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This administrative review action was brought by plaintiff, Raymond Jensen, from the denialof his application for a line-of-duty disability pension by defendants, the East Dundee Fire ProtectionDistrict Firefighters' Pension Fund Board of Trustees and the East Dundee Fire Protection DistrictFirefighter's Pension Fund (collectively the Board). The trial court reversed the Board's findings asagainst the manifest weight of the evidence in light of Alm v. Lincolnshire Police Pension Board,352 Ill. App. 3d 595 (2004). The Board contends on appeal that the trial court erred in reversing itsdecision. We hold that, in determining whether plaintiff was entitled to a line-of-duty pension undersection 4--110 of the Illinois Pension Code (Pension Code) (40 ILCS 5/4--110 (West 2004)), theBoard applied the wrong standard in considering whether plaintiff's injury was incurred in or resultedfrom the performance of an act of duty. In considering whether plaintiff's injuries were incurred inor resulted from acts of duty, both the Board and the trial court defined the term "act of duty" as itis applied to police officers under section 5--113 (40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 2004)), which is notsimilar to the definition applied to firefighters under section 6--110 (40 ILCS 5/6--110 (West 2004)). The Board and the trial court should have used section 6--110 to define the term "act of duty." Thus,the Board used the wrong standard in weighing the evidence. Because the Board failed to apply theproper standard in weighing the evidence and never addressed the question of whether the activitiesin which plaintiff was injured constituted acts of duty, we believe that the proper course is to reversethe trial court and remand the cause with directions for a new hearing before the Board to determinewhether plaintiff is entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension.

The facts are undisputed. Plaintiff became a full-time firefighter/paramedic with the EastDundee Fire Protection District on October 1, 1987, and remained employed full-time until July2003, when he stopped working due to an injury to his left knee. Plaintiff applied for a line-of-dutydisability pension under section 4--110, alleging that his disability resulted from acts of duty heperformed as a firefighter.

In November 1991, while stepping into an ambulance, plaintiff injured his left knee as he wasattending to a medical emergency. As a result of that injury, plaintiff was required to undergosurgery for torn cartilage in his left knee and was unable to return to work until March 1992. OnAugust 15, 1997, plaintiff again injured his left knee while crawling on the floor during a requiredfire department training drill. He was treated with cortisone therapy and returned to workapproximately six weeks later. On May 20, 2002, as he was arriving at a fire call, plaintiff reinjuredhis left knee when he stepped out of the fire engine and missed a step. The treatment for the injuryrequired a second surgery on the knee, in September 2002. Plaintiff was able to return to work inJanuary 2003. On July 23, 2003, plaintiff reinjured his left knee while on duty when he stepped outof an ambulance after performing required cleaning and maintenance on the ambulance. As a resultof that injury, plaintiff underwent treatment including a third surgery and physical therapy. Plaintiffhas not returned to work since July 2003.

Plaintiff applied for a line-of-duty disability pension because of his injury to his left knee. The Board ordered that he be examined by three physicians. Each physician who examined plaintiffreceived from the president of the pension fund, Rainier Gallieano, a letter asking the physician forexpertise and help in evaluating plaintiff's knee injury. The letter states that a firefighter is entitledto a line-of-duty disability pension under section 4--110 if "a firefighter, as the result of sickness,accident or injury incurred in or resulting from the performance of an act of duty or from thecumulative effect of acts of duty, is found, pursuant to Section 4--112, to be physically or mentallypermanently disabled for service in the fire department, so as to render necessary his or her beingplaced on disability pension ***. A firefighter shall be considered 'on duty' while on any assignmentapproved by the chief of the fire department, even though away from the municipality he or sheserves as a firefighter, if the assignment is related to the fire protection service of the municipality." 40 ILCS 5/4--110 (West 2004). Also enclosed was a copy of the firefighter/paramedic jobdescription for the physician to review and a form containing the following two questions:

"1. Is the applicant disabled to a point that he is not able to perform his duties as afirefighter pursuant to the job description of the East Dundee Fire District?

2. Is it medically possible that the applicant's injury/illness is a result of or caused byhis or her line of duty or service as a firefighter?"

Dr. John A. Elston examined plaintiff and submitted a certificate indicating that plaintiff wasdisabled and that the disability was caused by his line-of-duty or service as a firefighter. Dr.Lawrence B. Metrick's certificate indicated that plaintiff was disabled and that the disability wascaused by plaintiff's line-of-duty or service as a firefighter. Dr. Martin P. Lanoff examined plaintiffand certified that plaintiff was disabled. However, next to the question whether plaintiff's disabilitywas the result of or caused by his line-of-duty or service as a firefighter, Dr. Lanoff wrote, "possiblyto a small extent." In his report, Dr. Lanoff indicated that plaintiff's injury to his knee in 1991,requiring surgery, could have contributed to osteoarthritic changes, although it was much more likelythat the degenerative changes were simply due to aging and genetics as well as obesity and not to anywork-related injuries.

The Board determined that plaintiff's injury did not arise from the performance of an "act ofduty" as defined under section 4--110 of the Pension Code. The Board believed that, for purposesof section 4--110, an "act of duty" must "entail a special risk not ordinarily assumed by a citizen inthe ordinary walk of life." The Board believed that the circumstances of plaintiff's injuries weresimilar to those in White v. City of Aurora, 323 Ill. App. 3d 733 (2001), wherein we found that apolice officer who slipped and was injured while exiting his squad car to place a parking citation ona car windshield was not performing an act of duty, because it did not involve a special risk notordinarily assumed by a citizen. The Board believed that, like the police officer in White, plaintiff'sinjuries were the result of stepping in and out of vehicles and crawling on the floor, and therefore,plaintiff was acting as an ordinary citizen in those situations. Moreover, because of the "depth" ofDr. Lanoff's report, the Board believed that his finding of only a "small possibility" that plaintiff'sinjuries were duty-related was the more credible finding. Accordingly, the Board denied plaintiffa line-of-duty disability pension and awarded plaintiff a not-in-the-line-of-duty disability pensionpursuant to section 4--111 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/4--111 (West 2002)).

Plaintiff sought review of the Board's decision in the trial court, arguing that the factualfindings were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence and that the decision was arbitrary andcapricious and legally erroneous. Plaintiff argued, inter alia, that the Board applied an incorrectmeaning of the term "act of duty." Plaintiff also argued, alternatively, that his injuries were the resultof the performance of acts involving special risks not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinarywalk of life. Plaintiff asserted that the Board incorrectly relied on White, because this court's morerecent case of Alm, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 602, had criticized and rejected White for misapprehendingthe supreme court's decision in Johnson v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity & BenefitFund, 114 Ill. 2d 518 (1986).

Johnson expressly rejected the notion that the term "special risk" encompasses onlyinherently dangerous activities. Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 521. We observed in Alm that Johnsonteaches that, in determining whether an officer is entitled to line-of-duty benefits, " '[t]he crux is thecapacity in which the officer is acting' rather than the precise mechanism of injury." Alm, 352 Ill.App. 3d at 599, quoting Johnson, 114 Ill. 2d at 522. We concluded that an officer performing dutiesinvolving special risks will be entitled to line-of-duty benefits even if the immediate cause of injuryis an act involving only an ordinary risk. Alm, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 599. We distinguished Whitefrom Alm, in which the injury was not the result of any specific, identifiable, physical trauma butmay have developed over the course of time. In Alm, the plaintiff established that he incurred adisabling injury in the course of pedaling his bicycle. The question was whether pedaling the bicyclewas an act of duty. Mindful of Johnson, we concluded that, because he was on patrol, the plaintifffaced risks not ordinarily encountered by civilians. He was required to ride his bicycle at night overvarying terrain, looking after his own personal safety while also remaining vigilant in theperformance of his patrol duties. The plaintiff also carried a significant amount of additional weight. Under these conditions, the risks included falls and collisions as well as dangerous encounters withunsavory elements of society. We held that this particular duty had no clear counterpart in civilianlife and that therefore the bicycle patrol performed by the plaintiff involved special risks amountingto an act of duty such that he was entitled to line-of-duty benefits. Alm, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 601.

After briefing and hearing argument, the trial court found that the decision of the Board wasagainst the manifest weight of the evidence in light of Alm. Although the trial court never stated itsreasons for relying on Alm, the trial court apparently interpreted the term "act of duty" to encompassa firefighter's performance of duties involving special risks even if the immediate cause of an injuryis an act involving only an ordinary risk. Defendants timely appeal.

The Board contends that, although plaintiff was disabled, he had not been injured in theperformance of an "act of duty" within the meaning of section 4--110 of the Pension Code and,therefore, he was not entitled to a line-of-duty disability pension. In arriving at its decision, theBoard interpreted the term "act of duty" to mean "an act inherently involving a special risk notordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walk of life," and it applied that meaning to the factsof the case. On appeal, we review the decision of the administrative agency, not that of the trialcourt. Stec v. Board of Trustees of the Oak Park Police Pension Fund, 355 Ill. App. 3d 974, 978-79(2005). The findings and conclusions of an administrative agency on questions of fact are deemedprima facie true and correct and may be set aside only if they are against the manifest weight of theevidence. 735 ILCS 5/3--110 (West 2002); Daily v. Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund,251 Ill. App. 3d 119, 122 (1993). Our review of an administrative agency's determinations onquestions of law is de novo. City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d191, 205 (1998). Where the facts are undisputed, our review is generally de novo. See Alm, 352Ill. App. 3d at 598 (meaning of "act of duty" requires de novo review). However, where, as here, thecase involves an examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts, it involves a mixed questionof fact and law. Therefore, a "clearly erroneous" standard of review is appropriate to examine theBoard's decision. City of Belvidere, 181 Ill. 2d at 205. "A decision will be deemed clearly erroneousonly where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is ' "left with the definite and firm convictionthat a mistake has been committed. [Citation.]" ' " Anderson v. Department of ProfessionalRegulation, 348 Ill. App. 3d 554, 560 (2004).

Section 4--110 of the Pension Code provides in relevant part:

"If a firefighter, as the result of sickness, accident or injury incurred in or resultingfrom the performance of an act of duty or from the cumulative effects of acts of duty, isfound, pursuant to Section 4--112, to be physically or mentally permanently disabled forservice in the fire department, so as to render necessary his or her being placed on disabilitypension, the firefighter shall be entitled to a disability pension ***. A firefighter shall beconsidered 'on duty' while on any assignment approved by the chief of the fire department,even though away from the municipality he or she serves as a firefighter, if the assignmentis related to the fire protection service of the municipality." 40 ILCS 5/4--110 (West 2004).

Plaintiff contends that the Board improperly applied the definition of "act of duty" foundunder section 5--113 of the Pension Code, a section that is applicable to police officers, notfirefighters. Plaintiff further asserts that, had the Board applied the proper definition of "act of duty"pursuant to section 4--110, a section applicable to firefighters, the Board would have grantedplaintiff's application for a line-of-duty disability pension.

We agree with plaintiff that the Board improperly applied the wrong definition of the term"act of duty." "Act of duty" is defined for police officers as "[a]ny act of police duty inherentlyinvolving special risk, not ordinarily assumed by a citizen in the ordinary walks of life, imposed ona policeman by the statutes of this State or by the ordinances or police regulations of the city inwhich this Article is in effect or by a special assignment." 40 ILCS 5/5--113 (West 2004). ThePension Code language relating to police officers under section 5--113 is different from the languagedefining the term "act of duty" as it relates to firefighters under section 6--110 of the Pension Code(40 ILCS 5/6--110 (West 2004)). Section 6--110 of the Pension Code defines an "act of duty" as"[a]ny act imposed on an active fireman by the ordinances of a city, or by the rules or regulations ofits fire department, or any act performed by an active fireman while on duty, having for its directpurpose the saving of the life or property of another person." 40 ILCS 5/6--110 (West 2004).

In interpreting a statute, the court must ascertain the legislature's intent, the best evidence ofwhich is the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute. Land v. Board ofEducation of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 421 (2002). Where the statutory language is clear,the court will give that language effect without resort to other aids of construction. Martino v. PolicePension Board, 331 Ill. App. 3d 975, 980 (2002). It is clear that section 6--110 applies because itdefines acts of duty and it relates to firefighters. See Virden v. Board of Trustees of the FirefightersPension Fund, 304 Ill. App. 3d 330, 335 (1999) (applying section 6--110 and not section 5--113 inconcluding that firefighter's application for a line-of-duty disability pension should have beengranted). We note that section 6--101 provides that each city of more than 500,000 inhabitantsbe allowed to create a firefighters' annuity and benefit fund. 40 ILCS 5/6--101 (West 2004). Section4--101 grants a similar fund for cities, like East Dundee, of inhabitants under 500,000. 40 ILCS 5/4--101 (West 2004). Contrary to the parties' contentions, merely because the term "act of duty" isfound in Article 6 of the Pension Code does not mean that it is applicable only to statutes in Article6. The terms defined in the Pension Code have the meaning ascribed to them and there is nothingin section 6--110 or any other statute under Article 6 that prohibits a court from ascribing thedefinition in section 6--110 to section 4--110. Moreover, courts presume that statutes that relate toone subject are intended by the legislature to be consistent and harmonious with each other. Collinsv. Board of Trustees of the Fireman's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111-12 (1993). Thesame words used in different sections of a statute should be given a consistent meaning unlesslegislative intent to the contrary is clearly evident. Clardy v. Rapistan Division of Lear Siegler, Inc.,254 Ill. App. 3d 1066, 1070 (1993). Accordingly, we find that the Board, as well as the trial court,improperly applied the wrong definition of "act of duty" from section 5--113 of the Pension Codeto the facts of the case, because plaintiff is a firefighter and not a police officer, and, therefore, theBoard applied the wrong standard in weighing the evidence. See Virden, 304 Ill. App. 3d at 335.

Because the Board applied the wrong definition of the term "act of duty," any case lawanalyzing questions of specific "acts of duty" as they apply to police line-of-duty disability pensionsare not relevant. Thus, the Board's reliance on White, as well as the trial court's reliance on Alm,was misplaced inasmuch as both resolutions concerned the Pension Code's definition of "act of duty"applicable to police officers and not the standard applicable to firefighters.

Before both the Board and the trial court, the parties focused on whether plaintiff's injuries were incurred in or resulted from "acts of duty," and the Board and the trial court relied on theincorrect standard in weighing the evidence. While plaintiff points out that the Board had before itthe East Dundee Fire Protection District's policy and procedures regarding the nature of his workwhen it considered whether the injuries he suffered were incurred in or resulted from "acts of duty,"the Board never reviewed this evidence based on the proper standard. Furthermore, the Board neverdetermined whether the activities in which plaintiff was injured constituted acts of duty for purposesof section 4--110. We review an administrative agency's decision under the "clearly erroneous"standard. Anderson, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 560. Consequently, before we review its decision, webelieve that the Board should consider whether plaintiff's injury was incurred in or resulted from theperformance of "acts of duty" within the proper meaning of section 4--110. This is particularlyappropriate because the Board never addressed the issue of whether the activities in which plaintiffwas injured constituted acts of duty as defined by section 6--110 of the Pension Code. See, e.g.,O'Callaghan v. Retirement Board of Firemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund, 302 Ill. App. 3d 579 (1998)(reviewing board's determination that firefighter candidate drills constituted acts of duty as definedby section 6--110).

The Board argues that its decision to deny the line-of-duty disability pension should beupheld in any event because the Board chose to place greater credibility on Dr. Lanoff's reportconcerning the causation of plaintiff's injuries. Dr. Lanoff agreed with the other physicians thatplaintiff was disabled. However, he agreed with the other physicians as to the cause of the disability,but only to a "small extent." We observe that section 4--112 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/4--112(West 2004)) requires that a disability pension shall not be paid until disability has been establishedby the board by examinations of the firefighter by three physicians selected by the board and suchother evidence as the board deems necessary. Similar to the certificate provision of section 3--115(40 ILCS 5/3--115 (West 2002)), which we reviewed in Wade v City of North Chicago PolicePension Board, 359 Ill. App. 3d 224, 231-37 (2005), section 4--112 says nothing about the degreeor cause of the applicant's incapacity. While the Board can find Dr. Lanoff's opinion to be morecredible, we believe that, because all three physicians determined that plaintiff has a disabilitypreventing him from performing any assigned duties, it is for the Board to determine whether thedisability was caused by a covered act, based on all of the evidence presented at the hearing. SeeWade, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 238. The Board cannot make that determination until it holds a newhearing based on the appropriate standard.

Accordingly, for the preceding reasons, we reverse the judgment of the trial court and remandthe cause to the Board for a new hearing as to whether plaintiff is entitled to a line-of-duty disabilitypension pursuant to section 4--110.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

BOWMAN and GROMETER, JJ., concur.