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November 30, 2001

Cynthia S. was a mental health patient. Her psychiatristfiled a petition pursuant to the Mental Health and DevelopmentalDisabilities Code (Mental Health Code or Code) seeking a courtorder authorizing the involuntary administration of nonemergencypsychotropic medication. 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1 (West 2000). Thematter proceeded to an evidentiary hearing. The trial court foundthat respondent was a person who qualified for the involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication. The trial court entereda preprinted, typewritten order that respondent "shall receivepsychotropic medication (including the necessary lab work andmedical examinations) to be administered by the Illinois Departmentof Human Services for a period not to exceed 90 days, by thosestaff whose license allows them to administer psychotropicmedication pursuant to Illinois law." The order further reflectedthe medications and doses that could be administered. On appeal,respondent asserts that the judgment must be reversed because theorder did not specify the persons authorized to administer themedication. We reverse.

At the outset, we determine that this case is moot. In reNancy M., 317 Ill. App. 3d 167, 172 (2000). The trial court'sorder granting the involuntary administration of psychotropicmedication was entered on July 28, 2000. The terms of the orderlimited the duration of the administration of medication to 90days. This time has since passed. At this point, respondent couldbe forced to take psychotropic medication against her will only ifa new petition were filed and a new hearing conducted. Theoriginal judgment no longer has any force or effect.

However, when a challenged action is of short duration and is" 'capable of repetition, yet evading review,' " it may be reviewedon the merits, even if otherwise moot, if (1) the duration of thechallenged action is too short to be fully litigated prior to itscessation; and (2) there is a reasonable expectation thatrespondent would be subjected to the same action again. In reBarbara H., 183 Ill. 2d 482, 491 (1998), quoting In re A Minor, 127Ill. 2d 247, 258 (1989). Both criteria are satisfied here. Bystatute, psychotropic medication cannot be administeredinvoluntarily for more than 90 days without an additional hearing. 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1(a)(5) (West 2000). This period of time is fartoo brief to permit appellate review. In virtually every case, thechallenged medication orders would expire before appellate reviewwas completed, as occurred here. To apply the mootness doctrineunder such circumstances would deprive recipients of involuntaryadministration of psychotropic medication of legal recourse inchallenging the trial court's orders and render the right to appealas provided by the Mental Health Code a nullity. 405 ILCS 5/3--816(West 2000).

The second requirement to apply the exception to the mootnessdoctrine is also present. Although respondent's current status isnot revealed by the record filed on appeal, it does indicate thatshe was diagnosed with a schizo-affective disorder of a bipolartype and exhibited numerous associated symptoms. Additionally, sherefused to take psychotropic medications and suffered from adeterioration in her ability to function. Given this history, itis reasonable to expect that another petition may be filed againstrespondent in the future. Therefore, we will address the issue onthe merits.

Respondent contends that the trial court's order authorizingthe administration of medications must be reversed because itfailed to name specific individuals authorized to administer themedication as required by section 2--107.1 of the Act. This issuewas considered in In re Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d 1060 (1998). There, the trial court entered an order that unidentified staffmembers at Zeller Mental Health Center or Provena United SamaritansMedical Center were to administer psychotropic medication torespondent for a period not to exceed 90 days. On appeal, thecourt agreed that an order for the administration of involuntarytreatment should designate and specifically name individualsauthorized to administer such treatment. However, the court foundthat respondent failed to preserve such error for review by failingto object when the order was entered, the evidence showed thatrespondent's physician was intimately familiar with his treatment,and respondent did not assert that he was prejudiced by suchomissions.

While we agree with Miller's determination that the ordershould have been more specific, we do not agree with Miller'sconclusion that no prejudice occurred. As in Miller, the recordhere does not reflect that respondent objected to the form of theorder when it was entered. Additionally, from her brief, it doesnot appear that respondent has claimed actual prejudice as a resultof the form of the order. Nevertheless, under the plain errordoctrine, this court may address a waived issue if the evidence isclosely balanced or the error affects substantial rights. 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a); People v. McVeay, 302 Ill. App. 3d 960, 966 (1999).Fundamental liberty interests are involved in the involuntaryadministration of medication for mental health purposes. In reBarbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 498, citing Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S.348, 368-69, 134 L. Ed. 2d 498, 515, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1384 (1996). Because of the important liberty interests involved, we willconsider this issue on the merits under the plain error exceptionto the general waiver rule. See, e.g., In re Rovelstad 281 Ill.App. 3d 956 (1996); In re Len P., 302 Ill. App. 3d 281 (1999).

Section 2--107.1 of the Mental Health Code contains thefollowing requirement for the written court order authorizing theinvoluntary administration of psychotropic medication:

"An order issued *** shall designate the personsauthorized to administer the authorized involuntary treatmentunder the standards and procedures of this subsection (a--5). Those persons shall have complete discretion not to administerany treatment authorized under this Section." 405 ILCS 5/2--107.1 (a)(6) (West 2000).

Here, the preprinted order read, in pertinent portion:

"The petition is granted, and Cynthia [S.] shall receivepsychotropic medication (including the necessary lab work andmedical examinations) to be administered by the IllinoisDepartment of Human Services for a period not to exceed 90days, by those staff whose license allows them to administerpsychotropic medication pursuant to Illinois law."

In Miller, the court explained that the practice ofdesignating specific persons authorized to administer treatmentinvoluntarily on court orders reflects the "legislature's concernabout the 'substantially invasive nature of psychotropic substancesand their significant side effects.' " Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d at1072, quoting In re C.E., 161 Ill. 2d 200, 214 (1994). In thecourt's view, the requirement serves to "ensure that only a limitednumber of designated--and presumably well-trained--individuals willbe able to administer these powerful drugs, pursuant to a courtorder, to an unwilling recipient." Miller, 301 Ill. App. 3d at1072.

We agree with this analysis. The term "administer" asutilized in the Code is broad. Due to the sweeping manner in whichthis term is utilized, it is clear that the legislature intended itto encompass the entire process by which an individual receivesmedication on an involuntary basis, including the act ofprescribing the medication. Requiring the court order authorizinginvoluntary administration of psychotropic medication tospecifically list named individuals authorized to administer suchmedication ensures involvement by a qualified professional familiarwith respondent's individual situation and health status. Byrequiring the order to name specific health case professionalsinvolved in respondent's care, the statute serves to protect theindividual in that only a limited and specific number of qualifiedpersons will provide consent to such treatment on respondent'sbehalf. In our view, this requirement is consistent with thepurpose behind the Code.

In mental health cases, strict compliance with statutoryprovisions is compelling, as liberty interests are involved. TheCode's procedural safeguards are not mere technicalities, butessential tools to safeguard liberty interests of mental healthpatients. In re Janet S., 305 Ill. App. 3d 318, 320 (1999). Thus,procedural safeguards are construed strictly in favor of therespondent. Janet S., 305 Ill. App. 3d at 320. The failure tocomply with procedural rules requires the reversal of court ordersauthorizing involuntary treatment. See In re Michael D., 306 Ill.App. 3d 25, 27 (1999).

Here, the order did not specifically designate individualpersons authorized to administer psychotropic medication torespondent. The order is unduly vague in that it authorizesvirtually anyone with the proper license to administer thepsychotropic drugs, regardless of that person's prior involvementwith or knowledge of respondent's case. The order does not complywith the Code and must be reversed. Were we to conclude that therewas error and no resulting prejudice, we would essentiallyemasculate the portion of the statute in contention.

Nevertheless, the administration of the medication has beenterminated according to the terms of the trial court's order. Aremand is not in order since the proceedings have concluded. A newpetition and hearing must proceed if the State or respondent'sphysician seeks to administer additional psychotropic medication torespondent against her will. Barbara H., 183 Ill. 2d at 498.

The judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is reversed.

Reversed.

GEIGER and CALLUM, JJ., concur.