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After a trial, the trial court dissolved the marriage ofpetitioner, Tara Menken, and respondent, George Menken, awardedmaintenance and child support, and divided the marital assets. Thecourt awarded petitioner, among other things, 60% of the retirementbenefits respondent earned as a member of the Rockford policedepartment. On appeal, respondent contends that the trial courtlacked the authority to order him to sign a consent formauthorizing petitioner to receive the retirement benefits directlypursuant to a qualified Illinois domestic relations order (QILDRO). See 40 ILCS 5/1--119(b)(1) (West 2000). We vacate the orderrequiring respondent to sign the consent form and affirm in allother respects.

The parties were married on August 4, 1973. Respondent hadbeen a member of the Rockford police department since January 1977and participated in the Rockford Police Pension Fund. At the timeof the trial, the value of respondent's pension was approximately$2,250 per month.

On December 5, 2000, the trial court issued its memorandumdecision awarding petitioner "60% of [respondent's] retirementbenefits, which is $1,350.00 per month, *** to be distributed to[petitioner] pursuant to a QILDRO providing [respondent] agrees tosign an appropriate consent form, however, this is continued ***for further hearing." In the portion of the memorandum decisionaddressing attorney fees, the court stated:

"Should [respondent] agree to sign the appropriateconsent to distribute his pension pursuant to a QILDRO, theCourt may not order [respondent] to pay [petitioner's] entireattorneys fees and costs, and instead may or may not order[respondent] to contribute any sums to [petitioner.] However,should [respondent] refuse to sign said consent, the Court mayorder [respondent] to pay all of [petitioner's] attorneys feesas determined by the hearing to be reasonable and customarywithin the community." (Emphasis in original.)

During a hearing on February 1, 2001, respondent's counselindicated that respondent had decided not to sign a QILDRO consentform.

On February 15, 2001, the trial court entered a judgmentdissolving the parties' marriage, awarding maintenance and childsupport, and dividing the marital property in accordance with thefindings in the memorandum decision. Also on that date, the courtconducted a hearing and awarded petitioner $6,500 towards herattorney fees and ordered respondent to pay petitioner, upon hisretirement and within 10 days of receiving his monthly pensionbenefits, $1,350 per month.

On March 14, 2001, respondent moved to reconsider the trialcourt's attorney fees award. Respondent asserted that the feeaward was not based on the proper statutory factors but instead waspunishment for respondent's refusal to consent to a QILDRO.

During the hearing on the motion to reconsider, the trialcourt stated:

"[T]he court has done some research concerning theseQILDROs, and there is no case that's available as to whetheror not the court can order *** a participant to sign a consentform. Therefore, on motion of the court, the court isordering [respondent] to sign the consent form ***.

And, in view of that, the court is modifying the judgmentorder which would reduce attorneys' fees *** from $6,500 to$5,000."

The trial court entered an order reflecting these findings. Thecourt stayed the enforcement of the order requiring respondent tosign the consent form, and respondent timely appealed.

Initially, we note that petitioner has not filed an appellee'sbrief. Because the record is not long and the legal issue raisedon appeal can be decided without the aid of an appellee's brief, wewill address the merits. See First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v.Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).

This appeal requires us to examine section 1--119 of theIllinois Pension Code (Code), which created the QILDRO. 40 ILCS5/1--119 (West 2000). Respondent contends that the trial courtlacked the authority to order him to consent to a QILDRO undersection 1--119 of the Code.

It is well settled that pension benefits earned during themarriage are considered marital property and, upon dissolution, aresubject to division like any other property. In re Marriage ofAbma, 308 Ill. App. 3d 605, 615 (1999); see also 750 ILCS5/503(b)(2) (West 2000). Before July 1, 1999, which was theeffective date of section 1--119, no statute in Illinois authorizeda domestic relations court to order the payment of a governmentalpension benefit to a person other than the regular payee. Smithberg v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 192 Ill. 2d 291,301 (2000). However, section 1--119 now provides for QILDROs, andstates as follows:

"An Illinois court of competent jurisdiction in aproceeding for *** dissolution of marriage that provides forthe distribution of property *** may order that all or anypart of any (i) retirement benefit or (ii) member's refundpayable to or on behalf of the member be instead paid by theretirement system to a designated alternate payee." 40 ILCS5/1--119(b)(1) (West 2000).

Respondent's objection to the trial court's order is based onsection 1--119(m), which provides:

"(1) In accordance with Article XIII, Section 5 of theIllinois Constitution, which prohibits the impairment ordiminishment of benefits granted under this Code, a QILDROissued against a member of a retirement system establishedunder an Article of this Code that exempts the payment ofbenefits or refunds from attachment, garnishment, judgment orother legal process shall not be effective without the writtenconsent of the member if the member began participating in theretirement system on or before the effective date of thisSection. ***

(2) A member's consent to the issuance of a QILDRO shallbe irrevocable, and shall apply to any QILDRO that pertains tothe alternate payee and retirement system named in theconsent." 40 ILCS 5/1--119(m) (West 2000).

It appears that no court has had an occasion to interpretsection 1--119 of the Code. In interpreting section 1--119, ourprimary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of thelegislature. In re Marriage of Kates, 198 Ill. 2d 156, 163 (2001). The best evidence of legislative intent is the statute's language,which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. Kates, 198Ill. 2d at 163.

We find that the language of section 1--119(m)(1) is clear. This statutory language plainly indicates that, absent thepensioner's consent, section 1--119's effect on pension rights isto be applied prospectively. Before section 1--119's enactment, atrial court in a dissolution of marriage proceeding could not ordera governmental pension fund to distribute benefits directly to analternate payee. See In re Marriage of Roehn, 216 Ill. App. 3d891, 895 (1991) (holding that, in cases involving governmentalpensions, although a spouse may be awarded a portion of the otherspouse's retirement benefits, the payments must go "triangularly"from the retirement fund to the retiree to the spouse). Now, aQILDRO may be issued against an individual participating in aretirement system on or before the effective date of section 1--119only if the individual consents.

This consent provision apparently was included to protect apensioner's rights under article XIII, section 5, of the IllinoisConstitution, which provides that "[m]embership in any pension orretirement system of the State, any unit of local government orschool district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall bean enforceable contractual relationship, the benefits of whichshall not be diminished or impaired." Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIII,