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JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioner, William G. Swope, appeals from the order of the trial court denying his petitionfor conditional release pursuant to section 60 of the Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act (Act)(725 ILCS 207/60 (West 2000)). We affirm.

On November 9, 1999, Swope was adjudicated a sexually violent person and committed tothe custody of the Department of Human Services (DHS). This court affirmed the adjudication andcommitment in In re Detention of Swope, No. 2--99--1272 (2001) (unpublished order under SupremeCourt Rule 23). On May 24, 2001, Swope filed a petition for conditional release. After a hearing,the trial court denied Swope's petition. This appeal followed.

Swope first contends that he did not receive a fair hearing on his petition because his expertwitness was deprived of the opportunity to discuss his treatment progress with treatment providersat DHS while the State's expert was allowed to engage in such discussions.

On July 24, 2000, Swope petitioned the court to appoint the Institute for PsychologicalTherapies (the Institute) to perform a reexamination of him, pursuant to section 55 of the Act (725ILCS 207/55 (West 2000)). The court granted the motion and ordered the Institute to examineSwope, prepare a report, and testify in court. Hollida Wakefield and Ralph Underwager of theInstitute performed the examination and prepared the report. On two status dates during the courseof the examination, Swope's counsel told the court that two DHS employees refused to talk toUnderwager. On the second status date, Swope's counsel told the court that he would subpoena theworkers and depose them. Eventually, Thomas Speaker of the DHS was deposed, and the depositionwas used by Wakefield and Underwager "in lieu of an interview." However, Wakefield andUnderwager noted in their report:

"[T]his procedure is not adequate. An attorney cannot be expected to know whatquestions to ask and what issues need to be explored more fully. Therefore, it is ourprofessional opinion that Mr. Swope has been seriously disadvantaged by the state's refusalto allow professional psychological contact with the treatment staff. Once a person has beencommitted, it is crucial to be able to assess as fully and accurately as possible what changeshave been brought about and observed in the course of treatment provided as the civilcommitment law requires. *** Not having full access to comprehend the process and theoutcomes limits Mr. Swope's ability to get a fair and complete assessment of his progress."

At the hearing on Swope's petition, Wakefield testified that her evaluation of Swope wasmade "more difficult" by the refusal of the DHS employees to answer her questions, especially as towhether his behaviors had improved, stayed the same, or deteriorated. The State presented thetestimony of clinical psychologist Barry Mark Leavitt, who had spoken with Swope's treatment teamin preparing his evaluation, and Thomas Speaker, the member of Swope's treatment team who hadbeen deposed by Swope's attorney.

Swope argues that his right to due process was violated because his expert was denied theopportunity to interview the DHS treatment providers while the State's expert was allowed to speakto them. Although proceedings under the Act are considered as civil in nature, a petitioner under theAct is entitled to all the constitutional rights afforded a criminal defendant, including the right to dueprocess of law. In re Detention of Kortte, 317 Ill. App. 3d 111, 115 (2000). The right to dueprocess is the right to a fundamentally fair trial in which the State has no strategic advantage and therespondent can defend himself on a level playing field. Kortte, 317 Ill. App. 3d at 115-16.

We conclude that it was a violation of Swope's right to due process to allow the DHSemployees to decline to talk to Swope's expert while they talked to the State's expert. The coremeaning of due process is fairness. People v. Collins, 333 Ill. App. 3d 20, 26 (2002). Procedural dueprocess requires that a defendant have the right to relevant, competent evidence, and that the Statetake steps to insure that an indigent defendant has a fair opportunity to present his case. In reDetention of Allen, 331 Ill. App. 3d 996, 1003 (2002). We fail to see the fairness of a situation inwhich State witnesses may refuse to talk with the petitioner's experts yet may speak with the State'sexperts. Both parties' experts rely to some extent on a petitioner's current treatment and behavioralchanges in the course of the treatment to determine if that person should be released. Wakefieldclearly stated that Swope's ability to get a fair and complete assessment of his progress was limitedby the incomplete access she had to Swope's treatment staff. The State had access to this informationbut refused to give it to Swope. This is not a "level playing field."

However, we cannot say that Swope attempted to enforce his right to a fair hearing. WhileSwope's attorney twice informed the trial court that the DHS workers were not talking to his experts,counsel never sought a court order to remedy the situation. On October 31, 2000, the followingcolloquy took place:

"MR. MILLER [Swope's attorney]: *** Judge Roe approved an order allowing meto engage some experts to examine Mr. Swope. They're from the Minneapolis, Minnesotaarea. I got a call from Doctor Underwager, who is one of the two, last week, stating that hehasn't quite finished the report. He wanted to talk to or take a deposition of two of thepeople who are employed by the Department of Human Services, that's where Mr. Swope isin custody, a John [sic] Speaker and a Sean Jumper, J-u-m-p-e-r. I said since we had a statushearing coming up, I would bring this up with the Assistant Attorney General, Mr. Curran,and with the court. Mr. Curran has no objection to an order being entered.

MR. CURRAN [Assistant Attorney General]: Although, you know, Judge, justsubsequent to our thinking about it, I don't think we can really order a witness to speak unlessthere is a deposition.

MR. MILLER: Yeah.

MR. CURRAN: But I, I don't know why they're not talking to this doctor, and theyshould, so maybe, maybe a phone call will be enough.

MR. MILLER: We talked outside, Mr. Curran said, well, I will talk to theDepartment of Human Services' attorney, and I'm sure we can set something up, I'll get backto you, and that's fine with me, so I would suggest, Judge, we continue this for sixty days tosee if we can get this wound up, I mean at least as to the report."

On the next status date, December 28, 2000, the following took place:

"MR. MILLER: *** So what our problem is here is that I was trying to set up aninterview between one of my expert witnesses, and two of the workers at DHS, and wasworking with, through Mr. Curran. He's not able to budge them, so what I'm going to haveto do is subpoena them in for a deposition. So if you would put this for a status about sixtydays from now, I'll subpoena those people in and get that taken care of. That should be prettywell finalized, I think.

THE COURT: Sounds like a fair approach.

MR. CURRAN: That's fine, Judge. You know, like I said, I wish I could be of morehelp to Mr. Miller in expediting the process, but they don't want to talk without beingdeposed, so I guess it's, civil rules allow for it as much."

Swope brought the factual situation to the court's attention. However, he never petitionedthe court for any remedy, such as sanctions, or brought a motion in limine to bar the State's use ofevidence obtained from the conversations with the DHS workers. Instead, he went forward and tooka deposition and never gave the trial court an opportunity to correct the situation. This was aprocedural default by Swope, wherein he volunteered to act and acquiesced in a procedure thatultimately may have short-circuited his own right to due process. See In re B.L., 315 Ill. App. 3d602, 605 (2000). Swope helped to create the issue of a violation of his right to due process byslumbering on that right; he cannot now appeal from an alleged defect that he, himself, helped tocreate. For this reason, while we find that Swope's right to due process was violated, we will notreverse the trial court's judgment on this basis.

Swope next contends that the trial court applied the wrong standard in determining whetherto grant his petition for conditional release. Prior to August 17, 2001, section 60(d) of the Actprovided that a court shall grant a petition for conditional release unless the State proved by clear andconvincing evidence:

"[T]hat the person is still a sexually violent person and that it is still substantiallyprobable that the person will engage in acts of sexual violence if the person is not confinedin a secure facility." 725 ILCS 207/60(d) (West 2000).

However, section 60(d) was amended to provide that a petition should be granted unless the State,again by clear and convincing evidence, proved "that the person has not made sufficient progress tobe conditionally released." 725 ILCS 207/60(d) (West 2002).

The hearing on Swope's petition began on December 6, 2001, after the amendment to section60(d) took effect. In ruling on the petition on March 9, 2002, the trial court quoted thepreamendment language of the Act as the standard for the case and, in relevant part, found:

"16. This Court must agree with the People that William's failure to sustain hisparticipation in any aspect of his current treatment plan since October, 2000 indicates thatWilliam is not yet ready to move into a less secure environment. The Court has no doubt thatWilliam is capable of successfully completing his treatment plan in a reasonably short periodof time if he puts his heart and mind to the task.

17. For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the People have met the burdenof proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that William is still a sexually violent person andthat it is still substantially probable that he will engage in acts of sexual violence if he is notconfined in a secure facility."

The court clearly relied on and ruled under the incorrect, preamendment standard. However,we conclude that Swope was not prejudiced by this error. The preamendment standard is a higher,more difficult standard for the State to meet; proving that a petitioner is still a sexually dangerousperson and that "it is still substantially probable" that he will engage in acts of sexual violence if heis not confined is more difficult than proving a lack of "sufficient progress" toward conditionalrelease. In addition, a finding that it is "still substantially probable" that a person will engage in actsof sexual violence includes an implicit finding that the person has not made sufficient progress towardconditional release. For these reasons, we determine that Swope was not prejudiced by the court'serroneous use of the incorrect standard.

Swope next contends that the trial court erred in relying on evidence and expert testimonybased on inadmissible actuarial risk prediction instruments. The State's expert, Barry Leavitt, testifiedthat he relied, in part, on actuarial risk assessment instruments in forming his opinion on Swope'spotential for future sexual violence. Among these instruments were the Static-99 and the  MIN-SAT-R.

In People v. Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d 965 (2002), this court held that psychological andpsychiatric testimony of an expert that is predicated on actuarial instruments was subject to thestandard set forth in Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). In Taylor, we held that theState had failed to meet its burden to establish that such actuarial instruments had gained generalacceptance in the psychological and psychiatric communities and that the trial court abused itsdiscretion in permitting the State to present testimony regarding their use. See Taylor, 335 Ill. App.3d at 978-80. Swope now argues that Taylor requires this court to reverse the trial court and granthim a new hearing. The State, on the other hand, asks us to reconsider our ruling in Taylor.

However, we need not reach either party's argument. Swope failed to object to theintroduction of evidence regarding these instruments or move in limine to prevent the introductionof such evidence. Failure to specifically and timely object in the trial court waives the objection onreview. In re Detention of Traynoff, 338 Ill. App. 3d 949, 961 (2003). In addition, Swope's ownexperts used these instruments in their analysis and included them in their report and testimony beforethe court. At the hearing on the petition, Swope presented his evidence first, by agreement with theState. Wakefield's testimony, including testimony about the actuarial instruments and the results ofthose tests, was given before the State had presented its evidence. This distinguishes the case beforeus from Taylor, where the defendant sought to bar the results from these instruments via a motionin limine and the court allowed the State to present the evidence after a Frye hearing.

This court has not held that such actuarial instruments are, as a matter of law, incompetentevidence. In Taylor, while we held that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that thoseinstruments had gained general acceptance in the psychological and psychiatric communities, we didnot foreclose future reconsideration of the use of the instruments. See Taylor, 335 Ill. App. 3d at980. Thus, the State's introduction of evidence of these instruments, in the absence of an objectionand in the face of Swope's initial use of the same type of evidence, is not plain error or per sereversible. We conclude that Swope has procedurally defaulted on this issue, not only by failing topreserve the error for review, but by partaking of the same unsubstantiated evidence in his own case. Any error here is waived.

Swope next contends that the Act is unconstitutional under Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,151 L. Ed. 2d 856, 122 S. Ct. 867 (2002), in that the Act does not require a finding that he hasserious difficulty in controlling his behavior, as is required by Crane. However, this court has rejectedthis same argument in many cases, most recently in People v. Swanson, 335 Ill. App. 3d 117 (2002),and People v. Kastman, 335 Ill. App. 3d 87 (2002). See also Traynoff, 338 Ill. App. 3d at 956-58. We, therefore, decline to revisit this issue.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Ogle County is affirmed.

Affirmed.

GROMETER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.