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Nos. 2--02--0991 & 2--02--1009 cons. 

JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON delivered the opinion of the court:

In this consolidated appeal, the respondents, Mitchell C. andBlanche M., appeal from the August 29, 2002, order of the circuitcourt of Winnebago County terminating their parental rights totheir son, Jamarqon C. On appeal, Mitchell argues that the trialcourt erred in denying his motion for a continuance prior to thefitness hearing. Blanche argues that section 1(D)(t) of theAdoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(t) (West 2000)), the statutoryprovision under which she was adjudicated unfit, isunconstitutional. Alternatively, she argues that the State failedto present clear and convincing evidence that she was unfit. Weaffirm.

On September 20, 2001, the respondent gave birth to her eighthchild, Jamarqon. Jamarqon was born with cocaine in his blood,urine, and meconium. Blanche's previous three children had alsobeen born with cocaine in their systems and had been taken intoprotective custody after being adjudicated neglected.

On September 26, 2001, the State filed a petition allegingthat Jamarqon was neglected pursuant to section 2--3 of theJuvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS 405/2--3 (West 2000)). Specifically, the petition alleged that Jamarqon was neglectedbecause he was born with cocaine in his urine, blood, or meconium. The petition also alleged that Jamarqon's environment was injuriousbecause Blanche had a substance abuse problem and admitted to usingcocaine while she was pregnant. Additionally, the petition allegedthat Jamarqon was neglected because his siblings had previouslybeen adjudicated neglected, thereby placing him at risk of harm. Following a shelter care hearing, the trial court placed temporarycustody of Jamarqon with DCFS.

On March 6, 2002, the State filed a petition, as amended,seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mitchell and Blanche toJamarqon. The petition alleged that Mitchell was unfit because hewas depraved and had failed to maintain a reasonable degree ofinterest in Jamarqon. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i), (D)(m) (West2000)). The petition alleged that Blanche was unfit because shehad failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest in Jamarqon. The petition further alleged that she was unfit pursuant to section1(D)(t) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(t) (West 2000)),which identifies the following condition as a ground for unfitness:

"A finding that at birth the child's blood, urine, ormeconium contained any amount of a controlled substance asdefined in subsection (f) of Section 102 of the IllinoisControlled Substances Act, or a metabolite of a controlledsubstance, with the exception of controlled substances ormetabolites of such substances, the presence of which in thenewborn infant was the result of medical treatmentadministered to the mother or the newborn infant, and that thebiological mother of this child is the biological mother of atleast one other child who was adjudicated a neglected minorunder subsection (c) of Section 2--3 of the Juvenile Court Actof 1987, after which the biological mother had the opportunityto enroll in and participate in a clinically appropriatesubstance abuse counseling, treatment, and rehabilitationprogram." 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(t) (West 2000).

On April 26, 2002, the trial court conducted a pretrialconference on the State's petition. The trial court set August 29,2002, as the hearing date for the State's petition. The trialcourt informed both Mitchell and Blanche that they needed to be incourt on that date, and if they were not, the hearing would proceedin their absence. Mitchell indicated that he understood thisadmonishment.

On August 29, 2002, the trial court conducted a hearing on theState's petition. Neither Mitchell nor Julie Hughes, the attorneywho had represented him in the earlier proceedings, was present. Attorney Kathleen Hadley, who was standing in for Hughes, requesteda continuance. The trial court denied the motion.

The State then presented evidence on its allegations ofneglect. The State admitted into evidence Jamarqon's certifiedmedical records from Rockford Memorial Hospital. These recordsindicated that Jamarqon had been born on September 20, 2001, withcocaine in his blood, meconium, and urine. Neither the State northe respondents presented any other evidence as to the allegationsof neglect. The trial court then found that the State hadestablished by a preponderance of the evidence that Jamarqon wasneglected.

The State next presented evidence as to the respondents'unfitness. The State requested that the trial court take judicialnotice of the court files of Blanche's three previous children whohad been adjudicated neglected, Samuel H., Bionca H., and Markie C. The State also requested that the trial court take judicial noticeof two criminal files of Mitchell's which indicated that he hadthree prior felony convictions. The State also admitted intoevidence Jamarqon's certified medical records, Samuel's certifiedmedical records, and Blanche's records from Rosecrance, a substanceabuse treatment facility in Rockford.

Stephanie Tobolski testified that she was the caseworker fortwo of Blanche's children from January to August 2001. Tobolskitestified that as part of the service plan that she developed forBlanche, Blanche was required to receive treatment for her drugaddiction. Tobolski met with Blanche and gave her recommendationsabout obtaining treatment, but Blanche never cooperated. On cross-examination, Tobolski acknowledged that Blanche had obtained asubstance abuse assessment at Rosecrance in July or August 2001. Rosecrance recommended treatment for her; however, Blanche neverenrolled in substance abuse treatment.

Michelle Garnhart testified that she was Jamarqon'scaseworker. Blanche had made only sporadic contacts with her andhad not contacted her since the last court hearing in April 2002. Garnhart testified that Mitchell had visited Jamarqon only twice.He had never called or written her or stopped by her office toinquire about Jamarqon's condition. He also never sent any gifts,supplies, clothing, or money for Jamarqon.

Blanche testified on her own behalf. She acknowledged thatTobolski had tried to help her get substance abuse treatment. Shehad attended Rosecrance and had received an assessment and startedclasses. However, she did not complete the program. Blanchetestified that she had completed a treatment program at the SojournHouse in Freeport. However, she did not recall when she hadcompleted this program.

Following the hearing, the trial court found that the Statehad proved by clear and convincing evidence that Blanche was unfitpursuant to section 1(D)(t) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS50/1(D)(t) (West 2000)). The trial court explained that Blanchehad a severe drug addiction problem, that she had attemptedtreatment, but that she had been unable to cure her addiction. Thetrial court found that Blanche had given birth to three childrenbetween 1997 and 2000. Each of these children was born cocaine-exposed and was subsequently adjudicated neglected. Following thebirth of these children, Blanche had numerous opportunities toparticipate in drug counseling treatment and rehabilitationprograms. Nonetheless, Blanche had then given birth to Jamarqon,who tested positive for cocaine.

The trial court additionally found that the State had provedby clear and convincing evidence that Mitchell was unfit pursuantto sections 1(D)(i) and 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS50/1(D)(i), (D)(m) (West 2000)). The trial court found thatMitchell was depraved pursuant to section 1(D)(i) of the AdoptionAct because he had a felony conviction of attempted murder in 1985,a felony conviction of unlawful delivery of a controlled substancewithin 1,000 feet of a school in 1993, and a felony conviction ofattempted possession of a stolen vehicle in 1999. The trial courtalso found that Mitchell had failed to maintain a reasonable degreeof interest in Jamarqon pursuant to section 1(D)(m) of the AdoptionAct because he had only two visits with the child in a year and hadnever provided any help or assistance with the child.

Following a best interests hearing, the trial court determinedthat the termination of the respondents' parental rights was inJamarqon's best interests. The trial court therefore entered anorder terminating the respondents' parental rights, and therespondents thereafter filed separate, timely notices of appeal. On December 18, 2002, we granted Blanche's motion to consolidateboth appeals for purposes of our review.

In his appeal, Mitchell's sole contention is that the trialcourt erred in denying his motion for a continuance at the start ofthe fitness hearing. He contends that the trial court's failure togrant his motion jeopardized his right to a fair trial and hisability to defend against the State's allegations. Because neitherhe nor his original attorney was at the hearing, Mitchell contendsthat he suffered substantial prejudice.

Illinois recognizes that "serious delay in the adjudication ofabuse, neglect, or dependency cases can cause grave harm to theminor." 705 ILCS 405/2--14 (West 2000). There is no absoluteright to a continuance. In re D.P., 327 Ill. App. 3d 153, 158(2001). It is within the trial court's discretion whether to grantor deny a continuance motion, and the court's decision will not bedisturbed absent manifest abuse or palpable injustice. In re K.O.,336 Ill. App. 3d 98, 104 (2002). The denial of a request for acontinuance is not a ground for reversal unless the complainingparty has been prejudiced by such denial. In re M.R., 305 Ill.App. 3d 1083, 1086 (1999).

Here, we do not believe that Mitchell has demonstrated that hewas prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his motion for acontinuance. Although he asserts that his original counsel wouldhave been better able to represent him had the hearing beencontinued to a later date, this is mere speculation. Such anargument is also unconvincing in light of the overwhelming evidencethat the State presented as to Mitchell's unfitness. The recordreveals that Mitchell had been convicted of three prior felonies,one within the last five years. This created a rebuttablepresumption that he was depraved and therefore unfit pursuant tosection 1(D)(i) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(i) (West2000)). The record further reveals that Mitchell had visited hisson only twice since his son's birth, had never made any inquiriesto his son's caseworker about his son, and never sent his son anyletters, gifts, or financial assistance. As such, it is apparentthat Mitchell had not demonstrated a reasonable degree of interestin Jamarqon, and the trial court properly found that he was unfitpursuant to section 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 2000)). Accordingly, because Mitchell has failedto demonstrate how he or his original counsel could have underminedthis overwhelming evidence against him had the case been continuedto a later date, we do not believe that the trial court erred indenying his motion for a continuance. See M.R, 305 Ill. App. 3d at1086.

In her appeal, Blanche raises two contentions. Blanche firstargues that section 1(D)(t) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS50/1(D)(t) (West 2000)) is unconstitutional because it allowsone's parental rights to be terminated based on less than clear andconvincing evidence. Specifically, Blanche contends that one ofthe underlying factors for an unfitness finding under this section--the fact that another one of her children had been adjudicatedneglected because of being born with drugs in his system--need beestablished only by a preponderance of the evidence. As such,Blanche argues that this section does not afford her procedural dueprocess and is therefore unconstitutional.

At the outset, we note that Blanche has waived this issue byfailing to raise it before the trial court. See Villareal v.Peebles, 299 Ill. App. 3d 556, 560 (1998). However, because thisissue raises a clear question of law that may be resolved withoutfurther input from the trial court, and because the waiver rule isa limitation on the parties and not the court, we will address themerits of Blanche's constitutional claim. See In re O.R., 328 Ill.App. 3d 955, 959 (2002).

We note that all statutes are presumed to be constitutional;the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears theburden of rebutting this presumption and clearly establishing aconstitutional violation. O.R., 328 Ill. App. 3d at 959. Becausethis issue is one of law, our review is de novo. In re R.C., 195Ill. 2d 291, 296 (2001). We must construe acts of the legislatureso as to affirm their constitutionality and validity if we canreasonably do so. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d at 296-97.

In Illinois, because of the great importance of parentalrights to a child, those rights cannot be terminated except uponproof by clear and convincing evidence. In re Paul, 101 Ill. 2d345, 352 (1984). Moreover, in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 71L. Ed. 2d 599, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), the United States SupremeCourt held that, because of the importance of the parentalrelationship, due process requires that this relationship can bepermanently severed only upon proof by clear and convincingevidence.

In contrast to the requirement of clear and convincing proofof parental unfitness upon which parental rights can be terminated,a finding of parental neglect need be proved only by apreponderance or greater weight of the evidence. In re C.C., 224Ill. App. 3d 207, 215 (1991). The major thrust of Blanche'sargument on appeal is that, because a prior decree of neglectregarding one of her other children was necessary for the findingthat she was unfit under section 1(D)(t), section 1(D)(t) isunconstitutional because it did not necessitate that such a findingbe by clear and convincing evidence.

The issue Blanche raises is a matter of first impression inIllinois, as no other court has addressed whether section 1(D)(t)of the Adoption Act violates one's rights to procedural dueprocess. However, Illinois courts have previously considered dueprocess challenges to other sections of the Adoption Act that setforth the grounds for the finding of parental unfitness. See In reEnis, 121 Ill. 2d 124 (1988) (addressing the constitutionality ofsection 1(D)(f) (Ill. Rev Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(f))); Inre S.A., 296 Ill. App. 3d 1029 (1998) (addressing whether section1(D)(m) (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)) violated due process). In making her argument, Blanche relies on In re Enis, 121 Ill.2d 124 (1988), in which the supreme court held that a provision ofthe Adoption Act was unconstitutional because it allowed the termination of parental rights based only on a preponderance of theevidence. In Enis, the child was removed from her parents' custodyafter being adjudicated an abused minor due to various injuries shehad received while in her parents' custody. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at126. Shortly after the child was returned to her parents' custody,the State filed another petition, alleging new incidents ofphysical abuse. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 126. The trial court grantedthe petition and again placed the child in protective custody. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 126-27. The State thereafter filed a petitionto terminate the parents' parental rights pursuant to sections1(D)(f) and 1(D)(m) of the Adoption Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1983, ch.40, pars. 1501 (D)(f), (D)(m)). Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 127. Section1(D)(f) provided that a person was unfit based on two priorfindings of physical child abuse; section 1(D)(m) provided that theparents were unfit for failure to correct the conditions that werethe basis for the removal of the minor from them. Enis, 121 Ill.2d at 127. The trial court found that the State had establishedboth of these provisions by a preponderance of the evidence andterminated the parents' parental rights. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 127-28.

On appeal, this court found that section 1(D)(f) wasunconstitutional, and the supreme court affirmed. Enis, 121 Ill.2d at 128, 134. The supreme court explained that an adjudicationof abuse under the Juvenile Court Act was by a preponderance of theevidence. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 131-32. Section 1(D)(f) providedthat two findings of physical abuse (which had been established bya preponderance of the evidence) were grounds for a finding ofunfitness. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 133. The supreme court noted thatthere was nothing in section 1(D)(f) that suggested that the courtreview additional evidence to determine if the allegations of abusewere proved by clear and convincing evidence. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at133. As such, the supreme court held that section 1(D)(f) did notsatisfy the requirements of due process because it authorized thetermination of parental rights upon proof of physical abuse by apreponderance of the evidence. Enis, 121 Ill. 2d at 133.

Here, Blanche argues that the statute at issue, section1(D)(t), is analogous to the statute at issue in Enis, section1(D)(f), because it allows a finding of unfitness to be premised ona prior neglect adjudication rendered pursuant to the JuvenileCourt Act. That earlier neglect adjudication, which was obtainableby proof meeting the mere standard of a preponderance of theevidence, is then used to secure a finding of unfitness, inviolation of due process.

The State responds that Enis is distinguishable because, undersection 1(D)(t), the earlier finding of neglect--which wasestablished by a preponderance of the evidence--is not anindependent basis for a finding of unfitness under the Act. Rather, the State contends that the prior neglect finding requiresthe respondent to take steps to address her substance abuse. Ifthe State is able to show by clear and convincing evidence that shehas been given the opportunity for substance abuse treatment, yetgives birth to another child with drugs in his system, the Statecontends that the respondent's parental rights then may be properlyterminated.

In support of its argument, the State relies on In re S.A.,296 Ill. App. 3d 1029 (1998). In S.A., the minors were adjudicatedneglected based upon a finding that their father had exposed themto sexual abuse. S.A., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1030. The father'sparental rights were eventually terminated based on his failure tomake reasonable progress towards the return of the children andreasonable efforts to correct the conditions of neglect. S.A., 296Ill. App. 3d at 1031. On appeal, the father argued that, becausethe decree of neglect was necessary for the trial court todetermine that he had failed to make reasonable efforts to correctthe conditions of neglect and thereby terminate his parentalrights, the finding of neglect must also be established by clearand convincing evidence. S.A., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1031. Thereviewing court rejected this argument on three grounds. S.A., 296Ill. App. 3d at 1031-35. First, the court noted that, inpreviously considering the issue, it had determined that one'sparental rights were not terminated under section 1(D)(m) becauseof earlier conduct (the basis for the neglect petition) but rathernew conduct (failure to correct conditions). S.A., 296 Ill. App.3d at 1032, citing In re I.D., 205 Ill. App. 3d 543, 551 (1990),rev'd on other grounds, In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 304 (2001). Only to this new conduct did the clear and convincing evidencestandard apply. S.A., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1032. Second, the courtfound that in Enis the supreme court indicated that it would upholda determination of parental unfitness for failure to correctconditions of neglect even though the original finding of neglectwas established only by a preponderance of the evidence. S.A., 296Ill. App. 3d at 1033. The court noted that in Enis, as to theissue of whether the parents were unfit pursuant to section1(D)(m), the court reversed because the trial court did not applythe right standard of proof. S.A., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1033. TheS.A. court determined that if the supreme court had found that thelower burden of proof for the original neglect finding wasproblematic, the court would have commented on it. S.A., 296 Ill.App. 3d at 1033. Third, the S.A. court found that requiring theoriginal neglect finding to be proved again at a later hearingwould not work well in practice. S.A., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1034. The court explained that the later termination hearing might occurseveral years after the prior neglect hearing and proof might belost and memories dulled. S.A., 296 Ill. App. 3d at 1034. Basedon all these reasons, the court found that section 1(D)(m) did notdeprive the father of his due process rights. S.A., 296 Ill. App.3d at 1035.

We believe that section 1(D)(t) is more analogous to section1(D)(m), as analyzed in S.A., than section 1(D)(f), as analyzed inEnis. We agree with the State's argument that under section1(D)(t) the fact that the respondent gave birth to a child who haddrugs in his body and was subsequently adjudicated neglectedbecause of that marks the starting point of determining if therespondent was unfit. The State must still show by clear andconvincing evidence that she was given the opportunity to get drugtreatment yet still subsequently gave birth to another child whotested positive for drugs. Unlike the situation in Enis, undersection 1(D)(t), a person cannot have her parental rightsterminated based solely on a finding of neglect or abuse that wasestablished only by a preponderance of the evidence. We thereforeconclude that section 1(D)(t) does not violate one's constitutionalrights to procedural due process.

In the alternative, Blanche argues that the trial court'sorder finding her unfit was against the manifest weight of theevidence. As noted earlier, because of the great importance ofparental rights to a child, those rights cannot be terminatedexcept upon proof by clear and convincing evidence. In re Paul,101 Ill. 2d 345, 352 (1984). The Juvenile Court Act provides atwo-stage mechanism whereby parental rights may be involuntarilyterminated. 705 ILCS 405/2--29(2) (West 2000). Under thisbifurcated procedure there must be a threshold showing of parentalunfitness based upon clear and convincing evidence and then asubsequent showing that the best interests of the child are servedby severing parental rights. In re Adoption of Syck, 138 Ill. 2d255, 277 (1990); In re M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d 649, 655 (2000).

A trial court's determination of parental unfitness involvesfactual findings and credibility assessments that the trial courtis in the best position to make. In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227,240 (1999). We therefore defer to the trial court's factualfindings, and we will not reverse the trial court unless the recordshows that the factual findings are against the manifest weight ofthe evidence. A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 240. A factual finding isagainst the manifest weight of the evidence only if the oppositeconclusion is clearly evident or the determination is unreasonable,arbitrary, and not based on the evidence presented. Brazas v.Ramsey, 291 Ill. App. 3d 104, 109 (1997).

Parental unfitness is determined with reference to section1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2000)). 705 ILCS405/2--29(2) (West 2000). It is well recognized that a parent'sright to control the upbringing of his or her children is afundamental right. In re. R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 303 (2001). Therefore, before a trial court can adjudicate a parent unfit andterminate his or her parental rights, the State must prove by clearand convincing evidence at least one statutory ground of parentalunfitness. M.J., 314 Ill. App. 3d at 655.

Pursuant to section 1(D)(t) of the Adoption Act, in order forthe State to establish that a parent is unfit, it must show that(1) she has previously had a child who was adjudicated neglectedbecause he was born with drugs in his blood, urine, or meconium;(2) she had the opportunity to enroll and participate in aclinically appropriate substance abuse counseling, treatment andrehabilitation program; and (3) her child at issue in the petitionwas born with drugs in his blood, urine, or meconium. 750 ILCS50/1(D)(t) (West 2000).

In the case herein, we believe that the trial court's findingthat Blanche was unfit was not against the manifest weight of theevidence. The State presented evidence that three of Blanche'schildren had been adjudicated neglected between 1997 and 2000. TheState introduced into evidence her son Samuel's certified medicalrecords, which indicated that he had been born exposed to cocaine. The trial court took judicial notice of Samuel's court file, whichindicated that he had been adjudicated neglected. The State alsointroduced into evidence medical records from Rosecrance thatindicated that Blanche had enrolled and participated in drugtreatment and rehabilitation programs at various times between July2000 and June 2001. These records indicated that the doctors atRosecrance had created a master treatment program for Blanche totreat her problems associated with her addiction. This treatmentplan required Blanche to acknowledge that she was chemicallydependent and to accept responsibility for her illness; toparticipate in group and individual therapy; and to participate inactivities that would prevent a relapse. As to the fact that thechild at issue in the petition, Jamarqon, had been born withcocaine in his blood, urine, or meconium, the State introduced intoevidence his certified medical records. These records indicatedthat he had been born cocaine-exposed. Based on this evidence, wedetermine that the trial court's finding that Blanche was unfitpursuant to section 1(D)(t) of the Adoption Act was not against themanifest weight of the evidence.

In so ruling, we find without merit Blanche's contention thatthe State's evidence as to her unfitness was insufficient. Blancheargues that, in order to meet its burden of proof that one of herother children and Jamarqon were born with cocaine in their bodies,the State was required to present more than just their certifiedmedical records. Blanche contends that such evidence was onlyhearsay and did not conclusively establish that the children wereborn with cocaine in their bodies that was not the result ofnonmedical procedures. We disagree.

Section 2--18(4)(a) of the Juvenile Court Act provides thathospital or agency records made as to occurrences or eventsrelating to a minor in a neglect proceeding shall be admissibleinto evidence as proof of those occurrences or events if thedocument was made in the regular course of the hospital's oragency's business. 705 ILCS 405/2--18(4)(a) (West 2000). Evidenceadmitted pursuant to section 2--18(4)(a) is sufficient to establishat least one ground of parental unfitness by clear and convincingevidence. See In re A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d 227, 237 (1999)(determining that client service plans admitted pursuant to section2--18(4)(a), without the aid of supporting testimony, aresufficient to establish at least one ground of parental unfitnessby clear and convincing evidence).

Here, Samuel's and Jamarqon's certified medical records wereadmitted into evidence pursuant to section 2--18(4)(a) of theJuvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2--18(4)(a) (West 2000). DespiteBlanche's protests to the contrary, we believe that these recordsconclusively established that Samuel and Jamarqon were born withcocaine in their blood, urine, or meconium. Moreover, even thoughthese records were hearsay, they were sufficient for the State tomeet its burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence thatBlanche was unfit. See A.B., 308 Ill. App. 3d at 237. Therefore,the trial court's finding that Samuel and Jamarqon had been bornwith cocaine in their blood, urine, or meconium was not against themanifest weight of the evidence.

We also reject Blanche's argument that the State failed toestablish that she had the opportunity to enroll and participate ina "clinically appropriate" treatment or rehabilitation programfollowing her son Samuel's adjudication of neglect. Although sheacknowledges that the State admitted into evidence her records fromRosecrance as to her enrollment and participation in a treatmentprogram for her drug addiction, Blanche argues that these recordsare devoid of any evidence that the treatment program was"clinically appropriate" for her.

We agree with Blanche's assertion that her records fromRosecrance are devoid of any specific language indicating that thetreatment plan recommended for her drug addiction was "clinicallyappropriate." Nonetheless, we find that, in reviewing her records from Rosecrance in their entirety, it is apparent that Blanche hadthe opportunity to participate in "clinically appropriate"treatment for her addiction. "Clinical" is defined as "concernedwith or based on actual observation and treatment of disease inpatients rather than artificial experimentation or theory." Webster's Unabridged Dictionary 277 (1989). A determination thata program is "clinically appropriate" requires the exercise ofprofessional judgment. See C.J. v. Department of Human Services,331 Ill. App. 3d 871, 889 (2002).

Here, Blanche's records from Rosecrance reveal that twodoctors, after personally observing her, developed a treatment planfor her drug addiction. This treatment plan required her toacknowledge that she had an illness, to participate in therapy, andto participate in other social activities to prevent a drugrelapse. As this treatment plan was developed following thedoctors' actual observations of Blanche, we believe the treatmentplan the doctors created for her was "clinically appropriate." Wetherefore conclude that the State presented clear and convincingevidence that Blanche was given the opportunity to participate in"clinically appropriate" treatment after the birth of her cocaine-exposed son Samuel. Thus, the trial court's finding that she wasunfit on this basis was not against the manifest weight of theevidence.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit courtof Winnebago County terminating Mitchell's and Blanche's parentalrights to Jamarqon is affirmed.

Affirmed.

CALLUM and KAPALA, JJ., concur.