of the homestead statute. Considerations of soundpublic policy affecting the general interest were involved in andcontributed to the legislature's enactment of the statute thatcreated the estate of homestead. The principal objective increating the homestead estate was to protect the homesteader in theenjoyment of a home and to secure the homesteader a shelter beyondthe reach of his improvidence or financial misfortune. Holtermanv. Poynter, 361 Ill. 617, 625-26 (1935).

Illinois courts have construed the homestead estate liberallybecause the statutory exemption of property from enforcement is amatter affecting the remedy available to a judgment creditor forthe collection of a debt. Bank of Illmo v. Simmons, 142 Ill. App.3d 741, 744 (1986). Homestead is a possessory freehold estate thatgenerally is a proper defense to a forcible entry and detaineraction. Willard v. Northwest National Bank of Chicago, 137 Ill.App. 3d 255, 265 (1985).

Moreover, this construction of the legislative intent bothcomports with the purpose of the homestead statute and also allowsa condominium association a remedy against a unit owner who has notpaid assessments. Under this construction, a unit owner who has avalid claim of an estate of homestead in a unit for whichassessments have not been paid would be secure in his home andwould not be subject to dispossession pursuant to a forcible entryand detainer action despite his improvidence or financialmisfortune. However, as expressly provided in the homesteadstatute, an estate of homestead would not be a defense to acondominium association's action to enforce a lien that arises fromthe nonpayment of assessments. 735 ILCS 5/12--903 (West 2000).

In this case, the plaintiff does not dispute the defendant'sclaim of a homestead estate in the property. Rather, the plaintiffasserts that the defendant's estate of homestead is not a properdefense to its forcible entry and detainer action. However, basedon the foregoing, we conclude that the defendant's estate ofhomestead in the property was a proper defense to the plaintiff'sforcible entry and detainer action.

Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Du PageCounty is reversed.

Reversed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., concurs.

JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. The majority reasons that by use ofthe principle inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, or theinclusion of one is the exclusion of the other, the legislatureintended that section 12--903 of the homestead statute as itappears in the Code bars the use of a forcible entry and detaineraction by a condominium association against a unit owner for unpaidmaintenance assessments. In the majority's view, the language ofsection 12--903 of the homestead statute trumps the specificlanguage of both the Condominium Property Act and the forcibleentry and detainer statute (735 ILCS 5/9--101 et seq. (West 2000)). The majority's analysis produces a statutory disharmony that thelegislature could not have intended.

Courts presume that two or more statutes which relate to thesame subject are governed by one spirit and policy and that thelegislature intended the statutes to be operative and harmonious. Henrich v. Liberty High School, 186 Ill. 2d 381, 391-92 (1998). Therefore, statutes relating to the same subject matter must becompared and construed with reference to one another so that effectmay be given to the provisions of each, if reasonable. Carter v.Du Page County Sheriff, 304 Ill. App. 3d 443, 450 (1999).

Section 9--102(a)(7) of the forcible entry and detainer statute provides that a forcible entry and detainer action can bemaintained "[w]hen any property is subject to the provisions of theCondominium Property Act [and] the owner of a unit fails or refusesto pay when due his or her proportionate share of the commonexpenses of such property" or if the unit owner fails to comply "bythe declaration, by-laws, and rules and regulations of thecondominium." 735 ILCS 5/9--102(a)(7) (West 2000). Section 9.2 ofthe Condominium Property Act provides:

"In the event of any default by any unit owner *** in theperformance of his obligations under this Act or under thedeclaration, bylaws, or the rules and regulations of the boardof managers, the board of managers or its agents shall havesuch rights and remedies *** including the right to maintainan action for possession against such defaulting unit owner*** for the benefit of all the other unit owners in the mannerprescribed by Article IX of the Code of Civil Procedure." 765ILCS 605/9.2 (West 2000)

Article IX of the Code of Civil Procedure is the forcible entry anddetainer statute.

The accompanying historical and practice notes for section 9.2state, inter alia,:

"This section was added by P.A. 77--1760, effective July1, 1972, as part of a legislative package which also includedP.A. 77--1759 which added the procedures applicable tocondominiums to the Forcible Entry and Detainer Act. ***

***

This section makes Illinois unique in allowing acondominium association to evict a unit owner for failing topay assessments. When such action occurs, the unit ownermaintains title to the unit and the association has the rightto possession of the unit until the judgment for possession isvacated after the amount owed is paid.

This section was adopted to provide a constitutionallypermissible, quick method for collection of assessmentarrearages in condominium associations, and it has providedone of the better collection procedures found in any state."

765 ILCS Ann. 605/9.2, Historical & Practice Notes at 58-59(Smith-Hurd 1993).

In my view, section 9--102(a)(7) of the forcible entry anddetainer statute and section 9.2 of the Condominium Property Act specifically address what is at issue in the instant case, i.e., aremedy when an owner fails to pay assessments.

The majority's opinion ignores that the Condominium PropertyAct, the forcible entry and detainer statute, and the homesteadstatute relate to the same subject matter and constitute astatutory scheme. I do not believe that where the legislaturespecifically provided for a procedure for evicting a unit owner whofails to pay her assessments, it then intended to eliminate thisremedy by not specifically listing it in section 12--903 of thehomestead statute as one of the exceptions to the applicability ofan estate of homestead. Such an interpretation would render bothsection 9--102(a)(7) of the forcible entry and detainer statute andsection 9.2 of the Condominium Property Act meaningless. As notedin the historical and practice notes concerning section 9.2 of theCondominium Property Act, the purpose of the section was to providecondominium associations with a "constitutionally permissible,quick method" for collection of unpaid assessments. Under themajority's position, a condominium unit owner could raise thedefense of an estate of homestead every time a condominiumassociation attempted to bring a forcible entry and detainer actionto collect assessment arrearages.

Moreover, I do not believe it is inconsistent with the purposeof section 12--903 of the homestead statute to allow an action forforcible entry and detainer against a unit owner. Section 12--903pertains to exceptions to an estate of homestead when a sale of theproperty is involved. Here, the sale of property was not involved. Plaintiff did not seek the sale of defendant's property but onlysought possession of it until defendant paid her past-duemaintenance assessments. The historical comments to section 9.2 ofthe Condominium Property Act make it clear that, when a forcibleentry and detainer action occurs, the unit owner maintains title tothe unit and the condominium association has the right ofpossession until the assessment amount owed is paid. Consequently,I would not conclude, as has the majority, that the principle ofinclusio unius est exclusion alterius applies here because aforcible entry and detainer action is not listed in section 12--903of the homestead statute as one of the instances under which anestate of homestead will not be exempt from sale of the property.

When the plain language of more than one statute is relevantto a given action, courts must determine which statute is morespecifically applicable to the case at hand. Scalise v. Zarate,303 Ill. App. 3d 718, 723 (1999). Here, I believe section 9--102(a)(7) of the forcible entry and detainer statute and section9.2 of the Condominium Property Act are more specificallyapplicable to the case at hand than section 12--903 of thehomestead statute. I find support for my position in thehistorical and practice notes set forth above. The purpose ofsection 9.2 of the Condominium Property Act is to provide acondominium association with a permissible and quick method forcollecting unpaid assessments. That statute is specificallyapplicable to the instant case where the condominium associationsought to evict a unit owner for failure to pay past-duemaintenance assessments.

Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court's judgment.