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JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal comes before us on a certification of a question of law by the circuit court of DuPage County pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308). The question certified forappeal is : "What is the appropriate legal test or standard to determine whether a party to an actioncan obtain discovery of confidential information and documents from, and/or related to, a nonpartycompetitor?"

I. BACKGROUND

Although a full recitation of the specific facts underlying the case is not necessary to aresolution of this appeal, a basic recounting of the background will be helpful. The cause of actionarose when plaintiff, International Truck and Engine Corp., filed suit against defendant, Caterpillar,Inc., under several theories, claiming that defendant breached an agreement that required defendantto sell plaintiff certain types of heavy-duty truck engines at a price determined by various contractualprovisions. The trial court entered a stipulated protective order that applied to confidentialinformation that was being sought during discovery. The order provided that certain informationwould be designated as confidential information and that access to such information would be limitedto certain persons and entities. The order also stated that certain information could be designated bya party or nonparty as for "OUTSIDE COUNSEL'S EYES ONLY," which would further limit accessto the information. In the course of discovery, defendant propounded upon plaintiff a documentrequest that requested, in part, "[a]ll documents relating to International's negotiations, agreementsor anticipated supply agreements with any third party, including but not limited to Cummins *** forthe supply of engines." Cummins is a competitor of defendant.

Plaintiff objected to the request but responded that it would provide the documents requestedby defendant after receiving approval from the third parties involved. Plaintiff subsequently contactedCummins and informed it of plaintiff's intent to produce the requested documents with Cummins'approval. Cummins petitioned to intervene in the case and requested a protective order. Cumminsclaimed that it has signed an agreement with plaintiff requiring plaintiff to seek approval fromCummins before disclosing any of Cummins' confidential information. Cummins further claimed thatthe documents requested by defendant were confidential commercial documents that could not bedisclosed to defendant because defendant is a competitor of Cummins. The trial court grantedCummins' petition to intervene. On January 23, 2003, after a hearing on Cummins' motion for aprotective order, the court ordered that Cummins be included in the stipulated protective order andrequired plaintiff to produce redacted versions of some documents that contained Cumminsinformation. The court also ordered plaintiff to bring all other Cummins-related documents to thenext hearing so that it could determine what, if any, parts of those documents needed to be produced.

On January 30, 2003, plaintiff discovered that it had inadvertently disclosed unredactedCummins-related documents. Plaintiff wrote to defendant, requesting the return of the documents. Defendant refused to return the documents. Plaintiff then filed a motion to enforce the protectiveorder, seeking the return of the inadvertently disclosed documents. Defendant then filed a motionto modify the court's order regarding Cummins-related documents, seeking further Cummins-relateddocuments from plaintiff. After a hearing on both motions, the court reversed its prior decision andordered plaintiff to produce in unredacted form all documents previously produced in redacted form. The court reiterated that the documents would remain subject to the stipulated protective order withthe modification that no consulting experts or retained opinion witnesses could view the documents. Furthermore, the trial court entered Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d 304(a)) language so thatan appeal could be pursued. Cummins then appealed to this court (No. 2--03--0317). This courtdismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Cummins filed a petition for rehearing, subsequent towhich this court withdrew its previous order but once again found the trial court's order unappealablebecause it was an interlocutory order. In that order, we suggested Supreme Court Rule 308(a) (155Ill. 2d R. 308(a)) as a vehicle to appeal the discovery order.

On March 30, 2004, the trial court stated that its order as to the discovery of Cummins' confidential information satisfied the requirements of Rule 308(a) because it presented a question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and because an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. The trial court certified the question of law as stated above. Cummins then petitioned this court for leave to appeal and we granted the petition on May 13, 2004.

II. ANALYSIS

The sole question before this court is the question certified for appeal by the circuit court,namely: "What is the appropriate legal test or standard to determine whether a party to an action canobtain discovery of confidential information and documents from and/or related to, a nonpartycompetitor?" As plaintiff points out, the certified question contains two separate inquiries. First,what is the appropriate test to determine whether a party can obtain discovery of confidentialinformation from a nonparty competitor? Second, what is the test to determine whether a party canobtain discovery of confidential information related to a nonparty competitor? We first make clearthat we read both inquires as referring to confidential information pertaining to a nonpartycompetitor. They differ only in that the first inquiry refers to the discovery of such informationdirectly from the nonparty competitor itself while the second inquiry refers to discovery requestsdirected to a party. We will not address the situation in which discovery of confidential informationpertaining to a nonparty competitor is sought from a different nonparty. This question is notpresented by the facts of this case. Therefore, any answer to such a question would not materiallyadvance this litigation. It is within the above framework that we answer the certified question.

Cummins urges us to adopt the balancing test employed by the federal courts in situationsinvolving confidential or privileged information. Defendant urges that Supreme Court Rule 201(c)(166 Ill. 2d R. 201(c)) adequately covers the situations presented by the certified question and, hence,no further test is necessary. However, defendant also states that if we find that a further test isnecessary, it agrees that the balancing test proposed by Cummins is appropriate. Plaintiff states thatit takes no position as to what, if any, test we should adopt but simply urges us to answer the certifiedquestion completely and clearly so that the underlying litigation can move forward expeditiously. After reviewing the relevant case law, we choose to adopt a modified version of the balancing testemployed by the federal courts. First, we address defendant's argument that Rule 201(c) provides adequate guidance to thetrial court in these situations. Rule 201(c)(1) provides, in relevant part:

"(1) Protective Orders. The court may at any time on its own initiative, or on motion of any party or witness, make a protective order as justice requires, denying, limiting,conditioning, or regulating discovery to prevent unreasonable annoyance, expense,embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression." 166 Ill. 2d R. 201(c)(1).

Defendant contends that Rule 201(c) provides a sufficient standard that is applicable to manysituations. More specifically, defendant contends that the prevention of unreasonable annoyance,expense, embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression should guide the court in deciding when aprotective order should issue and the scope of such an order. According to defendant, a trial courtcan apply these factors just as well in a case involving the discovery of confidential informationrelated to a nonparty competitor as it can in any other case. As such, defendant's position is that asupplementary test is superfluous. We disagree.

The question at issue is not simply whether a protective order is appropriate, but what testshould be used to determine what discovery is available regarding the type of confidential informationat issue in this case. In choosing to adopt a test that defines the scope of discovery regardingconfidential information, we are determining the context in which a trial court should determine whena discovery request for confidential information causes such unreasonable annoyance, expense,embarrassment, disadvantage, or oppression that justice requires denial of the discovery request. Wenote that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically delineate confidential commercialinformation as a category of information that can be protected from discovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c),45(c)(3)(B)(i). We find that these rules implicitly recognize that confidential commercial informationis a category of discoverable information that deserves special attention. We believe thatsupplemental guidance on this point will be useful to the trial court in this case and to other trialcourts in future cases.

Having determined that a supplemental test is appropriate, we now turn our attention to whatthe test should be. Cummins has cited several federal district and circuit court of appeals casesconcerning the ability of a party to discover confidential information. Some of these cases involveinformation that is privileged and the question presented is whether the privilege can be overcome. See, e.g., Deitchman v. E.R. Squiib & Sons, Inc., 740 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1984). In fact, there isIllinois case law regarding discovery of certain types of privileged information. See, e.g., Kunz v.South Suburban Hospital, 326 Ill. App. 3d 951 (2001) (holding that medical records of nonpartiesare protected by the doctor-patient privilege and are not discoverable). The question presented tous in this case does not ask for a determination in relation to privileged information, but simplyconfidential information of a nonparty competitor. The fact that commercial information isconfidential does not necessarily give rise to an evidentiary privilege. However, the federal courtshave extended the balancing test to cover situations that involve confidential commercial information. See, e.g., Greater Rockford Energy & Technology Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 138 F.R.D. 530 (C.D. Ill.1991); Mannington Mills, Inc v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 206 F.R.D. 525 (Del. 2002).

We find that the concerns that arise when confidential information is being sought from anonparty competitor make a balancing test appropriate. Discovery rules are in place so that partiesmay obtain the information necessary to prosecute or defend their causes of action and to reach a justresult. As such, information that some entities or persons may not want disclosed may be necessary. However, there are certain types of confidential information the disclosure of which would beextremely damaging. Nonparties should be protected from disclosure when possible, since they havenot put such matters in issue. Therefore, such information should not be disclosed absent a need. Thus, we find that a balancing test is the best mechanism to evaluate these two competing interestsin any given case. As such, we must now determine the parameters of the balancing test.

In this regard, we find Greater Rockford instructive. In Greater Rockford, discovery wasbeing sought from Archer-Daniels-Midland (ADM), a nonparty and a producer and seller of ethanol. Greater Rockford, 138 F.R.D. at 532-33. ADM objected, stating that the plaintiffs and defendantswere competitors of ADM in the ethanol business and that disclosure of the requested informationto the parties would seriously damage ADM's bargaining position and sale of its ethanol products. Greater Rockford, 138 F.R.D. at 533. In determining whether the information should be disclosed,the court stated:

'' '[I]f it is established that confidential information is being sought, the burden is on the partyseeking discovery to establish that the information is sufficiently relevant and necessary to hiscase to outweigh the harm disclosure would cause to the person from whom he is seeking theinformation.' " Greater Rockford, 138 F.R.D. at 534, quoting Litton Industries v. Chesapeake& Ohio Ry., 129 F.R.D. 529, 530 (E.D. Wis. 1990), quoting Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. FirstChicago Corp., No. 86--C--10213 (N.D. Ill. 1988).

The court further stated that "it is not the magnitude of the potential harm that could occur fromdisclosure, but rather, the likelihood that such harm could occur at all." Greater Rockford, 138F.R.D. at 533.

Using the test enunciated in Greater Rockford as a guide, we adopt the following test to applyto the discoverability of the confidential information of a nonparty competitor of a party to an action. First, the party seeking the protective order denying discovery of confidential information related toa nonparty competitor must establish that the information is indeed confidential. The trial courtshould determine whether information is confidential by examining both the nature of the informationand the steps taken by the nonparty competitor to keep the information confidential. The moresensitive the information and the more measures employed to protect the information, the higher thelikelihood that the information is confidential.

If the requested information is shown to be confidential, the burden then shifts to the partyseeking discovery to show that the relevance of and the need for the information being soughtoutweigh any harm caused by its disclosure. The harm to the nonparty competitor itself shouldalways be considered. Furthermore, if the person or entity from whom production is being soughtis a party, the harm to the producing party should be considered. Additionally, in a given case, theremay be other parties or nonparties who claim that they are harmed by the disclosure. We leave it tothe discretion of the trial court to determine how much weight to assign to such harm in balancingthe considerations. Moreover, in assessing harm, we diverge from the limited approach enunciatedin Greater Rockford. The trial court should look not only to the likelihood of whether harm willoccur at all but also at the magnitude of the harm should it occur. We find such an approach moreequitable, as it may be reasonable to prevent disclosure of extremely sensitive information even if thelikelihood of harm, that is, disclosure to entities or persons who could use the information in a manneradverse to the nonparty competitor, is small.

If the need and relevance outweigh the harm, then the information should be produced. If theharm outweighs the relevance and need, then discovery should be denied. We note that a trial judgehas discretion to allow redaction of information to the point where the balance shifts in favor ofdiscovery or where redaction has removed all confidential information. Furthermore, a court mayconsider a protective order limiting access to any disclosed information when determining whetherharm will be suffered and to what extent it will be suffered.

Finally, we note that both Cummins and defendant have made arguments with respect to thespecific facts of this case and the applicability of the balancing test. These issues are not before usbecause such a question was not certified by the trial court. The trial court certified a question oflaw, which we have answered. Any other arguments made by the parties are irrelevant and were notconsidered by this court in rendering this decision.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons we adopt the balancing test as set out above as the appropriate test for determining whether a party can discover confidential information related to a nonparty competitor of one of the parties.

Certified question answered.

HUTCHINSON and GROMETER, JJ., concur.