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JUSTICE KAPALA delivered the opinion of the court:

The Illinois Department of Public Aid (Department) appealsfrom an order of the circuit court of Du Page County denying itspetition to increase the child support paid by respondent, RaymondWorrall, to petitioner, Roxann Worrall. We reverse that order andremand the cause for further proceedings.

On January 19, 1995, the circuit court of Du Page Countyentered a judgment dissolving the parties' marriage. The partieshad two minor children and respondent was initially ordered to pay$66 per week in child support. On October 23, 1995, the IllinoisDepartment of Public Aid (Department) entered an appearance and onJune 26, 1996, an agreed order was entered increasing the childsupport to $115 per week.

On March 24, 2000, the Department filed a petition to increaserespondent's child support, alleging a substantial change incircumstances (see 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) (West 2000)) in that bothrespondent's income and the children's needs had substantiallyincreased. The petition alternatively sought to increase childsupport based on an inconsistency of at least 20% between theamount of the existing order and the amount of support that wouldresult from the application of the guidelines. See 750 ILCS5/510(a)(2)(A) (West 2000).

The evidence at the hearing on the Department's petitionestablished that respondent was employed as an over-the-road truckdriver and his compensation consists of his base pay and an amountdesignated a "per diem," which is designed to cover expenses formeals and lodging while on the road. For instance, for the periodfrom March 18, 2001, to March 24, 2001, respondent received basepay of $1,067 and a $457 per diem. Respondent testified that whileon the road, he sleeps in his truck, but he incurs expenses to payfor showers. With reference to the per diem, respondent testified"I get so much a night to sleep in the truck from the government." The trial court excluded the per diem from respondent's income forpurposes of deciding the Department's petition. The trial courtcalculated respondent's income by averaging his income for theyears 1998, 1999, and 2000, and his projected income for 2001,resulting in an income of $34,988. The court stated as follows:

"Such an income places [respondent] in the 28 percent taxbracket, *** 25 percent Fed, three percent for the State,which under section 505 results in an average net income of$25,192."

This figure yielded guideline support in the amount of $121. Thetrial court concluded that the increase in respondent's income wasinsufficient to mandate increasing his child support obligation.Accordingly the trial court denied the Department's petition. TheDepartment brought this appeal.

The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the trial courterred in excluding the per diem from respondent's income forpurposes of calculating child support. We initially note thatrespondent has not filed an appellate brief. Nonetheless, thisappeal is amenable to a decision on the merits under the principlesof First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63Ill. 2d 128 (1976).

Section 505 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/505 (West 2000)) governsawards of child support in dissolution of marriage proceedings.Section 505(a)(1) establishes guidelines to determine the minimumamount of support. Guideline support is expressed as a percentageof the supporting parent's net income and the percentage varieswith the number of children being supported. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1)(West 2000). Here, respondent is obligated to support twochildren. The guideline support amount for two children is 25% ofthe supporting parent's net income. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(1) (West2000). The trial court must award the guideline amount unless thecourt: (1) makes a finding, after considering the best interests ofthe child, that the application of the guidelines would beinappropriate; (2) states the amount of support that would havebeen required under the guidelines, if determinable; and (3)indicates the reason or reasons for the variance from theguidelines. 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(2) (West 2000).

For purposes of determining the guideline amount, " 'Netincome' is defined as the total of all income from all sources"minus deductions for federal and state income taxes (properlycalculated withholding or estimated payments), social security,mandatory retirement contributions, union dues, dependent andindividual health/hospitalization premiums, prior support ormaintenance obligations, and, of significance here, "[e]xpendituresfor repayment of debts that represent reasonable and necessaryexpenses for the production of income." 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West2000). The case law cited by the Department illustrates that thesupporting parent bears the burden of establishing that a deductionapplies. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Minear, 181 Ill. 2d 552, 560 (1998) (even assuming that depreciation of business assetscould be deducted, supporting parent could not take the deductionbecause no evidence was offered to explain the claimed depreciationexpense); In re Marriage of Nelson, 297 Ill. App. 3d 651, 656(1998) (party claiming a deduction for depreciation as a reasonableand necessary expense for the production of income was required toshow that the expense was the repayment of a debt).

Under federal law, when an over-the-road truck driver'semployer pays a per diem allowance for meals and lodging that meetscertain requirements, the recipient may take a federal income taxdeduction in that amount without substantiating actual expenses. See generally Rev. Proc. 2001--47, 2001--42 I.R.B. 332. The amountdesignated a per diem does not necessarily correspond to any actualdeductible expenses; the recipient may spend the money as he or shesees fit. At issue here is whether a portion of a child supportobligor's compensation designated a per diem constitutes income forpurposes of setting child support.

We have observed, " 'Income' represents a 'gain or profit'[citation] and is 'ordinarily understood to be a return on theinvestment of labor or capital, thereby increasing the wealth ofthe recipient' [citations]." Villanueva v. O'Gara, 282 Ill. App.3d 147, 150 (1996). We have further noted that there is adistinction between income and the recoupment of capital. Villanueva, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 150. The issue in Villanueva waswhether, or what portion of, the net proceeds from the settlementof a product liability lawsuit constituted "income" for purposes ofmodifying child support. We held that to the extent the settlementcompensated the recipient for disability, disfigurement, pain,suffering, and reasonable past and future medical expenses, it didnot constitute income; those portions of the award served torestore the status quo prior to his injury, but did not make himricher. Villanueva, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 150-51. However, we heldthat the portion of the settlement representing past and futurelost earnings should be considered income for child supportpurposes. Villanueva, 282 Ill. App. 3d at 151.

In In re Marriage of Crossland, 307 Ill. App. 3d 292 (1999),an over-the-road truck driver argued that, in determining hisincome for child support purposes, the court should allow him totake a $36-per-day deduction permitted by the Internal RevenueService. The truck driver's employer did not designate any part ofhis compensation as a per diem. The Crossland court noted that inthe workers' compensation setting, it had been held that "paymentsto over-the-road truck drivers, designated by employers as'reimbursement,' constitute 'wages' to the extent that the paymentsrepresent real economic gain rather than actual reimbursement fortravel purposes." Crossland, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 295, citingSwearingen v. Industrial Comm'n, 298 Ill. App. 3d 666 (1998). TheCrossland court observed that "[a]lthough the definition of 'wages'for purposes of establishing workers' compensation benefits is notcoextensive with the concept of 'net income' for purposes of childsupport awards, we believe Swearingen's rationale is instructive." Crossland, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 295.

It is important to recognize that the Crossland court did notdefinitively reach the question of whether amounts properlydesignated a "per diem" should be included in income for purposesof calculating child support. It was unnecessary to do so becauseno part of the child support obligor's pay was designated as a perdiem. Viewing Crossland as a whole, the limited holding of thecase is that a parent owing support may not reduce his or herincome by an amount representing a per diem if his or her employerdoes not designate any portion of his pay as a "per diem."

Relying on Crossland, the trial court in this case ruled thatthe per diem represented income only to the extent that it exceededactual expenses and that the burden to prove the excess should beon the Department. This ruling misapprehends Crossland's limitedholding described above. In our view, the designation of a portionof respondent's pay as a per diem has no bearing on the economicreality of respondent's compensation. Respondent is free to usethat sum along with the rest of his compensation however he seesfit. Except for the tax benefits, he is in essentially the sameposition, from an economic standpoint, as he would have been if hereceived the same amount of pay without any portion designated aper diem. However, under the trial court's rationale, supportingparents earning the same total compensation and incurring the sameexpenses for meals and lodging might pay different amounts of childsupport depending on how much of the compensation, if any, isdesignated a per diem. An over-the-road truck driver who does notreceive any compensation designated a per diem would apparentlyhave to the show the applicability of a specific deduction undersection 505(a)(3) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3) (West 2000)). This he or she might be unable to do because the only potentiallyapplicable deduction is for "[e]xpenditures for repayment of debtsthat represent reasonable and necessary expenses for the productionof income." (Emphasis added.) 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(3)(h) (West 2000). See Crossland, 307 Ill. App. 3d at 294 (over-the-road trucker"concede[d] that his business travel expenses do not fall withinsubsection 505(a)(3)(h) of the Act because they do not constituterepayment of debt"). We see no reason why the amount of support aparent pays should depend on notations on his pay stub that aresimply designed to obtain advantageous tax treatment. To permitsuch a result would exalt form over substance. We thereforeconclude that per diem allowances for travel expenses generallyconstitute income for the purpose of calculating child support. This income, however, is subject to reduction to the extent thatthe child support payer can prove that the per diem was used foractual travel expenses and not for his or her economic gain.

We note that Villanueva, discussed earlier, does not requirea different result. In that case there was no question that partof the settlement paid to a child support obligor was compensationfor an injury actually suffered. Here, respondent's per diem wasonly nominally for meals and lodging; in actuality respondent could use the money for whatever purpose he chose.

General burden-of-proof principles and public policyconsiderations support our conclusion. In Snyder v. Ambrose, 266Ill. App. 3d 163, 166 (1994), this court observed:

"It is well recognized in this State that the burden ofproducing evidence chiefly, if not entirely, within thecontrol of an adverse party rests upon the same adverse partyif he would deny the existence of the facts claimed by anotheradverse party [citation]. Additionally, one need not prove anegative averment, the burden of proof being on the party whoasserts the affirmative [citation]. The United States SupremeCourt has stated, '[t]he ordinary rule, based onconsiderations of fairness, does not place the burden upon alitigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledgeof his adversary.' [Citations.] The corollary to the aboveproposition is:

'Where a party alone possesses information concerning adisputed issue of fact and fails to bring forward thatinformation, and it is shown that it can be produced byhim alone, a presumption arises in favor of hisadversary's claim of fact.' [Citation.]" Snyder, 266Ill. App. 3d at 166.

Here, the Department established that respondent had receiveda substantial pay increase. The trial court essentially imposedthe additional burden of proving a negative proposition: thatrespondent did not actually spend the amount designated a per diemfor food and lodging. Because respondent enjoyed far superioraccess to the relevant evidence, the burden should have been placedon him to prove his actual expenses for meals and lodging and toestablish a lawful basis for deducting them from his income. Moreover, unless the supporting parent bears the burden of proof,he or she will have no incentive to keep records of expenses formeals and lodging; such records are not necessary for tax purposesbut might be used against the parent in a child support proceeding. Even with liberal discovery, it might be impossible as a practicalmatter for the parent seeking support to establish the otherparent's expenses for meals and lodging. There is a strongsocietal interest in ensuring that parents provide appropriatesupport for their children. The trial court's rule rewards poorrecord keeping and facilitates a parent's efforts to avoid his orher support obligation. This is unacceptable as a matter of publicpolicy.

Accordingly, this cause is remanded for a new hearing. Atthat hearing, the trial court is directed to include inrespondent's income the entire amount of the per diem travelallowance he receives reduced by the amount actually used fortravel expenses with respondent having the burden of proving thoseexpenses.

For the foregoing reasons we reverse the order of the circuitcourt of Du Page County denying the Department's petition andremand the cause for further proceedings in accordance with thisorder.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

McLAREN and BYRNE, JJ., concur.