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JUSTICE BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal in a postdecree marriage dissolution case. Respondent, Rudolph H. Hahn, Jr., moved to terminate child support,and this motion was granted. Petitioner, Mary K. Hahn, appealsfrom that order. We affirm.

The parties' marriage was dissolved on September 9, 1996. Atthat time, Matthew, the parties' son, was 16 years old and wasattending high school. When the marriage was dissolved, theparties entered into a marital settlement agreement that the trialcourt incorporated into its judgment of dissolution. Two sectionsof this agreement provided for child support. Child support wasfirst mentioned under a section entitled "Maintenance." Thisprovision provided as follows:

"[Respondent] shall pay to [petitioner] UnallocatedFamily Support of *** $600.00 *** each month ***. Thisresponsibility shall continue until [Matthew] reaches age ***18 *** or graduates from high school, whichever occurs last."

Child support was mentioned a second time under a sectionentitled "Child Custody and Support." This provision provided:

"[Respondent] shall pay to [petitioner] UnallocatedFamily Support of *** $600.00 *** each month ***. Thisresponsibility shall continue until [Matthew] reaches age ***21 *** or graduates from high school, whichever occurs first."

The "Child Custody and Support" section also provided:

"The parties have considered seriously the aforesaidcustody and support provisions and determined that they are inthe best interests of [Matthew], taking into consideration notonly their own wishes but also the wishes of the child."

At the hearing on respondent's motion to terminate support,respondent testified that Matthew went to West Chicago High School,but Matthew did not graduate from that school. Instead, Matthew,whom respondent described as very intelligent, dropped out of highschool when he was 17 years old. When Matthew was 18 years old, heattained his general education development (GED) certificate. Respondent testified that with a GED Matthew could attend theCollege of Du Page (COD). Respondent based this opinion on COD'swritten spring 2000 acceptance criteria, which were admitted intoevidence. Respondent did not know whether Matthew would berequired to take some high school classes before he could startCOD.

Petitioner testified that Matthew started high school in 1994,and he was expected to graduate in June 1998. However, Matthewonly passed the first year of high school and dropped out of highschool in May 1997. According to an unofficial copy of Matthew'shigh school transcript, Matthew received mostly failing grades, hada 1.0 grade-point average, and accumulated only five credit hourstowards graduation. Petitioner stated that when she and respondentnegotiated the terms of the marital settlement agreement, she wasaware of Matthew's mental capabilities.

The trial court found that Matthew was not currently in highschool and had not attended high school for two years. Matthewtook the test for his GED and passed the test the first time hetook it. The court also noted that the junior college in thecourt's jurisdiction, COD, accepted a GED as a high school degree. Based on these facts, the trial court terminated child supportbecause Matthew was emancipated. This timely appeal followed.

The sole issue presented in this appeal is whether a GED isequivalent to "graduates from high school" for purposes of themarital settlement agreement. Section 510(d) of the IllinoisMarriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West2000)) addresses the termination of child support. This sectionprovides that the parties may agree in writing or expressly in ajudgment that child support will continue after the minor isemancipated, which generally occurs when a child reaches age 18. 750 ILCS 5/510(d) (West 2000); In re Marriage of Sweders, 296 Ill.App. 3d 919, 922 (1998). The parties here clearly wanted to extendchild support payments beyond Matthew's eighteenth birthday if hehad not graduated from high school. We must determine what theparties meant by "graduates from high school."

The general rules of contract interpretation apply to maritalsettlement agreements. Sweders, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 922. Wheninterpreting a contract, the court must ascertain and give effectto the parties' intent, and the language of the contract is thebest indication of the parties' intent. Sweders, 296 Ill. App. 3dat 922. When the terms of the marital agreement are clear andunambiguous, the court must give the terms their ordinary andnatural meaning. Sweders, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 922. An ambiguousterm is one that is susceptible to more than one meaning orinterpretation. In re Marriage of Frain, 258 Ill. App. 3d 475, 478(1994). Whether a term is ambiguous is a question of law that isreviewed de novo. In re Marriage of Velasquez, 295 Ill. App. 3d350, 356 (1998); Frain, 258 Ill. App. 3d at 478.

Here, the term "graduates from high school" is susceptible totwo different, yet plausible, interpretations. When a term issusceptible to two different interpretations, the court must followthe interpretation that establishes a rational and probableagreement. Sweders, 296 Ill. App. 3d at 922-23. With this inmind, we agree with respondent's interpretation that "graduatesfrom high school" includes receiving a GED.

In reaching this conclusion, we note that Webster's defineshigh school as "a secondary school *** [;] *** a schoolspecializing in adult education [that is] often professional ortechnical but sometimes liberal." Webster's Third NewInternational Dictionary 1069 (1993). Thus, "high school" includesa school where adults prepare for the GED test. Moreover, althoughno reviewing court in Illinois has determined whether "graduatesfrom high school" is equivalent to receiving a GED diploma, otherstates have found that the two terms are synonymous for the purposeof interpreting child support statutes. See Park v. Park, 634 So.2d 83, 86 (La. App. 1994)(in determining the extension ortermination of child support payments, court noted that a highschool equivalency diploma is no less a secondary school educationmerely because the equivalency diploma was received at avocational-technical institute and not a high school); In reMarriage of Copeland, 850 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Mo. App. 1993)(underchild support statute, graduating from a secondary school describesonly the event that makes a student eligible for postsecondarystudies, and, under the child support statute, this term is thesame as receiving a certificate of high school equivalency); L.D.v. K.D., 716 A.2d 569, 573, 315 N.J. Super. 71, 77 (1998) (inassessing the continuation of child support payments, courtrecognized that a GED is the equivalent of a high school diploma).

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of DuPage County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

HUTCHINSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.