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JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent-mother, Gladys C., appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of WinnebagoCounty terminating her parental rights to her minor children, Miracle C., Jasmine N., and Ilsheya N. Respondent-father, Illya N., appeals from the judgment terminating his parental rights to his minorchildren, Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. The appeals have been consolidated in this court.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On July 15, 1998, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship alleging that MiracleC. was a neglected minor because she was born with cocaine in her urine, blood, or meconium that was not the result of medical treatment administered to the mother or the child (705 ILCS 405/2--3(1)(c) (West 1998)). On the same date, the State filed petitions for adjudication of wardship allegingthat Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. were neglected minors. The State alleged that the minors'environments were injurious to their welfare because their sibling, Miracle C., was born with cocainein her urine, blood, or meconium that was not the result of medical treatment administered to themother or the child. The record shows that respondent-mother was served with a summons and acopy of the petitions for adjudication of wardship on October 21, 1998. The petitions identifiedrespondent-father as the father of Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N., but listed no address. Respondent-father was not served with a summons or notified of the proceedings by certified mail. Instead,respondent-father was notified of the proceedings concerning his children by a publication dated May21, 1999. Miracle C.'s father is someone other than respondent-father and is not a party to either ofthese consolidated appeals.

On June 2, 1999, after a hearing on the State's petitions for adjudication of wardship, MiracleC., Jasmine N., and Ilsheya N. were adjudicated neglected minors. On the same date an order ofdefault was entered against respondent-father. On September 1, 1999, the trial court entered adispositional order declaring the minors wards of the court and appointing the Department ofChildren and Family Services (DCFS) as their guardian. Following a permanency hearing, in an orderentered on October 27, 2000, the trial court determined that the appropriate permanency goal for theminors was substitute care pending court determination of termination of parental rights.

On January 4, 2001, the State filed motions for termination of respondents' parental rights. In the motions, the State alleged in count I that respondent-mother was an "unfit person" as definedby the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1 (West 2000)) because she failed to maintain a reasonable degreeof interest, concern, or responsibility as to her children's welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2000)). In count II the State alleged that she failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions thatwere the basis for the removal of her children from her, or to make reasonable progress toward thereturn of her children to her within nine months of the adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(West 2000)). As to respondent-father, the State alleged in count I that he was an "unfit person"because he abandoned his children (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(a) (West 2000)). In count II the State allegedthat he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to his children'swelfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2000)). In count III the State alleged that he failed to makereasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of his children fromhim, or to make reasonable progress toward the return of his children to him within nine months ofthe adjudication of neglect (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2000)). The matter was set for a January26, 2001, first appearance on the motions to terminate parental rights.

On January 26, 2001, respondent-father appeared before the trial court for the first time. Respondent-mother was also present in court. The trial court appointed counsel for respondent-father and provided him with copies of the motions to terminate his parental rights. The appointmentof respondent-mother's attorney in the previous neglect proceedings was continued. The trial courtalso explained to both respondents the allegations in the motions and advised them of their rights.

The motions for termination of parental rights were heard on February 28, 2002. During thefitness portion of the proceedings, the State called Kathryn Craig, a caseworker employed byLutheran Social Services of Illinois (LSSI). Craig was assigned to the minors' case at the end ofSeptember 2000. At that time, there was no documentation indicating that either respondent hadcompleted any services. Craig said that the children were removed from a placement with theirmaternal grandmother and placed in traditional foster care on January 4, 2001. Craig identified fourclient service plans, and the plans were admitted into evidence.

Craig testified that the previous caseworker determined that respondent-father was in prison. Craig did not mail respondent-father any client service plans while he was in prison, and she did notknow whether the previous caseworker had done so. Craig indicated that respondent-father had notcontacted the previous caseworker. Craig testified that she first met respondent-father in court onJanuary 26, 2001. At that time, respondent-father told Craig that he knew there had been DCFSinvolvement with his children but that he had not realized that the case was so serious. On January26, 2001, Craig gave respondent-father her phone number, and respondent-father gave Craig hisparents' phone number.

Craig explained that after several failed attempts to set up visits, respondent-father visited hischildren at the LSSI office on June 22, 2001. According to Craig, this was respondent-father's firstvisit with his children in nearly five years. Craig also testified that the minors' foster parents took theminors to Chicago in December 2001 to visit with respondent-father. Respondent-father did notrequest other visits. Craig said that respondent-father provided no financial support for the children,never requested information regarding the children's schooling or medical care, and did not send thechildren presents or cards at their birthdays. Craig indicated that respondent-father never requestedthat the children be placed with him and never contacted her to inquire as to what services he neededto complete so that placement with him could be considered. Craig also related that respondent-father refused to sign releases that would allow her to verify any previous services respondent-fatherhad received.

Craig identified substance abuse treatment as the primary focus of respondent-mother's serviceplan. According to Craig, respondent-mother had not complied with substance abuse treatment. Craig related that respondent-mother finally was assessed for substance abuse treatment on November8, 2001. Craig said that respondent-mother had not become involved in her children's lives andprovided no form of support. Respondent-mother did not attend scheduled visits in February andMarch of 2001. Respondent-mother had telephone contact with Miracle C. in May 2001. Otherwise,she had no contact with the children from January 2001 to June 2001. Craig indicated that, sinceJune 2001, visits with respondent-mother were more consistent and that her recent interaction withthe children was appropriate.

Respondent-father testified that he is the father of Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. According torespondent-father, he first became aware of the court proceedings concerning his children while hewas in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections (DOC). Respondent-father said he hasserved three different prison terms for a drug offense, forgery, and residential burglary. Respondent-father explained that he was released from DOC on April 18, 2000. According to respondent-father,approximately one week before his release from DOC, his DOC counselor informed him that "[his]kids was in DCFS." Respondent-father was notified of the January 26, 2001, court date by his father,who had received a telephone call from respondent-mother regarding the court date.

Respondent-father said that he never received a service plan and was not informed of his goalsand objectives in his children's case. Respondent-father explained that he refused to sign releaseswhen requested because, in contravention of their rules, he was admitted into a substance abuseprogram at Rosecrance treatment center in Rockford before he finished another treatment programthat he had previously started. Respondent-father did not want anyone to know that he was notsupposed to be in the program at Rosecrance. Respondent-father claimed that he finished a three-month inpatient substance abuse treatment program at Rosecrance. Respondent-father said he hada certificate to prove successful completion of that program but he did not bring it to court or giveit to the caseworker or to his attorney.

Respondent-father testified that he had three visits with his children since January 2001. Hewould have had more visits but when he left a telephone message for the caseworker in December2001 she did not return his call. Respondent-father could not recall the last time he had contact withhis children before coming to court on January 26, 2001. He indicated that his last contact was atabout the time that Ilsheya was five years old. Ilsheya was 11 years old as of respondent-father'stestimony. Respondent-father said that he had not sent a card, letter, or present to his children forabout seven years prior to January 26, 2001. Respondent-father indicated that the lack of contactwas not his choice but was because respondent-mother was mad at him. Respondent-father admittedthat he has not provided any financial support for his children.

Respondent-mother testified that she is the mother of Miracle C., Jasmine N., and Ilsheya N. She indicated that she was engaged in substance abuse treatment at P.H.A.S.E. in Rockford. Shebegan treatment there on November 14, 2001. Respondent-mother admitted that she tested positivefor drugs in November 2001. She also admitted that she knew back in 1998 that her substance abuseproblem needed correction.

The trial court found that respondent-mother failed to make reasonable progress toward thereturn of her children to her within nine months of the dispositional orders. Accordingly, the trialcourt held that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent-mother was anunfit person as alleged in count II of the motions to terminate her parental rights.

The trial court also found that respondent-father had no contact with his children for a periodof five to seven years before January 26, 2001. The trial court found further that during the periodsubsequent to January 26, 2001, respondent-father showed no interest in the children's welfare anddid not contribute to their support. The trial court said that "[respondent-father's] involvement withthe children and their lives subsequent to January 26, at best, [was] a token gesture of interest." Accordingly, the trial court held that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence thatrespondent-father was an unfit person as alleged in counts I and II of the motions to terminate hisparental rights.

The best-interest portion of the proceedings also took place on February 28, 2002,immediately following the unfitness portion. The State called Kathryn Craig, who testified that allthree children had been living with a foster family for just over one year. According to Craig, thefoster parents have provided an adequate home for the children, are financially able to provide fortheir needs, and participate fully in the children's education. The children are close to the fosterparents' son and call their foster parents Mom and Dad. Craig related that neither respondent couldprovide the stable family life that the foster parents offer the children. The foster parents haveindicated that they desire to adopt all three children. According to Craig, Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N.have both expressed a desire to continue living with their foster family. The foster parents expresseda willingness to allow the children to continue to visit respondents. Craig opined that it was in thechildren's best interest to terminate respondents' parental rights so that the children are freed foradoption.

The court appointed special advocate (CASA), as guardian ad litem, testified that sheobserved the children improve physically, mentally, and emotionally since their placement with thefoster family. The CASA opined that it was in the children's best interest that respondents' parentalrights be terminated to free the children for adoption.

Respondent-father did not testify or offer any evidence at the best-interest portion of theproceedings. Respondent-mother testified that she had a properly furnished two-bedroom apartmentand was looking for a job so that she could support her children. Respondent-mother indicated thatif her children were returned to her she would take them to church each week, see that they went toschool each day, and remain clean and sober. Respondent-mother said that her children lived withher last in December 1998.

Counsel for the State and counsel for the guardian ad litem urged the court to terminaterespondents' parental rights. Neither counsel for respondents made an argument or recommendation. Thereafter the trial court found that it was in the children's best interest to terminate respondents'parental rights and gave DCFS, as guardian, the authority to consent to the children's adoption. Respondents filed timely notices of appeal.

On appeal, respondent-father contends that (1) the State failed to prove by clear andconvincing evidence that he was an unfit person; (2) the trial court failed to admonish him inaccordance with section 1--5(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS405/1--5(3) (West 2000)); (3) the trial court abused its discretion in finding that it was in the minors'best interest to terminate his parental rights; and (4) he was not given actual notice of the juvenilecourt proceedings involving his children.

We hold that the lack of notice to respondent-father prior to the adjudicatory phase of theproceedings rendered void, for lack of jurisdiction, the orders finding his children neglected andadjudicating them wards of the court. Secondly, we hold that, as a result of the void adjudicatory anddispositional orders, respondent-father was denied due process in the proceedings terminating hisparental rights. Therefore, without deciding respondent-father's other contentions on appeal, wereverse the trial court's orders finding respondent-father's children neglected, adjudicating them wardsof the court, and terminating respondent-father's parental rights.

Respondent-father contends that he had no actual notice of the juvenile court proceedingsconcerning his children. He argues that he was never served with a summons, and that the State wasimproperly permitted to serve him with notice of the proceedings by publication without conductinga diligent inquiry to ascertain his whereabouts or filing an affidavit detailing the efforts to effectuateservice. See 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West 2000). While it is true that respondent-father does notspecifically appeal the adjudication of wardship of his two children, but only the order finding himunfit, terminating his parental rights, and authorizing DCFS to consent to the adoption of his children,we have an obligation to sua sponte consider the issue of the trial court's jurisdiction. See People v.Bounds, 182 Ill. 2d 1, 3 (1998).

Due process requires that notice in juvenile proceedings be equivalent to that constitutionallyrequired in civil and criminal cases. In re Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527,549, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1446-47 (1967); In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263, 269 (1994) (a minor and his orher parents have a constitutional right of due process to receive adequate notice of a juvenileproceeding). The Juvenile Court Act provides that when a petition is filed the clerk of the court shallissue a summons to the minor's legal guardian or custodian and to each person named as arespondent. 705 ILCS 405/2--15 (West 2000). Section 2--16 of the Juvenile Court Act governswhen service by publication is permitted. This section states in pertinent part that where arespondent's usual place of abode is not known, a diligent inquiry shall be made to ascertain therespondent's current and last known address. 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West 2000). If the diligentinquiry does not reveal the party's location, the Juvenile Court Act requires the petitioner's attorneyto file an affidavit showing that the respondent, on due inquiry, cannot be found or is concealing hisor her whereabouts so that process cannot be served. 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West 2000). Theaffidavit shall state the last known address of the respondent and the efforts that were made toeffectuate service. 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West 2000). Publication must then be made once in anewspaper of general circulation in the county where the action is pending. 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2)(West 2000). If the respondent fails to appear after publication has been properly effectuated, thetrial court shall enter any appropriate orders of default against the respondent. 705 ILCS 405/2--21(1) (West 2000).

In this case the order entered on April 28, 1999, includes the following language: "State givenleave to publish on [respondent-father] and other fathers. DCFS to perform a diligent search for[sic]." Thereafter, the State filed a "Publication Notice" directed to respondent-father dated May 21,1999. However, there was no affidavit filed by the assistant State's Attorney showing thatrespondent-father, on due inquiry, could not be found or was concealing his whereabouts, stating thelast known address of respondent-father, and describing the efforts that were made to effectuateservice. Notice by publication should not have been permitted prior to the filing of such an affidavit. See 705 ILCS 405/2--16(2) (West 2000). We note further that the trial court was not apprised, byany other means, that a diligent search for respondent-father was conducted. Moreover, the Stateconcedes that respondent-father was not properly served. Accordingly, the trial court erred in findingthat respondent-father was served properly by publication and erred in entering a default order againsthim based on that erroneous finding.

The failure to name and serve a necessary party in a juvenile proceeding raises the questionnot of personal jurisdiction over that party, but of the subject matter jurisdiction of the court. In reK.C., 323 Ill. App. 3d 839, 846 (2001). "A minor and his or her parents have a constitutional rightof due process to receive adequate notice of a juvenile proceeding." C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d at 269. "Apleading in a juvenile proceeding that does not name and notify necessary respondents, which includesparents or a legal guardian, fails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby renders its ordersvoid." C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d at 271; see also In re A.H., 195 Ill. 2d 408, 423-24 (2001); People v.R.D.S., 94 Ill. 2d 77, 83 (1983). The fact that respondent-father received no notice of theproceedings involving his children left the trial court without subject matter jurisdiction to findJasmine N. and Ilsheya N. neglected and to adjudicate them wards of the court at the subsequentdispositional hearing.

In C.R.H. the court recognized a limited exception to the above rule, excusing notice to anoncustodial parent where the noncustodial parent's whereabouts are unknown and the custodialparent received notice. C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d at 270-71, citing In re J.W., 87 Ill. 2d 56, 58-61 (1981),and In re J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d 129, 137-39 (1985). In this case the noncustodial parent, respondent-father, was not served and the custodial parent, respondent-mother, did receive notice. However,the limited exception excusing service is not applicable here because the record indicates thatrespondent-father's whereabouts were not unknown to the State by the time of the adjudicatoryhearing. The record contains a court report dated June 1, 1999, prepared by an LSSI caseworker,which was referenced by the trial court and presumably was reviewed by the State. That reportindicates that respondent-father was housed at Sheridan Correctional Center in Sheridan, Illinois, andwas yet to be released. Moreover, the petitions for adjudication of wardship regarding Jasmine N.and Ilsheya N. list respondent-father as the minors' father without an address but do not allege thatrespondent-father's whereabouts were unknown as is required by section 2--13(2) (705 ILCS 405/2--13(2) (West 1998)).

We granted the State's motion to cite this court's recent decision in In re Brett R., No. 2--03--0466 (October 27, 2003), as additional authority. In Brett R. the respondent-mother contended onappeal that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to terminate her parental rights to herminor children (Brett R., slip op. at 1) because the State failed to serve the minors' father prior to theadjudication of neglect (Brett R., slip op. at 5). This court rejected the respondent-mother'scontention because, although he had not been served, the minors' father had actual notice of theproceedings involving the minors prior to their being adjudicated neglected. Brett R., slip op. at 7. Additionally, we held that the respondent-mother waived the issue of the State's failure to serve theminors' father by failing to raise the issue in the trial court when afforded the opportunity. Brett R.,slip op. at 6.

Our decision in Brett R. is factually distinguishable from the case at bar and is not controlling. In Brett R. the minors' father had actual notice of the proceeding involving the minors prior to theadjudication of neglect (Brett R., slip op. at 7) and therefore the trial court had subject matterjurisdiction over the proceedings. In this case, however, respondent-father had no such notice.

In an effort to preserve its arguments in contemplation of an appeal of this court's ruling toour supreme court, the State argues that the decisions of our supreme court cited above wereincorrectly decided and should be reversed. We, of course, are bound by these decisions and,therefore, we hold that the trial court's orders adjudicating Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. neglectedminors and declaring them to be wards of the court are void for lack of jurisdiction.

We next turn to the order terminating respondent-father's parental rights and appointing aguardian with the power to consent to his children's adoption. The dispositional order in the neglectproceedings provides guidelines that, if followed, would weigh in respondent-father's favor at thesecond stage of the termination proceedings where the best interests of the children are considered. The trial court rightfully considers whether a parent is in compliance with the dispositional guidelinesin arriving at its decision of whether to terminate parental rights. See In re C.W., 199 Ill. 2d 198, 217(2002) ("evidence that a parent substantially completed offered services, or otherwise refrained fromprior objectionable conduct following removal of the child, does not somehow absolve or erase theparent's initial failing that triggered State intervention and removal of the child. Rather, such evidenceis appropriately considered at the second stage of the termination hearing, at which the courtconsiders whether it is in the best interest of the minor that parental rights be terminated. At thattime, the full range of the parent's conduct can be considered"). Regardless of the effect that the lackof notice in the neglect proceedings would have on the findings of unfitness, the lack of noticedeprived respondent-father of an opportunity to comply with the guidelines contained in thedispositional orders following the adjudication of neglect. Additionally, respondent-father wasdeprived of an opportunity to learn what he needed to do to enhance the likelihood that he would beable to preserve his parental rights. In its oral pronouncements terminating respondent-father'sparental rights, the trial court did not specify what amount of consideration it gave to respondent-father's conduct during the period after the dispositional order entered in the neglect proceedings. We must assume, therefore, that the trial court took such conduct into account. Thus, respondent-father was denied due process of law. The dispositional hearing on a neglect petition is a vital stagein the process by which parental rights may be terminated and is therefore important to the fairnessof any future termination proceeding. In re G.F.H., 315 Ill. App. 3d 711, 715-16 (2000). Accordingly, in this case, where the petition to terminate parental rights followed a neglect petition,the lack of notice of the neglect proceedings rendered the adjudicatory and dispositional orders void,denied respondent-father due process, and tainted the subsequent proceedings resulting in terminationof his parental rights. Consequently, the orders terminating respondent-father's parental rights cannotstand. We need not decide whether a parent is deprived of due process by lack of notice where thebest-interest determination is made independent of a parent's compliance with the directives in adispositional order, for example where parent-child reunification is inappropriate (see 705 ILCS405/1--2(1)(a), 2--13.1 (West 2002)) and family preservation services are, therefore, not offered.

We note that respondent-mother's notice of appeal is from the trial court's order of February28, 2002, finding her unfit and terminating her parental rights to all three of her children. The noticeof appeal references each of the trial court files concerning each of her three children. However,respondent-mother's contention on appeal is based on the lack of service to respondent-father, thefather of Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. and not of Miracle C. Respondent-mother has made no argumentregarding the propriety of the order terminating her parental rights to Miracle C. and, therefore, thosearguments are waived (188 Ill. 2d R. 341(e)(7)). Consequently, we affirm the trial court's ordersfinding Miracle C. to be a neglected minor, adjudicating her a ward of the court, and terminatingrespondent-mother's parental rights to Miracle C.

As to Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N., respondent-mother contends that the failure to serverespondent-father with proper notice of the proceedings rendered the neglect findings anddispositional orders with respect to those minors void. Respondent-mother concludes that her dueprocess rights were violated because the trial court's improper assumption of wardship of the minorstainted the subsequent termination of parental rights proceedings because the trial court found herto be unfit based on her lack of compliance with void dispositional orders. We agree.

The trial court found respondent-mother unfit based on her failure to make reasonableprogress toward the return of her children to her within nine months of the dispositional orders. See750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 2000). This finding was contingent upon a valid dispositional order,and because the dispositional orders were void, the finding of unfitness based on her lack ofcompliance with those orders and the client service plans drawn pursuant thereto was unfair anddeprived respondent-mother of due process. See G.F.H., 315 Ill. App. 3d at 715-16 (dispositionalhearing is a vital stage in the process by which parental rights may be terminated and is thereforeimportant to the fairness of any future termination proceeding). Accordingly, the trial court's orderterminating respondent-mother's parental rights to Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. cannot stand.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County terminatingrespondent-mother's parental rights to her minor child Miracle C. is affirmed. The judgment of thecircuit court terminating respondent-mother's parental rights to Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court finding Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. to be neglected minors andadjudicating them wards of the court is reversed. The judgment of the circuit court terminatingrespondent-father's parental rights to Jasmine N. and Ilsheya N. is reversed.

Appeal No. 2--02--0269, Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Appeal No. 2--02--0336, Reversed.

McLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.