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PRESIDING JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the opinion of the court:

Petitioners, Kevin Bloom and Steven Levin, appeal from the trial court's order dismissing withprejudice their petition for indemnity pursuant to section 21--305 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS200/21--305 (West 2002)). They also appeal from the court's order denying their motion toreconsider. We affirm the order of dismissal, but reverse the order denying the motion to reconsiderto the extent that it did not modify the dismissal with prejudice.

On March 28, 2002, petitioners filed a petition for indemnification from the fund (the fund)held by respondent, the Lake County treasurer, which exists to indemnify qualified persons who havelost properties due to issuance of a tax deed. The petition contained the allegations that follow. Bloom was the owner of record of the property at 34 S. Elmwood Avenue, Waukegan (the property),from "before 1996 through February 28, 2002." Levin was a co-owner of the property by virtue ofa deed made by Bloom at some unidentified time before December 6, 2001. Levin was a "veteranof the Vietnam conflict and a decorated and distinguished soldier with two medals of valor and twopurple hearts [who] suffer[ed] from significant disabilities as a result of gun shot wounds to his rightarm and leg during his service." His disabilities "sometimes hampered [him] in his ability to attendto these matters."

Petitioners paid all property taxes due for the property through December 1997, but made nopayments after that date until December 6, 2001, when they attempted to redeem the property. MLAgents purchased the delinquent taxes for all years in question. The period for redemption of the soldtaxes expired on December 6, 2001. On that date, petitioners arranged to have a cashier's check for$13,000 sent by certified mail to the Lake County collector. Petitioners believed that the mailing ofthis check sufficed to preserve their interest in the property, although they now concede that it wasmailed a day too late for compliance with redemption requirements. Their belief was the result oftheir reliance on the language in the notice they received that stated that " 'Redemption can be madeany time on or before December 6, 2001***.' " (Emphasis added.) On February 28, 2002, the trialcourt, over petitioners' objections, issued a tax deed for the property to ML Agents. This, and othercircumstances, precluded them from seeking relief from the issuance of the tax deed.

Respondent moved for dismissal of the petition pursuant to section 2--615 of the Code ofCivil Procedure (the Code) (735 ILCS 5/2--615 (West 2002)). He alleged that the petition wasdefective in that it failed to plead that the property contained four or fewer units. The motion alsocontained a listing of other allegations petitioners did not plead. For instance, it stated that thepetition did not allege that $13,000 would have been sufficient to make the redemption. It also notedthat petitioners' exhibit A shows that the check by which they attempted the redemption was payableto "Lake County Collector" and was issued to "Gerry Goldman," but that the petition neither refersdirectly to Goldman nor explains his role. The motion further argued that petitioners' attemptedmode of redemption was "negligent and at fault as a matter of law," because the law governingredemption states that a payment is timely only if it either is delivered in person or is mailed no laterthan one day before the expiration of the redemption period. The motion argued that petitioners'belief that their redemption method was proper was "incredible" because the notice sent to themstates that a person can redeem a property "by applying to the County Clerk of Lake County, Illinois,at the County Courthouse in Waukegan, Illinois."

Finally, the motion argued that petitioners had failed to allege facts showing that they wereequitably entitled to relief; nothing in the petition explained why Levin had taken no action before theredemption date, other than a general allegation that Levin had disabilities that "sometimes hampered[him] in his ability to attend to these matters." It further pointed out that the petition provided noexplanation of why Bloom was unable to attend to the taxes. It cited McClandon v. Rosewell, 299Ill. App. 3d 563 (1998), for the proposition that the legislature did not design the fund to compensateproperty owners who have "contribute[d] to the loss of their property." It then claimed that tocompensate petitioners would amount to "tacit approval of conduct which is naive and fiscallyirresponsible," which would be contrary to the requirement of In re Application of Kane CountyCollector, 135 Ill. App. 3d 796 (1985).

In their brief on respondent's motion, petitioners argued that respondent was urging the wrongstandard upon the trial court, but also alleged their ability to amend the petition to address some flawscited by respondent. The trial court heard oral argument on the motion, granted it, and made thedismissal with prejudice. The order of dismissal stated that "[p]etitioners have failed to allege factsthat would rise to the level of relief [sic] under the Indemnity Fund if proven, and amendment wouldnot cure [the] defects found."

Petitioners moved to reconsider the dismissal. The motion alleged that, at oral argument onthe motion to dismiss, the trial court was concerned with whether the property had four or fewer unitsand whether petitioners had tendered funds sufficient to redeem the property. It stated thatpetitioners could prove that the property contained a single-family house and that the check tenderedwas for more than the taxes due. It further alleged that "the Court's primary concern at the time ofthe hearing was the question regarding the mental and physical condition of Co-Petitioner, KEVINBLOOM, it having been established that Co-Petitioner, STEVEN LEVIN, was suffering from mentaland physical disabilities. For that reason, the Court dismissed the Petition with prejudice and did notpermit the Petitioners an opportunity to amend." Finally, the motion alleged that "[s]ubseqent to thehearing, Counsel for the Petitioners has learned that KEVIN BLOOM suffers from recognizeddisabilities such that he, KEVIN BLOOM, is unable to handle matters such as paying a tax bill andrequires STEVEN LEVIN, whose disabilities are not as severe as those suffered by KEVIN BLOOM,to be the only person among the Petitioners capable of handling such matters."

Petitioners argued that, under Hedrick v. Bathon, 319 Ill. App. 3d 599 (2001), theirdisabilities could establish their equitable claim for indemnity. They further argued that the trial courthad apparently engaged in a premature weighing of the facts regarding their disabilities, and that thetrial court had determined that petitioners were at fault, a matter that is not a necessary considerationwhen the award requested is less than $99,000.

Both parties filed briefs, and, after argument, the trial court denied petitioners' motion. Theorder states that the denial is "based on the Court's weighing of the equities and finding that thedismissal was proper." No transcript or other record of this hearing is part of the record on appeal. Petitioners now appeal, arguing, inter alia, that the trial court improperly considered the fault ofpetitioners, that fairness requires that petitioners have the chance to amend the petition, and that thetrial court engaged in an improper "weighing of [the] facts" in ruling on the motion to dismiss andthe motion to reconsider.

We first consider whether the trial court properly granted the original motion to dismiss. Atrial court should grant a motion to dismiss a complaint under section 2--615 of the Code only whenthe allegations in the complaint, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, fail to state acause of action upon which relief can be granted. Oliveira v. Amoco Oil Co., 201 Ill. 2d 134, 147(2002). It should accept all well-pleaded facts and inferences drawn from those facts as true. Oliveira, 201 Ill. 2d at 147. We review a dismissal under section 2--615 de novo. Oliveira, 201 Ill.2d at 147-48.

Indemnity under section 21--305 of the Property Tax Code is potentially available to "[a]nyowner of property sold under any provision of this Code who sustains loss or damage by reason ofthe issuance of a tax deed under Section 21--445 or 22--40 [(35 ILCS 200/21--445, 22--40 (West2002))] and who is barred or is in any way precluded from bringing an action for the recovery of theproperty." 35 ILCS 200/21--305 (West 2002). If a petitioner can meet this basic qualification, heor she can qualify for indemnity in either of two ways. Under the first, which we will call the"equitable entitlement provision," if the petitioner is seeking an award of less than $99,000, he or sheneeds to prove (1) that he or she resided in the property on the last day of the period of redemption,(2) that it contained four or fewer "dwelling units," and (3) that he or she is "equitably entitled tocompensation for the loss or damage." 35 ILCS 200/21--305(a)(1) (West 2002). Under the second,which we will call the "without fault provision," if he or she seeks more than $99,000, he or she mustshow that he or she is "without fault or negligence of his or her own." 35 ILCS 200/21--305(a)(2)(West 2002). When determining whether the petitioner was negligent or at fault, "the court shallconsider whether the owner exercised ordinary reasonable diligence under all of the relevantcircumstances." 35 ILCS 200/21--305(a)(2) (West 2002).

Clearly, petitioners in this case did not set forth the necessary allegations to establish eligibilityfor relief under the equitable entitlement provisions; they pleaded neither that they lived in theproperty nor that it had four or fewer dwelling units. Further, petitioners failed to provide sufficientdetail as to the nature of their claimed equitable entitlement. It appears that in the only reported casesunder section 21--305 in which the trial court refused indemnity to the petitioners without a hearing,the decisions were reversed on appeal (Van Dahm v. Novak, 174 Ill. App. 3d 880 (1988) (summaryjudgment); Mason v. Rosewell, 107 Ill. App. 3d 943 (1982) (failure to state a claim)), such that we have scant guidance as to what constitutes a minimally sufficient petition. Nevertheless, we believethat the petition as submitted was insufficiently specific. Under the equitable entitlement provision,courts must consider the totality of the circumstances and relevant factors, which include mental,physical, or financial status, sophistication and comprehension of responsibilities, and diligence inthose responsibilities. Prince v. Rosewell, 319 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1086-87 (2001). Petitioners havetouched on only one of these factors, Levin's physical disabilities, and this without explaining howthese contributed to his inability to pay his taxes. Although we will not say that the failure to addresssome set of the relevant factors will be fatal, petitioners need to address enough of them to establishthe circumstances upon which they base their claim. A sufficient petition would include at least anoutline of the events leading to the loss of the property and could be expected to require allegationsthat address many or all of the absences noted in the motion to dismiss.

Petitioners also failed to set forth allegations to establish eligibility for relief under the"without fault" provision. The phrase "without fault or negligence," as it is used in section 21--305,is not given its broadest legal interpretation. To do so would make the section meaningless, as anyowner who has lost his or her property by the issuance of a tax deed is to some extent at fault. SeeGarcia v. Rosewell, 43 Ill. App. 3d 512, 517 (1976). In this context, the phrase cannot be taken tomean "blameless." Instead, it is taken to mean that the petitioner "must not have purposefully failedin a duty or engaged in conduct that materially contributed to the problem complained of." Garcia,43 Ill. App. 3d at 517. In Garcia, the reviewing court held the petitioner to be without fault ornegligence, although she had never directly attempted to redeem her property through the countyclerk, had sufficient funds to do so, and had received notices of the impending loss of her property. Garcia, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 514-15, 517-18. The tax buyer had deceived her as to the redemptionstatus of the house by using the tax certificate to persuade her that he already owned it. Garcia, 43Ill. App. 3d at 514. He thus actively dissuaded the petitioner from acting on the official notices. Thereviewing court further held that "she [could not] be held to the highest standard of business conduct"when she was caring for nine children and her dying husband. Garcia, 43 Ill. App. 3d at 517.

Petitioners here have not pleaded any facts or circumstances that might show that theirdefective attempt at redemption was not the result of their fault or negligence. We read Garcia torequire the trial court to consider a petitioner's total circumstances when determining whether apetitioner's failure to follow statutorily prescribed procedure for redemption is negligent or at faultfor purposes of section 21--305. Under such a standard, it would take a far more egregious errorthan petitioners' for us to be able to conclude that they were negligent or at fault as a matter of law. On the other hand, we do not believe that petitioners have shown that the notices they received wereso inherently misleading that no one could be expected to understand what the clerk required. Therefore, petitioners are required to state what circumstances explain their noncompliance.

Petitioners also argue that the trial court erred in making the dismissal with prejudice. A trialcourt should dismiss a complaint with prejudice under section 2--615 of the Code only if it is clearlyapparent that the plaintiffs can prove no set of facts that will entitle them to recover. Illinois GraphicsCo. v. Nickum, 159 Ill. 2d 469, 488 (1994). The decision to deny leave to amend is within the sounddiscretion of the trial court. Cantrell v. Wendling, 249 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 1095 (1993); see alsoClemons v. Mechanical Devices Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 351 (2002). However, the trial court shouldexercise its discretion liberally in favor of allowing amendments if doing so will further the ends ofjustice, and it should resolve any doubts in favor of allowing amendments. Cantrell, 249 Ill. App. 3dat 1095-96. Generally, the trial court should give a plaintiff at least one opportunity to cure thedefects in his or her complaint. See Cantrell, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 1095-96.

Despite the general policy in favor of allowing amendments, we cannot say that the trial courtabused its discretion in this case. Because petitioners, as the appellants, bear the burden of presentinga sufficiently complete record of the proceedings to support their claim of error, we must resolveagainst them any uncertainty arising from the record's incompleteness. See Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984). The record indicates that the trial court held a hearing on the motion todismiss, but we have no record of the hearing itself. The trial court found that "amendment wouldnot cure [the] defects found" in the petition. Although we would not have arrived at this conclusionfrom the record as it stands, we cannot reasonably exclude the possibility that the proceedings at thehearing on the motion to dismiss made this conclusion appropriate.

Respondent argues that certain statements made by petitioners' attorney justified the dismissalwith prejudice. These purported statements are not part of the record on appeal. We admonishrespondent that, pursuant to Supreme Court Rules 321 (155 Ill. 2d R. 321) and 341(f) (188 Ill. 2dR. 341(f)), nonrecord facts have no place in a brief. We remind petitioners that the same applies tothem as well, even if the other party has already violated these rules.

We now turn to the question of whether the trial court erred when it denied petitioners'motion to reconsider the dismissal. When a motion to reconsider is based on the submission ofadditional facts or new arguments, we review a trial court's ruling on the motion under an abuse-of-discretion standard, but, regardless of whether the motion to reconsider presents new facts, we reviewde novo the trial court's application of law to the facts. O'Shield v. Lakeside Bank, 335 Ill. App.3d834, 838 (2002).

Petitioners argue that the trial court decided this motion under the wrong standard. We agree. The order denying the motion states that the denial was "based on the Court's weighing of the equitiesand finding that the dismissal was proper." In determining whether a petitioner is entitled toindemnification under the equitable entitlement provision, the trial court must consider all relevantfactors and the totality of the circumstances. Prince, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 1086. Such considerationis manifestly impossible based on the petition alone. This impossibility redoubles when the petition'sprimary deficiency is its lack of specificity. On this basis, we can also reject out of hand respondent'scontention that, because the trial court has great discretion in determining whether a petitioner isentitled to indemnification, it should be entitled to some similar discretion in determining whether itshould dismiss the complaint. The trial court's discretion is in the weighing of fully developedevidence, not in dismissing cases at the pleading stage.

We further find no other basis upon which we could affirm the portion of the order that makesthe dismissal with prejudice. The other bases proposed by respondent are meritless and dismissalbased upon them would have been an abuse of discretion. Respondent argues that, under the rule inSacramento Crushing Corp. v. Correct/All Sewer, Inc., 318 Ill. App. 3d 571, 577 (2000), whichaffirmed a summary judgment, a motion to reconsider cannot be used to introduce evidence thatshould have been introduced earlier. He argues that on this basis, the trial court should not haveconsidered petitioners' allegations regarding Bloom's disabilities. We are unwilling to apply the ruleof Sacramento Crushing Corp., or any rule from a case decided at an advanced stage, to bar theintroduction of new facts at this early stage of the pleadings. A motion to dismiss under section 2--615 of the Code tests the legal sufficiency of a petition. We do not think that it is appropriate orefficient to require that a petitioner allege every fact that he or she might plead in an alternate formof the petition in response to a motion to dismiss to avoid having it barred from consideration incircumstances such as this. Put another way, we think that the rule of Sacramento Crushing Corp.was intended to require only that allegations and evidence be timely introduced, and that, absentunusual circumstances, allegations introduced after a first motion to dismiss cannot be viewed asuntimely.

Respondent also argues that case law prohibits awards to petitioners who have contributedto the loss of their properties or who have acted naïvely or fiscally irresponsibly. This contention isnot correct if the matter is considered under the equitable entitlement standard, for which, asdiscussed above, the trial court must consider the totality of the circumstances. The two casesspecifically discussed by respondent, McClandon, 299 Ill. App. 3d 563, and In re Application of KaneCounty Collector, 135 Ill. App. 3d 796, are inapposite. In re Application of Kane County Collector,which respondent cites for the proposition that awards are barred by naïve and fiscally irresponsiblebehavior, actually concluded that the petitioner was too sophisticated to be the sort of person thelegislature intended to protect. In re Application of Kane County Collector, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 809-10. McClandon, cited for the bar on awards to those who contribute to the loss of their properties,was decided under the "without fault" standard and so does not apply to consideration of whetherpetitioners have a claim under the equitable entitlement standard.

Finally, respondent argues that, given that petitioners rely on Hedrick, 319 Ill. App. 3d 599,to show their equitable entitlement to indemnification, their attempt at redemption bars their claim. This argument appears to arise out of a failure to grasp how a court should apply a totality-of-the-circumstances standard. The petitioner in Hedrick was essentially homebound because of severeanxiety. A psychologist who evaluated the petitioner opined that she suffered from panic disorder,agoraphobia, and avoidant personality disorder, which interfered with her ability to manage herfinancial affairs. Hedrick, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 603. On her own testimony, she had received propertytax notices, but had put them away because she never felt able to deal with them. However, herfinancial distress was a significant part of the reason she did not pay her property taxes. Hedrick,319 Ill. App. 3d at 602. It appears from the description of the testimony as a whole that the petitionernever attempted to pay the property taxes or redeem the property. The reviewing court held that thetrial court had not abused its discretion in finding her equitably entitled to indemnification. Hedrick,319 Ill. App. 3d at 607-08. While we agree with respondent that petitioners' pleadings show that theydid not suffer disabilities identical to those of the petitioner in Hedrick, we fail to see how thisexcludes the possibility that other disabilities could have contributed to the loss of the property. Further, if petitioners did in fact temporarily overcome disabilities to attempt the redemption, wethink that this could only favor their equitable entitlement to indemnification.

More generally, we think that the overall circumstances in which the motion to reconsider washeard support an exercise of discretion in favor of petitioners. Generally, in furtherance of ourpreference for deciding cases on the merits, trial courts should give plaintiffs at least one opportunityto cure factually insufficient complaints. See Cantrell, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 1095-96. This policyshould be particularly strong when, as here, the authorities provide little guidance as to whatconstitutes a sufficient complaint. Section 21--305 of the Property Tax Code sets out only a fewminimum requirements for eligibility. We can find no published case that lays out the requirementsfor a minimally sufficient complaint. We held in Andersen v. Mack Trucks Inc., 341 Ill. App. 3d 212,219 (2003), that because an area of law was unsettled and the authorities were in conflict, a dismissalwith prejudice of a third-party complaint, the plaintiff's second attempt to plead a claim for spoliationof evidence, was an abuse of discretion. We believe that the situation in this case is analogous. Thetrial court's order denying the motion to reconsider must be reversed to the extent that it retained thedismissal with prejudice.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's initial dismissal of the petition, but reverse that portionof the trial court's denial of petitioners' motion to reconsider that retained the dismissal with prejudice,and we remand the cause to the trial court for further action consistent with this opinion.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded with directions.

McLAREN and BOWMAN, JJ., concur.