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JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, Amy L. Webb (Amy), appeals from a trial courtorder that assessed expenses against her, pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 219(e) (166 Ill. 2d R. 219(e)), as a condition for grantingthe voluntary dismissal of her action for dissolution of marriageagainst respondent, Patrick M. Webb (Patrick). Amy contends thatthe trial court erred by assessing the expenses under the rulewithout first determining whether she had engaged in discoverymisconduct. For the reasons that follow, we agree with Amy,reverse the order, and remand the cause for further proceedings.

On June 6, 2000, Amy filed a petition for dissolution ofmarriage against Patrick. On April 23, 2001, prior to trial, Amyfiled a petition for the voluntary dismissal of the dissolutionaction. Along with the dismissal petition, Amy tendered to Patricka check in the amount of $117 as payment of Patrick's appearancefee. On the same date, Patrick filed a motion seeking leave tofile a counterpetition for dissolution of the marriage. Patricklater also filed a motion to strike and dismiss Amy's petition forvoluntary dismissal on the ground that, in filing the petition, Amyhad not complied with local court rules.

On May 2, 2001, following a hearing on these matters, thetrial court entered an order that denied Patrick's motion to strikeand dismiss Amy's petition for voluntary dismissal; granted Amy'spetition for the voluntary dismissal of the dissolution actionwithout prejudice; pursuant to Rule 219(e), conditioned thedismissal on the payment of reasonable expenses by Amy to Patrick;and set a date for a hearing to determine the amount of theexpenses to be assessed against Amy.

On May 8, 2001, the trial court entered an order requiring Amyto pay Patrick $10,625 in expenses on or before May 21, 2001. Theorder also provided that, if Amy did not pay the expenses asordered, without further notice, the May 2, 2001, order would bevacated and Patrick's motion for leave to file a counterpetitionfor dissolution of the marriage would be granted. If Amy paid the expenses as ordered, then the dissolution action was dismissedvoluntarily. Amy's timely notice of appeal followed.

On appeal, Amy contends that she is entitled to the reversalof the May 8 order. Amy argues that the trial court erred inentering the order without first determining whether she engaged indiscovery misconduct (the discovery misconduct issue).

Patrick initially responds by arguing that we should notconsider the merits of the discovery misconduct issue because Amyfailed to raise the issue in the trial court and it is thereforewaived (the waiver argument). In addition, Patrick has filed amotion in this court to strike the first three paragraphs of Amy'sappellate reply brief. Those three paragraphs constitute Amy'sresponse to the waiver argument. In those paragraphs, Amy citesvarious places in the record and asserts that the record at thoseplaces shows that she raised the discovery misconduct issue in thetrial court. Patrick's motion seeking to strike the paragraphs wasordered taken with the case. Because the motion is directlyrelated to the waiver argument, we will consider the motion and thewaiver argument together.

In the waiver argument, Patrick asserts that Amy failed toraise the discovery misconduct issue in the trial court. As ageneral rule, questions not raised in the trial court are deemedwaived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. In reMarriage of Rodriguez, 131 Ill. 2d 273, 279 (1989).

In the first three paragraphs of her reply brief, Amy assertsthat the discovery misconduct issue is not waived because hercounsel raised the issue on several occasions in the trial court. In support of this assertion, Amy cites several places in therecord where, she argues, her counsel raised the discoverymisconduct issue. Patrick asserts in the motion to strike theparagraphs that the record, at the places Amy cites, does notsupport Amy's argument.

After carefully reviewing the record at the places indicatedby the citations in question, we conclude that the record supportsAmy's argument. The first pages in the record that Amy cites arepages 19 through 21 in the report of the proceedings for the May 2hearing. Patrick's counsel had just argued that, under SupremeCourt Rule 219(e) (166 Ill. 2d R. 219(e)), a trial court couldrequire a party seeking to voluntarily dismiss a claim to pay anopposing party's reasonable expenses incurred in defending theaction such as discovery expenses, opinion witness fees,reproduction costs, travel expenses, postage, and phone charges. Patrick claimed that he was entitled to be reimbursed for more than$16,000 in such expenses.

As part of his response, Amy's attorney stated:

"[L]et's look at Supreme Court Rule 219. Is there any ordersaying my client did something wrong as far as discovery goes? I don't believe there is. I certainly haven't seen one. Isthere anything my client has done wrong? And the answer isno. 219 is a discovery rule, your Honor."

After the trial court asked Amy's counsel if another supremecourt rule authorized the assessment of expenses such as those inquestion, the response of Amy's counsel included the following:

"These depositions and these costs [sic] must have beenabsolutely necessary in prosecuting the case, number one. Andthere also must be some finding that [Amy] either didsomething -- didn't comply with discovery, violated a ruleregarding discovery, so on and so forth.

[Patrick's] [c]ounsel has not said any of those things. What he said was, we don't want her to dismiss her case. Let's stick her with, you know, a mountain of costs [sic]. The law does not provide for that, nor does the case law, yourHonor."

Our reading of these passages and other similar passages inthe record at the places cited by Amy convinces us that Amy'scounsel plainly argued in the trial court that in order for thecourt to properly assess expenses against Amy under Rule 219(e) itwas necessary that there be a finding that Amy engaged in discoverymisconduct. We believe these arguments sufficiently raised thediscovery misconduct issue in the trial court to overcome Patrick'swaiver argument. Accordingly, the waiver argument fails andPatrick's motion to strike the first three paragraphs of Amy'sreply brief is denied. We now turn to the merits of the discoverymisconduct issue.

The discovery misconduct issue involves the trial court'sconstruction of Supreme Court Rule 219(e) (166 Ill. 2d R. 219(e)).Amy contends that the trial court erred when it construed Rule219(e) to allow it to require her to pay Patrick his expenses ofdefending the dissolution action, as a condition of granting herpetition to voluntarily dismiss the dissolution action, withoutfirst determining whether she had engaged in discovery misconduct. Amy argues that the proper construction of Rule 219(e) requires atrial court to determine whether a party has engaged in discoverymisconduct before assessing such expenses against the party.

The discovery misconduct issue involves the construction of asupreme court rule. The construction of a supreme court rule is aquestion of law subject to de novo review. In re Marriage ofZuberbier, 309 Ill. App. 3d 386, 388 (1999). In interpreting asupreme court rule, we apply the same principles that are employedto construe a statute, and our goal is to determine the intent ofthe drafters of the rule. Zuberbier, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 388.

In support of her contention that the trial court erred inconstruing Rule 219(e), Amy relies heavily on Scattered Corp. v.Midwest Clearing Corp., 299 Ill. App. 3d 653 (1998). The plaintiffin Scattered Corp. brought an action alleging conversion and breachof contract. Prior to trial, after discovery had largely closed,the plaintiff filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the casewithout prejudice pursuant to section 2--1009 of the Code of CivilProcedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1009 (West 1996)). The defendantresponded by filing a petition for reimbursement of its reasonableexpenses pursuant to Rule 219(e). Without determining whether theplaintiff had engaged in discovery misconduct, the trial courtawarded the defendant more than $135,000 as reasonable expenses andrequired the plaintiff to pay this amount to the defendant as acondition of granting the voluntary dismissal. After the trialcourt denied the plaintiff's motions to stay the judgment, withdrawthe dismissal, and amend the complaint, the plaintiff appealed. Scatterred Corp., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 655-66.

In Scattered Corp., the appellate court stated that the issuebefore it was whether a trial court, in considering a motion tovoluntarily dismiss an action in the context of a request forexpenses pursuant to Rule 219(e), was required by Rule 219(e) tomake a preliminary finding as to whether the party seeking todismiss the action had engaged in discovery misconduct before itcould impose expenses under the rule. Thus, the issue in ScatteredCorp. was virtually identical to the discovery misconduct issueraised by Amy in this case.

In resolving the issue, the Scattered Corp. court first notedthat Rule 219 was entitled "Consequences of Refusal to Comply withRules or Order Relating to Discovery or Pretrial Conferences." 166Ill. 2d R. 219. The court then considered the language of Rule219(e), which provides:

"A party shall not be permitted to avoid compliance withdiscovery deadlines, orders or applicable rules by voluntarilydismissing a lawsuit. In establishing discovery deadlines andruling on permissible discovery and testimony, the court shallconsider discovery undertaken (or the absence of same), anymisconduct, and orders entered in prior litigation involvinga party. The court may, in addition to the assessment ofcosts, require the party voluntarily dismissing a claim to payan opposing party or parties reasonable expenses incurred indefending the action including but not limited to discoveryexpenses, opinion witness fees, reproduction costs, travelexpenses, postage, and phone charges." 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(e).

The Scattered Corp. court determined that the language of Rule219(e) was ambiguous because the words "avoid compliance" in Rule219(e) were susceptible to reasonably divergent interpretations. The words were ambiguous because, by definition, a voluntarydismissal necessarily avoided all further litigation obligations. The court then turned to the committee comments related to Rule219(e), which provide:

"Paragraph (e) addresses the use of voluntary dismissalsto avoid compliance with discovery rules or deadlines, or toavoid the consequences of discovery failures, or ordersbarring witnesses or evidence. This paragraph does not changeexisting law regarding the right of a party to seek or obtaina voluntary dismissal. However, this paragraph does clearlydictate that when a case is refiled, the court shall considerthe prior litigation in determining what discovery will bepermitted, and what witnesses and evidence may be barred. Theconsequences of noncompliance with discovery deadlines, rulesor orders cannot be eliminated by taking a voluntarydismissal. Paragraph (e) further authorizes the court torequire the party taking the dismissal to pay the out-of-pocket expenses actually incurred by the adverse party orparties. This rule reverses the holdings in In re Air CrashDisaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, 259 Ill. App.3d 231, 631 N.E.2d 1302 (1st Dist. 1994), and Galowich v.Beech Aircraft Corp., 209 Ill. App. 3d 128, 568 N.E.2d 46 (1stDist. 1991). Paragraph (e) does not provide for the paymentof attorney fees when an action is voluntarily dismissed." 166 Ill. 2d R. 219(e), Committee Comments, at cxiv.

The Scattered Corp. court stated that the statement in thecommittee comments that "[t]he consequences of noncompliance withdiscovery deadlines, rules or orders cannot be eliminated by takinga voluntary dismissal" (166 Ill. 2d R. 219(e), Committee Comments,at cxiv) had a "particular resonance" for it in construing Rule219(e). Scattered Corp., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 658. The courtexplained that it believed the committee's emphasis onnoncompliance indicated that there must be some "disobedience" onthe plaintiff's part in order for the rule to apply. ScatteredCorp., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 658. The court also stated that thecommittee's reference to the case of In re Air Crash Disasterfurther supported its interpretation of Rule 219(e). ScatteredCorp., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 658.

The Scattered Corp. court then stated:

"Based upon the language of Rule 219(e) and illuminationfrom the Committee Comments, we find that Rule 219(e)'sreference to voluntary dismissals taken to 'avoid compliance'with 'discovery deadlines, orders or applicable rules' (166Ill. 2d R. 219(e)) requires the circuit court to make apreliminary finding of misconduct, analogous to the'unreasonable noncompliance' standard invoked in Rule 219(c)cases (166 Ill. 2d R. 219(c)), before imposing expensespursuant to Rule 219(e). [Citation.] To determine whetherthe noncompliance is unreasonable, the standard is whether theconduct of the noncomplying party shows a deliberate,contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the court'sauthority. [Citation.]" Scattered Corp., 299 Ill. App. 3d at659.

Finally, the Scattered Corp. court stated that itsconstruction of Rule 219(e) was "consistent with the language andspirit of the authority vested in the circuit court pursuant toSupreme Court Rule 219 generally and Rule 219(c) in particular. [Citation]." Scattered Corp., 299 Ill. App. 3d at 659. The courtthen noted that Rule 219(c) allowed for a continuum of sanctionsfor discovery violations and added, "we believe the purposes behindRule 219(c) and Rule 219(e) are similar." Scattered Corp., 299Ill. App. 3d at 659. Based on its construction of Rule 219(e), theScattered Corp. court reversed the order awarding expenses to thedefendant because the trial court had not made the required findingas to whether the plaintiff engaged in discovery misconduct.

Patrick responds that this court should not adopt thereasoning in Scattered Corp. because it is unpersuasive in view ofour supreme court's opinion in Morrison v. Wagner, 191 Ill. 2d 162(2000), and in view of the plain language of Rule 219(e). InMorrison, the issue before the court was whether Rule 219(e)conferred authority on a trial court to deny a pretrial motion forvoluntary dismissal that was filed pursuant to section 2--1009(a)of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2--1009(a) (West 2000)). Morrison, 191 Ill. 2d at 163. The court ruled that Rule 219(e)does not limit a party's right to voluntarily dismiss an actionwithout prejudice prior to trial and explained that this was sobecause "Rule 219(e) prevents voluntary dismissals from being usedas an artifice for evading discovery requirements through twoentirely different mechanisms." Morrison, 191 Ill. 2d at 166. Thecourt identified these mechanisms as the possible assessment ofcosts as a condition of taking a voluntary dismissal and thepossible attachment of adverse consequences if the party whoobtained the dismissal seeks to refile the action.

Accordingly, the Morrison court ruled that the trial courterred in basing its denial of the plaintiffs' motion for avoluntary dismissal on Rule 219(e). The court stated "[i]f the[plaintiffs] deserved to be sanctioned under Rule 219(e) fordismissing their case in order to avoid compliance with discoveryrequirements, the court could have assessed the additional expensesspecified by the rule." Morrison, 191 Ill. 2d at 167. The courtthen remanded the cause with directions to grant the plaintiffs'motion for voluntary dismissal and to conduct a hearing todetermine whether the plaintiffs should be assessed additionalexpenses as authorized by Rule 219(e).

Contrary to Patrick's assertions, we find nothing in Morrisonthat requires us to repudiate the Scattered Corp. reasoning. TheMorrison court simply did not address the discovery misconductissue that is before us in this case and even cited Scattered Corp.with approval on another point. Moreover, to the extent thatMorrison did address the requirements for allowing the assessmentof expenses under Rule 219(e), it did so by referring to sanctionsagainst a party who has sought to avoid compliance with discoveryrequirements. To the extent that this in any way impinges on theScattered Corp. reasoning, it supports it. For these reasons, weconclude that Patrick's reliance on Morrison as support for hisargument that we should not follow Scattered Corp. is misplaced.

Patrick next argues that the plain language of Rule 219(e)shows that the Scattered Corp. construction of the rule waserroneous. We disagree. In our view, the Scattered Corp. courtcorrectly determined that the terms "avoid compliance" in Rule219(e) were central to a resolution of the discovery misconductissue and that the terms were ambiguous. It was thereforeappropriate for the court to turn to the committee comments as an aid in construing Rule 219(e). We agree with Scattered Corp. thatthe committee comments show that the committee emphasizednoncompliance and that this emphasis indicated that there must besome misconduct on a plaintiff's part in order for the rule toapply. Consequently, we also agree with the Scattered Corp.conclusion that, before imposing expenses pursuant to Rule 219(e),a trial court must make a preliminary finding as to whether theplaintiff engaged in discovery misconduct. Accordingly, Patrick'sreliance on the plain language of the rule does not persuade usthat the Scattered Corp. court erred in construing Rule 219(e).

Finally, Patrick argues that we should affirm the trialcourt's ruling because, even if Rule 219(e) requires a finding ofdiscovery misconduct before expenses can be imposed on a partyseeking a voluntary dismissal, the record in this case containssufficient justification for the imposition of expenses under therule against Amy. It is undisputed that the trial court did notmake a determination as to whether Amy engaged in discoverymisconduct. "[I]t is the province of the circuit court to makesuch factual determinations." Scattered Corp., 299 Ill. App. 3d at661. Accordingly, Patrick's argument fails.

In sum, because the trial court erred by not making apreliminary determination of whether Amy engaged in discoverymisconduct before it assessed expenses against Amy under Rule219(e) as a condition for allowing her to voluntarily dismiss herdissolution action, the trial court's order entered on May 8, 2001,is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedingsconsistent with this opinion.

Reversed and remanded.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and GEIGER, J., concur.