In re Marriage of Rhodes
Case Date: 12/14/2001
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-01-0515 Rel
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December 14, 2001
JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court: The respondent, Rhonda Rhodes, appeals from the April 10,2001, order of the circuit court of De Kalb County declaring voidthe written consent to adoption executed by the petitioner, DonaldRhodes. In this consent, Donald voluntarily relinquished hisparental rights to his daughter, Ashley Rhodes. On appeal, Rhondaargues that a trial court in a dissolution of marriage proceedinglacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the validity of a written consentto adoption executed pursuant to the provisions of the Adoption Act(750 ILCS 50/10 (West 2000)). We conclude that the trial court didnot have jurisdiction to consider the validity of the consent andvacate its judgment. The parties were married in 1987. The parties had twochildren together, Ashley, born in 1987, and Bryan, born in 1988. On June 30, 1993, Donald filed a petition for dissolution ofmarriage. On August 11, 1993, a default judgment for dissolutionof marriage was entered, and Donald was awarded custody of thechildren. No action was taken in the case for the next sevenyears. On July 31, 2000, Rhonda filed a petition to modify custody,requesting that she be awarded custody of Ashley. On September 18,2000, by agreement of the parties, Rhonda was awarded temporarycustody of Ashley. On December 19, 2000, Donald executed a finaland irrevocable consent to the adoption of Ashley. The documentwas in the form prescribed by section 10(A) of the Adoption Act(750 ILCS 50/10(A) (West 2000)) and was acknowledged by the trialjudge. Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears thatDonald executed the consent in order to allow Rhonda's boyfriend toadopt Ashley. On April 3, 2001, Donald filed a motion seeking a declarationthat his written consent to the adoption of Ashley was invalid. Donald alleged that Rhonda had not married her boyfriend and hadnot initiated any adoption proceedings. Donald further allegedthat, despite the fact that he continued to pay child support forAshley, Rhonda had delivered a copy of the consent to Ashley'sschool and instructed the administration that Donald was not to begiven any information regarding Ashley. The motion requested thatRhonda be ordered to return the original consent executed byDonald, as well as all copies. On April 10, 2001, the trial court granted the motion anddeclared Donald's written consent to be "void and of no effect, inas much as [Donald's] parental rights have never been terminated." The trial court also ordered Rhonda to return the original writtenconsent to Donald. The trial court subsequently denied Rhonda'smotion to vacate this order, and Rhonda filed a timely notice ofappeal. Rhonda's sole argument on appeal is that the trial courtlacked jurisdiction to enter its order declaring Donald's writtenconsent void and of no effect. Rhonda argues that, because theinstant action was initiated under the Illinois Marriage andDissolution of Marriage Act (the Marriage Act)(750 ILCS 5/101 etseq. (West 2000)), the trial court's power to act was limited tothe power conferred by that statute. Rhonda asserts that theMarriage Act does not confer upon the trial court the power toinvalidate a written consent to adoption. In response, Donaldargues that the trial court had in personam jurisdiction over theparties and had jurisdiction over the subject matter pursuant toarticle VI, section 9, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, |
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