Find Legal Information

JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

The respondent, Mary Larson, appeals from the February 15,2002, order of the circuit court of Du Page County dismissing hercounterclaim against the Village of Winfield Municipal OfficersElectoral Board (the Board) and its members, John Kirschbaum, JeniOzark, and Rudy Czech. Larson's counterclaim sought a writ ofmandamus requiring the Board to place a public question upon theMarch 19, 2002, primary election ballot. The trial court dismissedthe action, finding that an action for mandamus was precluded bythe availability of judicial review under the Election Code (theCode) (10 ILCS 5/10--10.1 (West 2000)). We affirm.

Larson, a resident of the Village of Winfield (Village), hascirculated a petition among the Village's voters for the placementof a referendum on the March 19, 2002, primary election ballot. The referendum sought to change the manner of electing Villagetrustees from at-large elections, where trustees are selected byall of the Village's residents, to by-district elections, where theVillage is divided up into districts and one trustee is selectedfrom each district. See 65 ILCS 5/3.1--25--80 (West 2000). Afterobtaining the required number of signatures, Larson timely filedher petition with the Village's clerk on December 28, 2001.

David C. Russo, also a resident of the Village, filed severalobjections to Larson's petition. The Board conducted a hearing onthese objections on January 14, 2002. On January 17, 2002, theBoard filed its written order sustaining one of Russo's objections. The Board ordered that Larson's petition be stricken and that thepublic question not appear on the ballot.

Despite prevailing in the proceedings before the Board, Russofiled a petition for judicial review of the Board's decision in thecircuit court of Du Page County on January 24, 2002. Russo'spetition for review was filed pursuant to section 10--10.1 of theCode (10 ILCS 5/10--10.1 (West 2000)) and sought a review of thoseobjections that were not sustained by the Board. The Board andLarson were named as respondents in this action.

On January 25, 2002, Larson filed a counterclaim for a writ ofmandamus and requested that the Board's decision be reversed andthat the Board be ordered to certify the petition and place thereferendum on the March 19, 2002, ballot. The counterclaim, whichconsisted of three counts, alleged (1) that Russo lacked standingto raise objections to the petition; (2) the Board's decision waspredicated upon speculation, rather than evidence; and (3) theBoard's decision was without legal basis and against the manifestweight of the evidence. The Board and its members were named ascounterdefendants.

The Board and Russo filed motions to dismiss Larson'scounterclaim pursuant to section 2--619(a)(1) of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(1) (West 2000)). These partiesargued that the trial court was without jurisdiction to review theBoard's decision in a mandamus action. These parties insteadargued that Larson was obligated to file an action for judicialreview pursuant to the statutory authority provided by section 10--10.1 of the Code. Because Larson's counterclaim did not seekreview pursuant to section 10--10.1 and did not comply with theprocedural requirements of that section, the Board and Russoasserted that the counterclaim should be dismissed.

On February 15, 2002, the trial court held a hearing on themotions to dismiss. At the beginning of the hearing, Russovoluntarily dismissed his petition for judicial review of theBoard's decision. The trial court then proceeded with the hearingand granted the Board's motion to dismiss Larson's counterclaim. The trial court found that Larson's sole method to seek judicialreview of the Board's decision was through the procedure providedby section 10--10.1 of the Code. Because Larson had filed anaction for mandamus rather than comply with the requirements ofsection 10--10.1, the trial court found that it was without theauthority to review the merits of the Board's decision. After thedenial of her motion to reconsider, Larson filed this timely noticeof appeal.

On March 7, 2002, Larson filed a motion in this court for anexpedited hearing and emergency interlocutory relief. Larsonrequested that, due to the nearness of the March 19, 2002, primaryelection, this court enter an order requiring the referendum to beplaced on the ballot. On March 8, 2002, this court grantedLarson's motion for an expedited hearing, but continued the motionfor interlocutory relief until all the briefs had been filed. Thecourt has now had the opportunity to review the parties' briefs andis prepared to rule.

The dispositive issue on appeal is whether an action formandamus is an appropriate means to seek judicial review of theBoard's decision. Larson argues that, in instances where there isinsufficient time before an election to conduct judicial reviewunder section 10--10.1 of the Code, an action for mandamus is anappropriate remedy to seek expedited judicial review. Larsonalternatively argues that, as the proponent of the referendum, shehad no statutory basis to file a petition for judicial review undersection 10--10.1. The Board responds that section 10--10.1 wasLarson's sole remedy to seek the review of its decision and thatthere was sufficient time prior to the election for the trial courtto conduct such review.

The circuit court's power to review administrative action islimited to that provided by law. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV,