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JUSTICE O'MALLEY delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioners, Thomas J. Mowinski and Candida Cuneo Mowinski,appeal the order of the circuit court of Du Page County, findingthat a Palm Desert, California, condominium was an asset of theestate of decedent, Ann L. Cuneo, and that two quitclaim deedspurportedly transferring decedent's interest in the property topetitioners were not valid. We affirm.

Respondents Ronald Stout and Breda Stout maintain that theproperty is an asset of decedent's estate. Decedent's willprovides that respondents are to inherit the property. Petitionersassert that decedent gave them the condominium in a conveyanceoccurring about one year before decedent's death. During theprobate of decedent's estate, on March 1, 2000, petitioners filedthis action to confirm the ademption of the condominium. Followingthe denial of petitioners' motion for summary judgment, this matterproceeded to a bench trial.

At the bench trial, petitioners presented evidence concerningthe making of the quitclaim deeds. Petitioners presented testimonythat two deeds were executed, one on April 19, 1996 (the Fridaydeed), and one on April 20, 1996 (the Saturday deed). Petitioners'witnesses testified that on April 19, 1996, decedent signed aquitclaim deed conveying the property to decedent and CandidaMowinski jointly. Decedent's signature was witnessed by theMowinskis' neighbors, Diane Shroyer and John Somers. The Fridaydeed was notarized by another neighbor, Vivian Somers. Testimonyfurther indicated that the Friday deed had been prepared by ThomasMowinski from a blank form he kept in his home office. After theFriday deed had been completed, it was given to Thomas Mowinski forsafekeeping.

Petitioners presented further testimony that on April 20,1996, decedent was dissatisfied with the Friday conveyance anddemanded that another quitclaim deed be executed to transfer theproperty to Candida and Thomas Mowinski jointly. This time,decedent's signature was witnessed by Diane Shroyer and ThomasMowinski (John Somers had entered the house but remained in theMowinskis' garage, examining some golf clubs). The Saturday deedwas also notarized by Vivian Somers. Once again the Saturday deedwas given to Thomas Mowinski for safekeeping.

Candida Mowinski testified that on May 7, 1996, she recordedthe Friday deed in California. At this time, the Saturday deed hadnot yet been recorded. Candida Mowinski testified that sherecorded the Friday deed even though it did not represent thewishes of her mother, namely, that title to the condominium be inboth Candida and Thomas Mowinski's names.

Thomas Mowinski testified that on August 29, 1996, he recordedthe Saturday deed. He testified that the deed had been executedwithout being dated and that, when he went to record the deed, hewas instructed to use that day's date even though the deed had beenexecuted on April 20, 1996.

Respondents presented testimony that substantially impeachedpetitioners' evidence. Vivian Somers admitted that the stamp withwhich she notarized the Saturday deed did not exist on April 20,1996. Elaborating, Somers explained that her notarial commissionexpired in July 1996 and that she filed her renewal application inJune 1996. Somers conceded that she would not have had the stampwith which she notarized the Saturday deed before June or July1996. Somers nevertheless maintained that she notarized theSaturday deed on April 20, 1996.

Respondents also presented the testimony of Robyn Flannigan,the manager and record keeper for the Notary Public Association ofIllinois (NPAI). She testified that her company files thepaperwork necessary to complete an application or renewal for anotary public commission. In addition, her company makes thestamps given to their applicants. She testified that sherecognized the notarial stamp used on the Saturday deed owing to aunique feature of the software used to manufacture stamps for theNPAI. Flannigan also testified that she received Somers'sapplication for renewal in June 1996 and that the stamp would nothave been made until after the State had renewed the commission,sometime in late June or July 1996.

Respondents also presented testimony from Darlene Hennessy, a"questioned documents" examiner. Hennessy examined the "Ann L.Cuneo" signatures on the two deeds and compared them against threeknown signatures of decedent from her will. Hennessy concludedthat decedent could not be identified as the writer of thesignatures on either of the deeds.

Following the presentation of evidence, the trial courtdetermined that respondents had met their burden of proof by clearand convincing evidence and denied petitioners' complaint forademption. The trial court held that neither of the deeds wasvalid and that the California condominium was an asset ofdecedent's estate to be distributed according to decedent's will. Petitioners timely appeal.

Petitioners raise a number of issues on appeal. Petitionersappear to argue that the trial court's decision was against themanifest weight of the evidence because the two quitclaim deedscomplied with the formal requisites of California law andrespondents failed to carry their burden of demonstrating theirinvalidity by clear and convincing evidence.

As an initial matter, the parties agree upon the choice of lawto apply to the facts of this case. "The title to and dispositionof real estate either by deed or will is governed by the law of theState where the land is situated." In re Estate of Barrie, 331Ill. App. 443, 447 (1947). Further, in conflicts of law cases,procedural matters are governed by the law of the forum andsubstantive matters are governed by the law in which the propertyis located. Boersma v. Amoco Oil Co., 276 Ill. App. 3d 638, 645(1995). Accordingly, California law will apply to the substantiveissues in this case; Illinois law will apply to procedural matters.

Petitioners initially argue that the two deeds were properlyauthenticated under California law. By "authentication,"petitioners appear to mean that they introduced sufficient evidenceat trial to prove that the certified copies of the quitclaim deedswere accurate and correct copies of those documents. (Petitionersdid not produce the original deeds, even though the copies producedat trial included instructions that, after recording, the originalsbe returned to petitioners.) Petitioners' issue with respect tothe authentication of the deeds, however, misses the point ofrespondents' challenge to the documents. While respondents didsuggest that petitioners' failure to produce the originals gaverise to a presumption against petitioners, respondents' main pointwas that their evidence tended to demonstrate that the deeds werenot validly executed. Petitioners' contentions regarding theauthentication of the documents under California law do not shedany light on this issue (or on petitioners' contention that thetrial court's finding of invalidity was against the manifest weightof the evidence). Accordingly, we need not further address thisargument because it is not relevant or helpful to the issues raisedin this appeal.

We next turn to petitioners' contention that the trial court'sdetermination regarding the validity of the deeds was against themanifest weight of the evidence. The allocation of the burden ofproof is a procedural matter. Babcock v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.Co., 83 Ill. App. 3d 919, 928 (1979). A recorded deed raises apresumption that it is valid and effective. Resolution Trust Corp.v. Hardisty, 269 Ill. App. 3d 613, 619 (1995). In order to rebutthe presumption of validity, the party challenging the deed'svalidity must present clear and convincing evidence that the deedis not valid. Resolution Trust, 269 Ill. App. 3d at 619. Whenreviewing the trial court's assessment of a factual issue, such asthe validity of a deed, we use the deferential manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard. Joel R. v. Board of Education of MannheimSchool District 83, 292 Ill. App. 3d 607, 613 (1997). A factualfinding, such as respondents' proving the invalidity of the twodeeds by clear and convincing evidence, is against the manifestweight of the evidence "where, upon review of all the evidence inthe light most favorable to the prevailing party, an oppositeconclusion is clearly apparent" or the factual finding is "palpablyerroneous and wholly unwarranted, is clearly the result of passionor prejudice, or appears to be arbitrary and unsubstantiated by theevidence." Joel R., 292 Ill. App. 3d at 613. Moreover, in anonjury case, the judgment of the trial court will be upheld ifthere is evidence in the record to support it. Brown v. Zimmerman,18 Ill. 2d 94, 102 (1959); Brencick v. Spencer, 188 Ill. App. 3d217, 219 (1989). Even though we are proceeding under the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard of review, we must keep in mindthat we are reviewing the trial court's determination thatrespondent presented clear and convincing evidence to rebut thepresumption that the deeds were valid.

A review of all of the evidence shows that the trial court'sdetermination that the two deeds were shown to be invalid by clearand convincing evidence was not against the manifest weight of theevidence. The evidence at trial showed that, on Thursday morning,April 18, 1996, decedent was in California and learned of the deathof her brother-in-law, Hugh Stout. She traveled to Illinois andspent the evening in her Addison home with her brother, LarryLewis. At that time, decedent was an owner of the Columbian CuneoFuneral Home in Franklin Park, which handled some of the funeralarrangements for Hugh Stout.

The Stouts offered evidence that decedent was taken to hersister, Golda Stout, who had unexpectedly lost her husband. According to respondents, decedent stayed at their home in Elgin onFriday, April 19, 1996, and on Saturday, April 20, 1996.

Gina Lewis testified that she was a funeral director at theColumbian Cuneo Funeral Home. She testified that decedent was atthe funeral home on Friday, April 19, 1996. She testified that shelived across the street from decedent's house. She arrived homefrom work on Friday evening before her father, Larry Lewis,returned from the funeral home with decedent. Gina Lewis testifiedthat it was already dark when she observed her father and decedentarrive at their home. She further testified that it was aboutthree hours after dark when she saw a second vehicle arrive atdecedent's home. Gina Lewis testified that she observed thatCandida Mowinski had arrived at decedent's home. (Candida Mowinskitestified that she saw Gina Lewis when she picked up her mother.)

Evidence showed that sunset occurred at 7:38 p.m. in Addison. The end of twilight occurred at 8:08 p.m. Gina Lewis's testimonyshows that Candida Mowinski arrived at decedent's home about threehours after dark, or sometime after 10:30 p.m. on Friday night. According to Candida Mowinski's testimony, she left the Addisonhouse about a half-hour after she arrived (although we note thatpetitioners believe that this occurred much earlier), or sometimeafter 11 p.m. Candida Mowinski testified that it is about anhour's drive from Addison to her home in Sandwich. Thus, accordingto the evidence produced by respondents, decedent could not havearrived at the Mowinski house until some time after midnight, wellafter the time petitioners testified that the first deed waspurportedly executed. This evidence, therefore, calls intoquestion the version of the occurrence described by petitioners.

Next, petitioners' testimony concerning the first deed wassignificantly impeached. Candida Mowinski testified that, onFriday, April 19, at approximately 6 p.m., she picked up decedentfrom her home in Addison and drove decedent to the Mowinski home inSandwich. She testified that it was during the car ride thatdecedent first broached the topic of giving the Mowinskis theCalifornia condominium. Candida Mowinski also testified, however,that the first deed was prepared at 5 or 6 p.m. on Friday, April19, apparently before decedent expressed a desire to give theMowinskis the California condominium.

In addition, Candida Mowinski's trial testimony was impeachedby her earlier citation testimony. At trial, she testified thatdecedent spent Thursday night at decedent's Addison home. Thistestimony was impeached by her citation testimony in which shetestified that she picked up decedent at the funeral home onThursday and decedent spent that night at the Mowinski house. Moreover, at the citation, Candida Mowinski testified that, onFriday morning over coffee, decedent first broached the subject oftransferring the California property (not on Friday evening duringthe car ride to the Mowinski house). Candida Mowinski explainedthe difference between her trial testimony and her earlier citationtestimony was due to a déjà vu experience just before trial whichcompletely changed her recollection of the events of April 18, 19,and 20, 1996.

Similarly, Thomas Mowinski's trial testimony differedsignificantly from his earlier citation testimony. At trial,Thomas Mowinski testified that decedent did not arrive at his homeuntil Friday evening; at the citation, he testified that he wouldnever forget a shocking telephone call he received on Thursday,April 18, 1996, in which his wife informed him that she wasbringing decedent to their home. Thomas Mowinski was surprisedbecause decedent had never before visited the Mowinski home. Atthe citation, he testified that decedent arrived at his home duringthe afternoon or early evening of Thursday, April 18, and not onFriday, as he testified at trial. During the trial, he testifiedthat decedent stayed at his home only one night; at the citation,he testified that she stayed at his home both Thursday and Fridaynights.

Likewise, John Somers's trial testimony was impeached by hisearlier citation testimony. At trial, John Somers testified thatthe first deed was executed on Friday evening after he had returnedfrom work; at the citation, he testified that the deed was executedlate Friday morning. He testified at trial that the deed wassigned at the kitchen counter; at the citation, he testified thatit was signed in the office. He testified at trial that CandidaMowinski was present when the first deed was signed and that he sawDiane Shroyer sign the first deed as a witness; at the citation, hetestified that he was unsure if Candida Mowinski was present whenthe deed was executed and that he had no recollection of seeingDiane Shroyer sign the deed as a witness.

In addition to the impeachment of the witnesses regarding theexecution of the first deed, Darlene Hennessy testified forrespondents regarding her examination of decedent's purportedsignatures on the deed. Hennessy concluded that decedent could notbe identified as having written the signature on the first deed. She made this finding to a reasonable degree of certainty.

Regarding the second deed, petitioners' witnesses were againsignificantly impeached in their testimony regarding the creationand execution of the second deed. The second deed is dated asAugust 29, 1996, and was notarized in La Salle County, Illinois. Decedent could not have executed the second deed in La Salle Countyon that date, however, as she was in California attending abirthday celebration.

Petitioners explained the discrepancy by testifying that thesecond deed was created and executed on April 20, 1996, the dayfollowing the execution of the first deed. Thomas Mowinskitestified that on August 29, 1996, when he brought the deed to berecorded in California, the recorder noticed that the deed wasundated and required him to fill in a date. Thomas Mowinskifurther testified that he used that day's date, even though thedeed had been created and executed on April 20, 1996. BothMowinskis, Vivian Somers, and Diane Shroyer all testified thatVivian Somers applied her notary seal to the second deed on April20, 1996. Petitioners' account of the creation, execution, andrecording of the second deed, however, was significantly impeached.

The evidence shows that Vivian Somers notarized both the firstand the second deeds. Somers's notarial stamp used on the firstdeed bore an expiration date of July 13, 1996. Somers's notarialstamp used on the second deed bore an expiration date of July 13,2000. Ordinarily, the fact that Vivian Somers used two differentnotarial stamps to notarize two different documents would notexcite comment, especially where there is no question raised as towhether she was a valid notary at the time of the execution of bothdeeds. Here, however, the evidence showed that Vivian Somers didnot possess the second notarial stamp on April 20, 1996, and thatthe second notarial stamp had not even been created on that date.

Respondents offered the testimony of Robyn Flannigan, themanager and record keeper for the NPAI. Flannigan testified thatthe NPAI assists persons who apply to become or renew theircommissions as notaries public. The NPAI provides applications andrenewal forms, provides bonding for the applicant, and sends theapplication to Springfield for filing and processing. In addition,the NPAI also manufactures the notarial stamp for the successfulapplicant. Flannigan testified that the NPAI purchases a listingfrom the Secretary of State's office that identifies thoseapplicants who are approved and the dates of their commissions. Only after verifying that an applicant has been approved by thestate and the date of the applicant's commission does the NPAIcreate the notarial stamp.

Vivian Somers testified that her commission was due to expireon July 13, 1996. She utilized the NPAI in order to submit herrenewal application sometime in June 1996. Flannigan testifiedthat on June 15, 1996, the NPAI received Somers's application forthe renewal of her commission. (Somers's renewal application wasnotarized on June 6, 1996.)

Flannigan testified that she personally created the stamp usedby Somers on the second deed. She recognized the stamp due to aunique feature in the NPAI's fabrication process that results inthe characters of the stamp not being centered and aligned. Flannigan testified that she made the stamp only after Somers'sapplication had been approved by the state, sometime late in Juneor early in July. Likewise, Somers admitted on cross-examinationthat she could not have had the second stamp in her possessionuntil after June 5, 1996. Somers further admitted that sheobtained only one stamp in 1996, the one made for her by the NPAI. Thus, the evidence clearly demonstrates that the second deed couldnot have been notarized on April 20, 1996, because the stamp usedto notarize the second deed did not exist on that date. Becausepetitioners' witnesses testified that on April 20, 1996, they eachpersonally observed Vivian Somers affix her stamp to the seconddeed, their testimony has been overwhelmingly discredited.

In addition to rendering petitioners' account of the creationand execution of the second deed incredible, the evidence thatSomers could not have notarized the second deed on April 20, 1996,casts significant doubt upon petitioners' account of the creationand execution of the first deed. Indeed, the minor inconsistenciesamong the witnesses that normally would be insignificant take onmuch greater significance, especially in light of the fact thatrespondents presented evidence to suggest that decedent was not atthe Mowinski house in time to execute the deed as asserted bypetitioners.

In addition to the devastating effect of the evidence ofSomers's inability to have notarized the deed on April 20, 1996,the credibility of Vivian Somers and Diane Shroyer was furthercompromised when they admitted that their affidavits on a purportedwill of decedent were false. At trial, respondents presentedrespondents' exhibit 8, which was a will purportedly executed bydecedent in July 1996 and which was denied admission to probate. Vivian Somers notarized the document and Diane Shroyer witnessedthe execution of the document. At trial, Vivian Somers testifiedthat she notarized the document even though one of the witnessesdid not sign it in her presence. Similarly, Diane Shroyer admittedat trial that she was not present when the other witness signed thedocument, contrary to her affidavit included on the document. Thus, both Somers and Shroyer admitted that they were untruthful inmaking their representations on the document purporting to bedecedent's will, and these falsehoods impeach their testimony attrial.

In addition, the Mowinskis were unable to explain why, if thesecond deed transferred the California property to them jointly,decedent executed another will devising the same property to themthat she had already transferred to them via the second deed. Thewill was purportedly executed three months after the Mowinskis hadbeen given the California property.

Moreover, Hennessy testified that, with regard to the seconddeed, she was also unable to identify decedent as the writer of thesignature on the deed. She also held this opinion to a reasonabledegree of document examination certainty.

The second deed also directed the recorder to return theoriginal to the Mowinskis' home in Sandwich following itsrecording. The original of the second deed was never produced,either to respondents, Hennessy, or the trial court.

In addition to the foregoing information presented to thetrial court, we note that the deeds themselves do not correctlyindicate the number of the condominium unit. Instead, both deedsidentify the condominium number as "71" and not "471." This erroron the face of each deed does not, standing alone, invalidate thedeeds. It is, however, a relevant item of information for thetrial court to consider.

The foregoing recitation of the evidence demonstrates that thetrial court had before it ample evidence from which it couldconclude that respondents had met their burden of proving theinvalidity of both deeds by clear and convincing evidence. Thedemonstration that Vivian Somers could not have notarized thesecond deed on April 20, 1996, with a stamp that did not exist atthat time also serves to cast doubt upon all the witnesses'testimony because they testified that Somers notarized the documentin their presence. Further, it casts doubt on the remainder oftheir testimony concerning the first deed as well. Respondentspresented evidence, which, if believed, flatly contradicted allaspects of petitioners' version of the events surrounding themaking of the two deeds. We hold, therefore, that the trialcourt's determination that respondents had proved by clear andconvincing evidence that the two deeds were invalid was not againstthe manifest weight of the evidence.

Petitioners' primary argument is that the trial courterroneously believed respondents' evidence and discreditedpetitioners' evidence. Petitioners' brief recapitulatespetitioners' version of the creation of the deeds. Through theirrecapitulation of the evidence, petitioners appear to argue thattheirs is the only credible evidence presented to the trial court. In effect, petitioners ask this court to reweigh the evidence inorder to reach a decision in petitioners' favor. This we cannotdo. Our review is deferential to the trial court's factualdeterminations, as it was in the better position to view thewitnesses during their testimony and to make the necessarycredibility determinations. A reversal of the trial court'sjudgment in this case would amount only to a substitution of ourjudgment for that of the trial court and this is not our properfunction. Brencick, 188 Ill. App. 3d at 220.

We next will examine each of petitioners' remaining argumentsin detail. Petitioners contend that respondents' claim thatdecedent could not be identified as the signatory of the two deedsfails in light of the testimony of the Mowinskis, Somerses, andShroyer. This contention, however, misapprehends the effect of theevidence presented by respondents. Respondents clearly andconvincingly showed, as outlined above, that petitioners' versionof the creation of the deeds could not have happened as petitionersclaimed. In addition, respondents demonstrated that decedent couldnot be identified as the signer of the deeds. Petitioners aremerely asking this court to substitute its judgment and accept thetestimony of their witnesses and reject the factual resolutionsmade by the trial court. We decline petitioners' invitation.

Petitioners argue that the notarization of the deeds isirrelevant because, under California law, notarization is notnecessary where the witnesses testify about the making of the deed. Petitioners' argument misses the point of respondents' attack onthe notarization. Respondents showed that Vivian Somers'stestimony was not accurate concerning the preparation of the seconddeed and that, therefore, the second deed could not have beennotarized by Vivian Somers on April 20, 1996, as she and the otherwitnesses testified. This fact renders the testimony of all of thewitnesses suspect as they all testified that they observed VivianSomers notarize the second deed. The notarization issue is notraised to show that, as a result of a flawed notarization, thedeeds are invalid; rather, it demonstrates that Somers's and theothers' testimony is incredible or untruthful and calls intoquestion the very validity of the deeds themselves.

Petitioners also question the testimony of Hennessy, thedocument examiner. Petitioners emphasize the areas in whichHennessy's opinion was weak or inconclusive. Petitioners do not,however, challenge the admissibility of Hennessy's opinion. Theirarguments go to the weight of Hennessy's opinions, and it fallswithin the province of the trial court to accept or rejectHennessy's opinions and their effect on the trial court'sdetermination of the factual issues in this case. Therefore, whilepetitioners do properly note weaknesses in the testimony, ourreview of Hennessy's testimony shows that it is not so infirm as torequire its rejection as a matter of law. Petitioners, once again,effectively ask that this court substitute its judgment for that ofthe trial court, and this we may not do.

Petitioners next argue that respondents' evidence concerningwhere decedent spent the night of April 19, 1996, did not rise tothe level of clear and convincing evidence that decedent lodgedwith the Stouts on that night. Petitioners suggest that thetestimony of their witnesses concerning this issue is morecredible. We have carefully reviewed the evidence as set forthabove. Further, this issue involves a factual resolution on thepart of the trial court. Although there is no explicit finding inthe record, based on our analysis set out above, the trial courtcould have accepted respondents' testimony concerning decedent'slodgings on the night of April 19. This conclusion is supported byevidence in the record. As petitioners merely ask this court tofind that their version is preferable to respondents', petitionersare asking us to substitute our judgment for that of the trialcourt on a factual matter. We decline to do so.

Petitioners next argue that the two deeds complied with thesubstantive requisites for validity under California law. Specifically, petitioners state that, taken together, the deedssufficiently described the property to avoid invalidity. Additionally, petitioners argue that the fact that the second deedapparently was wrongly dated or undated does not affect itsvalidity. Petitioners also argue that the certified copies of thedeeds are sufficient to prove the contents of the original deeds,that petitioners did not need to establish donative intent underCalifornia law, that delivery of the deeds could be presumed due totheir recordation, and that, because there were no reservations inthe body of the deeds, their presumed delivery was effective toconvey the properties. Even if we were to accept these argumentsas correct, the arguments do not address respondents' evidencedemonstrating that the second deed could not have been executed atthe time and in the manner averred by petitioners. Respondentsshowed that the second deed could not have been notarized on April20, 1996, and, therefore, that petitioners' testimony concerningthe second deed was wholly incredible. As this incredibility alsoaffects the credibility judgment the trial court would have appliedto the remainder of petitioners' evidence, the trial court couldhave concluded that petitioners' evidence concerning the first deedwas similarly incredible. The arguments advanced by petitioners donot address this issue; rather, petitioners' evidence involves theprima facie case for the validity of the deeds. Respondents haveclearly and convincingly rebutted that prima facie validity andpetitioners' arguments do not address this rebuttal. Accordingly,we find that petitioners' arguments are without merit.

Petitioners also argue that the main issue in this appeal iswhether respondents successfully challenged an inter vivos giftfrom parent to child. Petitioners suggest that, in order to raisea challenge to an inter vivos gift, the plaintiff must allege andprove the existence of a confidential relationship and the breachof that relationship through fraud or undue influence, citing Brownv. Moore, 407 Ill. 618 (1950), McCrillis v. Utterback, 397 Ill. 550(1947), and Brecel v. Carlstedt, 64 Ill. App. 3d 875 (1978). Wedisagree. We note that the cases cited by petitioners set forththe burden of proof to be imposed upon the party challenging theinter vivos gift. In addition, these cases stand for theproposition that fraud or undue influence will not be presumedwhere a parent has transferred property to a child. In Brown, theplaintiff argued that the burden of proof was on the respondents toprove that he had freely conveyed to them the property. The courtfound that, as this was a transfer from a parent to a child, theburden was on the plaintiff to show the invalidity of theconveyance. Brown, 407 Ill. at 623. Likewise, in Brecel, thecourt rejected the plaintiff's attempt to place the burden ofdisproving the existence of a confidential relationship on thechild and instead noted that the one contesting a conveyance fromparent to child must prove the existence of a confidentialrelationship and fraud or undue influence or some other ground forsetting aside the conveyance. Brecel, 64 Ill. App. 3d at 878. Similarly, in McCrillis, the court placed the burden of proving theinvalidity of the conveyance upon the plaintiff, holding that theplaintiff had to show the existence of a confidential relationshipand fraud or undue influence or the grantor's mental incapacity toset aside the conveyance in that case. McCrillis, 397 Ill. at 554-55.

Petitioners appear to contend that the only way a conveyancefrom a parent to a child may be set aside is through showing theexistence of a confidential relationship between the parent and thechild and then proving fraud or undue influence in securing thetransfer. This contention, however, fails to address respondents'theory of the case, namely, that petitioners fabricated the deeds,not that they somehow wrongfully obtained Ann Cuneo's signatureupon the deeds. Brown, McCrillis, and Brecel do not involve asituation where the party challenging the transfer is claiming thatthe deed itself was not produced by the parent. These cases,therefore, are factually inapposite to this case. Neither theparties nor our own research has directed us to a case directly onpoint. Nevertheless, we cannot accept petitioners' formulation ofthe pleading requirements to challenge the purported inter vivosgift in this case. Petitioners suggest that there is a universalrequirement in any case involving an inter vivos gift between aparent and child, namely, that the party challenging the gift mustplead either fraud or the existence and abuse of a confidentialrelationship. That allegation, however, is unnecessary where, ashere, the allegations pled that there was no actual gift by theparent to the child because the transfer itself was a completefabrication. Thus, there is no gift and no transfer because AnnCuneo never made the transfer. This is different from allegingthat she made the transfer as a result of fraud or undue influence.

Here, respondents alleged and proved, by clear and convincingevidence, that the deeds were fabricated and that Ann Cuneo did notexecute the deeds or otherwise intend to make a gift of theproperty to petitioners. Respondents' arguments regarding thenecessity of pleading fraud or undue influence do not directlyaddress the factual situation in this case and, accordingly, wereject them,

We note that petitioners raise a number of other issues intheir materials on appeal; however, these issues merely reiteratearguments expressed elsewhere. Further, we have addressed theseduplicative arguments above.

In sum, we hold that the trial court's determination that thetwo deeds were clearly and convincingly proved to be invalid wasnot against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of DuPage County.

Affirmed.

GROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.