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Dhia was born in Iraq and came to the United States in 1980. Dhiasubsequently became a citizen of the United States. Dhia and Dawn were marriedin August 1993. Three children were born during the marriage: Marina was bornon September 22, 1994; Ibrahim was born on May 13, 1996; and Ismail was born onMay 9, 1998. On July, 20, 1999, Dhia filed a petition for the dissolution ofmarriage. At the time of this appeal, the petition for the dissolution remainspending, and the parties' children have been placed in the temporary custody ofDawn.

On August 17, 1999, the trial court entered an order granting Dhiavisitation on Wednesday evenings and on alternating Saturdays and Sundays. Thetrial court's order required that all visitation take place in the area of DuPage, Cook, Kane, and Lake Counties. The trial court imposed these restrictionsout of concern that Dhia presented a "risk of flight" and would take the childrenoutside of the jurisdiction.

On December 29, 1999, the trial court entered an order modifying thevisitation schedule to permit Dhia to have overnight visitation. The trial courtfound that the "risk of flight" had been reduced as a result of the fact that thechildren's passports were being held by Dawn's attorney. The trial court hadalso received the written report of Dr. Gerald Blechman, the psychologist who hadbeen appointed to perform a custody evaluation. In his report, Dr. Blechmanfound no evidence indicating that either party had abused the children. In fact,Dr. Blechman recommended that Dhia be awarded custody of the children.

On February 8, 2001, Dawn filed an emergency petition for a temporaryrestraining order and a preliminary injunction. In her petition, Dawn allegedthat there was a substantial risk that Dhia would abduct the parties' childrenand take them out of the United States. In support of her petition, Dawn allegedthat Dhia had made threats to remove the children from this country. Dhia wasalso alleged to have purchased a home in Iraq. Dawn requested that the trialcourt enter an order (1) preventing Dhia from removing the children fromIllinois; (2) requiring that all visitation be supervised; (3) requiring Dhia tosubmit to an evaluation for risk of abduction; and (4) requiring Dhia to post abond to ensure compliance with the court's order.

On February 8, 2001, the trial court entered an order denying Dawn'srequest for a temporary restraining order. The trial court found that Dawn didnot have a likelihood of succeeding on the merits. However, the trial court didenter a temporary restraining order prohibiting the removal of the children fromIllinois.

Between February 16, 2001, and March 9, 2001, the trial court conducted anevidentiary hearing on Dawn's petition for a preliminary injunction. At thehearing, Dawn testified to a number of statements Dhia allegedly made regardinghis intent to take the children from her. These statements were as follows:

September 16, 1999: Dhia told Dawn that his family had picked a new

wife for him in Baghdad named Norah.

September 19, 1999: Dhia told Dawn that he would get the childrenaway from Dawn and her family.

October 30, 1999: Dhia told Dawn that he would take the childrenand never bring them back. Dhia also said that,although he was without a passport, he could takethe children and hide with them in the UnitedStates.

January 5, 2000: Dhia told Dawn that he would not bring thechildren back someday.

June 9, 2000: Dhia told Dawn that the children would notconvert to Christianity and that, if he had to,he and the children would jump off the SearsTower. Dhia also told Dawn that nobody couldprotect her, not even "her f---ing president."

August 5, 2000: Dhia said he was waiting to get half of the moneyso that he could get Dawn out of the children'slives.

November 16, 2000: Dhia told the children that they would never staywith Dawn.

January 19, 2001: Dhia told his daughters that they were onlyliving with Dawn temporarily. Dhia also referredto Dawn as a whore and a "born-again f---ingChristian" and told Dawn that she would not seetheir daughter Marina at age 11.

January 30, 2001: Dhia allegedly said that the final destination ofthe children was with him and that she wouldnever see them.

Dawn offered into evidence tape recordings that documented some of thealleged conversations detailed above. Dawn made these recordings without Dhia'sknowledge. Over Dhia's objection, these recordings were admitted into evidence. The trial court found that the recordings were made under the reasonablesuspicion that Dhia had committed or was about to commit a criminal offense. See720 ILCS 5/14--3(i) (West 2000).

Dawn also testified that in September 2000 Dhia had been convicted ofdomestic battery and violating an order of protection. These convictions stemmedfrom an incident in which Dhia allegedly punched Dawn on the head. The incidenttook place in front of the parties' son, Ibrahim. Certified copies of theseconvictions were admitted into evidence.

Dawn testified that late in 1997 Dhia's sister called from Iraq to tell himthat the house next door to the house where Dhia's parents lived was for sale for$35,000. Dhia told Dawn that the house would be a beautiful villa for them. Dawn agreed to the purchase, and Dhia gave his mother the money to purchase thehome. Dawn testified that the money was not given to Dhia's mother as a loan,but was instead intended to buy the parties a home in Baghdad. Dawn testifiedthat she was not happy about the purchase, but that she would prefer to move toBaghdad than have her family broken apart.

Dawn also testified at length concerning Dhia's income. Dhia worked as anX-ray repair technician. Dawn testified that he earned $65,000 in 1998. It wasDawn's belief that Dhia had underreported his income on his 1999 tax returns andthat he was purposely hiding his income. Dhia's 1999 tax return indicated thathe had only $13,000 in income. However, in 1999, Dhia told Dawn that he wasworking on various projects that would net approximately $50,000. Dawn testifiedthat Dhia withdrew $20,000 from the parties' Schwab account and approximately$5,000 from his business account to pay for expenses for one of these jobs. Oncross-examination, Dawn denied any knowledge of loans that Dhia had allegedlytaken to buy parts for these jobs.

Dhia also testified at the hearing. Dhia denied that he had everthreatened to abduct the children or take them out of the United States. Dhiaalso testified that he had no intention to return to Iraq. He explained that hewould be in danger if he returned to Iraq because he had become a United Statescitizen and because he had not fought for Iraq during the Iran/Iraq War andduring Desert Storm. On cross-examination, Dhia denied making many of thestatements testified to by Dawn. However, after the tape-recorded conversationswere admitted into evidence, he acknowledged that he made the statements on thetape. Dhia also acknowledged that he had previously stated that he might returnto Iraq after Saddam Hussein dies.

Regarding the home purchase in Baghdad, Dhia denied that the partiespurchased the house for themselves. Rather, Dhia testified that the parties gavethe money for the purchase price of the home as a gift to his parents. Dhiaacknowledged that his parents already owned a home next door to the house thatwas purchased. In an earlier hearing, Dhia had testified that his parents' homewas "falling apart" and that they needed a new one.

Concerning his income, Dhia testified that he was paid $48,000 for a jobthat he completed in 1999. Of this amount, Dhia used $42,000 to repay loans hehad taken in order to purchase parts for the job. Dhia denied that he withdrew$20,000 from the parties' Schwab account to pay the expenses for this job. However, Dhia acknowledged that $20,000 was probably withdrawn from the accountfor a different job. Dhia also acknowledged that he received payments totalingapproximately $35,000 for other jobs he performed between June 1, 1999, andDecember 12, 1999. Of this amount, Dhia directed a wire transfer of $27,029 tohis brother's account.

Dr. Robert Shapiro testified that he had been appointed by the trial courtto conduct a psychological examination of the parties pursuant to Supreme CourtRule 215 (166 Ill. 2d R. 215). Dr. Shapiro's examination extended over a seven-month period during which he interviewed the parties on four separate occasionsand interviewed the children once. During one of these interviews, Dhia statedthat Du Page County was the "County of Rolando Cruz" and that the people are outto get everybody who is not white. Diaz also stated that there was a conspiracybetween the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) that, in the event of civil unrest, they would round up allthe Arabs and all people of the Muslim faith.

Dr. Shapiro also testified as to the results of the psychological testinghe performed on Dhia. Dr. Shapiro found that Dhia suffered from ethnic anxietyand paranoia regarding his status in the United States. Dr. Shapiro reportedthat Dhia exhibited a strong tendency toward defensiveness; he exhibited anxiety,demandingness, and a mistrust of others. Dr. Shapiro found some evidence thatDhia was purposely or unconsciously attempting to alienate the children fromDawn. Dr. Shapiro testified that Dhia had some of the characteristics that fallwithin the definition of sociopathic behavior.

During their interview with Dr. Shapiro, the parties' children indicatedthat Dawn liked Dhia, but that Dhia did not like Dawn or her parents. Thechildren explained that the reason that Dhia did not like Dawn was that she wasChristian. Dhia told the children that Christians are evil. Dhia also told thechildren that their new mother was going to be a woman named Norah.

Dr. Gerald Blechman testified that he was appointed by the trial court toperform a custody evaluation. Dr. Blechman performed his evaluation byinterviewing the parties and performing psychological testing. Dr. Blechman alsoobserved the parties interact with the children and reviewed the relevantdocuments appearing in the court file. In regard to Dhia, Dr. Blechman foundthat he indicated a strong tendency toward defensive posturing. Dhia underplayedpossible problem areas, while assessing his strengths unrealistically favorably. In response to inquiries concerning Dawn's fear of abduction, Dhia stated thathe would not interfere with Dawn's relationship with the children and he had nointention of leaving the country because his business and family ties were in theUnited States. Additionally, Dhia stated that it would be "suicidal" for him togo to Iraq. Based upon his investigation, Dr. Blechman found that there was noindication of any abusive patterns between Dhia and the children and that therewas no risk of abduction.

Dr. Blechman concluded that both parties were appropriate and good parentsfor the children. However, Dr. Blechman recommended that Dhia be awarded custodyof the children because his schedule permitted him to be more of a full-timeparent. On cross-examination, Dr. Blechman acknowledged that his recommendationswould be different if Dhia had indeed made threats that he might abduct thechildren. Dr. Blechman also testified that he might reconsider hisrecommendation if a majority of the alleged statements made by Dhia to Dawn weretrue.

Maureen Dabbagh was called as an expert witness on Dawn's behalf. Dabbaghtestified that she had been employed as a consultant in international childabduction since 1994. Dabbagh became involved in the area of child abductionafter her former husband abducted her daughter. Dabbagh's geographical area ofconcentration and experience was the Middle East. In addition to providingevaluations in individual cases to determine the risk for possible childabduction, she provides evaluations and strategies for coordinating recoveriesof children who have been abducted. Dabbagh obtains her clients byrecommendations through law firms, the FBI, the State Department, and othernongovernmental entities.

In regard to her experience, Dabbagh testified that she had been involvedin 300 actual cases. Of these 300 cases, 250 involved child recovery and 50involved performing a prevention evaluation. Of the 250 recovery cases, shetestified that she has assisted in the successful recovery of 60 children who hadbeen abducted to another country. Dabbagh attends and has spoken at the annualInternational PARENT Conference in Washington, D.C., and was a speaker at the1999 European Conference in London concerning child abduction issues. She hasalso attended and spoken at seminars concerning child abduction sponsored by theAmerican Bar Association (ABA) and the Vanished Children's Alliance. The UnitedStates Justice Department also invited her to participate in Team HOPE, a programdesigned to create a team of individuals knowledgeable in various areas ofmissing children. She has also participated in the drafting of certain federaland state legislation concerning issues of international child abduction. Dabbagh has also published three books relating to the recovery ofinternationally abducted children.

Dabbagh testified that she had received no formal education relating toher field and that her only degree was in nursing. Dabbagh testified that shehas learned about her field through her extensive reading and research of theliterature in the area and her participation in the seminars described above. Dabbagh indicated that she has testified as an expert in international childabduction in 20 other cases. The purpose of her testimony in these cases was toprovide her opinions as to a noncustodial parent's risk to abduct. These casestook place in Michigan, Maryland, Utah, Kansas, Texas, Tennessee, and Indiana.

Following this initial testimony, Dawn tendered Dabbagh to the trial courtto be qualified as an expert. Dhia objected to the tender, arguing that Dabbaghhad no education or experience that would allow her to articulate and evaluatethe relevant criteria for profiling whether an individual poses an abductionrisk. Dhia argued that Dabbagh had failed to demonstrate that there was anyaccepted body of knowledge or standards upon which she could render an opinionas an expert.

The trial court allowed Dabbagh to testify as a nonscientific expert overDhia's objection. The trial court explained that the risk of abduction was anissue before the court and that, to the extent that Dabbagh's experience orbackground would be helpful in the consideration of these issues, her testimonywas admissible. Although the trial court acknowledged Dhia's concerns as towhether there was a body of knowledge to support Dabbagh's testimony, the trialcourt found that this concern went to the weight to be given the testimony ratherthan its admissibility.

Dabbagh then testified regarding her opinions in the case. Dabbaghexplained that Dhia was a "dual national," a citizen of both the United Statesand Iraq. Dabbagh explained that, despite Dhia's naturalization, he continuesto be an Iraqi citizen. As a dual national, Dhia can travel on either his UnitedStates or Iraqi passport. Even if Dhia's Iraqi passport had been confiscated orexpired, he could obtain another one through the Iraqi Intersection inWashington, D.C. Even without a passport, he could still travel to Iraq as longas he could prove his Iraqi nationality upon arrival. Dabbagh also testifiedthat the parties' children are also dual nationals because their mother isAmerican and their father is Iraqi-born. In light of their dual national status,Dhia and the children could all travel to Iraq without United States or Iraqipassports.

As the basis of her analysis, Dabbagh considered six risk factors that havebeen identified as common to all abductors. These factors are (1) an individualwho feels disenfranchised from the system; (2) the presence of sociopathictendencies; (3) a parent's belief that there is ongoing abuse against the childby the other parent; (4) verbal threats or a previous abduction; (5) a biculturalrelationship that is dissolving; and (6) the presence of psychopathic tendencies. Dabbagh testified that such factors were discovered as a result of research thatthe ABA's Center on Children and the Law conducted on actual cases of abduction. These factors were identified as a result of questionnaires completed by parentswhose children had been internationally abducted. Dabbagh testified that thisresearch and these factors are discussed in the text "Profiles for the AbductorMost Likely to Succeed," written by Drs. Girdner, Hoff, and Chicony. Dabbaghdescribed these factors as the "bible" in the field of international childabduction. The ABA has incorporated these factors into several of their judges' manuals, including "A Judge's Guide to Risk Factors in Parental Kidnappings," "AJudge's Guide to Prosecuting Parental Abductors," and "A Judge's Guide toCriminal Parental Kidnapping Cases."

Dabbagh testified that, in forming her opinions, she reviewed the documentsrelevant to the case, including court orders, Dhia's testimony, and the writtenreports and testimony of Drs. Blechman and Shapiro. Dabbagh also listened to thetape-recorded conversations that had been admitted into evidence. Dabbaghtestified that she reviewed these materials for purposes of determining whetherDhia possessed any of the six risk factors described above. Dabbagh testifiedthat an individual need possess only one of the six risk factors before thatindividual would be considered at risk to abduct. In Dabbagh's opinion, Dhiapossessed three of the six risk factors and there was a "grave risk" that hewould abduct the parties' children. The specific risk factors that Dabbaghrecognized in Dhia's profile were (1) disenfranchisement from the system; (2) abicultural relationship that was dissolving; and (3) verbal threats of abduction.

As evidence of disenfranchisement, Dabbagh noted that Dhia had told Dr.Shapiro of his belief that the FBI and CIA would eventually "round up all of theMuslims" and kick them out of the country. Dabbagh also noted that Dhia hadrepeatedly made derogatory statements about the white race and the United States'Constitution, government, and president. Dhia also made repeated derogatorycomments about Christianity and indicated his intention that the parties'children be raised Muslim. Finally, Dabbagh testified that Dhia lacked respectfor this country's law and institutions, as exemplified by his refusal to complywith the order of protection.

The second factor that Dabbagh identified was that Dhia had made repeatedthreats to abduct the children. Dabbagh noted that Dawn had reported suchthreats to Drs. Shapiro and Blechman, as evidenced by their written reports. Dabbagh also heard evidence of such threats in the tape recordings documentingthe conversations between Dawn and Dhia.

The third factor that Dabbagh identified was the dissolution of abicultural relationship. Dabbagh testified that materials she revieweddemonstrated severe conflict between the parties concerning their culturalbackgrounds and how their children should be raised. Dabbagh testified that suchconflict was evident in Dhia's testimony, the reports of Drs. Shapiro andBlechman, and the tape recordings. Dabbagh also identified the potentialpresence of a fourth risk factor, sociopathic tendencies. Dabbagh testified thatevidence of such tendencies can be found in Drs. Blechman's and Shapiro'sreports.

At the close of the hearing, the trial court denied Dawn's request for apreliminary injunction. The trial court found that, if the children were indeedat risk for abduction, Dawn would have a clearly ascertained right in need ofprotection, that Dawn would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, andthat there was no adequate remedy at law. However, the trial court found thatDawn did not meet her burden to show that she was likely to succeed on themerits. Specifically, the trial court found that Dawn did not demonstrate thatthere was a risk that Dhia would abduct the children.

In reaching this result, the trial court commented that none of Dhia'salleged statements to Dawn or his statements in the tape recordings containedspecific threats to abduct the children. Rather, the trial court found thatthese statements were made in the context of a bitter divorce in which childcustody was a primary issue and in which there were significant disputes as tothe best interests of the minor children. The trial court found that thesestatements expressed Dhia's view that he ultimately would be successful in beingawarded sole custody of the children. Although the trial court found that someof these comments were intemperate and caused reasonable concern to Dawn, thetrial court explained that these comments did not constitute a threat ofabduction.

The trial court also found that other factors militated against thepossibility that Dhia might abduct the children. The trial court noted that Dhiahad been in the United States for over 18 years and had become a United Statescitizen. The trial court also noted that Dhia would have difficulty applying foran Iraqi passport because the United States does not have diplomatic relationswith Iraq. Additionally, the trial court found that Dhia would be in danger ifhe returned to Iraq because he did not serve in the Iraqi armed forces. Finally,the trial court noted that Dhia had actively participated in the courtproceedings and had complied with the visitation order for the past 18 months. The trial court found that such conduct demonstrated that Dhia recognized theauthority of the court system and was willing to participate in and abide by thatprocess.

The trial court found some merit to Dawn's allegations that Dhia wasunderreporting his income. Specifically, the trial court found that Dhia earnedmore money in 1999 than the $13,000 in gross income he reported on his income taxreturn. Based on the evidence, the trial court found that Dhia earned between$45,000 and $50,000 in gross receipts. However, the trial court did not believethat this finding, standing alone, supported a conclusion that Dhia was a flightrisk. The trial court explained that virtually all of the parties' maritalassets, including cash and real estate, were in Dawn's possession. The trialcourt also found credible Dhia's testimony that the parties mutually agreed togive $35,000 to Dhia's parents as a gift so they could purchase the home in Iraq.

The trial court also disagreed with the conclusions of Dawn's expert,Maureen Dabbagh. For the reasons detailed above, the trial court disagreed withDabbagh's conclusion that there had been credible evidence that Dhia had madethreats of abduction. The trial court also did not believe that there wascredible evidence of disenfranchisement. Finally, the trial court noted thatthere will always be a dissolution of a bicultural relationship in everybicultural divorce. Overall, the trial court found that Dabbagh's evaluation ofthe evidence was not evenhanded and that she had crossed the line from expert toadvocate. The trial court concluded that Dabbagh had improperly substantiatedher opinions through her own interpretation of the facts.

Finally, the trial court found that the testimony of Drs. Blechman andShapiro was credible and that their reports correlated to the other evidencepresented at the hearing. The trial court therefore concluded that Dawn hadfailed to show that there was a likelihood that she would succeed on the merits. Accordingly, the trial court denied the request for a preliminary injunction anddeclined to require supervised visitation. However, the trial court ordered thatneither party remove the children from Illinois. Dawn subsequently filed thisinterlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 307(a)(1) (188 Ill. 2d R.307(a)(1)).

Dawn's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in denying her petition for a preliminary injunction. Dawn arguesthat, in order to obtain a preliminary injunction, she was not obligated to proveher case. Rather, she asserts that she was only required to raise a fairquestion as to her right to the relief requested. See Village of Westmont v.Lenihan, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1050, 1055 (1998). Dawn argues that there wassufficient evidence introduced at the hearing to raise, at the very least, a fairquestion that the children were at serious risk of being abducted by Dhia.

In order to address the merits of Dawn's argument, we have carefullyreviewed the evidence introduced at the hearing. Based on our review, it isapparent that there was much controversy surrounding the admissibility of theexpert testimony of Maureen Dabbagh. As noted above, Dhia objected to theadmission of such testimony, arguing that Dawn had failed to demonstrate thatthere was any accepted body of knowledge or standards upon which Dabbagh couldrender an opinion as to whether Dhia was likely to abduct the children. Althoughthe trial court shared some of these concerns, it nonetheless permitted Dabbaghto testify concerning her opinions. At the end of the hearing, the trial courtdiscounted Dabbagh's testimony after finding that it lacked credibility and wasotherwise unreliable.

Although neither party has revisited the issue of Dabbagh's testimony onappeal, we nonetheless believe that a consideration of its admissibility willexpedite the ultimate resolution of this case. Indeed, we note that the issueof custody has yet to be resolved and the question of abduction is likely to beraised again. As Dawn is likely to once again rely on Dabbagh's testimony, wewill first address whether the trial court erred in admitting Dabbagh's opinionsinto evidence.

Generally, the opinion testimony of an expert is admissible if the expertis qualified by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education in a fieldthat has "at least a modicum of reliability" and if the testimony would aid inunderstanding the evidence. Wiegman v. Hitch-Inn Post of Libertyville, Inc., 308Ill. App. 3d 789, 799 (1999). However, an expert witness's opinion cannot bebased upon mere conjecture and guess. Dyback v. Weber, 114 Ill. 2d 232, 244(1986). An expert's opinion is only as valid as the reasons for the opinion, andthe trial court is not required to blindly accept the expert's assertion that histestimony has an adequate foundation. Soto v. Gaytan, 313 Ill. App. 3d 137, 146(2000). Rather, the trial court must look behind the expert's conclusion andanalyze the adequacy of the foundation. Soto, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 147 ("As thegatekeeper of expert opinions disseminated to the jury, the trial court plays acritical role in excluding testimony that does not bear an adequate foundationof reliability").

Additionally, in determining whether an expert is qualified to render anopinion based on novel scientific evidence, Illinois follows the test set forthin Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). See People v. Miller,173 Ill. 2d 167, 187 (1996). Under the standard articulated in Frye, theproponent of expert testimony predicated upon scientific theory must establishthat the theory has gained general acceptance in the expert's scientific field. Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 187-88. The proponent of the evidence also has the burdenof establishing the qualifications of the expert testimony. People v. Jordan,103 Ill. 2d 192, 208 (1984). The admission of an expert's testimony lies withinthe sound discretion of the trial court. Jordan, 103 Ill. 2d at 208.

In evaluating the admissibility of Dabbagh's testimony, we must firstdetermine precisely what testimony was being proffered and whether that testimonywould have assisted the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or indetermining the facts at issue. See Harris v. Cropmate Co., 302 Ill. App. 3d364, 368 (1999). Here, Dabbagh identified certain factors relevant indetermining whether an individual is likely to commit an international childabduction. Based upon her evaluation of the case in light of these factors,Dabbagh opined that there was a grave risk that Dhia would abduct the children. As the risk of abduction was the trial court's primary consideration in rulingupon Dawn's petition for preliminary injunction, we believe that the profferedtestimony would have been of assistance to the trial court in understanding theevidence and determinating the facts at issue.

Having determined that the proffered evidence would be of assistance to thetrier of fact, we must next examine whether the evidence met the otherfoundational and reliability requirements for admissibility. In order to applythe correct foundational criteria, we must first characterize whether theproffered evidence constitutes scientific evidence. See Harris, 302 Ill. App.3d at 368. If the testimony does not constitute scientific evidence, then theFrye admissibility standard does not apply.

Although Illinois has not adopted the standard for admission of scientifictestimony articulated in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.579, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), several Illinois courts haveutilized Daubert's discussion of "scientific knowledge" to determine whatconstitutes scientific testimony. See Whiting v. Coultrip, 324 Ill. App. 3d161, 166 (2001); Harris, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 369. In Daubert, the United StatesSupreme Court explained that "science" is a process whereby theories are proposedand refined. To qualify as "scientific knowledge," an inference or assertionmust be derived by the scientific method. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590, 125 L. Ed.2d at 481, 113 S. Ct. at 2795. In short, a "scientific expert" is an expert whorelies on the application of scientific principles, rather than on skill orexperience-based observations, for the basis of his opinion. Harris, 302 Ill.App. 3d at 369.

In the instant case, the trial court found that Dabbagh was a nonscientificexpert and that her opinions were predicated upon her observations and experienceresulting from her work in the field of international child abduction. However,an examination of her testimony reveals that her opinions were not derived solelyfrom her observations and experience. Rather, Dabbagh testified that herevaluation was predicated upon factors identified in studies and literatureauthored by certain psychologists. Dabbagh testified that she examined theevidence in the case in order to determine whether these factors were present. It is therefore apparent that Dabbagh's opinions relied on the application ofpsychological studies and literature. As such, we believe that Dabbagh'stestimony constituted scientific evidence. See People v. Shanahan, 323 Ill. App.3d 835, 837-38 (2001) (opinion testimony that a child suffered from "batteredchild syndrome" was scientific evidence for purposes of Frye).

As scientific evidence, the trial court was obligated to conduct a Fryehearing to determine whether the scientific theory upon which the evidence wasbased was novel and, if so, whether the scientific theory has gained generalacceptance in the relevant scientific community. See Miller, 173 Ill. 2d at 188. Without a determination that the science relied upon by Dabbagh has been acceptedby the relevant scientific community, her testimony lacked the necessaryfoundation to be admitted into evidence and should not have been considered bythe trial court. On remand, in the event that Dawn again seeks to introduceDabbagh's testimony, the trial court must conduct a Frye hearing to determine theadmissibility of such scientific evidence.

We next turn to a consideration of whether the trial court abused itsdiscretion in denying Dawn's request for a preliminary injunction. In order togrant preliminary injunctive relief, the trial court must find that (1) theplaintiff has demonstrated a clearly ascertained right in need of protection; (2)irreparable injury will occur without the injunction; (3) no adequate remedy atlaw exists; and (4) there is a probability that the plaintiff will succeed on themerits of the case. Westmont, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. It is not the purposeof a preliminary injunction to determine any controverted rights or to decide themerits of the case. Westmont, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. Rather, a preliminaryinjunction is granted prior to trial on the merits for the purpose of preventinga threatened wrong and to preserve the status quo with the least injury to theparties concerned. Westmont, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1055.

The issuance of a preliminary injunction is within the sound discretion ofthe trial court upon a prima facie demonstration that there is a fair questionas to the existence of the right claimed and that the circumstances lead to areasonable belief that the moving party will be entitled to the relief sought. Westmont, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1055. The reviewing court will not set aside thetrial court's determination unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Westmont, 301 Ill. App. 3d at 1055.

Although Dawn requested several different remedies in her petition, theonly remedy that she pursues on appeal is her request that all visitation betweenDhia and the parties' children be supervised. We will therefore limit our reviewto this question. As detailed above, the trial court denied this relief, findingthat Dawn did not demonstrate that she was likely to succeed on the merits of hercase. Specifically, the trial court found no credible evidence indicating thatthere was a risk that Dhia would abduct the parties' children.

After a careful review of the record, we cannot say that the trial courtabused its discretion in reaching this determination. Although the recordreveals that the parties are engaged in a contentious divorce and custodydispute, there is no direct evidence that Dhia intends to abduct the children. As noted by the trial court, there is no evidence indicating that Dhia everspecifically threatened to abduct the children or to take them to Iraq. Thetape-recorded conversations introduced into evidence contain no statements byDhia that he will abduct the children. As noted by the trial court, theserecordings certainly contain many vulgar comments that Dhia made to Dawn. Therecordings also contain some strongly worded statements indicating Dhia'sintention to raise the children and that Dawn would not be a part of their lives. However, we agree with the trial court that, when read against the context of thedissolution proceedings, such statements indicated Dhia's belief that he wouldbe successful in being awarded custody of the children. We do not believe thatthese statements rise to the level of a threat to abduct the children.

Additionally, Dr. Blechman found no evidence that there was a risk thatDhia would abduct the children. Indeed, Dr. Blechman found that Dhia would serveas a good parent to the children and recommended that Dhia be granted custody. Although Dr. Blechman had been made aware of Dawn's fears that Dhia would abductthe children, he found that these fears were not warranted. Such a conclusionwas supported by Dhia's testimony, in which he indicated that he had no intentionto leave the country or interfere with Dawn's relationship with the children. Dhia also testified as to the significant dangers he faced if he were to returnto Iraq.

The evidence also demonstrated that Dhia had been a willing and activeparticipant in the judicial proceedings. Dhia had exercised visitation for 18months in compliance with the trial court's visitation order. Even Dawnacknowledged such compliance, indicating that Dhia had returned the children asrequired at the end of each of his 150 to 175 visits. Such evidence certainlydemonstrates Dhia's willingness to comply with the trial court's orders and toabide by the judicial process. All of the evidence, when taken together, doesnot support Dawn's allegations that Dhia will abduct the children.

Dawn asserts that the trial court erred in giving too much weight to Dhia'stestimony. Dawn argues that Dhia's testimony was substantially impeached whenthe tape recordings of the parties were introduced into evidence. However, itwas for the trial court to assess the credibility of the witnesses and todetermine the weight to be given to the evidence. Based upon the totality of therecord, we do not believe the trial court erred in according weight to Dhia'stestimony that he did not intend to return to Iraq.

Dawn also argues that the trial court ignored evidence that Dhia was hidinghis income and that Dhia had purchased a home in Iraq. Dawn argues that Dhia wassaving these funds to help him take the children to Iraq. However, contrary toDawn's assertions, the trial court did consider the evidence of Dhia's income andspecifically found that Dhia had underreported his income. The trial court notedthat, despite this fact, most of the parties' marital assets were in Dawn'spossession. The trial court concluded that this fact would limit Dhia'sfinancial ability to abduct the children. As to the purchase of the home inBaghdad, the trial court found that the parties intended this to be a gift toDhia's parents. Such a determination finds support in the record, and we do notbelieve that trial court's evaluation of this evidence constituted an abuse ofdiscretion.

Finally, Dawn relies upon Dr. Shapiro's findings that Dhia suffers fromethnic anxiety and paranoia with his position in the United States. As noted bythe trial court, Dhia's feelings in this regard are similar to the feelings ofother minority groups in this country. Standing alone, these findings do notestablish that Dhia is at risk to abduct the children. Moreover, we note thatDr. Shapiro was not retained to perform a custody evaluation and did not make anyfindings as to custody. Accordingly, we do not believe that Dr. Shapiro'stestimony supports a finding that Dhia is at risk to abduct.

For the reasons discussed above, we do not believe that Dawn met her burdenof making a prima facie demonstration that there is a fair question as to herentitlement to the relief sought. None of the evidence appearing in the recorddirectly supports a finding that the children are at risk of abduction. Lackingsuch a showing, we do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion indenying the request for supervised visitation. We note that, notwithstanding thedenial of supervised visitation, the trial court nonetheless prohibited theparties from taking the children out of the state. On the basis of the evidencebefore us, we believe that such an order will sufficiently preserve the statusquo pending a resolution of the remaining issues in this dissolution proceeding.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Du PageCounty is affirmed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings inconformity with the opinions expressed herein.

Affirmed and remanded.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and GROMETER, J., concur.