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Very unlikely, but report: Eye/ear problems, change in urine color, bloody stools, difficulty breathing, mentalchanges."

No discussion occurred between Kasin and the pharmacist regarding the side effects or risks associated with Daypro. At hisdeposition, Kasin acknowledged that he relied on his doctor rather than on Osco to advise him of any risks associated withtaking the drug.

Kasin took Daypro for 10 days. During the first nine days, he experienced no side effects and felt normal. On approximatelythe tenth day, Kasin noticed that he lacked energy and that his stools were black. Later that day, Kasin collapsed. He wastaken to Harvard Community Hospital and then transported to Condell Medical Center, where he was diagnosed with threeulcers and renal failure. At Condell, Kasin learned for the first time that he had been born with only one functioning kidney,which had now failed. Kasin was placed on dialysis and, subsequently, underwent a kidney transplant in December 1995.Kasin's brother, Paul, provided the donated kidney.

On May 27, 1997, plaintiffs filed their negligence action. Subsequently, Osco filed its motion for summary judgment,which the trial court granted. This appeal ensued.

The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact but to determine if one exists. Frye v. Medicare-GlaserCorp., 153 Ill. 2d 26, 31 (1992). Summary judgment should be granted when the pleadings, depositions, and admissionson file, together with the affidavits presented, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party isentitled to judgment as a matter of law. Cramer v. Insurance Exchange Agency, 174 Ill. 2d 513, 530 (1996). The existenceof a duty owed by the defendant to a plaintiff is a question of law that may be determined on a motion for summaryjudgment. Jacob v. Greve, 251 Ill. App. 3d 529, 534 (1993). This court's review of the trial court's ruling on a summaryjudgment is de novo. Country Mutual Insurance Co. v. Hagan, 298 Ill. App. 3d 495, 500 (1998).

Plaintiffs first contend that Osco's voluntary undertaking to provide an information or a warning sheet with a prescriptiondrug removed it from the protection of the "learned intermediary doctrine." The learned intermediary doctrine provides thatmanufacturers of prescription drugs have a duty to warn prescribing physicians of a drug's known dangerous propensitiesand that physicians, in turn, using their medical judgment, have a duty to convey the warnings to their patients. Kirk v.Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center, 117 Ill. 2d 507, 517 (1987). The doctrine precludes the imposition of a dutyupon drug manufacturers to warn patients directly. Kirk, 117 Ill. 2d at 519. The doctrine also has been applied to exemptpharmacies and pharmacists from giving warnings to patients. See Fakhouri v. Taylor, 248 Ill. App. 3d 328 (1993); Leesleyv. West, 165 Ill. App. 3d 135 (1988).

Plaintiffs concede that absent Osco's voluntary undertaking it would have been shielded from liability by the learnedintermediary doctrine but argue that because Osco voluntarily undertook to warn of some side effects of Daypro it wasremoved from the protection of the doctrine. Conversely, Osco maintains that pursuant to our supreme court's decision inFrye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 153 Ill. 2d 26 (1992), it was protected by the doctrine.

In Frye a pharmacist voluntarily undertook to affix to a prescription drug a label warning that the medicine might causedrowsiness. The plaintiff sued both the pharmacy and the pharmacist under a voluntary undertaking theory of liability. Theplaintiff acknowledged that neither the pharmacy nor the pharmacist had the duty to warn of the dangerous side effects ofthe medication but argued that once they undertook to warn of dangerous side effects they undertook to warn of all potentialdangers involved in taking the drug. The supreme court rejected plaintiff's argument and found that the defendants' liabilitydepended upon the extent of their undertaking.

Osco asserts that the court in Frye determined that a pharmacist was still protected by the learned intermediary doctrineeven though the pharmacist offered a warning to a consumer of a drug's dangerous propensities. To support this assertionOsco relies on a statement made by the Frye court, in dicta. The statement followed the court's rejection of the plaintiff'sargument that the pharmacist's placement of a "drowsy eye" label on the prescription drug container might mislead aconsumer into believing that drowsiness was the only side effect of the drug. The court stated: