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On appeal, respondents argue that (1) the circuit court'sfailure to hold a dispositional hearing or declare the minor a wardof the court deprived the court of jurisdiction to adjudicate theState's petition to terminate respondents' parental rights; (2) thefailure to hold a dispositional hearing or declare the minor a wardof the court violated respondents' due process rights; (3)respondents were denied proper notice of the best interestshearing; and (4) the findings of parental unfitness are against themanifest weight of the evidence.

We hold that, although the lack of a dispositional hearing didnot deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction over the termination petition, the court's failure to hold a hearing asrequired by section 2--21(2) of the Act denied respondents afundamentally fair determination of their parental rights.Therefore, without deciding respondents' other contentions oferror, we reverse the findings of parental unfitness and the orderterminating respondents' parental rights.

The procedural history of this case requires recounting insome detail. On October 31, 1996, the State filed a petitionalleging that G.F.H. was neglected because his environment wasinjurious to his welfare (705 ILCS 405/2--3(1)(b) (West 1996));that he was abused in that his "parent" created a substantial riskof injury to him by other than accidental means (705 ILCS 405/2--3(2)(ii) (West 1996)); and that it was in his best interest that hebe made a ward of the court. On October 31, 1996, the circuitcourt entered an agreed shelter care order that set December 19,1996, for an adjudicatory hearing. Meanwhile, G.F.H. was placed inthe care of W.H.'s grandparents.

On December 19, 1996, the circuit court continued the causeuntil December 26, 1996. On that date, with respondents notpresent, the court continued the cause to February 20, 1997. OnFebruary 20, 1997, the circuit court entered an "AgreedAdjudicatory Order" reciting that T.H. had appeared for theadjudicatory hearing but that W.H. had not appeared; that the Statehad proved by a preponderance of the evidence that G.F.H. wasneglected (705 ILCS 405/2--3 (West 1998)) and dependent (705 ILCS405/2--4 (West 1998)); and that, in accord with the minor's bestinterests, he would remain in the custody of DCFS pending thedispositional hearing on the petition. The order scheduled thedispositional hearing for March 27, 1997.

On March 24, 1997, the court entered judgment on a rule toshow cause against T.H. The order states in part, "Thedispositional hearing scheduled for March 27, 1997, is stricken,and said Dispositional Hearing shall be scheduled by the State,following the discharge of [T.H.] from [treatment]." The orderalso states, "The cause is otherwise continued to May 28, 1997 ***for Dispositional Hearing." The order sets a permanency reviewhearing (see 705 ILCS 405/2--28(2) (West 1998)) for May 28, 1997.

On May 28, 1997, the trial court entered a "PermanencyPlanning Review Order" in which the court found that, during thepreceding six months, the permanency goal (the return of the minorto respondents) had not been achieved and that the services DCFSprovided were unsuccessful because respondents had not followed theservice providers' requests. The court approved the permanencygoal and ordered that G.F.H. continue in long-term foster care withhis great-grandparents, with DCFS as his legal custodian andguardian. The court remanded the case to DCFS for respondents tocomply with the service plan and set the next permanency reviewhearing for August 27, 1997. Later, the hearing was moved toAugust 20, 1997.

On August 20, 1997, with neither respondent appearing, thecircuit court continued the permanency review hearing to November12, 1997. On November 12, 1997, with both respondents present, thecourt continued the cause until March 4, 1998, for status. OnMarch 4, 1998, the court continued the cause until April 29, 1998,for status. After several more continuances, the court set January6, 1999, for a status hearing.

On December 30, 1998, the State filed its petition toterminate respondents' parental rights. The petition recited that,on February 20, 1997, G.F.H. had been adjudicated neglected; that,on that date, the court made DCFS his guardian; and that, sincethat date, G.F.H. had remained in the care and custody of DCFS. The petition alleged that respondents were unfit parents because(1) they failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest,concern or responsibility as to the minor's welfare (750 ILCS50/1(D)(b) (West 1998)); (2) they failed to make reasonable effortsto correct the conditions that were the basis of the removal ofG.F.H. from respondents (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998)); and (3)they failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of G.F.H.within 12 months after G.F.H. was adjudicated neglected (750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 1996)). (At the time the State filed itspetition, the Adoption Act specified that a parent could be foundunfit if he or she had failed to make reasonable progress towardthe return of the child within nine months after an adjudication ofneglect, abuse or dependency. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West 1998). The statute formerly allowed the parent 12 months. See 750 ILCS50/1(D)(m) (West 1996); In re E.O., 311 Ill. App. 3d 720, 721 n.1(2000). Here, the State's petition relied on the earlier versionof the statute.)

The trial court heard evidence on the petition. On September29, 1999, the court entered an order holding that the State hadproved respondents were unfit for all the reasons alleged in thepetition. After a hearing at which respondents did not appear, thecourt terminated their parental rights and appointed DCFS as theminor's guardian with the power to consent to his adoption. Respondents filed a timely notice of appeal.

Respondents raise several challenges to the judgment, but weaddress only those that turn on the circuit court's failure to holda dispositional hearing under section 2--21(2) of the Act. In thisregard, respondents claim that the lack of a dispositional hearing(1) deprived the court of jurisdiction to proceed on the petitionto terminate their parental rights; and (2) violated the statute,denied them due process, and tainted the subsequent terminationproceedings. We explain why we agree with the second of thesecontentions.

Article II of the Act (705 ILCS 405/2--1 et seq. (West 1998))sets out procedures for adjudicating a petition that alleges thata minor is abused, neglected, or dependent. Section 2--21(1) ofthe Act specifies that, after hearing evidence on the petition, thecircuit court shall determine whether the minor is abused,neglected, or dependent, and that the court shall state thisdetermination in writing with an appropriate factual basis. See705 ILCS 405/2--21(1) (West 1998). Subsection 2--21 of the Actcontinues:

"(2) If, pursuant to subsection (1) of this Section, thecourt determines and puts in writing the factual basissupporting the determination that the minor is either abusedor neglected or dependent, the court shall then set a time notlater than 30 days after the entry of the finding for adispositional hearing *** to be conducted under Section 2--22at which hearing the court shall determine whether it isconsistent with the health, safety and best interests of theminor and the public that he be made a ward of the court. ***The dispositional hearing may be continued once for a periodnot to exceed 30 days if the court finds that such continuanceis necessary to complete the dispositional report.

(3) The time limits of this Section may be waived only byconsent of all parties and approval by the court, asdetermined to be consistent with the health, safety and bestinterests of the minor." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/2--21(2), (3) (West 1998).

The statute plainly requires a trial court that has found a minorabused, neglected, or dependent to hold a dispositional hearing andto do so within 30 days unless there is a valid continuance orwaiver. The legislature's use of "shall" ordinarily denotes amandatory obligation. In re Justin T., 291 Ill. App. 3d 872, 878(1997). This is especially so when the legislation at issueexplicitly recognizes that a court's failure to follow thelegislature's instructions may cause serious harm. See In re S.G.,175 Ill. 2d 471, 481 (1997). Here, the legislature has recognizedthat a dispositional hearing serves a crucial purpose in allowingthe circuit court to decide what further actions are in the bestinterests of a neglected, abused, or dependent minor. See 705 ILCS405/2--21(2), 2--22(1) (West 1998). We add that a dispositionalhearing and a ruling on whether to make a minor a ward of the courtalso give the parents fair notice of what they must do to retaintheir rights to their child. Indeed, the Act explicitly statesthat, if the trial court makes a child a ward of the court, it mustadmonish the parents of what they must do if they wish to retaintheir parental rights. See 705 ILCS 405/2--22(6) (West 1998). These rights themselves "are of deep human importance and will notbe lightly terminated." In re Paul, 101 Ill. 2d 345, 351-52(1984).

Given the importance of a dispositional hearing to thefairness of any future termination proceedings, we cannot say thatthe legislature intended to allow a court that has found a childabused, neglected, or dependent to omit this vital stage of theprocess by which parental rights may be terminated. In so stating,we do not agree with respondents that the failure to hold adispositional hearing deprives the circuit court of jurisdictionover petitions to terminate parental rights. That a court actsbeyond its statutory authority in a particular case does not meanthat the court lacks jurisdiction over the type of proceedinginvolved. See In re M.M., 156 Ill. 2d 53, 64-66 (1993); In reC.S., 294 Ill. App. 3d 780, 785-86 (1998). Thus, we agree with theauthority the State cites insofar as it holds that the absence ofa dispositional hearing in a proceeding to declare a childneglected, abused, or dependent does not deprive the circuit courtof jurisdiction to adjudicate a petition to terminate parentalrights. See In re R.K., 247 Ill. App. 3d 512, 515-16 (1993); In reShawn B., 218 Ill. App. 3d 374, 380-81 (1991); In re E.P., 167 Ill.App. 3d 534, 539-40 (1988).

However, although the trial court had jurisdiction to hear thetermination petition, we agree with respondents that the trialcourt erred in proceeding on the petition without having held adispositional hearing after it found G.F.H. neglected anddependent. Although the court ordered the State to schedule adispositional hearing, the State never did so and no hearing tookplace. The court went directly from the finding of neglect anddependency to deciding the petition to terminate respondents'parental rights. In so doing, the court exceeded its authorityunder the Act.

The State argues cursorily that respondents waived their rightto a dispositional hearing because they never raised this issue atthe trial level. This assertion ignores section 2--21(3) of theAct, under which even the time limit for a dispositional hearingmay not be waived without the consent of the parties and theapproval of the trial court after it has considered the minor'sbest interests. See 705 ILCS 405/2--21(3) (West 1998). Theparents' mere inaction will not waive the statutory requirement ofa prompt dispositional hearing. A fortiori, the parents' mereinaction cannot allow the court to dispense with any dispositionalhearing at all. It would be absurd to hold that the trial courtmust obtain the parties' consent and determine what serves theminor's best interests before it delays the dispositional hearingbut that the court need not follow these explicit safeguards beforeit dispenses with the hearing entirely.

The statutory command that the court consider the bestinterests of the minor before it delays the dispositional hearingalso refutes the State's waiver argument. This requirement showsthat the legislature did not consider a prompt dispositionalhearing as merely a right of the parents that they could waive bychoice or inaction. Rather, it is clear that, in enacting section2--21(3) of the Act, the legislature believed that, in general, aprompt dispositional hearing is necessary to the minor's welfare. We would disregard this legislative judgment were we to hold thatthe parents' mere inaction could waive the statutory requirement ofa dispositional hearing following an adjudication that their childis abused, neglected, or dependent.

We hold that the trial court violated the Act by failing tohold a dispositional hearing after it adjudicated G.F.H. neglectedand dependent; that this omission was fundamentally unfair torespondents; and that, as a result, the order terminating theirparental rights cannot stand.

The judgment of the circuit court of Kendall County isreversed.

Reversed.

BOWMAN, P.J., and HUTCHINSON, J., concur.