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No. 2--01--0809

Respondent, Dexter L., was placed on probation for a period offive years on April 15, 1999. Respondent was 15 years old at thetime. Subsequent to respondent's seventeenth birthday, the Statefiled a petition to revoke his probation. Respondent admitted tosome of the allegations set forth in the petition. The trial courtmodified the conditions of respondent's probation and ordered thathe be detained for 30 days in the Kane County jail. The trialcourt's order also specified that respondent was not entitled toany good-time credit. Respondent now appeals. He first contendsthat the trial court lacked authority to sentence him to a term ofdetention in the county jail. In the alternative, he argues that,if the trial court did possess such authority, it lacked theauthority to deny him good-time credit. We agree with respondent'sfirst contention and need not address his second one.

Before turning to this issue, however, we must address theState's argument that this appeal is moot. An issue becomes mootwhen an actual controversy no longer exists and the interests ofthe parties no longer are in controversy. Novak v. Rathnam, 106Ill. 2d 478, 482 (1985). The State points out that respondent hasserved his sentence and is now an adult. However, exceptions tothe mootness doctrine exist. Respondent correctly points out thatthe public interest exception applies in this case. This exceptionrequires "(1) the existence of a question of a public nature; (2)the desirability of an authoritative determination for the purposeof guiding public officers in the performance of their duties; and(3) the likelihood the question will recur." People v. McCaskill,298 Ill. App. 3d 260, 264 (1998). In People v. D.T., 287 Ill. App.3d 408, 410-11 (1997), the First District applied the publicinterest exception in a case where a juvenile had been temporarilydetained but had been released by the time the appeal was decided. The First District concluded that the detention of a juvenile is amatter of public concern and that authoritative determination ofthe issue was desirable to guide the conduct of public officials,particularly juvenile court judges, in the future. D.T., 287 Ill.App. 3d at 411; see also People v. Clayborn, 90 Ill. App. 3d 1047,1052 (1980) ("The detention of a juvenile is a matter of publicconcern, and an authoritative determination of the issue will guidepublic officials and juvenile court judges who are likely to facethe problem in the future"). Further, the court reasoned that, dueto the time constraints imposed by the Juvenile Court Act of 1987(Act) (705 ILCS 405/1--1 et seq. (West 1994)), the issue was likelyto recur with other minors in the future. D.T., 287 Ill. App. 3dat 411. We find the same considerations relevant in the case atbar; accordingly, we conclude that the public interest exceptionpermits us to address the merits of this appeal.

The resolution of this appeal requires us to construe severalportions of the Act. Our primary goal in construing a statute isto ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 118 (2002). The most reliableindicator of the legislature's intent is the language of thestatute itself. People v. Lavallier, 187 Ill. 2d 464, 468 (1999). If the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, a court mustnot read exceptions, limitations, or other conditions into it. People v. Daniels, 172 Ill. 2d 154, 163 (1996). Moreover,proceedings under the Act, while still not truly criminal innature, have shifted "from the singular goal of rehabilitation toinclude the overriding concerns of protecting the public andholding juvenile offenders accountable for violations of the law." In re A.G., 195 Ill. 2d 313, 317 (2001); see also 705 ILCS 405/5--101 (West 1998). Statutes that are penal in nature warrant astrict construction. In re M.F., 315 Ill. App. 3d 641, 650 (2000).

A reading of the statutes involved in this case shows that thetrial court lacked authority to sentence respondent to a period ofdetention in the county jail. The State filed a petition to revokerespondent's probation; therefore, we begin our analysis withsection 5--720 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5--720 (West 1998)). Section 5--720(4) provides:

"If the court finds that the minor has violated acondition at any time prior to the expiration or terminationof the period of probation or conditional discharge, it maycontinue him or her on the existing sentence, with or withoutmodifying or enlarging the conditions, or may revoke probationor conditional discharge and impose any other sentence thatwas available under Section 5--710 at the time of the initialsentence." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5--720(4) (West1998).

Thus, the plain language of this section states that a minor foundto have violated a condition of probation may be subjected to anysentence that was available at the time of the initial sentence asallowed by section 5--710 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5--710 (West1998)). Nowhere in section 5--710 is the trial court grantedauthority to sentence a juvenile to county jail. In fact, thissection specifically provides that a minor may be placed indetention for 30 days "provided that any such detention shall be ina juvenile detention home." 705 ILCS 405/5--710(1)(a)(v) (West1998). Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred insentencing respondent to a term of detention in the county jail. Cf. 1994 Ill. Att'y Gen. Op. No. 94--020, at 5 ("If, for example,a petition to revoke probation based upon a violation of the termsthereof had been filed, instead of an action for contempt, theprovisions of the Juvenile Court Act would apply, and, under theterms of section 5--25 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5--25 (West 1992)),a term of confinement in the county jail would not bepermissible").

The trial court relied on section 5--410 of the Act (705 ILCS405/5--410 (West 1998)) in concluding that it could orderrespondent confined in the county jail. This provision provides,inter alia:

"Minors under 17 years of age shall be kept separate fromconfined adults and may not at any time be kept in the samecell, room or yard with adults confined pursuant to criminallaw. Persons 17 years of age and older who have a petition ofdelinquency filed against them shall be confined in an adultdetention facility." 705 ILCS 405/5--410(2)(c)(v) (West1998).

The trial court found this provision relevant because neither itnor section 5--710 uses the term "sentence," which, the trial courtapparently concluded, indicated that they should be read together. Thus, the trial court concluded, the final sentence of section 5--410(2)(c)(v) required minors over the age of 17 to be confined inadult detention facilities, such as a county jail. Further, thetrial court noted that a contrary conclusion would violate "everyDepartment of Corrections regulation there is."

We find the trial court's reliance on this provisionmisplaced. The plain language of section 5--720 authorizes a courtto impose a sentence under section 5--710 when a probationviolation occurs. Nowhere is section 5--410 mentioned. Moreover,it is axiomatic that a statute must be interpreted as a whole andevery provision must be interpreted in light of every otherprovision. Devoney v. Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity& Benefit Fund, 199 Ill. 2d 414, 425 (2002). A reading of section5--410 as a whole demonstrates that it deals with pretrialdetention rather than sentencing. See 705 ILCS 405/5--410 (West1998).

Furthermore, it has been held, in the context of both adultand juvenile proceedings, that the sentence for a probationviolation is determined by the sentence available at the time ofthe original disposition. See People v. Witte, 317 Ill. App. 3d959, 964-65 (2000); In re Tucker, 45 Ill. App. 3d 728, 730-31(1976). Section 5--720 reflects this principle, stating that, uponrevocation of probation, a court may impose any sentence available"at the time of the initial sentence." 705 ILCS 405/5--720(4)(West 1998). At the time respondent was initially sentenced, hewas not yet 17 years old. Hence, assuming the trial court wascorrect in its reliance on section 5--410, it would not have beenapplicable to respondent in any event because it did not apply tohim at the time he was initially sentenced.

We decline to consider the possible effect of any of theDepartment of Corrections' regulations, which apparently do notallow for a juvenile over the age of 17 to be placed in a juveniledetention facility, on this case. The State has not provided acitation to any such regulation, thus waiving the issue. Fuller v.Justice, 117 Ill. App. 3d 933, 942 (1983). Moreover, we questionwhether an administrative regulation should prevail over aconflicting statute.

The State points to another statutory provision in an attemptto justify the trial court's decision. Relying on section 5--715of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5--715 (West 1998)), the State posits thatthe trial court could sentence respondent to a term in the countyjail as a condition of probation. This section provides that"[t]he court may as a condition of probation or of conditionaldischarge require that the minor *** comply with other conditionsas may be ordered by the court." 705 ILCS 405/5--715(2)(u) (West1998). We decline to read this provision as an expansive grant ofpower to confine juveniles in a manner not otherwise specified inthe Act. We note that a similar argument was rejected in In reJ.M.S., 92 Ill. App. 3d 1141, 1142 (1981). In that case, the Stateargued that an identically worded catch-all provision contained inan earlier version of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 37, par.705--3(2)(o)) authorized the court to tax costs as a condition ofprobation. J.M.S., 92 Ill. App. 3d at 1142. The J.M.S. courtconcluded that this broad phraseology was insufficient to justifytaxing costs where they were not authorized by any other provisionin the Act. J.M.S., 92 Ill. App. 3d at 1142. We similarly rejectthe State's contention that the broad language of section 5--715(2)(u) justifies a sentence not otherwise authorized by the Act.

The State also relies on People v. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d 289(1979), in support of its position. In that case, our supremecourt held that an individual's age at the date of sentencing wasrelevant for determining whether he or she should be sentenced tothe adult or juvenile division of the Department of Corrections. Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 310. Taylor relied on a statutory provisionthat stated, "All offenders under 17 years of age sentenced toimprisonment shall be committed to the Juvenile Division of theDepartment of Corrections ***." Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par.1005--8--6(c). The supreme court concluded that the most naturalinterpretation of this provision was "under 17 years of age whensentenced." (Emphasis in original.) Taylor, 76 Ill. 2d at 310. Inthe instant case, we are confronted with a different statutoryprovision, which provides that a court may "impose any othersentence that was available under Section 5--710 at the time of theinitial sentence." (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5--720(4) (West1998). Hence, we find Taylor to be of no guidance.

The State also argues the Act vests a sentencing judge withwide discretion in determining an appropriate sentence. The Statesuggests that the sentence was appropriate because it was a lesssevere alternative than placement in the juvenile division of theDepartment of Corrections. In a related argument, the Stateasserts that the history of this case, which, as presented by theState, indicates that defendant has been largely unsuccessful incomplying with probation, warrants the sentence imposed. Theseconsiderations are beside the point. The State, in fact, providesits own answer to these arguments. In the course of making theformer one, the State notes that a judge "need not enumerate allpossible alternatives" when imposing a sentence. See In re F.N.,253 Ill. App. 3d 483, 488 (1993). Quite simply, given thestatutory scheme discussed above, detention in the county jail isnot a possible alternative.

To the extent these latter two arguments can be read asadvancing considerations of public policy, such concerns are moreappropriately addressed to the legislature. Whether it would bebeneficial for courts to be able to sentence a 17 year old to thecounty jail is a matter for that body to resolve. Our role issimply to interpret the statutory scheme, and it is clear to usthat section 5--710 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5--710 (West 1998)),read in light of section 5--720 of the Act (705 ILCS 405/5--720(West 1998)), does not authorize a court to sentence a juvenile toa term of detention in a county jail.

In light of the foregoing, we need not address respondent'ssecond contention. The order of the circuit court of Kane Countyrequiring respondent to serve his term of detention in the countyjail is reversed.

Reversed.

BOWMAN and KAPALA, JJ., concur.