In re B. L.

Case Date: 07/27/2000
Court: 2nd District Appellate
Docket No: 2-98-1448

27 July 2000

No. 2--98--1448


IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT


In re B.L., a Minor




(The People of the State of
Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee,
v. B.L., Respondent-Appellant).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of Lake County.

No. 97--JD--625

Honorable
Joseph R. Waldeck,
Judge, Presiding.

JUSTICE McLAREN delivered the opinion of the court:

The minor, B.L., appeals from his adjudication as a delinquentminor and ward of the court. We affirm.

On September 25, 1997, the State filed a petition foradjudication of wardship against B.L., alleging that B.L. was adelinquent minor. The petition contained the same address forB.L., his mother, Janice, and his father, George. On the firstcourt date, Janice appeared and told the court that George and shehad not been together for over three years and that she did notknow George's address. The record entry sheet indicates thatGeorge was present in court on the next date. However, no courtreporter was present.

On December 29, 1997, the trial was continued on the State'smotion. Janice was present and told the court that she and Georgewere divorced and that, while she knew that George lived in DesPlaines, he had never told her his address. However, she did havehis telephone number at home. The following colloquy then tookplace:

"MR. NEWSOME [assistant State's Attorney]: Judge, I wouldask if we could amend the petition to change the last knownaddress for the father as DesPlaines [sic], and maybe we couldget a different address. Do you have that he has ever beenpresent in court?

MR. WINEBERG [public defender]: He was here November26th.

MR. NEWSOME: So we do have jurisdiction.

MR. WINEBERG: There was."

After a discussion of supervision of the minor, the followingdiscourse occurred:

"THE COURT: I'll be happy to give you a longer date ifyou want, but the statute--the law requires that a parent bepresent at the time of the trial.

MS. L.: I understand that.

THE COURT: We could try and force your former husband tocome to trial.

MS. L.: Actually, I think if you just asked, to behonest, he probably would come. It's better than me asking,is the problem.

THE COURT: Maybe his public defender--

MR. WINEBERG: Give me the phone number.

THE COURT: So why don't we continue this until Monday,January 26th, and this will be a final date, at 1:30, overdefendant's [sic] objection, and then Janice, if you can getthat number to your son's attorney, maybe he can help you outwith that.

MS. L.: Okay.

THE COURT: Thanks for coming in."

There is no indication that the public defender ever spoke toGeorge.

Several court dates later, the parties still demonstratedconfusion over George's address and status, as evidenced by thefollowing:

"MR. NEWSOME: Is his father George L.?

MS. L.: He was suppose [sic] to be called before, but hewasn't. That is the minor's father.

MR. NEWSOME: Does he have service? Do we have service onhim? Do we know the address of George L.?

THE COURT: 2206 Jethro.

MS. L.: That is not where it is. That is my address."

Eventually, an adjudicatory hearing was held, and the courtfound the petition to be proved. Following a dispositionalhearing, the court imposed a five-year term of intensive probation. The record does not indicate that George was present at either theadjudicatory or dispositional hearing or that George was everserved with a summons regarding this case. The issue of service ofsummons on George was not raised at the dispositional hearing.

B.L.'s only contention is that the trial court lackedjurisdiction to adjudicate him delinquent and enter a dispositionalorder against him because George was never served with the petitionand a summons or given notice of the adjudicatory and dispositionalhearing dates. In juvenile proceedings, due process requiresadequate notice of the proceedings to a minor and his parents,including written notification of the specific charge or factualallegations to be considered at an adjudicatory hearing. In reJ.O., 302 Ill. App. 3d 969, 973 (1999). A delinquency petitionmust provide the names and residences of the minor's parents, and,if these facts are unknown, the petition must so allege. In reD.L., 299 Ill. App. 3d 269, 271 (1998). Noncustodial parentsshould be served personally or by mail whenever possible; however,it is notice to the custodial parent that is crucial. In reL.C.C., 167 Ill. App. 3d 670, 672 (1988). A pleading in a juvenileproceeding that fails to name and notify the necessary respondentsfails to invoke the jurisdiction of the court and thereby rendersits orders void. In re C.R.H., 163 Ill. 2d 263, 271 (1994). However, the lack of notice to a party can be waived. See C.R.H.,163 Ill. 2d at 272-73; In re J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d 129, 136-37(1985). Unless some question is raised in the circuit courtregarding the failure to identify or locate a noncustodial parentwhose identity or address is unknown to the State at the outset ofthe proceedings, the matter is waived, and diligence on the part ofthe State may be assumed. J.P.J., 109 Ill. 2d at 136-37.

Here, the State was put on notice by Janice that George didnot live at the address alleged in the petition. However, neithershe nor the minor knew George's current address. The State askedleave to amend the petition to reflect a different address butnever followed up with any action. It is the State's burden toproperly allege a delinquency petition and give notice to theproper parties, and it failed to give proper notice in this case.

However, the minor's attorney volunteered to try to reachGeorge, and the circuit court directed the minor to give George'stelephone number to the public defender, instead of to the State,in order to get George to attend the next court date. While theState could have been more diligent in its attempts to properlyserve George, the minor did not raise the State's diligence in thecircuit court and even failed to object when the court instructedthe minor and his attorney to find George. This is not so much awaiver as a procedural default wherein the minor and his attorneyvolunteered to act and acquiesced in a procedure that short-circuited the statutory procedures. The minor should not beallowed to appeal based on his own complicity in creating the issuethat he now claims is error.

We also note that on December 24, 1997, B.L.'s attorneyconceded that the court had jurisdiction over George, who hadappeared in court on November 26. Because no court reporter waspresent, we do not know what George said or what he was told. Theappearance of a person named as a respondent in the petition at anyproceedings under the Act constitutes a waiver of service ofsummons and submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 705 ILCS405/5--15(7) (West 1996); In re M.G., 301 Ill. App. 3d 401, 411(1998). However, the Act requires that a copy of the summons andthe petition shall be provided to the person at the time of theappearance. See 705 ILCS 405/5--15(7) (West 1996). While George'sappearance would normally constitute a waiver of service, andB.L.'s attorney conceded that the court had jurisdiction overGeorge, we do not choose to so hold since we do not know what, ifanything, George was told or given on that date and do not wish tohold that the mere entrance into a juvenile courtroom is a waiverof service and a submission to jurisdiction. However, theattorney's concession is another factor in our conclusion that theminor may not now argue that jurisdiction was lacking.

For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of LakeCounty is affirmed.

Affirmed.

RAPP and GALASSO, JJ., concur.