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In re Marriage of Konchar, No. 2-98-1236

2nd District, 6 April 2000

JUSTICE GEIGER delivered the opinion of the court:

In a postdecree marriage dissolution proceeding, the petitioner, George Konchar, filed a petition for attorney fees. The trialcourt denied the petition because it found that the petition was not timely filed. The petitioner now appeals, arguing that thetrial court erred in denying his petition for attorney fees. We affirm.

On June 30, 1993, the trial court dissolved the parties' marriage, and custody of the parties' minor son was subsequentlyawarded to the respondent, Anna Clara Ionta. On April 11, 1997, the respondent filed a motion to suspend or to supervisethe petitioner's visitation with the parties' minor son, and an amended motion was filed later. The petitioner filed a motionto dismiss the respondent's amended motion, and he included in that motion a one-sentence prayer for attorney fees. Insubsequent motions to dismiss the respondent's motion to suspend or to supervise the petitioner's visitation with the parties'son, the petitioner also included a one-sentence prayer for attorney fees. On April 15, 1998, the trial court granted therespondent's motion in part, denied the motion in part, and established a new visitation schedule. The trial court's order didnot address the petitioner's prayer for attorney fees.

On May 13, 1998, the petitioner filed a petition for attorney fees. The petitioner claimed that he could not pay the feesbecause he was unemployed and disabled. A record delineating the time spent and costs incurred in representing thepetitioner was attached to the petition for attorney fees. The trial court subsequently denied the petition for attorney feesbecause the petition was not heard and decided before the April 15, 1998, judgment was entered. This appeal followed.

The petitioner argues that the trial court erred in denying his petition for attorney fees. The petitioner claims that section508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/508 (West 1998)) applies to postdecreemarriage dissolution cases and section 503 of the Act (750 ILCS 5/503 (West 1998)) applies to predecree marriagedissolution cases. The petitioner alleges that, because this cause is a postdecree marriage dissolution case, section 508 of theAct should apply, and, under section 508, the petitioner is entitled to attorney fees. The respondent claims that a petition forattorney fees filed after the close of proofs in a final hearing is untimely under either section 503 or 508 of the Act. Therespondent argues that the trial court properly dismissed the petition for attorney fees because the petition was filed after theclose of proofs and after the final judgment was entered.

Before June 1, 1997, section 508 of the Act exclusively governed petitions for attorney fees. 750 ILCS 5/508 (West 1994).However, effective June 1, 1997, section 508 of the Act was substantially amended and section 503(j) of the Act was added.See Pub. Act. 89--712,